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Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders in 
Chinese Listed Companies 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This thesis comprises comparative research, focusing on the legal design 
of minority shareholder protection and the effectiveness of this protection. 
Through comparison with similar legal arrangements in developed 
countries, this thesis aims to find ways to improve minority protection in 
Chinese listed companies. At the heart of this thesis are six main 
contributions. 
 
Firstly, the thesis begins by investigating the possibility of and 
effectiveness of self-protection by shareholders. It is argued that activism 
by institutional investors, rather than individual minority shareholders, 
would eliminate misconduct by management and infringement by majority 
shareholders. In addition, in order to encourage and support minority 
shareholders to become more involved in corporate governance in China, 
this thesis suggests the reinforcement of specific legal institutions for 
minority protection, such as the cumulative voting system and the 
derivative claim. Moreover, the thesis notes that the newly introduced 
derivative claim could provide better protection of minorities if the locus 
standi requirement were lower, and the litigation procedure easier. 
 
Second, this thesis argues that the board of directors is the most important 
participant in corporate governance. A professional and independent board 
of directors can guarantee that corporate decisions are made in the 
interests of all shareholders, including the minorities. With an effective 
board, majority shareholders would have less opportunity to obtain private 
ii 
 
 
benefits by infringing the rights of minorities. Accordingly, the question of 
how to guarantee board independence is the most important concern in 
corporate legal design. This thesis reviews the law concerning 
independent directors in the US, and concludes that the institution of 
independent directors in Chinese listed companies is still immature. If 
current deficiencies were overcome, independent directors in Chinese 
listed companies could help to increase corporate transparency, providing 
minorities with timely and accurate information. 
 
Thirdly, unlike Anglo-American countries, China uses a two-tier corporate 
governance structure, with a board of directors and a supervisory board. 
Although the effectiveness of the supervisory board in Chinese listed 
companies has frequently been challenged, this thesis argues that the 
supervisory board is and will remain the one of the most important internal 
monitors in the Chinese corporate governance structure. It will not be 
replaced easily. Therefore, this thesis suggests that legislators should 
clarify the function and responsibilities of the supervisory board and 
independent directors, and authorize more substantial powers to the 
supervisory board, for the purpose of increasing minority protection. 
 
Fourth, with regard to that unique participant in Chinese corporate 
governance, the party committee of the Chinese Communist Party, this 
thesis argues that it cannot improve corporate efficiency or minority 
protection.  Rather, owing mainly to the mismatch of rights and 
responsibilities in legislation, it has brought about problems related to 
corruption. Therefore, this thesis argues that legislators should restrict the 
involvement of the party committee in corporate affairs, so as to reduce 
the potential for infringement of minority shareholders‟ rights. 
 
Fifth, this thesis also argues that, in order to protect minority shareholders, 
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the existence of a powerful external monitor is equally as important as that 
of an internal one. This study investigates the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and compares it to the Securities & 
Futures Commission in Hong Kong and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the US. The thesis highlights the efforts by the CSRC to 
improve the quality of governance in the Chinese market, and suggests 
that it should go further in increasing corporate transparency and investor 
education, in order to establish a better market environment for minority 
investors. 
 
Finally, this thesis advances a new ideal model of corporate governance 
structure, based on the principle of board-centralization and with a higher 
level of minority protection. The thesis has proposed that listed companies 
be divided into two categories, the competitive area and the non-
competitive area. In the competitive area, the state should begin by 
ensuring a fair competitive market, and eventually quit that market. In the 
non-competitive area, the state should operate companies in the interests 
of both shareholders and social welfare. Furthermore, a three-level 
structure should be established, in which one or more state-owned asset 
management companies are set up as an insulation layer, or alternatively 
a buffer, between the government and the listed companies, in order to 
eliminate undue government intervention. This would make it less likely 
that the rights of minorities would be infringed.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Given the persistent reduction in the demographic dividend, the traditional 
growth pattern, which takes advantage of low labour cost in the 
manufacturing industry, can no longer promote the growth of the national 
economy in China. The capital market, on the other hand, has become 
more and more important to Chinese economic development. 
 
A report by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, dated December 31st, 2010, 
reports the total transaction volume on that exchange as RMB 30.4 trillion, 
placing it 3rd in the world. Financial products traded on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange include corporate shares, corporate bonds, capital funds and 
warrants. With 894 listed companies, the total market value of shares in 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange amounts to RMB 17.9 trillion.1 
 
Accordingly, listed companies are the most important element in the 
Chinese capital market. However, most listed companies in China have a 
distinctive characteristic; unlike their Anglo-American counterparts, they 
are subject to state control, whereby the state holds all or the majority of 
corporate shares, and so dominates corporate decisions. Owing to the 
massive shareholding by the state, corporate governance in Chinese listed 
companies is more complex than is the case elsewhere. Rather than the 
agency cost problem, which is the core issue in the Anglo-American 
corporate governance regime, in Chinese corporate governance the 
problems concern conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholder, 
the state, and the many thousands of minority investors. Therefore, finding 
a means to increase minority protection is a core issue in Chinese 
corporate governance. 
                                                             
1 Bloomberg, 'Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index' (Bloomberg 2012) 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SHCOMP:IND> accessed 23-11-2012. 
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As evidenced by La Porta et al., the infringement of minority shareholder 
rights by controlling shareholders is a phenomenon that exists worldwide.2 
The difference between countries lies merely in the extent of infringement. 
Generally speaking, minority protection is better in developed countries 
than in those that are still developing.3 Therefore, this research examines 
the practical experience of minority protection in developed countries, in 
order to formulate some suggestions specifically tailored to the Chinese 
context, to inform the next stage of reform. 
 
In order to provide a basic understanding of the complexity of Chinese 
corporate governance, this introductory chapter describes the 
shareholding structure of an existing listed company in China. The 
graduated history of Chinese corporate reform, and the problems 
remaining in the current corporate governance regime as highlighted by 
this thesis are introduced in Part 1.2. In Part 1.3, the importance of 
minority protection in the Chinese market is illustrated, while Part 1.4 
provides a brief description of the legal framework in the corporate area. 
The structure of the main body of the thesis is presented in Part 1.5. 
 
1.1 Example of a Chinese Listed Company 
 
Most Chinese listed companies were originally state-owned enterprises. 
During the gradual reform state-owned enterprises partitioned some 
superior businesses to form new legal entities for listing purposes. 
Although those new entities are listed on the two stock markets in China, 
and issue corporate shares to private investors, the listed companies are 
still controlled by the parent enterprise, which hold the greatest proportion 
of corporate shares. Hence the connection between the listed company 
                                                             
2 La Porta and others, 'Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation' (2002) 57 Journal of Finance 1147, 1148. 
3 Ibid. 
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and the controlling shareholder is a historical problem, which cannot easily 
be changed. 
 
As an example of a Chinese listed company, the corporate structure of 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd (Baosteel) and its parent enterprise 
Baosteel Group Corporation (Baosteel Group) is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Corporate Structure of Baosteel Group and BaoShan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd 
(600019)
4 
 
                                                             
4  Information collected from the website of Baosteel Group and structured by the author. 
<http://www.baosteel.com/group_en/> accessed 22-10-2013. 
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The Baosteel Group is currently the largest iron and steel enterprise in 
China. With an operating income of $40.327 billion, the Baosteel Group is 
placed 211th in the top 500 companies worldwide.5 It is a wholly state-
owned company, controlling several subsidiary companies in the iron and 
steel industry, including Baosteel. 
 
In order to develop its global competitive strategy, such as striving for 
overseas resources of ironstone, and in order to undertake mergers and 
acquisitions abroad, Baosteel Group has required huge amounts of 
funding. Consequently, in 2000, Baosteel Group separated its high-quality 
iron and steel business and formed a new stock limited company under 
the Chinese Company Law 1993.6 The new legal entity, named Baosteel, 
has successfully raised capital and been listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. Today, the iron and steel business is operated by Baosteel, 
while other relevant businesses remain under the management of 
Baosteel Group. 
 
Over 74 per cent of corporate shares issued by Baosteel are held by its 
parent company, the Baosteel Group, and between them the top 10 
shareholders hold a total of 76.68 per cent. 7  As the most important 
subsidiary company, Baosteel contributes approximately 70 per cent of the 
total income of Baosteel Group.8 
 
As an example of a Chinese listed company with relatively good corporate 
governance, Baosteel integrates many modern governance techniques, 
including external directors, independent directors, nomination committee, 
remuneration and assessment committee and audit committee. 
                                                             
5 Baosteel homepage, 'Corporate Introduction' <http://www.baosteel.com/group_en/> accessed 24-07-2013. 
6 Ibid. 
7 It is calculated by this thesis through the information disclosure in the website of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. 
8 Baosteel homepage, 'Corporate Introduction' (n 5). 
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Nevertheless, this thesis will highlight some defects, including but not 
limited to: (1) there being too many related party transactions, which would 
work against minority protection; (2) as the actual controller, the 
government intervening in the corporate affairs too often, and (3) the 
decisive influence of the party committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
in personnel affairs hindering the effectiveness of the nomination 
committee. 
 
Using the example of Baosteel, this thesis concludes that the complicated 
situation of corporate governance in Chinese listed companies is a result 
of state control. Control by the state leads to a number of crucial problems, 
specifically: (1) the real owner of shares held by the state is absent, which 
can lead to a serious problem of insider control; (2) corruption; (3) 
uncertainty of corporate goals because the companies take on undue 
public management functions, and (4) most importantly, conflicts of 
interest between the controller and minority shareholders. 
 
According to the Chinese Corporate Governance Index, shown in Table 1, 
in 2011 the average score of corporate governance of 1,950 sample 
companies was 60.28, a slight improvement on the score in 2010, 59.09.9 
However, this thesis notes that not a single company among the 1,950 
achieved quality level of CCGI I or CCGI II, and only 8 reached CCGI III. 
The majority of listed companies scored CCGI IV and CCGI V.10 
  
                                                             
9 Wei-an Li, Chinese Corporate Governance Index (Corporate Governance Research Institution of Nankai 
University 2011), 6. 
10 Ibid 13. 
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Corporate Governance Index Rank 
Corporate Governance Index 
Quality Level 
 
Number Proportion (%) 
CCGI I 90-100 - - 
CCGI II 80-90 - - 
CCGI III 70-80 8 0.41 
CCGI IV 60-70 1070 54.87 
CCGI V 50-60 859 44.05 
CCGI VI 50 and below 13 0.67 
Amount  1950 100.00 
Table 1: Corporate Governance Index Rank 
 
While the quality of governance of Chinese listed companies has been 
improving over the past few years, the existing problems cannot be 
ignored. Instead, those defects make it crucial for China to seek further 
development. Among all the problems in Chinese corporate governance, 
this thesis contends that minority protection is the toughest issue to 
overcome. In order to establish a healthy and fair capital market to support 
the development of the national economy, it is essential that minority 
protection be improved. Therefore, this thesis will focus on this issue and 
attempt to find solutions for the next reform. 
 
1.2 Chinese Corporate Reform 
 
The gradual economic reform relating to the Chinese listed companies can 
be traced back to the 1990s. It had been realized already that tight control 
by the state would block the development of the Chinese national 
economy. However, the political concern for social stability discouraged 
the government from launching a radical reform scheme in the short term. 
Chapter One: Introduction 
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In this section, the history of Chinese corporate reform is reviewed, in 
order to establish a general understanding of how the state became the 
majority shareholder in modern listed companies in China. Specific 
emphasis is placed on the recent reform, namely the split share structure 
reform, which will have fundamental influence on future developments in 
the corporate governance regime in China. 
 
1.2.1 The 1990s 
 
Most of the listed companies on the two stock exchanges in mainland 
China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
have been transformed from former state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
which were set up before the Chinese economic reform. The SOEs 
undertook many public functions, which were fundamental for society at 
that time. Scholars argued that the SOE is not merely a legal-economic 
entity, but also a political entity which involves the political power of the 
Chinese Communist Party. 11  The government desired the SOEs to be 
operated with high efficiency, but not solely for the purpose of wealth 
maximization.12 In other words, chasing profit was not the only goal of 
those SOEs. They should also provide benefits to employees, retired 
workers and their families.13 
 
For example, in the 1990s, some traditional SOEs possessed subsidiary 
businesses or assets such as employees‟ accommodation, hospitals, 
schools and hotels, in addition to the core business. The subsidiary 
                                                             
11 Haizheng Zhang, 'Bankruptcy of State-owned Enterprises and Planned Bankruptcy' in Rebecca Parry, 
Yongqian Xu and Haizheng Zhang (eds), China's New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: Context, Interpretation 
and Application (Ashgate 2010), 296. 
12 Donald C Clarke, 'Corporate Governance in China: An Overview' 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=424885> accessed 22-10-2013, 1. 
13 Rebecca Parry and Haizheng Zhang, 'China's New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives and Principles' 
(2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 113, 117. 
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businesses could cover almost every aspect of an employee‟s daily life. In 
this way, the SOEs could be seen as supporting and governing the whole 
society.  
 
As such, it is not surprising that there existed an extremely close 
relationship between the SOEs and the government, at both central and 
local level. This relationship might include supervision and being 
supervised, supporting and being supported, and cooperation between the 
two counterparties. When the government made public policy, it would 
often delegate some tasks, such as providing funds or exercising 
subordinate management, to relevant SOEs; meanwhile the SOEs would 
seek political support from the government in its day-to-day operations.14 
This support might take the form of tax-exemption, authorizing a special 
qualification for certain businesses or the granting of huge low-interest or 
even interest-free loans from the government-controlled banks.  
 
However, far from creating the desired harmonious win-win situation, this 
cooperation between the SOEs and government actually led to serious 
social problems. As the government continued to add further public 
responsibilities to the SOEs, some public authorities became chaotic, and 
the social welfare system remained under-developed. Meanwhile, the 
SOEs relied too much on political support. The operators of the SOEs 
believed that, as long as they could fulfil the tasks assigned by the 
government, they would continue to enjoy political support and gain profits 
accordingly. Sometimes, these profits related to the personal interests of 
the operators.  
 
As a result of this situation, the SOEs began to face many crises, such as 
                                                             
14 Enterprises with such a benefit-based relationship with government are known as “Red Hat” enterprises in 
the Chinese commercial field. 
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decreased operating efficiency, low competitive strength, and inadequate 
capability to undertake certain responsibilities of public governance. 
According to government statistics, at the beginning of the 1990s more 
than two-thirds of the SOEs were losing money in their operations. 15 
Meanwhile, without sufficient assistance from the SOEs, the government 
could no longer provide political support to SOEs. Therefore, a top-down 
reform of the SOEs was imperative. 
 
1.2.2 State Owned Enterprises Reform 
 
The first round of the SOEs reform, also referred to as „stockholding 
reform‟, aimed to establish a joint stock system for SOEs under the 
Company Law 1993. The SOEs were restructured into Limited Stock 
Corporations, and the state became a shareholder of the new companies.  
 
Furthermore, during this reform, China chose to strengthen its large state-
owned enterprises and keep these under state control, whilst getting rid of 
some smaller firms by selling them off to private investors. This was known 
as the policy of „Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small‟, or „zhua da, fang 
xiao‟.16 
 
However, the first round of reform was little more than a cosmetic exercise, 
and did not bring about any substantial changes. Although the modern 
corporate structure has been built up since that reform, which could be 
regarded as a milestone in the development of Chinese corporate 
governance, the key issue of the over-close relationship between the 
enterprises and government still remained. Independent legal personality 
                                                             
15 Clarke (n 12) 6. 
16 Roman Tomasic, 'Looking at Corporate Governance in China‟s Large Companies: Is the Glass Half Full or 
Half Empty?' in Guanghua Yu (ed), The Development of the Chinese Legal System Change and Challenges 
(Routledge 2010), 8. 
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failed to bring about independent operation, and certainly not the modern 
corporate governance system based on the separation of ownership and 
management. In China, the government acted not only as owner of the 
company, but also as administrator and the regulator of businesses. 
Various governmental authorities intervened in the management of the 
SOEs, frequently and subjectively, which led to poor operating results for 
business entities.17 
 
1.2.3 The Securities Market 
 
During the 1990s, the Chinese government further promoted public listing 
of the stock companies and the development of the capital market. The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) was founded on November 26, 1990 
and opened for trading on December 19, 1990.18 The Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) was founded in the same year on December 1 and 
formally opened for trading on July 3, 1991.19 A large number of SOEs 
went public after converting to limited stock companies to be listed both in 
China and overseas.  
 
An interesting point to note here is that the Chinese capital market has a 
large number of individual investors. The number of investor accounts 
increased from 8.35 million in 1992 to nearly 138 million by the end of 
2007.20 Around 99 per cent of investors are individuals, with less than 
RMB 1 million in cash or shares equivalent. 21  Those individual stock 
investors in China have been nicknamed „stock-citizens‟, meaning citizens 
                                                             
17 Z Jun Lin, Ming Liu and Xu Zhang, 'The Development of  Corporate  Governance in  China' (2007) 28 
Company Lawyer 195, 199. 
18 Official website of the SHSE, <http://www.sse.com.cn> accessed 22-10-2013.  
19 Official website of the SZSE, <http:// www.szse.cn> accessed 22-10-2013 Also see, Xiao Huang, 
'Modernising the Chinese Capital Market: Old Problems and New Legal Responses' (2010) 21 International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 26, 27. 
20 CSRC, China Capital Market Development Report (Beijing: China Financial Publishing, 2008), 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/yjzx/cbwxz/201007/P020100714390847659848.pdf> accessed 22-10-
2013, 195. 
21 Ibid 269. 
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in the stock market. Due to their limited experience of investment and lack 
of reliable information, these minority shareholders are usually silent 
investors, waiting for a free ride in corporate affairs. Hence it could be 
concluded that the Chinese individual minority shareholder is more like a 
speculator who seeks the premium income of share price, rather than a 
real corporate investor who looks forward to a long-term return. The 
average turnover ratio in China‟s stock market is nearly seven times higher 
than those in more mature markets.22  
 
A twenty-year period is not a long developing history for a securities 
market. The New York Stock Exchange was born in 1792,23 and the history 
of the London security market can be traced back 300 years. 24  The 
Chinese security market, therefore, is still in its infancy, and much remains 
to be improved and perfected. 
 
1.2.4 Split Share Structure Reform 
 
Split share structure reform refers to measures to resolve the drawbacks 
caused by split share structure. More specifically, it is a design to 
transform non-tradable shares, listed in mainland China as A-shares, into 
tradable A-shares. Article 2 of the Measures for Administration of Split 
Share Scheme Reform of Listed Companies provides that: 
 
Split share structure reform of listed companies shall refer to 
the processes to eliminate the systematic discrepancy of share 
                                                             
22 Ibid 271. 
23 The New York Stock Exchange traces its origins to 1792, when 24 New York City stockbrokers and 
merchants signed the Buttonwood Agreement. This agreement set in motion the NYSE‟s unwavering 
commitment to investors and issuers. See, < http://www.nyse.com/about/history/1089312755484.html> 
accessed 22-10-2013. 
24 For over 300 years, the London Stock Exchange has produced detailed market information for companies 
and investors. See, <http://www.londonstockexchange.com/products-and-services/rns/history/history.htm> 
accessed 22-10-2013. 
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transfer in the A share market through the consultation 
mechanism for balancing interests between shareholders of 
non-tradable shares and the shareholders of tradable shares.25 
 
The ideas of selling state-controlled shares for cash and withdrawing state 
funding from the market have long been among the aims of Chinese 
economic reform. As indicated by Cooper‟s research, China is pursuing a 
gradualist strategy, slowly but steadily expanding the role of the markets.26 
 
In this section, the reform of split share structure will be investigated in 
detail as a successful case of Chinese reform, in which the interests of 
minority shareholders have been properly considered. This thesis argues 
that it is possible to provide necessary protection for minorities as long as 
the state government approaches this issue in the right way. 
 
(1) The Reasons for Split Share Structure 
At the inception of the Chinese stock market, there was a common 
understanding that the purpose behind it was to raise capital for moribund 
state-owned enterprises.27 At that time, many bank loans had become bad 
debts, due to the poor performance of SOEs. In order to minimize the risks 
to the banking system on one side and to diversify the channels of capital-
raising on the other, the Chinese government was seeking a method other 
than bank loans to pour domestic savings into the SOEs. As reported 
above, Chinese domestic savings at that time represented a tremendous 
capital resource, constituting 40 per cent of China‟s GDP.28 Therefore, if a 
platform designed for capital-raising could be established, for example, the 
                                                             
25 Measures for Administration of Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies (2005), Article 2. 
26 Mary C Cooper, 'New Thinking in Financial Market Regulation: Dismantling the "Split Share Structure" of 
Chinese Listed Companies' (2008) 13 Journal of Chinese Political Science 53, 72. 
27 Ziqiao Chen, 'The Way to Invigorate Enterprises --- Joint Stock System in China' (1998) 3 Fazhi Jianshe 
[Legal Construction] 6, 6. 
28 Q Chen, Securities (China Mechine Press 2003), 161. 
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stock market, SOEs in China would be able to gain a huge amount of 
funding for „free‟.29 
 
However, contrary to the views expressed by Chinese policy makers, 
some scholars question the main function of the capital market. Wu argues 
that in a mature financial environment, the core function of a capital 
market is not to raise extra funds for a company, but to re-allocate the 
existing resources of the company by merger and acquisition. A capital 
market cannot achieve the same efficiency as the commercial banks in 
terms of providing finance, while it does have unique advantages in the re-
allocation of existing resources, because it can provide corporate 
resources with liquidity.30 However, the split share structure took some 
liquidity away from the Chinese capital market and left raising capital as 
the only function. This is why, according to the viewpoint of this thesis, the 
Chinese economic reform has lasted for a decade while little improvement 
in corporate efficiency has been achieved. 
 
While this thesis accepts that the original intention of establishing the 
Chinese stock market was to raise funds for SOEs, 31  it must be 
acknowledged that such reform marked the first occasion on which 
Chinese government loosened the strict control over the state economy. 
Accordingly, the risk of losing control over those companies and the state 
economy was a matter of concern for politicians, who had to deal with the 
ideological issue of whether the re-structure of SOEs would undermine 
state control and ownership, before establishing the stock market.32  
                                                             
29 Compared with bank loans which the interests is compulsory to pay, capital raised from stock market 
belongs to the company and no money should be paid, if the company decides not to deliver a dividend. 
30 Xiaoqiu Wu, 'Guquan Fenzhi Gaige De Ruogan Lilun Wenti [A Certain Theoretical Issues Relating to Split 
Share Structure Reform]' (2006) 2 Finance & Trade Economics 24, 25. 
31 Reviewed by this thesis, the main defect in operating the SOEs was not the inadequacy of funds, but the 
low efficiency owning to the poor corporate governance. Without the improvement of governance quality, 
attracting domestic savings to invest in those moribund SOEs would have no difference to misappropriation 
of minority shareholders‟ assets. 
32 X Gao, 'The Perceived Unreasonable Man --- A Response to Fang Liufang' (1995) 5 Duke Journal of 
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To avoid political risks, government retained a majority of issued shares 
following corporate IPOs, in the form of state shares and legal person 
shares, which could not be traded on the open market. This was intended 
to ensure the state‟s continued dominant control of the listed companies 
and of the whole economy.33 The co-existence of several different groups 
of shares formed the split share structure in the 1990s. 
 
(2) Share-holding Status under the Split Share Structure 
To maintain the state control over companies after listing on the open 
market, corporate shares were classified into different groups on the basis 
of the characteristics of the holders. Different groups of shares had 
different limitations in terms of trading on the stock market. 
 
 
Split Share Structure 
Name of Group Listing Place Trading Currency 
A-Share China Mainland RMB 
B-Share China Mainland HK Dollar/ US Dollar 
H-Share Hong Kong HK Dollar 
N-Share New York US Dollar 
S-Share Singapore Singapore Dollar 
Table 2: Five different groups of shares issued by Chinese companies 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Comparative and International Law 271, 271. 
33 Lee Suet Lin Joyce, 'From Non-tradable to Tradable Shares: Split Share Structure Reform of China's Listed 
Companies' (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 57, 62. 
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Sub Classification of A Shares 
Liquidity Nature of Shareholders 
Non-tradable Shares State Shares Central Government 
Other Levels of Government 
Legal Person 
Shares 
State-owned Enterprises 
Government-Related Entities 
Tradable Shares Normal A-
Shares 
Domestic Individuals 
Domestic Institutional Investors 
Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors 
Table 3: Sub-classification of A shares 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, the non-tradable shares issued by 
companies had a close link with government.  Hence these could be 
deemed „state-controlled shares‟. When approved by the state, non-
tradable shares could be transferred only to other government-related 
entities, such as government agencies or strategic investing companies off 
market. The transfer price was normally based on net book value per 
share, return on equity, return on investment, recent market price, or a 
reasonable price-to-earnings ratio.34 
 
According to figures calculated by the „China Stock Markets Web‟ facility at 
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, dated Oct 24th, 2008, the 
total market capitalization of the two mainland China stock exchanges, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, amounted at 
that time to RMB 11,874 billion,35 while the capitalization of tradable A-
shares was a mere RMB 3,994 billion.36 That is to say, approximately two-
                                                             
34 Fei Lu, Maria Balabat and Robert Czernkowski, 'The Role of Consideration in China's Split Share Structure 
Reform' <SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1284067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1284067> accessed 16-
05-2013, 4. 
35 The total market capitalization is calculated by imputing value to domestic, non-tradable shares, using the 
secondary market price for its tradable A-shares. 
36 Paul B McGuinness, 'An Overview and Assessment of the Reform of the Non-tradable Shares of Chinese 
State-owned Enterprise A-Share Issuers' (2009) 17 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 41, 43. 
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thirds of the A-shares in the Chinese market were controlled by the state. 
 
(3) Defects Caused by the Split Share Structure 
It should be admitted that the Chinese stock market, established just two 
decades ago, has developed rapidly and is now the fifth largest market in 
the world. Nonetheless, the Chinese stock market still faces certain 
problems regarding further development, albeit that the total capitalization 
is tremendous. The split share structure has been widely regarded as the 
root of the problem. In this thesis, three of the main problems created by 
the split share structure will be highlighted, as follows: 
 
 Dysfunction of Pricing of the Stock Market 
The market price of corporate shares under a split share structure can be 
deemed only as the price of tradable shares, in circumstances where the 
majority of corporate shares are not allowed to be traded on the market. In 
other words, the share price on the market does not reflect the actual 
value of the company. This creates a disjunction between the price of 
corporate shares and real corporate performance. The market price of 
corporate shares depends largely on the relation of supply-and-demand, 
rather than the fundamental factors of corporate operation. In other words, 
minority shareholders, or the so-called public investors, who purchased 
the tradable shares could know little about the real operation of the 
company via the fluctuation of share price. As a consequence, without any 
essential changes, the stock market will eventually develop into a 
speculative playground, like a casino. In line with this hypothesis, scholars 
argue that the high turnover ratio for tradable shares before the reform, 
reported as 550%, was evidence of the speculative nature of the Chinese 
stock market, which in general lacked liquidity.37 
                                                             
37 Joyce (n 33) 64. 
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Furthermore, dysfunction of pricing of the stock market would lead to 
difficulty in evaluating the performance of corporate executives. In 
practice, due to the disjunction between the share price and corporate 
performance, term profitability has been used as the main criterion to 
evaluate the performance of corporate management. However, it is 
inappropriate. First, as an accounting index, term profitability is a flexible 
figure which can be adjusted in many ways.38 Secondly, it is very hard to 
determine whether the profit earned now might be at the expense of 
corporate long-term development. 
 
Therefore, the pricing function of the stock market should be restored in 
order to reflect the comprehensive factors of the company, including 
industrial growth ratio, productivity and profitability, as well as the value of 
the managerial team. Under such mature market conditions, the 
performance of corporate executives could be simply evaluated by share 
price on the market. 
 
 Blocking the Establishment of Market for Corporate Control 
The market for corporate control has been widely regarded as an 
important external monitoring institution in corporate governance. Listed 
companies with poor performance or low efficiency would become the 
target of a merger or acquisition. By changing the executive team and 
improving management, target companies might achieve a better 
performance. Moreover, the threat of merger would become an incentive 
for corporate managers to fulfil their duties better.39 
 
                                                             
38 Wu (n 30) 26. 
39 Market for corporate control has been defined as a market in which alternative managerial teams compete 
for the rights to manage corporate resources. In other words, the current managers may be substituted after 
takeover. See Michael C Jensen and Richard S Ruback, 'The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence' (1983) 11 Journal of Financial Economics 5, 6.   
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However, as mentioned above, under the split share structure a dominant 
part of shares in Chinese listed companies could not be traded on the 
open market. Corporate mergers and acquisitions could be achieved only 
by agreement on transferring the shares off the market. In addition, such 
agreement would have to be approved by the government before it could 
be exercised. As such, the effectiveness of the market for corporate 
control as the external monitoring institution in China was totally 
restrained.  
 
Because of such systemic problems, some scholars maintained that 
SOEs‟ reform under the split share structure could be deemed only a 
partial privatization, which would not be able to improve corporate 
performance in terms of profitability and efficiency.40 Similarly, Cooper has 
argued that floating a minority of shares in the market can hardly help to 
improve the governance quality of those companies in practice.41 
 
 Conflict of Interests between the Controlling Shareholder and Minority 
The split share structure created conflicts of interest between the holders 
of non-tradable shares, usually the controlling shareholder, and holders of 
tradable shares, usually the minority investors of the listed companies. 
This is because the two parties held different expectations of corporate 
operations. 
 
On the one side, holders of tradable shares were aware that they would 
have little say in corporate decision making, and could certainly not control 
the company, since the counterpart with the non-tradable shares 
accounted for the majority of corporate issuance. Hence, the most 
common way for tradable shareholders to maximise their returns was 
                                                             
40 G Chen, M Firth and O Rui, 'Have China's Enterprise Reforms Led to Improved Efficiency and 
Profitability for Privatized SOEs?' (2006) 7 Emerging Market Review 82, 82. 
41 Cooper (n 26) 58. 
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through share price inflation. In this way, the company‟s performance and 
profitability would be the most important concerns. However, these issues 
would not be considered so important by the controlling shareholder with a 
majority shareholding of non-tradable shares. 42  In other words, only 
minority shareholders with tradable shares care about the relation 
between corporate performance and market price of corporate shares. 
 
On the other side, holders of non-tradable shares would normally have a 
close relation with the government, a circumstance that has been criticized 
as the key problem, resulting in all sorts of inefficiencies in corporate 
operation.43 Better corporate performance may not benefit the controlling 
shareholder any more than in a dividend acquired from the company. 
However, the majority holder may obtain benefits by taking advantage of 
corporate control, for example by tunnelling the corporate assets or 
through related-party transactions to deliver profits to their parent 
companies. 
 
(4) Two Failures of Attempted Reform Schemes 
The defects of split share structure were realized by policy makers very 
early on. The central government attempted two reform schemes, in 1999 
and 2001 respectively, trying to convert non-tradable shares into tradable 
form and to sell a certain proportion of state-controlled shares for cash. 
Unfortunately, neither of these schemes succeeded. The key reason for 
the failure was the inevitable drop in market price when the quantity of 
tradable shares increased. 
 
 Reform Scheme in 1999 
In late 1999, two listed companies were selected by the government to sell 
                                                             
42 Joyce (n 33) 64. 
43 Andrei Shleifer, 'State Versus Private Ownership' (1998) 12 Journal of Economic Perspectives 133, 133. 
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their non-tradable state shares through the stock exchange. If the pilot 
scheme were to succeed, the government planned to attempt a larger sale 
of non-tradable shares, reducing the shareholding to just over 50 per cent 
of the total corporate issues. This would allow the government to raise 
tens of billions of Reminbi, the Chinese currency, which would be used to 
establish China‟s social security system.44 
 
Since the expectation of the government was to obtain more cash by 
selling the state-controlled shares, they wanted to take advantage of the 
market price for these shares. However, the owners of tradable shares 
insisted that the market price was based on the fact that a huge proportion 
of corporate shares could not be traded freely in the market.45 If the supply 
of tradable shares increased, the market price of tradable shares would 
inevitably fall. Accordingly, the transaction price of non-tradable shares 
should be lower than the market price of tradable shares. Shareholders 
reacted negatively to this scheme. The share price fell dramatically in a 
short period, and therefore, the attempted scheme of reform had to be 
abandoned by the state.46 
 
 Reform Scheme in 2001 
In July 2001, the government set out a new scheme to raise RMB 2.2 
trillion by selling the non-tradable state shares in the market, at the market 
price of tradable shares. Reviewing the Provisional Measures on Raising 
Social Security Funds through Sales of the State-owned Shares, it is 
disappointing to note that no compensation to holders of tradable shares 
was suggested. As a result of negative market reaction, the two stock 
markets in mainland China collapsed, with falls of 43% and 53% on the 
                                                             
44 Cooper (n 26) 58. 
45 Li Liao, Bibo Liu and Jinliang Li, 'Daode Fengxian, Xinxi Faxian Yu Shichang Youxiaoxing [On the Moral 
Hazards, Information Revelation and Market Efficiency: Evidence from the Split-share Reform in China]' 
(2008) 4 Jinrong Yanjiu [Journal of Financial Research] 146, 148. 
46 Cooper (n 26) 59. 
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Shanghai and Shenzhen composite indices respectively. 47  As a 
consequence, the scheme of reform had to be suspended for a second 
time. 
 
(5) The Successful Reform in 2005 
Having learned lessons from the former attempts, the state decided to 
implement a new pilot scheme intended to overcome the deficiencies 
caused by split share structure. 
 
In May 2005, the CSRC announced a pilot scheme, involving four 
medium-sized companies for the first phase. 48  The companies were 
Tsinghua Tongfang, Hebei Jinniu Energy Resources, Shanghai Zi Jiang 
Enterprise Group and Sany Heavy Industry. 49  With the exception of 
Tsinghua Tongfang, 50  these companies completed reform with a 
compensation package in 35 days on average.51 
 
One month later, in the second phase, another 46 issuers started to 
implement the scheme.  Subsequently, all other listed companies were 
required to implement reforms to the split share structure. By the end of 
2007, 1,254 listed companies, over 97% of the capitalization of A-shares, 
had completed the reform.52 
 
 Approaches Adopted in the New Reform 
In order to implement the reform successfully, two new approaches were 
                                                             
47 Chen (n 28) 148. 
48 M O'Neill, 'China State Share Sale Spooks Market: Regulator Names Four Companies to Start Revived 
Scheme' South China Morning Post (10-05-2005). 
49 Andrea Beltratti and Bernardo Bortolotti, 'The Nontradable Share Reform in the Chinese Stock Market' 
<http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2006/NDL2006-131.pdf> accessed 16-05-2013. 
50 Tsinghua Tongfang failed to pass its reform proposal the first time, since the compensation package was not 
passed by holders of tradable shares. See, ibid 3. 
51 Yin-Hua Yeh and others, 'Non-Tradable Share Reform and Corporate Governance in the Chinese Stock 
Market' (2009) 17 Corporate Governance: An International Review 457, 460. 
52 Kai Li and others, 'Privatization and Risk Sharing: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in 
China' (2011) 24 The Review of Financial Studies 2499, 2501. 
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adopted by the CSRC in 2005. 
 
First, with regard to the compensation paid by the non-tradable 
shareholders to those with tradable shares, the 2005 reform adopted a 
hands-off approach, rather than a one-size-fits-all solution. In fact, it would 
be impossible for the CSRC, a government department, to determine the 
compensation packages for listed companies with varied corporate 
backgrounds. A hands-off approach left this issue to the listed companies 
themselves, so that they could establish the most suitable compensation 
package. 
 
Secondly, the principle of protecting the interests of tradable shareholders 
was applied. That is to say, the CSRC put more emphasis on minority 
shareholder protection during the reform. As reported by SinoCast China 
Business Daily News, a total of 340 billion non-tradable shares would be 
involved in the new reform scheme, accounting for 64% of the total 
capitalization of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.53 If this 
amount of shares were to pour into the market, the price of tradable 
shares would come under enormous pressure, and the owners of tradable 
shares would inevitably suffer economic loss. 
 
With political concern that the stability of the stock market was linked to 
the stability of society, and therefore a top priority for the central 
government in China, 54  the CSRC confirmed the necessity of 
compensation paid by non-tradable shareholder to owners of tradable 
shares.  
 
The amount of compensation and methods of payment were to be 
                                                             
53 Lei Ni, 'China's Transfer of State Shares to SSF Under Way' SinoCast China Business Daily News (13-03-
2006). 
54 Joyce (n 33) 65. 
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negotiated between the two parties. Companies could use various forms 
of compensation packages, such as bonus shares, cash, warrants and 
share splits.55 Among these, the offering of bonus shares proved the most 
popular method chosen throughout the reform. An empirical study 
involving 476 companies shows that 436 compensated tradable 
shareholders by offering bonus shares.56 
 
To ensure that the individual investors, who were the minority 
shareholders in most cases, had access to corporate information 
regarding the reform, when issuing the notice of shareholders‟ meeting 
with regard to split share structure reform, boards of directors were 
required to publish an announcement including a letter of opinion from the 
independent directors, an investment bank‟s recommendation, and legal 
opinion.57 In addition, the board of directors was required to establish good 
communication with tradable shareholders by various methods, such as 
conducting conferences or roadshows, within 10 days of issuing the notice 
of shareholders‟ meeting.58  
 
Furthermore, in order to encourage a widespread involvement of minority 
investors, two extra responsibilities were imposed upon the companies: (a) 
the announcement of shareholders‟ meeting should be published at least 
three times; and (b) internet ballot for independent directors to collect 
proxies from tradable shareholders would last not less than five days.59 
 
 Reform Process of a Listed Company 
                                                             
55 Yeh and others (n 51) 458. 
56 Beltratti and Bortolotti (n 49) 7. 
57 Measures for Administration of Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies (2005), Article 9. 
58 Ibid, Article 10. 
59 Takeshi Inoue, 'Reform of China's Split-Share Structure Takes Shape' (2005) 8 Nomura Capital Market 
Review 42, 49. 
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Figure 2: The Timetable for a Company to Implement the Reform 
 
According to Article 5 of the Measures for Administration of Split Share 
Structure Reform of Listed Companies: 
 
all non-tradable shareholders of a listed company shall in 
principle reach a consensus before they propose a motion on 
the split share structure reform. In case a consensus cannot 
be accomplished, such a motion may be proposed by a 
shareholder/shareholders holding individually/collectively two-
thirds of the non-tradable shares of the listed company.60 
 
Once drafted, the reform proposal would be sent to the stock exchange to 
check the feasibility of the scheme.61 Share trading would be suspended 
on the day of the reform proposal and disclosure of the shareholders‟ 
meeting.  
 
                                                             
60 Measures for Administration of Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies (2005), Article 5. 
61 Yeh and others (n 51) 459. 
(1) 
•Drafting the Proposal by Board of Directors in accordance with the Consensus Reached by Non-tradable 
Shareholders 
(2) 
•Approved by Stock Exchange 
•Announcing the Proposal and Negotiating with Tradable Shareholders 
•Trading Suspended 
(3) 
•Disclosing the Negotiation Results 
•Trading Resumed 
(4) 
•Registration  for Shareholders' Meeting 
•Trading Suspended 
(5) 
•Voting on the Meeting 
•Releasing the Voting Outcomes 
•Trading Resumed 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Page 26 of 415 
 
During the following 10 days, non-tradable shareholders and the board 
members would communicate with tradable shareholders in order to reach 
consensus. If the proposal obtained acceptance by both parties, an 
announcement would be made and share trading would be resumed.62 
 
The share trading would be suspended for a second time when 
registration for the shareholders‟ meeting began. With regard to that 
meeting, the proposal of reform, including the compensation package, 
would need to satisfy the requirements in the Measures for Administration 
of Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies, whereby: 
 
The reform plan of a listed company shall be approved by 
shareholders with at least two-thirds of voting shares at the 
relevant shareholders‟ meeting. Such a reform plan shall also 
be approved by the tradable shareholders owning at least 
two-thirds of tradable voting shares at the relevant 
shareholders‟ meeting.63  
 
If the proposal were to be vetoed in the shareholders‟ meeting, no new 
proposal could be presented for voting within 3 months. 
 
Even after the reform proposal had been approved by tradable 
shareholders, a 12-month lock-up would be imposed before those new 
tradable shares, converted from former non-tradable shares, could be 
traded freely in the market. In addition, no more than 5 per cent of 
corporate shares could be traded on the open market within the first year 
after the lock-up period by those holders of formerly non-tradable shares 
holding more than 5 per cent of corporate shares. Another 5 per cent 
                                                             
62 Ibid. Once the proposal had been accepted by both parties, it could not be modified before voting in the 
shareholders‟ meeting. Anyone opposed to such a proposal could only vote against it in the meeting. 
63 Measures for Administration of Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies (2005), Article 16. 
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limitation would be applied within the second year after the lock-up 
period.64 
 
(6) The Significance of Split Share Structure Reform 
Some scholars believe that the success of many other reforms in the 
Chinese capital market depends to a large extent on the achievement of 
split share structure reform.65 The success of this reform could help to 
achieve four major improvements: (a) perfecting the pricing mechanism of 
the capital market; (b) establishing the market for corporate control over 
listed companies; (c) promoting the further reform of state-owned or state-
controlled enterprises in terms of corporate governance structure; and (d) 
achieving the corporate target of maximizing the shareholder value.66  
 
To complete treatment of this issue, it is worth mentioning the following 
points. 
 
First, like many other reforms in Chinese corporate governance, the split 
share structure reform is an example of top-down policy change. The 
state, in particular the central government, played a decisive role in the 
process. In order to achieve the success of the proposed reform, central 
government brought pressure to bear on different sectors, including:  
 
(a) Pressure on the listed companies through the administrative powers of 
the CSRC. Listed companies which had not implemented the reform 
successfully would not be allowed to raise capital or participate in any 
of the new derivatives pilot schemes, 67  while those that had 
                                                             
64 Ibid, Article 27. 
65 Joyce (n 33) 58. 
66 Opinions of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council on Performing the Work of Pilot Reform of Equity Division 
<http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n258222/n259203/11661185.html> accessed 13-12-2013. 
67 Joyce (n 33) 68. 
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implemented reform successfully would be given priority by the CSRC 
to raise new capital in the stock market.68 In other words, losing the 
support of the government would lead to an even bigger financial cost 
in business operations.  
 
(b) Direct or indirect influence on corporate leaders in companies holding 
non-tradable shares, which are normally formed as wholly state-owned 
companies or state-controlled companies. Owing to the tight relation 
between the business entities and the state, government usually has a 
big say in the companies‟ personnel issues. Therefore, it would not be 
sensible for corporate leaders to act against the will of their patron. 
Instead, they would complete the reform at all costs so as to gain 
political credit. As evidenced by scholars, state-controlled owners of 
non-tradable shares offered a relatively high compensation ratio to 
tradable-share holders, so that negotiations could be completed 
smoothly and speedily.69 
 
(c) Pressure on the institutional shareholders. Reviewing the 
administrative document issued by the state, it is evident that direct or 
indirect pressure was placed on institutional shareholders in the 
Chinese market to promote the success of split share structure 
reform.70 This would impact negatively on the development of a fair 
market and, in particular, minority protection. 71  The threshold of 
                                                             
68 Beltratti and Bortolotti (n 49) 3. 
69 Michael Firth, Chen Lin and Hong Zou, 'Friend or Foe? The Role of State and Mutual Fund Ownership in 
the Split Share Structure Reform in China' (2010) 45 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 685, 687. 
70 Opinion VI of Opinions of the China Securities Regulatory Commission of the State Council on 
Performing the Work of Pilot Reform of Split Share Structure provides that „the institutional investors shall 
play positive roles in the reform…with respect to those who manipulate the voting result as a result of 
shareholders‟ meeting with other shareholders by right of shareholding preponderance and disturb the normal 
decision-making of other shareholders, the CSRC shall investigate‟. 
71 Although the institutional shareholder is one of the minority shareholders based on their shareholding 
percentage, however, it is different from other individual minority shareholders. Institutional shareholders 
noticed here refer to those mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, banks and QFIIs, who invested 
in the Chinese capital market. More details could be found in Chapter Two of this thesis. The individual 
minority shareholders refer to those so-called “stock-citizens”, mentioned on page 11 of this thesis. The 
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approval by two-thirds of shareholding of the tradable shares would be 
easy to achieve with the help of institutional investors of the company, 
and therefore, the minority individual investors would be denied any 
say on the compensation issue. Indeed, most institutional investors 
chose to stand with the government,72 thus avoiding likely indirect cost, 
including but not limited to the possibility of losing access to crucial 
insider information, and the negative impact on their relationship with 
the government.  
 
Secondly, some scholars have argued that the listed companies in the 
Chinese market have achieved full liquidity of corporate shares and 
completed privatization entirely through the split share structure reform.73 
This thesis takes a contrary view. The Chinese capital market, as defined 
in this thesis and elsewhere, was not established to promote privatization 
of the state-controlled economy, but to reinforce the ability of the state to 
allocate capital.74 
 
Although the state announced that the reform of split share structure had 
been implemented successfully, it is disappointing that there was no large 
scale privatization. McGuinness has confirmed this in his research, which 
found little evidence of significant disposals amongst the largest and most 
strategic of the former holders of non-tradable shares. 75  The majority 
shareholders kept their dominant position of corporate control with a 
relatively lower shareholding (51.7 per cent), compared with the figure 
before the reform (62.4 per cent).76 However, given the liquidity of their 
                                                                                                                                                                       
difference between the institutional shareholders and individual shareholders will also be investigated in 
detail in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
72 Theoretically, institutional investors, such as mutual funds, should align with the interest of individual 
shareholders with regard to the compensation package. However, recent research has found that this was not 
the case. See, Firth, Lin and Zou (n 69) 686. 
73 Joyce (n 33) 60. 
74 Cooper (n 26) 54. 
75 McGuinness (n 36) 41. 
76 Yeh and others (n 51) 458. 
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shares, controlling shareholders would be able to choose a diverse 
investment portfolio and to acquire more benefits. What should be noted 
here is that the market administrator would face new challenges owing to 
the increased possibility of inside trading or manipulation of share price by 
controlling shareholders.77 
 
Nonetheless, the split share reform did at least reflect the attitude of 
policymakers that state control over the market-oriented economy would 
be more or less relaxed.78 Jiang et al. affirm this conclusion with their 
research finding that the increase in the tradable share proportion and 
decrease in the government-owned share proportion, regardless of the 
size of those changes, have influenced corporate performance positively.79 
 
Thirdly, this thesis notes that in this third attempt at reform, proper 
attention was paid to the interests of minority shareholders. Scholars 
estimate that through the split share structure reform, total shareholder 
wealth has been increased by approximately 8%.80 Given the bear market 
that prevailed for almost a decade, it was, at least, a good opportunity for 
individual minority investors to realize their investment in the Chinese 
stock market. Research by Lu et al. provides comprehensive evidence on 
the impact of the split share structure reform, and indicates that the 
consideration paid by the former non-tradable shareholders to the tradable 
shareholders was usually fair and reasonable. 81  At least, there is no 
evidence to show that the interests of the minority shareholders were 
harmed by the arrangements in the implementation of the split share 
structure reform. 
                                                             
77 Ibid 460. 
78 Cooper (n 26) 54. 
79 Bing-Bing Jiang, James Laurenceson and Kam Ki Tang, 'Share Reform and the Performance of China's 
Listed Companies' (2008) 19 China Economic Review 489, 491. 
80 Beltratti and Bortolotti (n 49) 15. 
81 Lu, Balabat and Czernkowski (n 34) 2. 
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According to Wu, in the long run this reform provides the possibility of 
eliminating the conflict of interest between the majority shareholder and 
minorities, by sweeping away the problematic system design. 82  He 
believes that all shareholders would have similar interests, pursuing better 
corporate performance, based on the greater liquidity of corporate shares. 
The controlling shareholder would put more emphasis on corporate 
competiveness in the market, rather than tunnelling corporate assets or 
infringing the rights of minority counterparts. Therefore, improper related-
party transactions would reduce in both amount and scale, since the loss 
of the listed company has a direct link to the asset value of the controlling 
shareholder.83 
 
Nevertheless, other researchers have expressed some doubts. They 
question whether the holders of tradable shares, especially the individual 
minority investors, have the capability to calculate the negative impact on 
their share price of floating such a large amount of non-tradable shares.84 
Therefore, minorities should have been provided with more reliable advice 
by consultants.  
 
Furthermore, disappointing cases have been exposed in which non-
tradable shareholders failed to fulfil their commitments in the reform 
proposals. For example, some controlling shareholders promised to buy 
back shares if the market price dropped to a certain level, but failed to do 
so. Shanghai‟s Baoshan Iron & Steel Co. was an example.85 Even worse, 
administrative bodies, such as the CSRC, did nothing to protect the 
                                                             
82 Wu (n 30) 27. 
83 Ibid 30. 
84 Joyce (n 33) 70. 
85 , 'Guquan Fenzhi Gaige: 2006 Nian Jiang Yinglai Juezhan [Split Share Reform: 2006 Will Greet an All-
Decisive Battle]' <http://news3.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2006-01/08/content_4024114.htm> accessed 18-05-
2013. 
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interest of minorities involved in the reform, although the relevant 
administrative documents had granted them power to do so.86 Therefore, 
in line with the conclusion of an empirical research by Yeh et al., the split 
share structure reform did not entirely resolve the conflict of interest 
between controlling shareholders and the vast number of minorities.87 
 
Notwithstanding these critical concerns, this thesis still defines the 2005 
reform as an important example of a win-win situation which benefited the 
state while also protecting the interests of minorities. Providing better 
protection to minority shareholders need not inevitably be at the expense 
of the state economy, as long as a proper approach is chosen. 
 
1.3 Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders in China 
 
As has been mentioned, the key issue of corporate governance in Chinese 
listed companies is the conflict of interest between the controlling 
shareholder and minorities, rather than the agency cost problem as in the 
Anglo-American countries. The problem is mainly a result of the 
concentrated shareholding structure. Listed companies in mainland China 
are normally controlled by the state, which holds the majority of corporate 
shares, leaving little say to the minority shareholders. 
 
In research on minority shareholder protection in China‟s top 100 listed 
companies, Tomasic and Andrews point out that the actual situation of the 
minority shareholder is much weaker than it should be, according to the 
law and announcements made by the government.88 In addition, among all 
                                                             
86 Article 50 of the Measures for Administration of Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies 
provides that: „In the event that any shareholder who has made commitments in the split share structure 
reform fails to fulfill his commitments, any stock exchange shall condemn and adopt relevant administrative 
and regulatory measures; if such shareholder causes damages and losses to the legitimate rights and interests 
of any other shareholder, he shall bear the relevant legal liabilities according to law.‟ 
87 Yeh and others (n 51) 472. 
88 Roman Tomasic and Neil Andrews, 'Minority Shareholder Protection in China‟s Top 100 Listed 
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kinds of stakeholders in Chinese listed companies, including all the 
shareholders, the state-owned majority shareholder, or the government, 
receives the top priority in the corporate decision-making context. 
Consideration of the interests of banks, creditors, and employers 
sometimes is given prior to consideration of the minority shareholders.89 
 
Minority shareholders are in a weak position in the Chinese corporate 
governance structure. Compared with the majority shareholder or 
controlling shareholder, this thesis notes that minorities suffer or might 
suffer from three kinds of disadvantage in current market circumstances: 
 
First, minorities have little access to crucial corporate information. While 
the controlling shareholder can keep himself updated through corporate 
executives appointed by him, with the exception of institutional investors 
most minority shareholders are unable to acquire timely and accurate 
information on how the company is running. 
 
In recent years, the CSRC has put great emphasis on information 
disclosure in Chinese listed companies. Yet, while the accuracy of 
disclosed information has improved, this thesis believes what has not 
been disclosed might be more important. Thus, ensuring minorities have 
access to all important corporate information, information that is both 
timely and accurate, is one of the key issues of minority protection 
addressed by this thesis.  
 
Secondly, it is difficult for minority shareholders to participate in corporate 
operations. In line with the traditional majority rule, majority shareholders 
in Chinese listed companies are able to influence any corporate proposals 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Companies' (2007) 9 The Australian Journal of Asian Law 88, 88. 
89 Ibid 111. 
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in favour of their private interests by voting in the shareholders‟ meeting, 
especially on the issue of electing directors. In contrast, minority investors 
have little say during the decision-making process, even if they act jointly. 
 
Therefore, finding a means by which the law can provide special powers 
regarding corporate operations to minorities, for example by introducing a 
special voting mechanism or providing particular rights, becomes another 
important issue for this thesis. Under such reforms, corporate decisions 
would be no longer at the cost of minorities‟ interests, but in the interests 
of shareholders as a whole. 
 
Thirdly, minorities in Chinese listed companies are not likely to receive as 
much investment return as the majority shareholder. As argued by this 
thesis, there are two main methods for shareholders to realize their 
investment: dividends paid by the company, and increases in share 
premiums. In theory, these two kinds of benefit depend on a good 
corporate performance. However, the interests of majority shareholders in 
Chinese listed companies are not exactly the same as those of minorities. 
More specifically, a controlling shareholder may not always rely on better 
corporate performance to satisfy his interests, including financial benefits 
and non-financial benefits such as public governance targets. Accordingly, 
the benefits which should be acquired by minorities might be denied. 
 
Hence, the question of how legislation regarding corporate governance 
can prohibit the controlling shareholder from abusing corporate control to 
pursue private benefits, and exclude those concerns not necessary for 
business operation (in the interests of all shareholders),90 will be another 
                                                             
90 This thesis argues that most Chinese listed companies in competitive areas should not bear any unnecessary 
operation target, for example, taking responsibility for public management. The interests of other 
stakeholders, such as employees or creditors, would be regarded as a part of shareholders‟ interests in the long 
term. 
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key issue in this research. 
 
In addition, two questions need to be discussed: (1) why the interests of 
the controlling shareholder differ from those of minorities; and (2) why 
policy makers should have special concern for minority protection, 
especially when listed companies are controlled by the state. 
 
1.3.1 Conflict of Interest between Controlling Shareholder and 
Minorities 
 
The issue here is to identify the reason why the interest of the majority 
shareholder can deviate from that of minority shareholders. Generally 
speaking, there are two approaches of investment return for both the 
majority and minority shareholders: dividend from the company and 
share.91 If this is the case, both the majority shareholder and the minority 
ones, regardless of how many shares they actually hold, should have the 
same underlying interest, even where each is in pursuit of his own ends. 
This is because each shareholder can benefit when the company receives 
more income and when the price of shares increases in the stock market, 
while if the company performs poorly, fewer dividends will be paid to 
shareholders and the share price will drop accordingly.  
 
Unfortunately, however, deviation between the shareholders certainly does 
exist. In this thesis, three main reasons for this situation will be highlighted, 
as follows: 
   
(1) The natural motivation for the majority shareholder to infringe the rights 
of minority shareholders. 
                                                             
91 Shaobo Liu, 'The Paradox of Private Benefits of Control and Excessive Benefits of Control:A New 
Theoretical Explanation of Large Shareholders' Expropriation of Small Ones' (2007) 2 Economic Research 
Journal 85, 86.  
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According to the research of Shleifer and Vishny in 1997,92 and that of 
Pagano and Roell in 1995,93 the controlling shareholder would be able to 
take advantage of the controlling power to infringe the rights of dispersed 
minority investors. This might be done via legal means, or by means that 
could hardly be called illegal. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (LLSV) argued in 1998 that the most important problem had been 
changed from one of agency to how to constrain the majority shareholder 
from exploiting the interests of the minority shareholders.94 One year later, 
LLSV published further research of ownership structure of large 
companies in 27 countries or areas around the world. After identifying 
every ultimate controller, they reached the conclusion that, except in those 
countries whose legal protection of minority shareholders was already 
developed, such as the UK and the US, in general there was a pyramidal 
ownership structure.95 Such an ownership structure, this thesis argues, 
would provide the controller with a natural motivation to infringe the rights 
of minorities. 
   
It is not difficult to see the difference between the majority‟s control and 
dividend rights. The following example illustrates the situation: X holds 
100% of the shares in company A, and company A holds 51% of the 
shares in company B. Theoretically speaking, when a shareholder owns 
over 50% of the shares of a certain company, he would be able to control 
this company completely. So in the above case, X would be able to control 
company A and company A would be able to control company B entirely. 
                                                             
92 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 The Journal of 
Finance 737. 
93 Marco Pagano and Ailsa Roell, 'The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and 
the Decision to Go Public' (1998) 113 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 187. 
94 Florencio López de Silanes and others, 'Law and Finance' (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113, 
1151. 
95 Pyramidal Ownership Structure is talking about the controller behind the controlling shareholder. One of 
the aims of this research is to identify the ultimate power of control and cash flow right. See, Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 'Corporate Ownership around the World' (1999) 54 The 
Journal of Finance 471, 511. 
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As such, company B is actually controlled by X. However, if we focus on 
the X‟s control rights and dividend rights in company B, we see that with 
51% of the shares, X has 100% control. That is to say, X receives 
complete control through a 51% investment. This is what this thesis refers 
to as the natural motivation of infringement by the majority shareholder. 
   
Furthermore, under the pyramidal ownership structure, this deviation could 
be even more skewed. Using the above example, if company B holds 51% 
of shares in company C, we can conclude that X would be able to fully 
control company C with (100%×51%×51%=)26% of the shares. Some 
further empirical researches by LLSV in 1999 showed that the higher the 
deviation that exists, the greater the possibility that the majority 
shareholder will infringe the rights of minorities, and the more serious will 
be the level of infringement.96  
     
This deviation between control rights and dividend rights can explain why 
the majority shareholder sometimes takes a different view from that of the 
minority shareholders. However, it should be mentioned here that legal 
protection of the minority shareholders reduces the natural motivation of 
the majority shareholder to infringe the rights of the remainder.97 
 
(2) Benefits of corporate control 
Corporate control refers to the right to influence the day-to-day operation 
of the company. It could be acquired either based on the ownership on 
some other basis. In either case, the controlling power could have effect 
on the structure and the effectiveness of corporate governance, and then 
impact upon the market value of the company. The benefits derived from 
such determinant controlling power can be termed the benefits of 
                                                             
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
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corporate control.98  
   
Benefits of corporate control can be classified into two kinds. On the one 
hand, if the controlling power is beneficial to all the shareholders of the 
company, such benefits can be termed „Public Benefits of Control‟.99 All 
shareholders are capable of sharing these benefits according to the share-
holding proportion they own. However, if the controlling power benefits 
only the majority shareholder, such benefits can be termed „Private 
Benefits of Corporate Control‟.100  
 
In the Chinese context, the majority shareholder exercises his controlling 
power only for the purpose of maximizing his self-interest, rather than the 
interests of company members as a whole. This can be achieved, for 
example, by tunnelling or related-party transactions. 101  The minority 
shareholders in the company are not capable of sharing such interests 
with the majority. In some cases, the reasonable interests of the minority 
shareholders would be sacrificed or infringed by the majority shareholder 
on account of his profit maximizing.  
   
Nevertheless, some scholars argue that it is acceptable for the controlling 
shareholder to enjoy the benefits of corporate control, to some extent.102 
They assert that the cost borne by the majority shareholder of acquiring 
and maintaining corporate control cannot be ignored or taken for granted. 
Indeed, there exist some costs, including paying a premium to the former 
                                                             
98 Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, 'Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison' (2004) 59 
The Journal of Finance 537, 537. 
99 Research Centre of Shanghai Stock Exchange, 'Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili Baogao (2009): Kongzhiquan 
Shichang he Gongsi Zhili [China Corporate Governance Report (2009): Market for Corporate Control and 
Corporate Governance]' <http://doc.mbalib.com/view/034fe9d78734449baae3a2d74de62972.html> accessed 
22-10-2013, 67.  
100 Ibid. 
101 Tunnelling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling 
shareholders. Simon Johnson and others, 'Tunnelling' 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w7523.pdf?new_window=1> accessed 22-10-2013, 1. 
102 Liu (n 91) 86. 
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controller, facing more risks than the minority shareholders owing to 
relatively concentrated investment, 103  bearing more responsibilities of 
supervision and social concerns and/or losing the opportunity for multiple 
investments.104 On the basis of these costs, it has been argued that the 
benefit of corporate control is an appropriate consideration for the majority 
shareholder. In other words, it can be regarded as a profit return of 
investing in a controlling stake. 
 
However, this thesis argues that such a defence cannot sufficiently justify 
the benefits of corporate control. Acquiring a controlling stake in the 
company enables the majority shareholder to determine the decision 
making in the interest of the shareholders rather than the directors or the 
other stakeholders. Consequently, the risks of investment could be 
controlled at a lower level and the profit-returns could be maximized for 
the shareholders as a whole. Therefore, a further conclusion would be that 
the public benefits of corporate control could be regarded as a kind of 
reasonable investment return for the controlling shareholder, whereas the 
so-called private benefits of corporate control should be prohibited by law, 
in order to protect the interests of the minority shareholders and the other 
stakeholders. 
 
The facts show, however, that the private benefit of corporate control 
exists widely among Chinese listed companies, due to the imperfections of 
legal regulations and insufficient supervision by the government. Taking 
related-party transactions as an example, during the financial year 2006 to 
2007 there were 6,114 transactions defined as related-party transactions, 
496 of which were classified as potentially beneficial for the listed 
company because it received cash, loans or guarantees from the related 
                                                             
103 Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn, 'The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences' 
(1985) 93 Journal of Political Economy 1155, 1159. 
104 Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford University Express 1995), 95. 
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party, whereas 5,618 of these transactions were considered as potentially 
harmful.105 In other words, infringements of the minority shareholders by 
the majority, via use of the controlling power, are frequent and serious in 
Chinese listed companies.   
 
(3) The absence of the real owner of the listed companies controlled by the 
state 
Another reason for the current contradiction between the majority 
shareholder and the minority ones is the absence of the real owner where 
the owner is the state. As argued by this thesis, this issue is the distinctive 
agency cost problem in the Chinese political and economic environment.  
   
It will not be difficult to find that the real investor of Chinese state-
controlled companies is absent for extended periods. According to Article 7 
of the Constitution of the People‟s Republic of China:  
 
The state economy is the sector of socialist economy under 
ownership by the whole people; it is the leading force in the 
national economy. The state ensures the consolidation and 
growth of the state economy.106 
 
Meanwhile, the Real Right Law of the People‟s Republic of China states 
that „as regards the properties that shall be owned by the state as 
provided for by law, they shall be in the ownership of the state, that is, 
owned by all the people‟.107  
 
However, the term „all the people‟ is an ambiguous one when trying to 
                                                             
105 Henk Berkman, Rebel A Cole and Lawrence J Fu, 'Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder 
Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China' (2011) 45 Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 1391, 1403. 
106 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Article 7.  
107 Real Right Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 45. 
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determine the real investor or the real subject to exercise the rights as a 
shareholder, since it is obviously impossible for all the citizens of China to 
be involved in corporate operations. The only official representative of all 
Chinese people is the state, the People‟s Republic of China. 108 
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the jurisprudence of International 
Public Law, the state is an abstract concept, comprising three elements: 
territory, sovereignty and residents. Hence, there must be another agent 
below the state, to perform the rights and obligations on behalf of the 
state.109  
   
In 2009, the State-owned Asset Law of the People‟s Republic of China 
came into force, clarifying that the State Council of China is the general 
agent of state ownership.110 However, the State Council is just one link in 
the chain of agents of those listed companies controlled by the state. 
Figure 3 gives an example to show the whole agent chain from the 
beginning, a normal citizen A, to the end of the chain, the director in a 
listed company controlled by the government. 
                                                             
108 Article 2 of Constitution of the People‟s Republic of China ensures the right for people to exercise state 
power via the National People‟s Congress and the local people‟s congresses at different levels.  
109 Research Group of East China University of Political Science and Law, „Research of Optimizing the 
Management of the State Assets and Corporate Governance of Listed Companies Controlled by State-owned 
Companies (2010)‟, available on the website of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
<http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/home/home.shtml> accessed 27-01-2012.  
110 Article 3 states that the State Council shall exercise the ownership of state-owned properties on behalf of 
the state. Law of the People's Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, Article 3.  
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Figure 3: Agent Chain in China 
 
When investigating each link of the agent chain, it should be noted that 
except for the director of the company, none of the interim agents, whether 
a deputy to a certain level of People‟s Congress or the State Assets 
Administration Committee, is able to gain any personal interest in the light 
of legal regulations. Such agents without direct claims on the company will 
not be sufficiently motivated to maximize the interests of the principals, 
because they will not be able to obtain any further profits on the basis of 
their performance. As such, a national majority shareholder, the State 
Assets Administration Committee for example, may not act as an ordinary 
shareholder, seeking better performance and profits, in the decision 
making of the company. Instead, public interests of concern to the 
government sometimes take priority over the benefits of the shareholders, 
thus causing inevitable contradiction between the majority and minority 
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shareholders. 
 
1.3.2 Reasons to Improve Minority Protection 
 
Since most listed companies are controlled by the state, what is the 
rationale to reinforce minority protection, which might negatively affect the 
vested interests acquired by the state? In the view of this thesis, improving 
minority protection is a necessary requirement of the gradual reform to 
maintain the sustainable development of the national economy and finally 
achieve the transformation to a market-oriented economy. 
 
According to LLSV, the level of investors‟ protection can determine the 
capacity of the financial market, especially in developed countries such as 
the USA or the UK.111 This finding has been widely cited and approved 
over the past decade. If the legal protection of investors could be 
engineered and maintained at a higher level, such investors would suffer 
less anxiety, and more capital would be introduced into the financial 
market. Meanwhile, the blooming of investment would lead to 
diversification of financial products and promote the economy as a whole. 
In this way, the national economy would develop further. 
 
On the other hand, corporate stock ownership is based on a private 
contract. Compared with an explicit contract between parties, it is more 
difficult for the shareholders to seek remedies for the rights implied. 
Therefore, to some extent, the value of the stock should include an 
evaluation of legal protection and political supervision.112 On this basis, if 
China intends to increase the value of its capital stock and securities 
market, improving and perfecting its legal protection of minority 
                                                             
111 Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (n 95) 472.  
112 Xianping Lang, Text Book of Corporate Governance (Social Sciences Academic Press 2003), preface.  
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shareholders will be necessary. 
 
1.4 Legal Framework 
 
China is a jurisdiction with a preference for Statutory Law. According to the 
Chinese legal framework, there are four levels of regulation in corporate 
government: (1) Laws; (2) Administrative Regulations; (3) Regulations 
issued by the departments of central government; and (4) Self-regulatory 
Rules. 
 
Each level of regulation has different legal effect. The top level laws have 
the highest priority. Lower level regulations can only supplement the ones 
in the higher levels. Any lower-level rule violating higher-level rules is 
deemed as invalid.  
 
(1) Laws 
 
The laws in China refer to the legislation passed and issued by the 
National People‟s Congress and can only be amended or abolished by the 
National People‟s Congress or its Standing Committee.  With regard to the 
corporate governance field, the relevant legislation includes Company Law 
of the P.R.C (Revised in 2005), Securities Law of the P.R.C (Revised in 
2005), Criminal Law of the P.R.C, Law of the P.R.C. on the State-Owned 
Assets of Enterprises, and Accounting Law of the P.R.C (Revised in 1999). 
 
(2) Administrative Regulations 
 
Administrative regulations are those issued under the name of the State 
Council of China. The most important in terms of minority protection are 
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„Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening 
and Steady Growth of Capital Markets‟,113 and the „Notice of the State 
Council on Approving and Forwarding the Opinions of China Securities 
Regulatory Commission on Improving the Quality of Listed Companies‟.114  
 
(3) Regulations Issued by the Departments of Central Government 
 
In relation to corporate governance, the departments of central 
government such as the State Assets Administration Committee, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, The People‟s Bank of China and the 
National Audit Office of the P.R.C can be authorized to issue certain 
regulations. These regulations cover most of the practices in the realm of 
corporate governance, and include: the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies, the Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure 
by Listed Companies, the Guidelines for the Articles of Association of 
Listed Companies (Revised in 2006), the Administration of the Takeover of 
Listed Companies Procedures, the Measures for Administration of Material 
Assets Reorganization of Listed Companies, the Notice of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating the Measures for the 
Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies (For Trial 
Implementation), the Circular of China Securities Regulatory Commission 
on Distributing the Measures for the Administration of the Share-trading 
Reform of Listed Companies, and the Measures for the Administration of 
Securities Registration and Clearing. 
 
(4) Self-regulatory Rules 
 
                                                             
113 English vision available on <http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/sootscoptroasgocm970/> accessed 
22-10-2013. 
114 English vision available on <http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6117&CGid=> 
accessed 22-10-2013. 
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The lowest level rule in the corporate governance area is the self-
regulatory rule, which is usually issued by the stock exchange. These rules 
include the Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Notice of Shanghai Stock Exchange on Promulgating 
the Trading Rules for the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Although such rules 
lack the highest level of legal effect, breaches can carry serious 
punishment, such as trade suspension or delisting.  
 
In order to illustrate the current corporate governance structure with the 
four levels of regulation, Figure 4 provides a simple representation of the 
formal structure of a Chinese listed company:115  
 
                                                             
115 On Kit Tam, 'Models of Corporate Governance for Chinese Companies' (2000) 8 Corporate Governance 
52, 54. 
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Figure 4: Legal Rights and Actual Influence of Powers in Chinese 
Corporate Governance 
 
1.5 Methodology and Thesis Structure 
 
1.5.1 Methodology 
This thesis uses the methodology of comparative research. The 
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effectiveness of legal rules promoting to minority protection both in 
mainland China and in other jurisdictions is investigated and evaluated. 
Through comparative analysis a good understanding of those institutions, 
both in their original jurisdictions and in the Chinese context, is 
established.  
 
As has been argued elsewhere, comparative research can provide 
important suggestions for legal amendment. 116  Legislators in western 
countries would prefer to select jurisdictions with similar language and 
cultural background as the comparative object.117 However, in spite of the 
differences in language and social background between China and 
western countries, this thesis maintains that legal rules for minority 
protection in developed countries, such as the UK and the US, are proper 
comparative objects. 
 
There are two main reasons for this view. First, during the gradual 
corporate reform that has been taking place since the 1990s, China has 
learnt a lot from those developed countries. For example, it has adopted 
the company form, established stock markets, and adjusted board 
governance. Reviewing such legal rules in its birthplace would help 
Chinese researchers and legislators to understand fully their pros and 
cons. Secondly, the globalization of business has caused the commercial 
environment in China to change in order to meet the needs of international 
trading. Hence, this thesis argues that comparative research on the 
legislation on minority protection in China and that in developed countries 
may be helpful to improve the quality of minority protection upon further 
corporate reform in China. 
 
                                                             
116 Helen Xanthaki, 'Legal Transplants in Legislation: Defusing the Trap' (2008) 57 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 659, 660. 
117 Ibid. Those comparative researches argue that like must be compared with like. 
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Nevertheless, in comparative research it is more important to investigate 
divergences rather than convergences between cases. Comparative 
researchers cannot conclude that one jurisdiction is better than another 
simply because the former incorporates a certain design into its legal 
structure; nor can they evaluate a particular jurisdiction by the criteria of 
their home historic, social, cultural, and economic background.118 
 
Without localization, even if the legal transplant has been completed, the 
original legislative intention would still be inapplicable. 119  Even worse, 
such a transplant could bring about an illusion that the problem issue has 
been resolved.120 In that case, the original problem could become more 
complicated due to delays in correction. 
 
Therefore, this thesis places special emphasis on the social and business 
environment in which the legal rules for minority protection are rooted. 
Based on such research, the thesis puts forward some suggestions for the 
further improvement of minority protection in Chinese listed companies. 
 
The literature on current corporate governance status in China comprises 
diverse studies. However, most of these are introductory in nature, 
highlighting the special characteristics in Chinese corporate governance 
practice: for example, how the relatively concentrated shareholding 
structure affects governance quality or what may result from the tight 
connection between listed companies and the government.  
 
This thesis has found that there remain gaps in the literature. This is partly 
because the Chinese economy has developed rapidly in the last two 
                                                             
118 Mathias M Siems, 'What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al's 
Methodology' (2005) 16 International Company and Commercial Law Review 300, 303. 
119 Xanthaki (n 116) 659. 
120 Ibid. 
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decades. Commercial environment and social status are subject to 
continuous and tremendous change and research should keep up to date 
with the latest developments. In addition, there has been little research 
focusing in particular on minority protection. 
 
This thesis comprises comprehensive research on minority shareholder 
protection in Chinese listed companies, based on the latest corporate 
governance legislation. It fills the gap in the literature by putting forward a 
detailed model for further Chinese legal reform, which provides better 
protection for the interests of minority shareholders. 
 
1.5.2 Thesis Structure 
 
The rest parts of this thesis will be organised as follows: 
 
Chapter Two focuses on shareholder self-help by shareholders 
themselves. Minority shareholders may safeguard their own interests 
either by participating in corporate management or by initiating lawsuits as 
remedies. Shareholder activism, especially when exercised by institutional 
investors, has been regarded as one of the most important methods to 
reduce agency costs, and therefore prevent the interests of minorities from 
being infringed. Will such activism be effective in Chinese listed 
companies? If not, what blocks it from being effective? In terms of the 
remedies which minority shareholders could seek if damage occurs, this 
thesis places special emphasis on the derivative claim, incorporated into 
Chinese Company Law in 2005, to see whether this new litigation 
technique could help to improve minority protection. 
 
In Chapter Three, the board of directors, as the locus of corporate 
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management, is analysed. By reviewing the duties owed by directors and 
the powers authorized to the board, the thesis argues that the board of 
directors should be and is able to become the key institution to balance 
different interests relating to corporate operations, including the interests 
of minority shareholders. This chapter also investigates in detail the 
institution of independent directors. As a mechanism of internal monitoring, 
the independent directors in Western countries bear high expectations. 
Will this institution succeed in the Chinese context? What is the 
relationship between the independent directors and the existing internal 
monitoring body, the supervisory board? 
 
Chapter Four reviews the development of the supervisory board in China. 
Although often criticized as useless, the supervisory board was not 
abandoned in the revision of Chinese Company Law in 2005. Instead, the 
power of this internal monitoring body was reinforced. By analysing its 
shortcomings, this thesis suggests that the supervisory board could co-
exist with the independent directors and the two could work effectively if 
their responsibilities were clearly defined. 
 
Chapter Five introduces a special participant in corporate governance in 
China, the party committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This 
thesis finds that the CCP has decisive influence over many corporate 
affairs, including personnel, corporate strategy-making, and internal 
supervision. However, the thesis notes that there is little legal 
accountability to regulate this powerful actor. The party committee of the 
CCP is unaccountable to shareholders, especially minority shareholders. 
Taking into account the political concern, this thesis suggests that the 
party committee of the CCP could remain as part of the corporate structure 
after any further reform, but only for the purposes of political propaganda. 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Page 52 of 415 
 
 
Chapter Six focuses on the external mechanisms which may increase 
minority protection. Starting with a case study, this chapter argues that the 
market administrator could be a key body to prevent the interests of 
minorities from being infringed by either the executives or the controlling 
shareholder. The case of PCCW in Hong Kong is a good example of such 
an external helper. Following the case study, the market regulator, the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) is investigated and 
evaluated in comparison with its counterpart in the United States, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
 
In Chapter Seven, the thesis proposes a fundamental change in the 
corporate governance regime in China. After reviewing all the institutions 
relating to minority protection, it insists that state control is still the key 
obstacle to the improvement of minority protection, despite many 
institutions having been transplanted or reinforced. Only by cutting off 
undue intervention by the state can the protection of minority investors be 
increased. With this in mind, the thesis creates an ideal model with a 
three-level structure, based on the principle of board centralization. With 
such an ideal model, minority protection in China could be substantially 
improved. 
 
Finally, the concluding chapter brings together the suggestions from each 
of the previous chapters. It is submitted that, taken together, these 
suggestions could substantially improve the level of protection of 
minorities‟ interests in Chinese listed companies. 
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Chapter Two: Self-help by Minority Shareholders 
 
Executive Summary 
 
As an effective method to reduce agency costs, ultimate supervision by 
shareholders has been encouraged in Anglo-American countries in recent 
years. The more the shareholders participate in corporate operations, the 
less misconduct by management will occur. However, this thesis argues 
that only activism by institutional investors will improve the legal protection 
of minorities. This is because individual minority shareholders lack the 
professional knowledge and skills needed to participate in business 
operations, while the institutional investors have both the motivation and 
the ability to become active.  
 
However, institutional investors in China face a different market 
environment from that in the Anglo-American countries. Owing to the 
concentrated shareholding structure, institutional shareholders must fight 
against infringements by the majority shareholder, rather than just the 
misconduct of managers. Therefore, further governance mechanisms 
should be introduced, for example a cumulative voting system to support 
activism by institutional investors. 
 
When damage occurs or is likely to occur to the company, minority 
shareholders need some special legal mechanism as their remedy to 
protect their investment. The derivative claim is such a mechanism, 
whereby a shareholder in the name of the company can initiate a claim 
against wrongdoers who harmed or may harm the company‟s interests. 
Through comparative research on the practice of derivative claim in the 
UK and in China, this thesis concludes that, in spite of some need for 
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clarification, the systematic design of the derivative claim in the UK puts 
more weight on minority protection, which should be instructive to China. 
 
At the moment, however, the Chinese derivative claim is too restrictive, so 
that few minority shareholders could satisfy the locus standi requirement. 
As to litigation proceedings, the demand rule under the Chinese Company 
Law not only fails to eliminate unmeritorious and speculative claims, but 
also increases the difficulty for minority shareholders in initiating a 
reasonable derivative claim. Hence, this thesis suggests that the demand 
rule should be abolished in the next legal reform. Nevertheless, the thesis 
does conclude that the Chinese derivative claim, if it could be improved, 
would provide better minority protection in China. 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
The separation of ownership and management is widely recognized in the 
modern corporate field.121 However, as the capital providers or the owners 
of the company, shareholders in different countries have been granted 
certain rights. These include not only the right to acquire the corporate 
profits, but also the decisive rights to determine crucial corporate affairs, 
such as electing directors and merger and acquisition issues. Even the 
minority shareholders are entitled to exercise such rights. Therefore, in 
terms of minority protection in Chinese listed companies, it is necessary 
first to review whether current corporate laws include any specific legal 
mechanisms to protect the interests of minority shareholders. If such 
mechanisms exist, then how do they work? In which aspects can they be 
improved in the future? 
                                                             
121 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Reprint edn, 
Transaction Publishers 1991), Book I, Chapter VI. 
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In this thesis, the legal mechanisms of self-protection by minority 
shareholders are divided into two groups according to the time at which 
they may be used in corporate governance. The first group contains the 
influential powers on the corporate operation, while the second consists of 
remedies which could be sought when damage occurs. In terms of 
minority protection, this thesis will suggest that legislators should authorize 
more effective powers to minorities, and that when damage occurs, the 
legal remedies should be improved. 
 
In terms of corporate efficiency, it has to be admitted that leaving the day-
to-day operation to professional managers and simply enjoying the 
investment return is a good choice for shareholders. This is because, in 
general, shareholders are not business experts, so they might make some 
poor decisions in corporate strategies and management.122 Prior research 
has concluded that weaker shareholder rights may increase corporate 
efficiency, since the executives would have greater security of position and 
incentives to engage in long-term projects.123 
 
Nevertheless, the separation of ownership and management leads to a 
core problem in corporate governance, known as the agency cost 
problem.124 Corporate scandals in the last two decades have underlined 
the importance of the ultimate monitoring role of shareholders. 
Shareholders have been called on to become more actively involved in 
corporate operation and to fulfil their supervisory responsibility over the 
                                                             
122 Ataollah Rahmani, 'Shareholder Control and Its Nemesis' (2012) 23 International Company and 
Commercial Law Review 12, 12. 
123 For advanced research see L Bebchuk and L Stole, 'Do Short-term Managerial Objectives Lead to Under-
or-overinvestment in Long-term Projects?' (1993) 48 Journal of Finance 719; M Harris, 'Anti-takeover 
Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder Welfare' (1990) 21 Journal of Economics 614; 
and J C Stein, 'Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia' (1988) 96 Journal of Political Economy 61. 
124 Eugene F Fama, 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm' (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 
288, 288. 
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management. This can also be referred to as shareholder activism. 
 
Owing to the huge cost of activism and the difficulty of exerting effective 
influence on corporate decisions, individual minority shareholders are not 
likely to be capable of participating in corporate governance or, 
consequently, of protecting their interest by their activities. Hence, 
institutional shareholders, minority investors which normally hold relatively 
more corporate shares than individuals, have been regarded as the major 
driving force of shareholder activism. In 2009, the increase in the intensity 
and quality of institutional shareholder activism was cited in certain 
documents in the UK, such as the UK Treasury White Paper and the 
Walker Review.125 This thesis will confirm that institutional shareholders 
have both the motivations and the abilities to become active in corporate 
governance so as to reduce the agency cost and to safeguard their 
investment. 
 
However, the question remains as to whether shareholder activism, or 
institutional shareholder activism in particular, could have the same effect 
in the Chinese context, because the positive function of shareholder 
activism pertains particularly to jurisdictions with dispersed shareholding 
structure. China, in contrast, has a concentrated shareholding structure, 
which results in the appropriation of value from minorities by the majority 
shareholder as the core issue of Chinese corporate governance. Thus, it 
cannot necessarily be concluded that institutional investor activism can 
help to provide better protection of minority shareholders‟ interests in 
China. This position arises as a result of various factors. For example, the 
shareholding of institutional investors is inadequate to achieve effective 
influence, and the dominant type of institutional shareholder is different 
                                                             
125 Iris H-Y Chiu, 'Stewardship as Investment Management for Institutional Shareholders' (2011) 32 Company 
Lawyer 65, 65. 
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from that in the UK or the US. Yet, this thesis holds the view that 
encouraging institutional shareholder activism in China is the right 
direction for further development. If China were to learn from the 
experience of the West, and amend current regulations, it could be rational 
to expect that institutional shareholder activism would improve the quality 
of Chinese corporate governance. 
 
If damages occur, either to the company or to shareholders, there are 
certain remedies available under the law. Generally speaking, shareholder 
individual claims and derivative claims, brought by shareholders rather 
than the company, are the two main legal mechanisms for ex post 
compensation.  The former is a traditional form of litigation based on direct 
damage to shareholders, whereas the latter has been newly introduced 
into Chinese corporate regulations, although there is no action in the case 
of merely reflective losses.126 This thesis will pay special attention to the 
relatively new mechanism of the derivative claim. 
 
The derivative claim is a type of litigation initiated by shareholders in the 
name of the company, based on wrongs done to the company, against the 
wrongdoers. In most cases, the alleged wrongdoer is a director, the 
majority shareholder or a certain related third party. Any compensation 
from the lawsuit belongs directly to the company. The ultimate aim of such 
litigation is to control the agency costs and protect the interests of 
shareholders. If the actual controller, director or majority shareholder has 
not taken any action against the wrongdoer or has acted improperly in an 
existing lawsuit, the shareholders of the company are permitted to initiate 
a claim or take over the existing proceeding127 in the name of the company 
                                                             
126 For Chinese Law, see Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 152; for 
English law, see Johnson v Gore Woods & Co [2002] 2 AC 1. 
127 To date, there is no provision confirming that existing litigation could be taken over in current Chinese 
Company Law 2005. More details will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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to protect the company‟s interests.  
 
The derivative claim is widely prescribed by law. It originated in the United 
States and received broad acceptance owing to its positive effect on the 
quality of corporate governance. The UK courts endeavoured to 
encourage derivative claims under the common law until 2006, when the 
Companies Act 2006 was passed (hereafter the CA 2006). In China, the 
derivative claim was introduced by the Chinese Company Law 2005 
(hereafter the CCL 2005). Using comparative methodology, this thesis 
investigates certain specific issues in respect of derivative claim systems 
in the UK and in China. Although this litigation mechanism has been 
transplanted from the US to China, it is argued that given the similar 
conservative attitude towards such litigation in both jurisdictions, the UK 
experience of broadening the use of derivative claims could be a good 
example for China in order to improve the legal protection of shareholders, 
especially the minority shareholders. Therefore, this chapter also 
evaluates how the derivative claim system has balanced the interests 
between the shareholder on the one hand, providing a judicial remedy to 
the owners to prevent the company from wrongs, and the company itself 
on the other, establishing a judicial proceeding to avoid improper actions in 
order to maintain day-to-day operations. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The investigation focuses 
first on shareholder activism, to review how minority shareholders can 
protect their own interests using the powers authorized by law. Part 2.1.1 
provides a brief introduction to shareholder activism, reviewing the 
methods which minority shareholders could use to improve corporate 
governance. In Part 2.1.2, institutional investors are differentiated from 
individual minority shareholders according to two factors: motivation and 
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ability. Moreover, an evaluation of institutional shareholder activism is 
provided, with special concern paid to its deficiencies. Part 2.1.3 focuses 
on the Chinese context, and discusses three questions: (1) Can 
institutional investor activism improve Chinese corporate governance just 
as it has done in the US and the UK? (2) How do institutional investors 
perform in the Chinese market in terms of minority protection? (3) What 
blocks institutional investor activism from being effective under current 
conditions? 
 
The derivative claim is then discussed in detail, beginning with a definition. 
Part 2.2.2 compares the locus standi requirements in the UK and in China. 
The subject matter of litigation is considered in Part 2.2.3, followed by an 
analysis of litigation procedures. In Part 2.2.5, the financial issues of 
litigation are investigated, with emphasis upon motivation and incentives. 
 
2.1 Shareholder Activism 
2.1.1 Brief Introduction to Shareholder Activism 
 
In this part, two questions will be addressed: (1) What is shareholder 
activism? (2) How can shareholders become involved in corporate 
operations? 
 
(1) The Concept of Shareholder Activism 
As defined by Ryan and Schneider, shareholder activism refers to the „use 
of power by an investor either to influence the processes or outcomes of a 
given portfolio firm or to evoke large-scale change in processes or 
outcomes across multiple firms through the symbolic targeting of one or 
more portfolio firms‟. 128  Sparkes and Cowton clarify the concept of 
                                                             
128 Lori V Ryan and Marguerite Schneider, 'The Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism' (2002) 27 
Academy of Management Review 554, 555. 
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shareholders‟ power, suggesting that shareholders‟ rights should include 
not just the usage of voting and resolutions, but also activities such as 
seeking publicity for the group‟s objectives or informal dialogue with 
corporate executives.129 
 
Shuangge Wen argues that the encouragement of shareholder activism 
could be beneficial to the capital market in a macro sense.130 He asserts 
that investors would prefer to invest where they can have a say in the 
running of the business. Therefore, jurisdictions which advocate 
shareholder activism would attract more capital for investment, both from 
domestic investors and from abroad.131  
 
(2) The Methods of Activism 
The main methods available for shareholder activism are voting and 
presenting a proposal in the shareholders‟ general meeting. It has been 
recognized that the general meeting is a key mechanism whereby 
shareholders have an opportunity to participate in corporate operations 
and hold the board members to account.132 
 
For minority shareholders in particular, it is not often possible to participate 
in corporate governance by presenting proposals in the general meeting. 
They are unlikely to know the company‟s business well enough to put 
forward any governance proposal, or to be sufficiently professional to give 
proper guidance in terms of corporate operations. Accordingly, some have 
argued that exercising the right to vote is the only way they can get 
                                                             
129 R Sparkes and C Cowton, 'The Maturing of Socially Responsible Investment: A Review of the 
Development Link With Corporate Social Responsibility' (2004) 52 Journal of Business Ethics 45, 51. 
130 Shuangge Wen, 'Institutional Investor Activism on Socially Responsible Investment: Effects and 
Expectations' (2009) 18 Business Ethics: A European Review 308, 312. 
131 Ibid. 
132 John H Farrar, Nigel Furey and Brenda Hannigan, Farrar's Company Law (4th edn, Butterworths Law 
1998), 308. 
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involved in corporate governance. 133  However, due to their low 
shareholdings, the minority shareholders are usually not in a good position 
to bargain with the controlling shareholder or the management. As 
suggested by scholars, a new balance should be considered, imposed by 
law, so that the majority rule can prevail but not at the expense of the 
minority‟s interests. 134  Therefore, in this part, two legal mechanisms 
relating to the voting process, the cumulative voting system and proxy 
voting, are discussed, along with other special methods such as „Just vote 
no‟ campaigns and releasing a focus list, to investigate whether such 
mechanisms would help minority shareholders in their activism.  
 
 Cumulative Voting System 
Cumulative voting is a special voting mechanism to balance the 
disadvantage of minority shareholdings.135  Originating in North America, it 
has not been adopted by British law.136 In contrast to the „one share one 
vote‟ principle, in cumulative voting shareholders are given extra votes 
based on the number of nominees to the board. Shareholders can allocate 
all their votes to any of the candidates,137 this increasing the possibility for 
minority shareholders to elect directors who stand for their interests. 
 
However, the cumulative voting system has limitations. It can only 
strengthen the voice of large minority shareholders and is of little direct 
help to individuals.138 To illustrate, if a board consists of 11 members, 
shareholders would need more than 9.09 per cent of shareholding, 
                                                             
133 Burton Rothber and Steven Lilien, 'Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evidence on Corporate 
Governance' (2006) 1 Journal of Business & Technology Law 157, 158. 
134 Mohammad Rizal Salim and Ong Yee Shyun, 'The Law on Shareholders' Meetings in Malaysia' (2009) 20 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 436, 436. 
135 Jeffery N Gorden, 'Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting' (1994) 94 
Columbia Law Review 124, 124. 
136 David Milman, 'Ascertaining Shareholder Wishes in UK Company Law in the 21st Century' (2010) 280 
Company Law Newsletter 1, 3. 
137 Salim and Shyun (n 134) 446. 
138 Ibid. 
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individually or collectively, to win a seat on the board. 139 Thus, only if 
minority shareholders reach a consensus and vote collectively, can the 
cumulative voting mechanism help them to elect more directors on behalf 
of their interests than would be possible using the normal voting method. 
 
 Proxy Voting 
Generally speaking, most company laws allow shareholders to vote either 
in person or by proxy.  Indeed, while a proxy was originally considered as 
the representative of the appointer with the right to vote on their behalf, 
nowadays these rights extend to the right to speak and to demand a 
poll.140 
 
The law relating to voting by proxy can be traced back to the mid-19th 
century. 141  In the UK, reviewing the Companies Act 1929, the Cohen 
Committee investigated proxy voting and suggested that the right of 
shareholders of the company to appoint someone as a proxy, even if the 
proxy was not a member of the company, should be set down in statute.142 
Taking up this suggestion, the legislature passed s.136 of the Companies 
Act 1948 which provided that: 
 
any member of a company entitled to attend and vote at 
a meeting of the company shall be entitled to appoint 
another person (whether a member or not) as his proxy 
to attend and vote instead of him, and a proxy appointed 
to attend and vote instead of a member of a private 
company shall also have the same right as the member 
                                                             
139 Bo Gong, 'The Role of Institutional Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance: A Comparative 
Analysis of China and the United Kingdom' (2012) 33 Company Lawyer 171, 176. 
140 Deirdre Ahern and Karen Maher, 'The Continuing Evolution of Proxy Representation' (2011) 2 Journal of 
Business Law 125, 136. 
141 Ibid 125. 
142 Cohen Committee, Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd 6659, 1945), para 133 
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to speak at the meeting.143 
 
With the development of technology, in the early 21st century CREST 
introduced an automated proxy voting service, by which proxy 
appointment and voting instructions could be presented online.144 This has 
been considered an important milestone in the development of proxy 
voting, because it has made the proxy voting system more convenient and 
widely available. 
 
Despite the formal acceptance of proxy voting in statute law in the UK, 
there are no provisions regulating the formalities attached to the 
appointment of proxies. In the light of business tradition, a written 
document, normally with „wet signatures‟, is required for proxy 
appointment.145 However, corporate law has not explicitly prohibited other 
methods of appointing a proxy. Since 2000, there has been statutory 
permission for appointment of a proxy by way of an electronic 
communication.146 So far, the formality of proxy appointment has been left 
to the companies themselves, through regulations in their articles. 
 
According to UK law, any individual can be appointed as proxy, even if he 
is not a member of the firm. However, it is worth noting the practice in 
Malaysia, where a proxy of any shareholder must be „an advocate, an 
approved company auditor or a person approved by the Registrar in a 
particular case‟.147 In the view of this thesis, there is a good rationale for 
this requirement, especially for emerging markets such as Malaysia and 
                                                             
143 Companies Act 1948, s 136(1). 
144 J Tuckley and T Lewis, 'CREST Settlement System: New Proxy Voting Service' 
<http://uk.practicallaw.com/7-102-2583?sd=plc> accessed 22-10-2013, 15. 
145 R C Nolan, 'The Continuing Evolution of Shareholder Governance' (2006) 65 The Cambridge Law Journal 
92, 108. 
146 The Companies Act 1985, s 372(A) It is an inserted article, amending the Companies Act 1985 (Electronic 
Communications) Order 2000. 
147 Malaysian Companies Act 1965, s 149(1)(b) The articles of the company can exclude such a requirement 
by  agreement among shareholders. 
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China, since it ensures that the proxy has a good understanding and 
experience to act professionally as an appropriate representative of 
shareholders.148 
 
Under the Companies Act 2006, multiple proxy appointment is also 
acceptable. In other words, a shareholder is allowed to appoint more than 
one proxy to attend the meeting and vote, and each proxy is „appointed to 
exercise the rights attaching to a different share or shares held by him, or 
(as the case may be) to a different 10 pounds, or multiple of 10 pounds, of 
stock held by him‟.149 Accordingly, those nominee shareholders who hold 
shares on behalf of no less than two beneficial owners can separate the 
votes by appointing different proxies. 150  In addition, the Act makes it 
permissible for a proxy to represent more than one shareholder at a 
meeting. Section 285(2) provides that, on a show of hands, every proxy 
present has one vote for and one vote against a resolution if „the proxy 
has been instructed by one or more of those members to vote for the 
resolution and by one or more other of those members to vote against 
it‟.151 
 
However, some scholars have noted that the importance of proxy voting 
will be challenged by the increasing involvement of institutional 
shareholders at the meeting.152 They argue that discussion on proxy voting 
is normally focused on the individual shareholders, because those 
individuals might benefit from the ability of the proxy to speak at the 
meeting, whereas this is of little importance to the institutional investors.153 
Furthermore, in the case of the United States, the SEC issued new rules in 
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1992 which allowed direct communication among shareholders. As a 
consequence, the institutional shareholders no longer need a high-cost 
intermediary, a proxy, to communicate with others.154 
 
 ‘Just vote no’ Campaigns 
„Just vote no‟ campaigns, proposed by Joseph Grundfest, have been 
considered a useful tool for active shareholders. 155  The term refers to 
organized attempts by activists to convince their fellow shareholders via 
letters, press releases, and internet communications to withhold their vote 
from one or more directors in an effort to communicate a message of 
shareholder dissatisfaction to the board.156 Similar to the shareholders‟ 
proposal, „just vote no‟ campaigns are not legally binding on board 
members, but are deemed an effective method by activists, with very low 
cost.157 
 
Why is it that such a cheap tool can be effective? In the view of this thesis, 
the campaign gives rise to public attention, which may negatively affect the 
personal reputation of the directors involved. For a professional manager, 
personal reputation is extremely important, because to an extent, his 
career depends upon it. Therefore, the „just vote no‟ campaign becomes 
an external monitoring mechanism, similar to the market for corporate 
control, which could force directors to perform better in management. 
 
 Releasing a Focus List 
CalPERS, one of the largest public pension funds in the United States, 
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has been organizing shareholder activism campaigns since 1986. 158 
CalPERS publish an annual „focus list‟ of companies it will actively engage 
with in order to improve their governance quality and share performance. 
In fact, therefore, it is a list of poorly performing companies. Researchers 
have found that inclusion in the list would lead to positive abnormal stock 
returns of companies. That is to say, it is an effective method of 
shareholder activism which increases shareholder value.159 
 
2.1.2 Institutional Shareholder Activism 
 
In spite of the existence of several active methods provided for in law by 
which minority shareholders might safeguard their interests, this thesis 
contends that in practice, due to low shareholding and lack of necessary 
knowledge, individual minority shareholders are rarely able to use those 
means to participate in corporate operations. As confirmed by the Hampel 
Report, the discussion of the role of shareholders in corporate governance 
has mainly concerned institutional investors.160 Undoubtedly, institutions 
have greater motivation to perform actively and are also equipped with the 
proper knowledge and influential powers. 
 
In this section, both the motivations and capability of institutional investors 
are investigated. A review of the effectiveness of institutional shareholder 
activism leads this thesis to conclude that institutional investors could and 
should participate more actively in order to improve corporate governance 
and provide better minority protection. 
 
                                                             
158 Michael P Smith, 'Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS' (1996) 51 
The Journal of Finance 227, 231. 
159 Eun-Hee Kim and Thomas Lyon, 'When Does Institutional Investor Activism Increase Shareholder Value?: 
The Carbon Disclosure Project' (2011) 11 The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 1, 1. 
160 Hampel, Committee on Corporate Governance --- Final Report (HMSO 1998). 
Chapter Two: Minority Shareholders 
Page 67 of 415 
 
(1) Motivation 
Under a dispersed shareholding structure, almost all shareholders are 
minority members. Holding a small bulk of corporate shares, minority 
shareholders, especially individuals, cannot decide corporate affairs 
exactly as they wish. Therefore, it will be no surprise to find shareholder 
apathy, with no motivation to get involved in corporate operations, in the 
modern company model. The only option available to disappointed 
shareholders is the „Wall Street Walk‟; that is, to leave by selling the 
shares they hold. 
 
However, the situation has been changed with the development of 
institutional shareholding. In contrast to the minority individuals, this thesis 
argues that for a number of reasons institutional investors have much 
more incentive to take part in the corporate decision-making process and 
fulfil their internal monitoring responsibility.  
 
First, the dramatic increase of shareholding would push institutional 
investors to perform more actively in corporate governance than before. 
Figures show that, in the 1960s, institutional shareholders held only 16 per 
cent of the United States‟ corporate equity; by 2000 this figure had climbed 
to 57 per cent.161  At the end of 2003, institutional ownership accounted for 
approximately 60 per cent of listed US equities and over 70 per cent of 
listed UK equities.162 To safeguard such large investments, institutional 
shareholders are obliged to pay more attention to corporate performance. 
And the best way to ensure a better corporate performance is to get 
involved. 
 
Secondly, it is not so easy for institutional investors to exit the company by 
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choosing the „Wall Street Walk‟, owing to their relatively large 
shareholdings. The share price of the company will drop rapidly if large 
amounts of shares are sold in the market, and in that circumstance 
institutional investors may face considerable financial losses. Hence, 
compared with the huge loss caused by poor management, active 
involvement in corporate operation and monitoring is much cheaper and 
may become a better choice for institutional investors.163 
 
Thirdly, sometimes, legal regulations may require institutional shareholders 
to be active. Since 2000, all trustees of occupational and local government 
pension funds are required to pay more attention to socially responsible 
investment and to disclose their relevant policies.164 As a consequence, 
those institutional investors have to become more involved in their portfolio 
companies, to ensure that their investments are in accordance with the 
requirement of social responsibility.  
 
In addition, as noted by Jensen, the institutional shareholder has more 
motivation if the market for corporate control is inactive.165 The market for 
corporate control has been recognized as an effective external monitoring 
mechanism over corporate management. Takeovers may occur if 
managerial performance is poor. In other words, in order to avoid being 
taken over, executives have to perform well in operating the business and 
achieving high investment return. However, when the market for corporate 
control is subdued, the external threat becomes weaker. Accordingly, 
institutional shareholders are unable to rely on such an external monitoring 
system, but have to act positively to safeguard their own interests, by 
participating in corporate issues more actively.  
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(2) Capability 
As mentioned above, participating in corporate operations may be too 
complicated for individual minority shareholders. They are not business 
experts, but capital providers who bet their future on investment return. 
However, this is not the case for institutional investors. Normally, 
institutional shareholders are either financial service companies or 
investment companies, which have the ability to participate in corporate 
governance. 
 
First of all, as participants in the market, institutional investors are 
equipped with professional knowledge of corporate management, 
especially corporate financial affairs. Empirical research by R. Chung et al. 
concludes that the presence of large institutional shareholdings can deter 
managers from using opportunistic earnings management to pursue self-
serving objectives.166 It has been found that corporate managers have 
some scope to decide reported profits by using discretionary accruals. Put 
simply, the executives can move profits from one year to the next, which 
may result in financial loss for shareholders. However, such opportunistic 
behaviour could be constrained by effective monitoring by investors with 
professional knowledge. According to Chung et al., large institutional 
shareholders have both greater incentive and the professional knowledge 
to undertake internal monitoring.167 
 
Secondly, institutional investors have more weight in the corporate 
decision-making process based on their shareholding percentage. If 
several institutional investors vote collectively, it might be possible for them 
to obtain a majority vote on corporate issues. 
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Moreover, institutional shareholders may take advantage of their public 
influence to affect corporate operations, in order to protect their interests. 
For example, by expressing an opinion or suggestion on the operation of a 
certain listed company through the media, an institutional investor could 
influence decisions by other shareholders. 
 
(3) Different Institutional Shareholders 
In the US and the UK, institutional shareholders can be classified into 
several main types as follows: (a) Pension Funds; (b) Mutual Funds; (c) 
Insurance Companies, and (d) Banks.168 
 
It has been widely recognized that different characteristics of institutional 
investors would lead to different contributions to shareholder activism. 
Generally speaking, pension funds prefer long-term investment, so they 
would tend to keep a better relationship with corporate management. 
Hence, they may have less motivation to get involved in corporate affairs 
against management. In an examination of the natural role of the public 
pension fund, Monks finds that it could be a valuable ally for activism with 
other institutional shareholders, rather than perform actively alone.169 
 
In contrast, mutual funds normally have less conflict of interest with their 
portfolio companies, but more concern about corporate performance, that 
is in seeking higher profits. Therefore, mutual funds have been deemed as 
the best potential activist to monitor corporate management.170  
 
As for insurance companies, in most cases they pay more attention to 
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corporate bonds and mortgages than to company shares.171 Hence, it is 
rare to see insurance companies become very involved in corporate 
operations. 
 
Some scholars classify institutional shareholders into two categories 
based on the interest link between the institutional investors and their 
portfolio companies.172 Those institutional shareholders that have existing 
or potential business relations with the portfolio companies, such as 
insurance companies and banks, are labelled Pressure-sensitive 
investors. Conversely, institutional investors such as mutual funds, whose 
business with the firm is limited to investing in corporate shares, are 
classified as Pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders. It has been 
argued by scholars that the Pressure-insensitive investors have greater 
incentive to get involved in corporate monitoring and operations than their 
Pressure-sensitive counterparts, who would be reluctant to challenge the 
management owing to concerns about their other businesses.173 
 
(4) Evaluation of Institutional Shareholder Activism 
This subsection reports evidence to support the effectiveness of 
institutional shareholder activism. It also notes certain deficiencies. 
  
 Positive Evidence  
Empirical research by Gillan and Starks examined voting outcomes and 
short-term market reactions conditioned on proposal type and sponsor 
identity to measure the success of shareholder activism.174 The findings 
show that, in general, shareholder activism has a positive effect, and those 
proposals sponsored by institutional shareholders receive significantly 
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more favourable votes than those sponsored by individuals.175 Similarly, 
Smith finds that shareholder activism is largely successful in changing 
governance structures, with a consequent increase in shareholder 
value. 176  McConnell and Servaes find that the amount of institutional 
shareholding is positively related to a company‟s Tobin‟s Q Index. 177  
Hence, institutional shareholder activism has been proved effective on 
some extent.  
 
Almazan et al. conclude in their research that greater shareholding 
ownership by Pressure-insensitive investors is associated with greater 
discipline on executive remuneration.178 Furthermore, empirical study has 
shown that on the issues of takeover defences, board independence and 
executive remuneration, institutional shareholders play a positive role in 
monitoring the management, and eventually achieve better governance 
quality. 179  Chen et al. find evidence that intervention by institutional 
investors has positive influence on the quality of corporate decision 
making in relation to acquisition. 180  More specific research shows that 
pension fund involvement can encourage corporate management to select 
a long-term strategy.181 
 
In addition to monitoring management, it has been noted that institutional 
shareholder activism can achieve further positive influence in corporate 
governance in the United States, by issuing certain practice 
recommendations.182 Institutional investors such as CalPERS, TIAA-CREF 
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and AFL-CIO have been deemed an important sector in corporate 
governance in the US.183 
 
 Deficiencies 
In spite of the support given by this thesis to institutional shareholder 
activism, it cannot be ignored that the effectiveness of institutional 
shareholder activism has been challenged. For instance, empirical results 
show little evidence that activism exerted any positive influence on the 
major decisions made by corporate boards before 1993.184 In this thesis, 
three of the main deficiencies are investigated, as follows: 
 
(a) Free Rider Issue 
One of the most important deterrents to shareholder activism is the free 
rider issue. Easterbrook and Fischel illustrate this problem as follows: 
 
Most shareholders are passive investors seeking liquid 
holding. They have little interest in managing the firm and 
less incentive to learn the details of management. No one 
shareholder can collect all or even a little of the gains 
available from monitoring the firm‟s managers. The 
benefits would be dispersed among all stockholders 
according to their investment, not according to their 
monitoring efforts. Because other shareholders take a 
free ride on any one shareholder‟s monitoring, each 
shareholder finds it in his self-interest to be passive. He 
simply sells his shares if he is dissatisfied.185 
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Based on such a concern, shareholder apathy has been widely 
acknowledged. Low attendance at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) 
could be evidence of apathy among institutional shareholders in the UK.186 
Many institutional investors consider attendance at the AGM and voting as 
a waste of time and money. They prefer other methods to exercise their 
influence,187 for example, by meeting with the executives to express their 
concerns. However, as concluded by the Myners Report, meeting directly 
with executives is not obviously effective in practice.188 
 
It has been mentioned above that only large institutional investors with a 
certain amount of company shares have the incentive to become active, 
since the sake of a large amount of shares would cause a drop in their 
price and thus lead to a potential financial loss.  However, in the 1990s, 
there was a welcome shift in attitude by some institutional investors 
towards activism. Some public pension funds started to choose target 
companies based on their performance in particular.189 Therefore, there 
appeared more active involvement by institutional shareholders in 
corporate operations. 
 
(b) Inadequacy of Power 
Some scholars claim that lack of power is the shortcoming in the nature of 
institutional shareholder activism. The expectation that shareholders may 
influence the management by their instructions may not be achieved 
easily. Zhao argues that the voting right is reserved for limited occasions 
only. Proposals asking for shareholder approval have usually been agreed 
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by the executives in advance.190 
 
In addition, scholars note that the limited influence of voting rights held by 
institutional shareholders is partly caused by legal constraints.191 In some 
jurisdictions, such as the US, institutional investors are prohibited from 
holding a large proportion of corporate shares, in order to prevent market 
manipulation. 192  In the Chinese context, the legal requirement of 
disclosure discourages institutional investors from holding more than 5 per 
cent of corporate shares.193 Therefore, votes by institutional shareholders 
on corporate issues are unlikely to have decisive influence on the 
outcomes. 
 
(c) Sub-Agency Cost Problem in Institutional Investors 
Because an institutional investor is also a company, it may suffer from its 
own agency cost problem. Some institutional investors have a multiple 
role, performing both as shareholders in portfolio companies, and as 
investment intermediaries, who may have conflicting interests with the 
portfolio companies.194 Under some circumstances, a fund manager may 
support management at the expense of the fund-holders, in order to 
further his own interests. Even in the case of the mutual fund, which has 
been regarded as having most potential for activism, independence is an 
issue. In the real business world, a mutual fund is usually one of the 
divisions of a huge financial service company which holds a set of other 
businesses with the portfolio company. Embarrassing the management 
may have negative impact on those other businesses. 195  Moreover, 
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scholars have noted two interesting points which impede fund managers 
from performing actively: (i) Competition among fund managers may 
hinder collective performance in activism, because they may worry about 
the better performance achieved by others; and (ii) By standing with the 
management, fund managers may acquire important corporate information 
only known by the executives. Using such information could help the fund 
managers to achieve better personal performance.196 
 
Moreover, in practice, it is difficult to keep funds managers accountable 
with regard to their performance as shareholders in portfolio companies. 
Three key problems have been noted, namely: (i) the wide acceptance of 
the business judgment rule can help the fund manager to immunise his 
liability, unless an obvious breach of duty occurs; (ii) the necessary 
causative link between the failure to exercise shareholder‟s right and any 
financial loss is extremely difficult to establish; and (iii) the fund investors 
may not have a cause of action provided by law.197 Thus, the question 
arises of how to ensure the vote by fund managers is in the interest of 
fund investors.  
 
In response, some scholars have suggested that information about fund 
proxy vote should be disclosed, so that fund investors could better monitor 
the fund managers in order to avoid conflicts of interest.198 In 2003, the 
SEC implemented two new rules relating to proxy information disclosure. 
One requires the funds to publish the policies on how they will make 
decisions on proxy votes, and the other requires them to disclose how 
they actually voted.199 
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(5) Summary 
Despite some lingering problems, it is still rational to believe that 
encouraging greater shareholder activism, especially by institutional 
shareholders, is the right direction to improve corporate governance and 
achieve legal protection of minority investors.  
 
As a result of lessons from the recent financial crisis in the UK banking 
sector, there is a new emphasis on greater involvement of institutional 
shareholders in corporate governance.200  In 2009 the UK amended its 
Companies Act 2006 to implement the EC Shareholder Rights Directive 
(2007/36), 201  which adopts some modern information technologies, 
requires more information disclosure202 and clarifies the responsibility of 
the proxy in voting. As a result, scholars believe that shareholders, 
especially institutions, will be encouraged to become more active in 
corporate operations and monitoring,203 although the culture cannot to be 
changed easily in a short period. 204 
 
2.1.3 Institutional Shareholder Activism in China 
 
After a late start, institutional shareholding developed rapidly in the 
Chinese market. This section investigates whether institutional 
shareholder activism could have the same positive influence on minority 
protection in China as it does in the Anglo-American countries.  The 
section does so by addressing the following three questions: 
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(1) Can institutional investor activism improve Chinese corporate 
governance just as it has done in the US and the UK? 
 
To answer this question it is necessary to note two main differences 
between China and the Anglo-American countries, to establish a basic 
understanding of the current situation institutional investors may face in 
Chinese corporate governance. 
 
First, the shareholding structure in China is different. Under a concentrated 
shareholding structure, the core issue of corporate governance is not the 
agency cost problem between shareholders and management, but the 
infringement of minority shareholders by the majority shareholder. In other 
words, the main target of institutional shareholder activism in China is not 
monitoring the executives, but keeping the controlling shareholder 
accountable.205 
 
Secondly, it is important to notice that companies in Anglo-American 
countries are controlled by pension funds and insurance companies,206 
while in China, the dominant institutional investors are mutual funds.207 
Theoretically, the dominance of mutual funds should bring about better 
internal monitoring, since, as discussed above, the mutual funds are the 
most active institutional investors. However, the practical problem for 
Chinese mutual funds is how they can fight against the majority 
shareholder, who may control more than half of corporate equities.  
 
In addition to the differences mentioned above, Yang points out that the 
weak enforcement of the law on minority protection may deter the success 
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of institutional shareholder activism in China.208 He lists four reasons for 
the weakness of legal enforcement: (a) government control remains, both 
in business operations and in regulation enforcement; (b) the courts lack 
experience to assess breaches of directors‟ duties; (c) the courts can 
rarely establish causality between the alleged wrongdoings and the 
financial losses of shareholders; and (d) the majority of company lawyers 
are not equipped with knowledge and experience of derivative claims in 
China.209 
 
However, difficulty does not equate to impossibility. The dramatic increase 
of institutional shareholding and support from legislators have made 
institutional shareholder activism one of the most important sectors in the 
further development of the Chinese securities market. Compared with 
individual minority shareholders, who have less professional knowledge 
and weaker decision power, institutional shareholders could achieve better 
outcomes in terms of preventing the majority shareholder from abusing its 
controlling position. As such, better legal protection of minority 
shareholders could be realized. 
 
(2) How do the institutional investors perform in the Chinese market 
in terms of minority protection? 
 
The two stock exchanges in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, were established only relatively recently, in 
the early 1990s. Accordingly, the development of institutional shareholding 
also had a late start. However, with political support from the Chinese 
government, institutional investors have blossomed in the last decade. The 
investment threshold for institutional shareholders is continually being 
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lowered, and some state-owned shares have been transferred to the 
national social security pension fund at the IPO stage. As reported by the 
CSRC, by 2009, institutional investors held more than half of Chinese 
equities which were trading in the stock market.210  
 
Furthermore, it has been expected that institutional shareholder activism 
could positively support the adoption of some significant legal mechanisms 
for minority protection. Such support could include the introduction of 
advanced corporate governance regulations, and shaping the evolution of 
standards of Chinese corporate governance.211 A few successful cases 
have been reported. For example, shareholders in China Vanke, one of 
the largest real estate developers in the Chinese market, passed a 
proposal raised by institutional investors to tighten shareholders‟ control 
over the provision of guarantees, which ran against the proposal 
presented by the majority shareholder.212 
 
However, in the view of scholars, institutional shareholder activism in 
China is still at a preliminary stage, with little participation in corporate 
governance.213 Furthermore, the Shanghai Stock Exchange has reported 
that it is rare to see institutional shareholders contributing to corporate 
internal monitoring.214 
 
In comparative research, Gong reviews the increasing importance of 
institutional shareholders in the United Kingdom, and concludes that they 
will form a growing sector in the Chinese capital market. They could at 
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least play „a greater role in the appointment of company directors, the 
compensation and supervision of management and major decision-making 
processes to ensure good corporate governance in Chinese listed 
companies‟.215 However, it is rare to see successful examples in practice. 
As Xi concludes in his study, many obstacles to institutional shareholder 
activism still remain.216 
 
With further reform of the split-share structure, it will not be surprising to 
see more non-tradable shares being transferred to institutional investors. 
As such, the importance of institutional investors in corporate governance 
will be enhanced. The attitude towards institutional shareholder activism 
can be seen in the recent reform of the split share structure, which 
requires institutional investors to ensure a fair compensation scheme for 
existing shareholders with tradable shares, who are normally minority 
individuals. A CSRC administrative document states that „institutional 
shareholders are urged to take active part in the share reform, and defend 
the rights of investors, especially public investors, as well as sustained 
development of the market‟.217 
 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning the development in the last decade of 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs). Before opening up to 
foreign investors in 2003, the A-share market, as the domestic stock 
market, was reserved for domestic investors only. 218  The investment 
quotas of QFIIs are allocated by the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, and by July 2005 had increased from $4 billion to a total of $10 
billion. 219  This thesis holds the view that greater involvement of QFIIs 
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Knowledge Press 2005), 308. 
219 Florian Gimbel and Geoff Dyer, 'Why Foreign Investors Are Not Saviours' Financial Times (July 13, 
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could help to improve the governance quality of Chinese listed companies, 
as they will endeavour to implement the advanced corporate governance 
mechanisms evident in developed western countries. 
 
(3) What blocks institutional investor activism from being effective 
under current conditions? 
 
This thesis identifies two main obstacles to institutional shareholder 
activism in the Chinese market. These are the shareholding structure and 
the absence of effective legal mechanism to enhance activism. 
 
 Shareholding Structure 
As stated above, in China, the majority shareholder usually controls the 
company by holding more than half of corporate equities. In such a case, 
even if all the institutional minority shareholders perform collectively, it is 
still not possible for them to challenge the controller. For example, Lushan 
Laojiao (000568), a listed company, has the highest shareholding by 
institutional shareholders in the Chinese market; 41.50 per cent of its 
tradable shares are collectively controlled by mutual funds. However, 
these institutions still fail to challenge the controlling shareholder on 
corporate issues, since the controlling shareholder holds 53.53 per cent of 
total shares.220 A similar huge gap in shareholding exists in many other 
listed companies. The controlling shareholder of the Bank of China holds 
67.49 per cent of total company shares, while a mere 0.19 per cent of 
shares is controlled by all levels of institutional investors.221 
 
Under such circumstances, institutional investors can neither decide 
managerial affairs nor act as monitors. Hence, it will not be surprising to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
accessed 30-01-2013. 
220 Gong (n 139) 174. 
221 Ibid 175. 
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see institutional investors stand with the controller. Any other course of 
action would lead to limited access to crucial corporate information, and 
consequently to a poor trading performance.222 
 
 Inadequacy of Effective Legal Mechanisms to Enhance Activism 
Where there is a controlling shareholder in the company, the voting 
process may be the easiest way to infringe the rights of minority 
shareholders.223  By voting, the will of the majority shareholder can be 
transferred to corporate decisions. According to the principles of „one 
share one vote‟ and majority rule, minority shareholders, including 
institutions, would have almost no chance to prevail against the controller. 
Although the cumulative voting system has been introduced into Chinese 
company law, its effectiveness in practice is still in doubt. 
 
The earliest provision relating to cumulative voting can be found in the 
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, 2002. 
Article 31 provides: 
 
The election of directors shall fully reflect the opinions of 
minority shareholders. A cumulative voting system shall 
be earnestly advanced in shareholders‟ meetings for the 
election of directors. Listed companies that are more 
than 30% owned by controlling shareholders shall adopt 
a cumulative voting system, and the companies that do 
adopt such system shall stipulate the implementing rules 
for such cumulative system in their articles of 
                                                             
222 Rothber and Lilien (n 133) 160. 
223 Lilian Miles and Miao He, 'Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minority Shareholders in Listed 
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association.224 
 
A regulation has been adopted in the revised Chinese Company Law 
2005, whereby a cumulative voting system can be introduced to elect the 
members of the board of directors and supervisory board in accordance 
with the corporate articles.225 However, the implementation of cumulative 
voting design is not compulsory. Shareholders can reach any agreement 
on this issue in the company‟s articles of association. 
 
As mentioned above, the cumulative voting system can help minorities to 
have a say only when they control a certain proportion of company shares. 
In order to investigate whether such a voting design is likely to be 
effective, Gong randomly selected 10 samples from the top 100 Chinese 
listed companies.226 The result shows that the average shareholding by 
institutional investors in this sample is less than the minimum requirement 
(9.09 per cent), which means, disappointingly, that institutional 
shareholders will be unable to use cumulative voting to win a seat on the 
board. 
 
Moreover, Zhao notes that cumulative voting may result in disharmony 
within the board, because directors elected by cumulative votes would be 
separated into different groups. The corporate operation may suffer from 
serious disputes and endless debate. 227  Consequently, corporate 
efficiency will be negatively affected and the interests of minority 
shareholders may be harmed.  
 
As evidenced by empirical study, the voting system in China has not 
                                                             
224 CSRC, The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (2002), Article 31. 
225 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 106. 
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functioned as well as legislators expected, so that minority shareholders 
still have little say through the voting process.228 By 2010, there had not 
been a single case relating to the application of cumulative voting rights.229 
 
Apart from the uselessness of the cumulative voting system, this thesis 
holds the view that more specific mechanisms should be designed to 
compensate for the weakness of minority shareholders in participating in 
corporate operations. Detailed suggestions will be put forward in the 
concluding part of this chapter. 
 
2.2 Remedies by Shareholders 
 
2.2.1 Derivative Claim vs Shareholder Individual Claim 
 
As mentioned earlier, derivative claims are initiated by a shareholder but in 
the name of the company against the wrongdoers to the company. It 
should be noted that the derivative claim differs from individual claims 
raised by shareholders (Table 1). First, the claims are initiated under 
different names. In an individual shareholder claim, the claimant 
shareholder acts on his own behalf, whereas under a derivative claim the 
claimant is the company and the shareholder is just the instigator of the 
litigation. In other words, the claimant shareholder is a company 
representative when raising a derivative claim. Second, the subject matter 
of the two kinds of claim is different. An infringement of individual interests 
can only be litigated in court by an individual shareholder action. Personal 
interests or reflective loss cannot be compensated through a derivative 
claim. Finally, compensation obtained as a result of the lawsuit belongs to 
different entities under the two different types of claim. This difference 
                                                             
228 Yang, 'Shareholder Meetings and Voting Rights in China: Some Empirical Evidence' (n 186) 6. 
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might be one of the most important factors which the shareholder and his 
lawyer would take into consideration when deciding which claim to pursue. 
A claimant shareholder can receive compensation directly in an individual 
claim, while under a derivative claim, only the company can benefit 
directly. Following the success of such a claim, the shareholder, as an 
agent of the company bringing the litigation, can realize his interest via an 
increase in the share price or in extra dividends. Regarding this last point, 
it is still debatable whether the derivative claim mechanism is sufficient to 
motivate shareholders to intervene in corporate governance by monitoring 
the directors‟ activities.  
 
Items Derivative Claims Other Individual Claims 
initiated by shareholders 
Claimant The company with 
the shareholder as 
representative 
Shareholder 
Subject Matter of 
Litigation 
Wrongs done to the 
company 
Personal interest or 
reflective loss 
Allocation of 
Legal 
Compensation 
The company The claimant 
shareholder 
 
Table 1: Derivative Claims vs. Other Individual Claims Initiated by 
Shareholders 
 
It should be noted that, although the derivative claim provides a remedy 
for shareholders against wrongdoers, it inevitably carries the risk of abuse 
of rights of action for personal interests. Hence, a soundly-designed 
derivative claim should balance protection of shareholders‟ interest on the 
one hand and the stability of corporate operations on the other. In this 
section, attention is focused on this newly-transplanted legal mechanism, 
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the derivative claim, as it applies in China. The expectation of legislators is 
that the derivative claim should improve protection for shareholders, 
especially minority shareholders, in Chinese corporate practice. 
 
Looking back at the history of derivative claims around the world, it is 
obvious that there have been changes in attitude toward such litigation. 
More specifically, the issues of the locus standi requirement, the subject 
matter of litigation and the litigation procedure remain controversial. 
 
Generally speaking, UK courts have been conservative in relation to 
treating derivative claims, compared to their counterparts in the United 
States. The UK courts have strictly insisted on two fundamental principles 
set out in Foss v Harbottle:230 the independence of corporate personality 
and majority rule. Prior to the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), in common 
law the locus standi requirement meant that individuals could not bring 
lawsuits on behalf of the company for wrongs done to a company. 
Moreover, if corporate actions had been ratified by the shareholders under 
majority rule, a minority shareholder was not permitted to initiate a 
derivative claim unless he could successfully establish the existence of a 
„prejudicial operation‟ and „wrongdoer control‟. Once CA 2006 came into 
force, statute replaced common law in regulating derivative claims (Table 
2). According to the Secretary of State Alistair Darling: „This Act will help 
ensure Britain remains one of the best places in the world to set up and 
run a business. It makes sure the regulatory burden on business is “light-
touch”, promotes shareholder engagement and will help encourage a long-
term investment culture in the UK.‟231  
 
                                                             
230 (1843) 67 ER 189. 
231  A Darling, 'Consultation on Secondary Legislation' <http://www.dti.gov.uk/bbf/co-act-2006/index.html> 
accessed 16-07-2011. 
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 Common Law Statute (the CA 2006) 
Subject Matter of 
Litigation 
Exceptions to Foss s 260 
Conditions Establishing the existence of 
both „fraud on minority‟ and 
„control of the wrongdoer‟ 
Comply with the two-
stage proceeding 
Comments The statutory derivative claim extends the range of 
actions and increases the possibility of success by the 
claimant shareholder.  
 
Table 2: Derivative Claim under Common Law vs. Statute Derivative 
Claim 
 
The statutory derivative claim extends the subject matter of litigation. It 
also removes some restrictive conditions which were present in the 
common law. As such, it can be concluded that the possibility of a 
shareholder initiating a derivative claim was increased by CA 2006. 
Additionally, in order to prevent litigation rights being abused, CA 2006 
provides a two-stage proceeding as a safeguard. This two-stage 
proceeding can be briefly described as follows: at the first stage, if the 
claimant shareholder cannot establish a prima facie case, the application 
to continue the derivative claim will be dismissed by the court. If the 
claimant successfully passes the first stage, in the second stage the 
wrongdoer and the company will be asked to present their defences 
against the wrongs complained of. Consequently, the court decides 
whether the derivative claim should proceed to determination.  
 
However, in practice, the provisions relating to this two-stage procedure 
fail to provide clear criteria. For example, what is the exact requirement for 
establishing a prima facie case? In the second stage, how should the court 
Chapter Two: Minority Shareholders 
Page 89 of 415 
 
weigh all the matters listed under s.172 of CA 2006 to determine whether 
the director has breached the duty owed to the company? 232  The 
uncertainty of such criteria can ultimately result in doubt about the likely 
outcome of derivative claim. This appears to be a negative aspect of the 
remedy, which was designed to help shareholders to protect their 
companies‟ interests and was presumed to be efficient. Overall, this thesis 
agrees that the derivative claim under the CA 2006 provides the best 
remedy so far for shareholders to protect corporate interests against those 
who commit wrongs against the company. Therefore, it attempts to 
determine what aspects of the procedure could be used for the further 
reform of the Chinese corporate regime. 
 
In China, the derivative claim was introduced into the legal system under 
Art.152 of the CCL 2005, and has not yet been widely used in practice. 
Owing to the concentrated shareholding structure, the core issue of 
corporate governance in China is not the agency cost problem between 
the management and shareholders, but the conflict of interests between 
majority shareholder and minority counterparts. Thus, a soundly designed 
Chinese derivative claim should place greater emphasis on minority 
protection.   
 
Art.152 states: 
 
Where a director or a senior manager falls within the 
circumstances as mentioned in Article 150 of this Law, 
                                                             
232 S.172(1) of CA 2006 formulates several matters the director should also have regard to: (a) the likely 
consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company‟s employees, (c) the need to 
foster the company‟s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the 
company‟s operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the company maintaining 
a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the 
company. 
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shareholder(s) of a limited liability company, or those of a 
joint stock limited company separately or aggregately 
holding 1% or more of the total shares of the company 
for 180 consecutive days or more, may make a written 
demand to the board of supervisors or the supervisor in a 
limited liability company with no board of supervisors to 
initiate a lawsuit in the People‟s Court. Where a 
supervisor falls within the circumstances as mentioned in 
Article 150 of this Law, the aforesaid shareholder(s) may 
make a written demand to the board of directors or the 
executive director in a limited liability company with no 
board of directors to initiate a lawsuit in the People‟s 
Court. If the board of supervisors, the supervisor in the 
limited liability company with no board of supervisors, the 
board of directors, or the executive director in the limited 
liability company with no board of directors refuse(s) to 
initiate a lawsuit after receiving the shareholder‟s written 
demand as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, or 
fail(s) to initiate a lawsuit within 30 days after receiving 
such a demand, or if, in an emergency, the failure to 
initiate a lawsuit immediately will cause irrecoverable 
damage to the interests of the company, the aforesaid 
shareholder(s) may, on his/their own behalf, directly 
initiate a lawsuit for the interests of the company in the 
People‟s Court. Where the legal rights and interests of 
the company are impaired by a third party and any loss is 
caused to the company, the aforesaid shareholder(s) 
may initiate a lawsuit in the People‟s Court in accordance 
with the preceding two paragraphs. 
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Compared with the statutory derivative claim under CA 2006 in the UK, 
there remains an obvious difference in the Chinese provision. According to 
the CCL 2005, the claimant in a derivative claim is restricted not only by a 
locus standi requirement but also by a procedure, named demand rule, 
which ensures the shareholder has exhausted internal remedies before 
bringing the claim to the court. In other words, according to current 
regulations, it is not easy for Chinese shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders, to initiate such action before the court. 
 
2.2.2 The Locus Standi Requirement 
 
In this section, the key issue to be discussed is who qualifies to bring a 
derivative claim, or, alternatively, what is the locus standi requirement for a 
derivative claim in the two jurisdictions. As previously mentioned, it must 
be remembered that the derivative claim is a special litigation mechanism 
to protect shareholders‟ interests. However, business should not be 
inhibited by unmeritorious claims and speculative claims. Therefore, 
certain safeguards need to be established. One of these is the locus 
standi requirement. The „proper claimant rule‟ ensures that the litigation is 
pursued on behalf of, and any damages are awarded to, the company, 
rather than shareholders. 
 
(1) The Locus Standi Requirement in the UK 
There is almost no qualification necessary for the initiation of a derivative 
claim according under UK law, as long as the requirement of being a 
member of the company is fulfilled. No additional restriction, such as 
holding a minimum proportion of shares or a minimum shareholding 
period, is required.  
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Indeed, somebody who becomes a member of the company after the 
wrong has occurred is still able to initiate a derivative claim as long as he 
retains his membership when he brings the claim to court. In contrast, a 
derivative claim initiated by somebody who is no longer a member of the 
company will not be permitted to continue, even if the wrong complained 
of occurred when he was a member. Therefore, being a member can be 
concluded as the only locus standi requirement for initiating a derivative 
claim in the UK. 
 
(2) The Locus Standi Requirements in China 
Regarding derivative claims, CCL 2005 lists a series of locus standi 
requirements as one of the safeguards to prevent unmeritorious suits. 
These safeguards are formulated in two categories: (a) minimum 
shareholding percentage; and (b) minimum shareholding period. 
 
Moreover, these locus standi requirements are divided into different 
standards for different company types. Shareholder(s) of a Joint Stock 
Company (hereafter JSC) must hold separately or aggregately no less 
than 1% of the total shares for a minimum of 180 days,233 whereas there is 
no such limitation on the shareholder(s) in a Limited Liability Company 
(hereafter LLC). In other words, any shareholder in a LLC is capable of 
bringing a derivative claim under Art.152 of CCL 2005. However, all the 
listed companies focused upon in this thesis are formed as JSCs. 
Therefore, minority shareholders in listed companies are bound by this 
legal requirement. 
 
One important reason for these requirements is that legislators have 
                                                             
233 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 152(1). 
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considered the fact that the shareholders in JSCs have the choice and 
flexibility to leave the company by selling the shares they hold on a stock 
exchange. Shareholders in LLCs, in most cases, are bound by the 
constitution of the company and need the agreement of other 
shareholders to leave the company, either by transferring their shares to 
others or by asking the company to buy out their shares.234  
 
However, this thesis argues that selling company shares in order to leave 
is not an appropriate choice for shareholders of a JSC as an alternative to 
a derivative claim when wrong has been done to the company, because 
the contested wrong would normally result in an infringement of the 
company‟s interests and be accompanied afterwards by a drop in the 
share price. Therefore, selling shares at this point would probably incur a 
financial loss. In addition, such a financial loss would be defined as a 
failure of investment, which cannot be compensated via any claims. Seen 
from this viewpoint, the possibility of transferring shares in a stock 
exchange should not become a reason for setting a higher locus standi 
requirement for shareholders in JSCs.  It is suggested here that the real 
rationale could be consideration of the political aim to stabilize the financial 
market. In China, stability, or so-called „harmony‟, is one of the most 
important targets of social development, and a key factor in promoting 
development. Preventing companies from too many speculative or 
unmeritorious claims by raising the locus standi requirements could 
ensure the stability of the day-to-day operations of JSCs. Accordingly, the 
company would be able to concentrate more on its business operations, 
achieving better profits; and consequently shareholders could earn a 
relatively higher premium on the stock market to realize their investment. 
As such, it could ultimately achieve harmony in society as a whole. 
                                                             
234 Ibid, Article 72; Also see, Z Y Zhang, 'The Rule of Derivative Actions in the Company Law Reform 
Proposal Draft 2005' (2005) 5 Company Lawyer 52, 52. 
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 Shareholding Percentage 
The locus standi requirement for a percentage shareholding, which as 
mentioned above sets a threshold of holding separately or aggregately not 
less than one per cent of the company‟s shares, could be problematic in 
practice. As argued by this thesis, it might be too restrictive for minority 
shareholders to permit them to exercise their rights. 
 
First of all, the statutory minimum shareholding of one per cent might be 
too high in the Chinese context. Apart from the top three shareholders, 
hardly any individual shareholder can meet the one per cent 
requirement.235 According to a survey of the ownership structure of listed 
companies in China conducted by Yang in 2006, the average proportion of 
shares held by the largest shareholder is in excess of 45%, the second 
largest holding is about five per cent and the third about three per cent; 
after that, no individual shareholder holds more than one per cent.236 In 
listed companies with a relatively dispersed shareholding structure,237 it is 
especially uncommon to find individual shareholders who meet such 
minimum requirement. The tremendous expense and cost in time also 
dissuades minority shareholders from acting collectively. Therefore, in the 
real business world the minimum requirement lacks practicability. 
 
Secondly, the one per cent requirement is fixed, regardless of size or 
scale, which creates inequity between the shareholders in large JSCs and 
those in small ones. In some large JSCs, hundreds of millions of shares 
might be needed to meet the one per cent requirement, whereas in small 
                                                             
235 F Ma, 'The Deficiencies of Derivative Actions in China' (2010) 31 Company Lawyer 150, 152. 
236 Ibid. Also see, Jinzhu Yang, 'The Role of Shareholders in Enforcing Director‟s Duties: A Comparative 
Study of the United Kingdom and China (Part 2)' (2006) 17 International Company and Commercial Law 
Review 381, 390. 
237 Such listed companies are normally those reformed from State Owned Enterprises. 
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JSCs, the figure could be only a few million. This means that minority 
shareholders in large listed companies may face greater obstacles against 
initiating a derivative claim under the same regulation.238 
 
When evaluating the statutory locus standi requirement of a percentage 
shareholding in China, it could be concluded that such a restriction 
precludes not only unmeritorious and speculative claims, but also a certain 
number of reasonable claims, due to the difficulty for minority shareholders 
to fulfil the requirement.  
 
 Shareholding Period 
To initiate a derivative claim, a shareholder in a JSC has to meet not only 
the minimum shareholding percentage, but also the statutory shareholding 
period requirement. Art.152 of the CCL 2005 stipulates a minimum period 
of 180 days before the day when the litigation is initiated.239 This design 
clearly aims to avoid abuse of the litigation right and to promote long-term 
investment. For example, with no such limitation on the shareholding 
period, a business competitor would be able to bring a derivative claim 
immediately after purchasing an adequate percentage of the company‟s 
shares for the purpose of achieving a negative impact on the company‟s 
reputation. 
 
However, it might be argued that the length of the shareholding 
requirement, 180 days, is inappropriate. Research by a Chinese scholar 
has shown that the average shareholding period on the stock market is 
less than four months: that is, 120 days.240 In other words, ex facto, most 
                                                             
238 Bin Hu and Shunming Cao, 'Gudong Paisheng Susong de Helixing Jichu Yu Zhidu Sheji [The Reasonable 
Basis and Design of Rules on Shareholders' Derivative  Actions]' (2004) 4 Faxue Yanjiu [Cass Journal of 
Law] 92, 93. 
239 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 152(1). 
240 J Xin, Shareholding Structure and Corporate Governance in Listed Companies (CFP 2005), 143-144. 
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shareholders of Chinese listed companies would not meet the 
shareholding period requirement of 180 days.  
 
Taking into account both the shareholding percentage and shareholding 
period requirements, few shareholders of Chinese listed companies would 
be able to initiate a derivative claim in the light of Art.152, even if the claim 
would indeed be in the interests of the company. However, it can also be 
argued that lowering or abolishing these requirements would mean that 
the current Chinese derivative claim procedure would face harder 
challenges from the abuse of litigation rights. One possible solution to this 
dilemma might be the introduction of a floating limitation. Simply put, this 
would mean that the greater the shareholding, the shorter the holding 
period should be. For example, if a shareholder owns five per cent of a 
company‟s shares, far more than the statutory minimum requirement of 
one per cent, he would be allowed to satisfy the locus standi requirement 
with a relatively short shareholding period, less than the current statutory 
minimum of 180 days. In fact, the flexible floating requirement would lower 
the locus standi requirement to initiate a derivative claim in China and 
could, consequently, result in a higher rate of litigation under the derivative 
claim, following wrongdoing to the company.241 
 
2.2.3 Subject Matter of Litigation 
 
(1) The Subject Matter of Litigation in the UK 
Under CA 2006, the common law conceptions of „fraud on the minority‟ 
and „control of the wrongdoer‟ have been discarded and replaced by 
judicial discretion to grant leave to bring a derivative claim, which is to be 
                                                             
241 More detailed investigation of floating requirement could see, Zhong Zhang, 'Making Shareholder 
Derivative Actions Happen in China: How Should Lawsuits Be Funded?' (2008) 38 Hong Kong LJ 523, 529; 
and James Kirkbride, Steve Letza and Clive Smallman, 'Minority Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Reflections on the Derivative Action in the UK, the USA and in China' (2009) 51 International Journal of 
Law and Management 206, 215. 
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exercised by reference to statutory criteria set out in ss. 261-263 of the CA 
2006.242 More importantly, under the CA 2006, a defendant director does 
not have to gain individual benefits from the wrong of which the claimant 
complains. Some lawyers are concerned that if directors fail to have 
regard to one of the factors in s.172, or place undue weight on others, they 
might be brought before a court under a derivative claim. 243  In other 
words, breach of almost any duty, or „mere negligence‟, is potentially 
actionable, and the statutory codification of directors‟ duties expands the 
scope for derivative claims.244 To some extent, this was designed for more 
effective shareholder control of the directors‟ activities. 
 
Moreover, in common law, Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding245 provides that, 
generally speaking, a shadow director has no duties unless a special 
responsibility is assumed regarding a particular asset in the case, while he 
would bear the same responsibility as an ordinary director under CA 2006.  
 
The conclusion could be drawn that, as regards subject matters of 
litigation in the UK, with the passage of the CA 2006, shareholders now 
have fewer limitations on bringing a derivative claim. In the view of this 
thesis, this should have a positive impact on promoting better corporate 
governance. 
 
(2) Subject Matter of Litigation in China 
The subject matter of derivative claims under CCL 2005 in China is similar 
                                                             
242 Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey, 'Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed: an Analysis of 
the New Derivative Action under the Companies Act 2006' (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 469, 469. 
243 Gary Milner-Moore and Rupert Lewis, '"In the Line of Fire" - Directors' Duties under the Companies Act 
2006' <http://uk.practicallaw.com/9-213-2952?source=relatedcontent> accessed 12-03-2012, 11. 
244 J P Sykes, 'The Continuing Paradox: A Critique of Minority Shareholder and Derivative Claims Under the 
Companies Act 2006' (2010) 29 Civil Justice Quarterly 205, 215. 
245 [2005] EWHC 1638 (CH). 
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to that regulated by CA 2006, with a broader scope of action. A 
shareholder can bring a derivative claim against any director, supervisor or 
senior manager for the reason that their conduct violates laws, 
administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company, 
and thereby has caused damage to the company.246 Moreover, the CCL 
2005 provides that such derivative claims can also be initiated against any 
other person who has infringed the interests of the company and caused 
damage to it.247 
 
The problem here is in the definitions of some key concepts; for example, 
„the duty of diligence‟ and „any other person‟, which have not been tested 
or interpreted by law. Consequently, the current subject matter of litigation 
remains uncertain. 
 
Taking the breach of the duty of diligence as an example, the uncertainty 
of legal concepts could be problematic in practice. Art.148 of the CCL 
2005 stipulates that directors owe a duty of diligence to the company, but 
fails to specify either a definition or any criteria for this. As such, it could be 
hard to distinguish a breach of diligence from a mere bad business 
decision. As a result, day-to-day operations may suffer, because directors 
may be reluctant to take some risky decisions, even though these may be 
profitable. In order to overcome the uncertainty relating to the issue of 
breach of the duty of diligence, it is highly recommended that the Chinese 
legal system adopt the concept of business judgment rule, which 
originated in the United States.248 According to this rule, which has the 
intention of „stimulating risk taking, innovation and other creative 
                                                             
246 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 150. 
247 Ibid, Article 152(3). 
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entrepreneurial activities‟,249 if a director is found to have acted without 
self-interest, in an informed manner and with the rational belief that the 
decision was in the best interests of the company in a business matter, he 
will not be found to be negligent.250 
 
However, in common with the UK, the current regulations defining the 
subject matter of litigation in China could be considered as satisfactory 
overall, given that it improves the legal protections of shareholders.  
 
2.2.4 Litigation Procedure of Derivative Claims 
 
In this section, the litigation procedures for derivative claims in the two 
jurisdictions are investigated separately. There are two key issues to 
consider here: (1) whether the litigation procedure makes it practicable for 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders, to achieve the legislative 
aim of providing them with an efficient remedy to protect their interests; 
and (2) whether the litigation procedure effectively precludes unmeritorious 
and speculative claims so as to maintain the stable operation of the 
company. 
 
(1) The Two-stage Procedure in the UK 
The CA 2006 introduced a new two-stage procedure for a claimant to 
obtain leave to pursue a derivative action.251 In the first stage, an ex parte 
application is made to the court for consideration of the shareholder‟s 
evidence only; the claim should be struck out if a prima facie case is not 
                                                             
249 American Law Institute, „Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations‟ 
(Publication Catalog 2008) <http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=88> 
accessed 15-08-2011, 76. 
250 Aronson v Lewis (1984) 473 A. 2d 805. 
251 Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r.19.9. 
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established, and the court can make an appropriate order for costs.252 If it 
succeeds in passing the first stage, the application moves to the second 
stage, in which the court has discretion as to whether to allow the claim to 
proceed.253 Certain aspects should be considered by the court here, in 
particular: 
 
(a) Whether the member is acting in good faith in seeking 
to continue the claim; 
(b) The importance that a person acting in accordance 
with section 172 (duty to promote the success of the 
company) would attach to continuing it; 
(c) Where the cause of action results from an act or 
omission that is yet to occur, whether the act or omission 
could be, and in the circumstances would be likely to be: 
(i) Authorised by the company before it occurs, or 
(ii) Ratified by the company after it occurs; 
(d) Where the cause of action arises from an act or 
omission that has already occurred, whether the act or 
omission could be, and in the circumstances would be 
likely to be, ratified by the company; 
(e) Whether the company has decided not to pursue the 
claim; 
(f) Whether the act or omission in respect of which the 
claim is brought gives rise to a course of action that the 
member could pursue in his own right rather than on 
behalf of the company. 254 
 
                                                             
252 The Companies Act 2006, s.261(2). 
253 Ibid, s.261(3). 
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The criteria formulated by the legislation are not exhaustive; for example 
the views of disinterested members should also be considered as a 
whole. 255  However, permission (or leave) must be refused if the court 
believes a person under the duty to promote the success of the company 
would not seek to continue the claim or if the wrong complained of has 
been authorized or ratified.256 
 
The two main controversial issues relating to this two-stage procedure are 
(a) how to judge whether the claimant has established a prima facie case; 
and (b) how to weigh the matters listed in the second stage under s.263 
(3). 
 
 Prima Facie Case 
Generally speaking, the court would prefer to allow derivative claims to 
proceed at this initial stage. The evidence which the court decision is 
based on is provided by the claimant, ex parte. According to recent 
research, there is little evidence from the UK case law that the test has 
presented a significant obstacle to minority shareholders. 257  The total 
number of reported judgments on derivative claims is small, but among 
them there have been few cases in which a shareholder has failed to 
establish a prima facie case.258 However, Reed has criticized this fact, 
stating that, „obliged to decide the issue on inadequate evidence, the 
Courts have been much too willing to permit the continuation of derivative 
claims in circumstances that are far from exceptional‟.259 
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So far, there remains uncertainty as to what exactly the first stage of the 
proceeding requires. In common law，the requirements for establishing a 
prima facie case on its merits are not set at a high level; „all the courts will 
require is for the applicant to demonstrate: a credible case; a substantive 
claim; a genuine triable issue; and that his case is worthy of being heard in 
full‟.260 On appeal in the Scottish case of Wishart v Castlecroft Securities 
Ltd, 261  the court demonstrated a liberal view of the prima facie case 
requirement, by stating that: 
 
…[T]he question is not whether the application and 
supporting evidence disclose a prima facie case against 
the defenders to the proposed derivative proceedings, but 
whether there is no prima facie case disclosed for granting 
the application for leave [permission in England]. 
 
Put simply, according to the viewpoint of the Scottish judges, it is not 
compulsory for shareholders to prove that they have established a prima 
facie case, but if the court is satisfied that there is not a prima facie case, 
there should be refusal. In addition, the judgment specifies the matters 
which must be taken into account.262 
 
To determine whether the applicant has established a prima facie case, 
some factors in s.263 (2) (3) and (4) can be taken into account. However, 
the consequent question is whether considering those factors under s.263 
might lead to a „mini-trial‟ in the first stage, which would be time consuming 
and expensive.263 This would deviate from the model of the derivative 
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claim favoured by legislators. Furthermore, taking into account that there 
is no great difference between establishing a prima facie case and s.263 
(2) (a), some scholars have argued that there is little need to establish a 
prima facie case.264 
 
As such, if the two-stage procedure for derivative claims is still to be 
considered as the most important safeguard against unmeritorious and 
speculative claims, the criterion of having established a prima facie case 
needs more clarity, whether by case law or by amendment to the statute.  
 
 Good Faith 
In common law, the claimant shareholder must be acting in good faith 
when initiating a derivative claim, although this requirement has been 
criticized as uncertain and unworkable.265 Unlike „wrongdoer control‟ and 
„fraud on minority‟, the legal concept of „good faith‟ has been inherited by 
CA 2006, under s.263(3)(a). However, the good faith requirement under 
s.263(3)(a) of CA 2006 is also controversial. Hannigan has pointed out 
that „the vulture hedge fund and opportunistic shareholder may have 
difficulty in meeting this good faith requirement‟, to some extent, but they 
do qualify to initiate a derivative claim in practice.266  
 
It should be remembered that, sometimes, it is quite hard to distinguish 
between the personal interest of a shareholder and his interest in 
promoting the success of the company. For example, taking into account 
the fact that the legal concept of „success of the company‟ has not been 
defined explicitly, it would be hard to conclude that an expectation of 
                                                             
264 David Gibbs, 'Has the Statutory Derivative  Claim Fulfilled Its Objectives? A Prima Facie Case and the 
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265 Arad Reisberg, 'Theoretical Reflections on Derivative Actions in English Law: The Representative 
Problem' (2006) 3 European Company & Financial Law Review 69, 101. 
266 Brenda Hannigan, The Derivative Claim: An Invitation to Litigate? (Butterworths 2009) para.4.69. 
Chapter Two: Minority Shareholders 
Page 104 of 415 
 
making more profit is merely an individual interest of the shareholder. 
Therefore, the question arising from Hannigan‟s statement is whether the 
permission would be definitely refused on the ground of a lack of good 
faith if the claimant shareholder holds any individual interest or a collateral 
motivation for initiating a derivative claim.  
 
So far, the case law indicates that the existence of such ulterior motivation 
would not definitely be regarded as a lack of good faith, as long as the 
litigation could consequently benefit the company.267 In Mission Capital v 
Sinclair,268 it was argued that the claimant shareholders were seeking to 
bring a derivative claim simply to obtain the benefit of a costs indemnity,269 
while in Iesini & Ors v Westrip Holding Ltd & Ors270 it was argued that the 
shareholders brought the claim for the benefit of a third party instead of 
the company, since they were funded by that party. However, in neither 
case were these collateral motivations considered relevant, since the 
claim had also been brought in the interests of the company. As such, the 
conclusion can be drawn that a personal motivation attached to the 
willingness to benefit the company is sometimes acceptable by the court. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that the good faith requirement is 
without doubt fulfilled if the company could be ultimately benefited by the 
litigation. Good faith could still be absent if the shareholder is found to 
conduct the action in an abusive or unreasonable manner.271 
 
In regard to this issue, the practice in Australia indicates that the courts 
may consider two sides of the same coin in examining „good faith‟: first, 
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the claimant‟s genuine belief that there are good grounds for suing should 
be examined; and secondly, the court should consider whether the 
claimant has a selfish interest in bringing an action that would constitute 
an abuse of process.272 It should be pointed out that the requirement of 
acting in good faith on behalf of the company is quite similar to that 
formulated under s.263(3)(b), that is, whether a hypothetical director would 
continue the action. Some scholars argue that, if the action could benefit 
the company, it is less likely that the court will find that good faith is 
absent, whereas if it is not in the company‟s interests the contrary 
conclusion is more likely to be drawn.273  
 
 The Duties Under s.172 of CA 2006 
Hitherto, directors‟ duties were set out in 250 years‟ of accumulated case 
law, leading to „considerable confusion amongst director [because] three 
quarters thought that directors‟ duties were difficult to understand‟. 274 
However, under the CA 2006, for the first time part of directors‟ duties were 
codified in statute law. Under CA 2006 s.172, a duty is imposed on 
directors to promote the success of the company and to take an array of 
considerations into account during its daily operation. 275 Any purported 
failure of directors to „have regard‟ to such factors or to give them 
                                                             
272 Ian M Ramsay and Benjamin B Saunders, 'Litigation by Shareholders and Directors: an Empirical Study 
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appropriate weight might result in a derivative claim initiated by a 
shareholder who is „seeking judicial review, in effect, of a commercial 
decision of management‟.276 
 
The key issue in the second stage of the procedure is that the court must 
decide whether or not the defendant director has breached the duties he 
owes to the company. Hence, the question of which test the court uses to 
determine this, a subjective one or an objective one, becomes crucial in 
practice. Hannigan has suggested that the hypothetical test is for the court 
„to look at the matter from a subjective perspective of the hypothetical 
director acting to promote the success of the company‟. 277  However, 
Reisberg holds the same view as Lord Goldsmith, that: 
 
[T]he test of whether a claim is a sensible one to bring, 
which is what s.263 (3) (b) deals with, is objective, since, by 
definition, what is at issue is whether the director acted 
properly. It is coupled with a series of tests which are 
designed to look at what the company actually wants.278 
 
According to the two statements above, even Lord Goldsmith, who 
supports the objective test, also admits that the company‟s actual wants 
need to be investigated. In other words, each derivative claim should be 
considered on the basis of the actual situation of the company involved, 
not that of some abstract company.  
 
In short, what the judge will do in this stage, as understood by this thesis, 
is to act as a hypothetical director who has equal professional capability 
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and owes the same duty to the company, as the real director, to make a 
decision based on evidence presented by both parties in the litigation. 
During such decision making, corporate social responsibility, the interests 
of employees, the interests of creditors and so on should also be taken 
into account in order to promote the success of the company. If the 
decision made by the judge, alternatively named a hypothetical director, is 
in accordance with what the real director did, there should be no violation 
of directors‟ duties under s.172 of CA 2006; if not, the real director should 
take responsibility for breach of his duties.  
 
 Independent Shareholders 
Another issue to be cleared up about the second stage is the concept of 
„independent member‟. Under s.263(4), the court is asked to consider the 
views of members of the company who have no personal interest, direct or 
indirect, in the matter.279 The question here is who, in practice, should be 
considered as independent members. 
 
Generally speaking, derivative claims affect the interests of every member 
of a company. For a listed company, derivative claims are likely to have 
some influence on the share price. Hence, the interests of members of the 
company suffer a collateral impact of the litigation. As to private 
companies, derivative claims have influence on the business‟s reputation 
and corporate management, so as a consequence such claims also 
impact indirectly on the members. According to such concerns, only by 
defining the concept of „independent member‟ more explicitly can provision 
s.263 (4) be made more practicable. 
 
Justice Lewison underlines the difficulty of understanding the meaning of 
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s.263 (4). In Iesini, he stated that: 
 
[I] am of the opinion that it was referring to those members 
who were not implicated in the alleged wrongdoing and who 
did not stand to benefit otherwise than in their capacity as 
members of the company.280 
 
This is undeniably a practicable way to understand the provision. 
However, according to the understanding of this thesis, it is not necessary 
to give specific concern to the views of these independent members. The 
reason is that the viewpoints of such members could be fully taken into 
account via voting in relation to the wrongs complained of, such as voting 
to authorize or ratify. Even if they have not been fully presented, their 
interests should be considered by the hypothetical director as a part of the 
interests of the company as a whole.  
 
 Summary of the Two-stage Procedure in the UK 
Although there remain some uncertainties in the regulations under CA 
2006, it is clear that the two-stage procedure has not become an obvious 
obstacle to a shareholder bringing a derivative claim. Instead, those 
uncertainties mainly result in a failure to effectively prohibit unmeritorious 
and speculative claims. In the context of the UK, where shareholder 
activism is valued, such regulations could be regarded as a kind of 
encouragement for shareholders to get involved in corporate governance. 
 
(2) The Procedure in China under Article 152 of CCL 2005  
In the Chinese legal system, there is no special litigation procedure with 
regard to derivative claims comparable to the two-stage procedure in the 
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UK. However, Art.152 of the CCL 2005 stipulates a demand rule for the 
shareholder to be able to bring the claim to the court.281 Put simply, it is 
compulsory to exhaust the possibility of internal remedy before bringing 
the lawsuit.  
 
The demand rule originated from relevant law in the United States.282 The 
rule reflects a preference for leaving to the directors the decision whether 
to bring a claim for the wrongs done to the company, because the directors 
know the company‟s exact situation better than anybody else. Of course, it 
might also reflect judicial reluctance to intervene in the company‟s affairs.  
 
Several issues relating to the current Chinese demand rule need to be 
raised. First of all, Art.152 of the CCL 2005 fails to formulate the necessary 
content of the demand to be sent by shareholders to the board of 
supervisors or the board of directors, for example whether the shareholder 
should identify the wrongdoer and provide some evidence to prove his 
allegation, and whether he should put forward the remedial relief in the 
demand. Without such detailed requirements on the content of the 
demand, it may be very difficult for the board of supervisors or the board of 
directors to determine whether the wrong complained of should be litigated 
in the interests of the company. Moreover, if the boards make the decision 
not to initiate a claim against the wrongdoer on the ground of inadequate 
information provided by the shareholders, the latter are still capable of 
bringing the claim to court in the name of the company in the light of 
Art.152. As such, it is pointless to require shareholders to exhaust internal 
remedies before initiating a derivative claim. 
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Secondly, in China there is no clear mechanism for shareholders to take 
over existing litigation. Deadlock is likely to be the result if the wrongdoing 
director or the actual controlling shareholder has brought a claim for 
wrongdoing but with no positive actions in the litigation: under the CCL 
2005 other shareholders who do act in the interest of the company can do 
nothing besides wait. Under this legal system, a wrongdoing director or the 
majority shareholder would be able to evade legal punishment by bringing 
a claim against themselves or looking for some qualified shareholder to 
initiate a derivative claim against them before sitting on the claim. For 
example, when a claim has been brought to court, the claimant might fail 
to provide effective evidence so that the defendant director might 
consequently avoid legal scrutiny. This legal loophole could be a crucial 
defect of derivative claims in China. In the UK, the problem does not arise 
because shareholders are allowed by law to take over ineffective 
actions.283  
 
Thirdly, it could be problematic that the board of supervisors or the board 
of directors is given a maximum of 30 days by statute law to consider the 
allegation of wrongdoing made by shareholders. Apart from the loophole 
concerning requirements for the content of the demand mentioned above, 
it should be noted that the time needed for such consideration is different 
for companies of different sizes. Generally speaking, listed companies are 
bigger than LLCs and therefore they are given a longer period for the 
decision-making process. The principle behind setting limitations on the 
duration of decision making would seem to be „the sooner the better‟, but 
with the condition that the duration should also be adequate for the board 
to investigate the factors involved in detail and make a rational decision. 
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However, the 30-day limitation under current Chinese company law might 
be too long for most small LLCs. As a result, the company may incur 
irreversible loss due to the delay in the shareholders‟ bringing of a claim 
on behalf of the company. On the other hand, for big companies, such as 
listed companies, the maximum of 30 days may be inadequate for boards 
to investigate the wrong complained of. Although Art.152 (2) stipulates that 
the demand requirement can be avoided in „emergency situations‟ or 
„when the damage to the company will be irrecoverable if shareholders do 
not bring proceedings immediately‟, 284  it has never been applied in 
practice without uncertainty. The reason for this is that the law fails to give 
a definition of „emergency situations‟ or to clarify in what situation „the 
damage will be irrecoverable if shareholders do not bring proceedings 
immediately‟. As a consequence of such uncertainty, it can be difficult to 
estimate the possibility of exemption from the 30-day limitation based on 
the facts of a specific case. 
 
Last but not least, it has been argued that the demand rule is an 
unnecessary procedure. Overall, reviewing the provisions relating to it, it 
will be seen that as long as the board of supervisors or directors decides 
not to sue the wrongdoer, or alternatively, the shareholders simply wait for 
the expiration of the 30-day time limitation after sending the demand to the 
board, they will be capable of initiating a derivative claim under the name 
of the company. That is to say, the demand rule does not preclude 
unmeritorious or speculative claims. Contrary to expectation, unfortunately, 
the demand rule might improperly delay the bringing of claims, thereby 
causing irreversible loss. As a short conclusion to this section, this thesis 
suggests that the 30-day time limitation should be deleted in the next 
reform of Chinese company law. 
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2.2.5 Selected Financial Issues 
 
This section discusses the costs to the claimant shareholder of bringing a 
derivative claim, in both the UK and China. There is a consensus that 
financial concerns are one of the key issues related to the practicability of 
derivative claims. It is hard to encourage shareholders to participate in 
corporate governance without any financial support.  
 
(1) Indemnity Orders in the UK 
In the UK, the position on costs in relation to statutory derivative claims 
remains unchanged from common law, by which a minority shareholder 
with a reasonable bona fide claim may be indemnified as to costs by the 
company where the company would benefit from the claim. 285  In 
Wallersteiner v Moir (No.2), Buckley L.J. held that: 
 
where a shareholder has in good faith and on reasonable 
grounds sued as a plaintiff in a minority shareholder‟s 
action, the benefit of which, if successful, will accrue to the 
company and only indirectly to the plaintiff as a member of 
the company, and which it would have been reasonable for 
an independent board of directors to bring in the company‟s 
name, it would, I think, clearly be a proper exercise of 
judicial discretion to order the company to pay the plaintiff‟s 
costs.286 
 
The reason for providing such an indemnity order to minority shareholders, 
whether or not they are successful, is that they have little to gain but much 
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to lose. As mentioned above, a derivative claim is initiated by a 
shareholder on behalf of the company and the legal outcome accrues to 
the company directly. Briefly put, the claimant shareholder will not achieve 
any individual interest directly via litigation, whereas if he loses the claim 
he has to pay the cost of litigation. Clearly, such an allocation of risks is 
unfair to the claimant shareholder.  
 
However, an analysis of how the indemnity cost order operates shows the 
serious flaws in the operation of such orders:  
 
(a) Obtaining an indemnity order does not completely 
suppress the funding problem; 
(b) It does not provide a positive inducement to litigate; and 
(c) There is also little likelihood that this will encourage 
shareholders to opt for the derivative action in lieu of 
s.459 proceedings. 287 
 
Reisberg also argues that without any individual reward or element of 
compensation, the claimant shareholder would not have any substantive 
incentive to initiate a derivative claim.288 Yet, the defendant director whose 
conduct is complained of would not have any concerns about litigation 
costs because they are paid by the company. Although, according to CA 
2006 s.205(1), the defendant director has to repay the cost if the derivative 
claim against him is successful, he may still have some advantages during 
the action. For example, he may receive better legal assistance, being 
able to hire the best lawyers at the expense of the company. Nevertheless, 
in the view of this thesis, implementation of the indemnity cost order is 
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better than nothing. 
 
(2) Financial Issues in China 
In general, litigation costs in China consist of two main parts: the payment 
to the court, such as filing fees, application fees for enforcement of the 
court‟s judgments and other statutory fees;289 and payment to the lawyers. 
The filing fees are based on a percentage with no upper limit and 
calculated on a sliding scale according to the amount of the claim.290 The 
principle of cost allocation is that the loser has to bear the payment to the 
court and each party pays its lawyers‟ fees separately.291 Accordingly, in 
China, a shareholder who plans to initiate a derivative claim has to 
undertake not only the financial risk of losing the litigation, normally 
involving the filing fees of the court, but also the payment to his lawyer, 
even if the claim is successful.  
 
In addition, the filing fees and other statutory fees must be paid at the 
moment when the claimant brings an action. Due to the high filing fees, 
many individual minority shareholders are restricted from seeking large 
amounts of compensation for their company. Although the law allows the 
claimant shareholder to apply for a reduction of or exemption from the 
filing fees,292 in practice lawyers advise against this on the grounds that 
such a request may be viewed unfavourably, since the courts rely heavily 
on these fees for their operation.293 
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As such, the financial issue is one of the key problems behind the 
ineffectiveness in practice of derivative claims in China. Few minority 
shareholders can afford the financial cost to initiate a derivative claim. 
Accordingly, this thesis suggests that in the next legal reform Chinese 
legislators follow the UK example and introduce the cost indemnity order. 
 
2.3 Conclusion and Suggestions 
 
According to Bainbridge, the system of corporate governance is designed 
to function largely without shareholder input. 294  However, with the 
separation of ownership and management, it is inevitable, sometimes, that 
the shareholder will intervene in the day-to-day operations in order to 
reduce agency costs. 
 
After reviewing the development of institutional shareholder activism in the 
Anglo-American countries, this thesis takes the view that such activism 
would help to improve the quality of corporate governance. Taking into 
account the special characteristics of the Chinese context, institutional 
shareholder activism may also be helpful in achieving better governance, 
especially regarding minority protection, if the shareholding requirement 
could be lowered and further improvements in the procedure could be 
implemented by law. 
 
This thesis puts forward the following suggestions for further reforms in 
corporate governance in China in terms of shareholder activism. 
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(1) With reference to shareholding structure, it is worth noting the 
suggestion by Tenev et al., that the Chinese government transform state-
held shares into non-voting shares or restrained-voting shares.295 In this 
way, the voting process could become the real instrument of shareholder 
democracy and the weight of the votes of minority shareholders could be 
increased. 
 
(2) In spite of the shortcomings of the cumulative voting system in 
Chinese law, this thesis maintains that improving voting mechanisms is the 
right direction for the further development of Chinese corporate 
governance. Relevant to this argument is the fact that in Malaysia, a 
jurisdiction with the same concentrated shareholding structure, scholars 
are calling for the introduction of a cumulative voting mechanism to protect 
its minority shareholders.296  
 
In order to improve the cumulative voting mechanism for minority 
protection in practice, Zhao proposes an upgraded model, the „Threshold 
Voting‟ system.297 Under this mechanism, a „minimum supporting rate‟ is 
required in the first round of voting for election to the board. If the 
candidate satisfies the minimum condition, there is no need to vote again; 
but if the candidate fails to reach the minimum supporting rate in the first 
round, a second round of voting, implemented under the cumulative voting 
system, takes place. Using such a voting mechanism, the likelihood that 
majority shareholders will win all the seats on the board will be decreased, 
since the controlling shareholder is forced to nominate those candidates 
who will also receive the support of minority shareholders. Otherwise, the 
candidate may fail to obtain the minimum supporting rate in the first round, 
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and then lose in the subsequent cumulative round. On the other hand, 
each member of the board will balance the interests of majority and 
minority shareholders, since he needs the support of both. Hence, under 
this mechanism, both the interests of minority shareholders and the 
prosperity of the company can be ensured simultaneously. 
 
(3) Chinese company law should be revised to be more detailed in 
terms of shareholders‟ rights. Based on empirical research, Huang and Wu 
argue that it is hard to determine the benefit of granting shareholders‟ 
rights in law, given the concern of long-term corporate development. 
Therefore, they suggest that it should be left to the company‟s articles to 
decide the range of shareholders‟ rights, rather than having these 
formulated in law.298 They further note that in China there is too much 
stipulation of shareholder rights in law and administrative regulations, 
leaving little room for companies to decide their own levels of shareholder 
rights.299 
 
Admittedly, corporate autonomy could be the best model. However, in a 
jurisdiction such as China, where corporate governance has been 
introduced only relatively recently, more detailed regulations are necessary 
to promote further development and avoid unnecessary problems. In 
addition, this thesis argues that, while current Chinese company law does 
have many provisions relating to shareholders‟ rights, they are not 
sufficiently detailed. More guidance is needed; otherwise, shareholders, 
especially the minorities who are normally not professional market 
participants, may find their rights difficult to exercise.  
 
For instance, the right to appoint a proxy has been introduced in Chinese 
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company law, but no detailed guidance is provided, such as how to 
appoint a proxy and who can be appointed as a proxy. Accordingly, 
minority shareholders, with little knowledge of the proxy voting system and 
inadequate corporate information, are unlikely in practice to exercise their 
right to proxy voting.300 To date, proxy voting designed for shareholder 
activism has not been widely used in China. 
 
Another example relates to the notice of shareholder meeting. In the UK, 
especially since implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive 
(2007/36) via changes to the Companies Act 2006, certain information has 
been required in the notice, including how to appoint a proxy electronically 
and a reminder of the right to ask questions. 301  However, Chinese 
company law does not stipulate what information should be included in the 
notice. 
 
Therefore, this thesis suggests that more detailed regulations should be 
put into the next revision of Chinese company law.302 
 
(4) The use of modern technology in corporate governance should be 
explicitly encouraged by law. It has been mentioned above that in the UK, 
electronic documents have been widely facilitated by statutes, for example 
for the notice of company meetings, proxy appointment, instruction of 
voting and meeting results. This follows from Directive 2007/36, which 
concerns cross-border voting issues. 303  Additionally, the legislation in 
Austria allows companies to hold a satellite meeting simultaneously with 
the general meeting.304 China should learn from the experience of these 
                                                             
300 Yang, 'Comparative Corporate Governance: Reforming Chinese Corporate Governance' (n 182) 10. 
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jurisdictions because modern technologies can provide convenient 
methods for shareholders to perform actively, which would lead in turn to 
better governance. 
 
In terms of remedies which minority shareholders could seek when 
damage occurs, among other remedies such as individual lawsuits or 
quitting the company, this thesis puts special emphasis on the derivative 
claim, a litigation mechanism which allows shareholders to initiate a claim 
on behalf of the company. With better regulation, such a remedy would 
improve the protection level of minority shareholders in listed companies. 
As commented by Bu, the derivative action is a procedural device to 
enable the court to do justice to the company.305 
 
As noted, in theory, such a litigation mechanism should carry a low 
threshold so that shareholders, especially minority shareholders, are able 
to use it as an effective instrument to protect the company‟s interests, and 
consequently benefit from their investment in the company. However, at 
the same time, sufficient judicial control should be in place to safeguard 
the interests of the company against both shareholders‟ malicious suits 
and out-of-court settlements for improper reasons.306 
 
In this thesis, the regulations on derivative claims under UK law and in 
China have been investigated comparatively (Table 3).  
Items UK China 
Locus Standi 
requirement 
Company Member (1) Holding individually or 
aggregately no less 
than one per cent of 
the company‟s 
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shares; 
(2) Holding shares no 
less than 180 days 
before the date of 
litigation 
Subject matter of 
litigation 
All kinds of breaches of 
duty 
All kinds of breaches of 
duty 
Litigation 
procedure 
Two-stage procedure (1) Satisfying the 
Demand Rule before 
initiating a derivative 
claim; 
(2) Normal civil 
procedure 
Financial support Indemnity order None 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Derivative Claims in China and the UK  
 
It can be seen that, since the common law rules have been surpassed by 
the statutory derivative claim under CA 2006, the subject matter of 
litigation has become much wider in practice. This change would seem to 
be a reflection of a preference by legislators for promoting shareholder 
activism. To the UK‟s two-stage procedure for derivative claims, should be 
applauded, despite the fact that there remain some uncertainties, such as 
the requirement to establish „a prima facie case‟, the definition of „good 
faith‟, the approach to weighing the duties under s.172 of CA 2006 and the 
understanding of „independent member‟. It is reasonable to expect that 
minority protection could be improved by using derivative claims, if such 
uncertainties can be resolved. 
 
In comparison, the derivative claim system in China appears more 
problematic in terms of practicability. First, the locus standi requirement 
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regarding minimum shareholding percentage and shareholding period is 
less rational, because few shareholders would be able to meet it. Hence, it 
is suggested that the locus standi requirement should be lowered in the 
next legal reform. Secondly, there exist certain problems concerning the 
special procedure of the demand rule, under CCL 2005. In practice this 
demand rule is unable to preclude unmeritorious or speculative claims, but 
rather it might lead to irreversible loss by delaying claims. Hence, it is 
suggested that the problem be resolved by abolishing the demand rule. 
 
As argued by Ma, if the derivative claim can be made more practicable, it 
is likely that it will become much more widely used in the Chinese legal 
system, owing to its broad scope and simple procedure, and the lack of 
alternative remedies.307 Comparative study of the systems in the UK and 
in China suggests that the UK derivative claim, in terms of its low locus 
standi requirement, two-stage procedure and indemnity order for resolving 
the financial burden on the plaintiff shareholder, is weighted more heavily 
towards shareholders‟ protection. Thus, the UK example should be 
followed by Chinese legislators. 
 
As for the issue of precluding unreasonable claims, it should be mentioned 
that the special feature of Chinese corporate governance is not that there 
are too many unmeritorious and speculative claims, but that there is a lack 
of participation by minority shareholders in corporate operations. It is 
proposed, therefore, that the balance between the two aspects should be 
tilted towards the latter. Even if a claim has been raised vexatiously, the 
court will eventually be able to dismiss it.  
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Chapter Three: Directors’ Role in Minority 
Shareholder Protection 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This thesis argues that, in modern corporate governance, the board of 
directors is the core participant. The board is the decision maker on most 
corporate issues, as well as the internal monitor of management. Despite 
some shortcomings, this thesis maintains that the board of directors could 
be the most important safeguard of minorities‟ interests. 
 
Important elements in the design of the board of directors include board 
size, board composition, director duties and director rights. The most 
important concern for legislators is to ensure the independence of the 
board. More specifically, the board of directors should be independent not 
only from the executive managers, but also from the majority shareholder. 
In the Chinese context, the latter is more important for minority protection. 
 
Through comparative research, this thesis finds that Chinese legislation 
regarding directors‟ duties is too general. As a result, minority 
shareholders in Chinese listed companies face difficulties in judging 
whether a director has breached his duty. Even worse, where a director 
has done something wrong, current legislation offers few remedies to 
minority shareholders.  
 
This chapter discusses the following four shortcomings which block the 
board from performing effectively: (1) directors lack sufficient working 
hours and professional abilities; (2) directors have little motivation to 
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discharge their duties; (3) more substantial powers are needed; and (4) 
the board cannot be guaranteed timely and accurate information. 
 
In order to increase board independence, and fulfil the internal monitoring 
mission, the institution of independent directors has been introduced into 
the corporate governance structure. This thesis proposes an ideal model, 
the „All-Right Model‟, which advocates putting the right person in the right 
position, armed with the right powers. More specifically, the majority of 
members of a board of directors should be independent, and board sub-
committees, such as the audit committee, should consist entirely of 
independent directors. Furthermore, this thesis argues that legislators 
should grant some special powers to independent directors, for example, 
in the need to approve related-party transactions, in order to protect 
minorities‟ interests. 
 
With specific reference to the institution of independent directors in 
Chinese listed companies, this thesis argues that it is still immature. The 
percentage of independent directors on the board is too low to guarantee 
that board decisions will be in the interests of all shareholders, rather than 
the private interests of the majority shareholder. However, this thesis still 
believes that, with improvement, the institution of independent directors 
could benefit the minorities by improving the quality of board decisions and 
corporate transparency. 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
According to the theory of separation of ownership and management, the 
interests of shareholders are threatened by misappropriation by the 
executives who actually control the company. This is the so-called agency 
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cost problem. Minority shareholders with an insignificant shareholding may 
be helpless to act against executives by themselves, simply because the 
voting power attached to their shareholding is too weak to make any 
change. Accordingly, the board of directors, as the intermediary between 
shareholders and managers, takes an important role in corporate 
governance, especially in terms of minority protection. 
 
On the one hand, as experienced businessman, directors are obligated to 
set out variety strategies and core decisions for the company; on the other 
hand, they have been defined as internal monitors to ensure that 
management is running the company in the interests of shareholders. In 
addition, directors should be accountable to shareholders in terms of their 
duties. For example, in most cases, managers wish to pursue the maximal 
expansion of the company using all corporate resources.308 In this case, 
the directors should first determine whether such expansion is for the 
benefit of shareholders, and then estimate both investment costs and 
risks. If it is in the interests of shareholders, directors should guide the 
executives in performing their duties. 
 
It has been argued that executive remuneration is higher when the board 
is weak. 309  In other words, if the board works effectively, executive 
remuneration would be lower, which may benefit shareholders‟ return. 
Therefore, in theory, a sound board of directors will reduce agency costs 
and protect the interests of shareholders. 
 
Moreover, this thesis argues that in Anglo-American countries, protection 
of shareholders‟ interests by directors is practically equal to protection of 
                                                             
308 Dujuan Yuan, 'Inefficient American Corporate Governance Under the Financial Crisis and China's 
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minority shareholders, who are in a weaker position in the company‟s 
operation. This point of view is based on the fact that in countries such as 
the UK and the USA, there is usually no controlling shareholder. Most 
corporate shares are dispersed in the hands of thousands of minority 
investors. These investors are not able to be involved in the day-to-day 
operation, but simply hope the company performs well.310 Therefore, if the 
board of directors could promote better protection for all shareholders, it 
would thereby provide legal protection of minority shareholders. 
 
Theoretically, a well-designed board of directors starts with clear director 
duties, in order to bind and guide directors‟ activities. Meanwhile, directors 
should be equipped with powerful and practical rights, granted by law or 
authorized by articles of association, to assist them in fulfilling their 
responsibilities. Other factors influencing the effectiveness of the board of 
directors include board size, composition of board members, and terms.  
 
Finally, the independence of board of directors has been regarded as the 
key factor in determining whether directors can fulfil their roles, in 
preventing the interests of shareholders, minorities in particular, from 
being infringed by executives. Principle requires board of directors to act 
independently from management, so that directors are able to monitor and 
evaluate the performance of executives. Equally, directors should perform 
independently from the shareholders who nominated and elected them to 
become corporate directors. It is worth noting that, despite the fact that 
directors are elected by shareholders, in most cases their duties are owed 
to the company, rather than the shareholders. In other words, directors 
should not stand for the interests of a certain individual or group of 
shareholders, but for all shareholders as a whole. Board independence 
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from the controlling shareholder is more important in those jurisdictions 
with relatively concentrated shareholding structure, such as China. 
Otherwise, directors may become watchdogs of the controlling 
shareholder at the expense of minorities. 
 
In practice, however, the effectiveness of the board of directors has long 
been criticized, given its failure fulfil achieve its duties as expected. 
Bebchuk, a Harvard scholar of corporate governance, claims that one of 
the central flaws of corporate governance in the United States is that 
„boards of directors frequently are ornamental and provide negligible 
oversight‟.311 Others claim that the board is often controlled by executives, 
especially the CEO.312 A company CEO may have the decisive say when 
nominating candidates for directors. Sometimes, the CEO is also capable 
of determining what the board does and what it does not do.  
 
As mentioned, Chinese listed companies have their unique governance 
issues owing to the existence of a controlling shareholder. Can minority 
shareholders seek protection from the board of directors? If so, will there 
be any differences in legal design of board of directors with a special 
emphasis on minority protection? This chapter focuses on the 
effectiveness of the board of directors, both in the UK and in China. 
Through comparative study, the chapter attempts to identify a better legal 
arrangement for this institution, for the purpose of improving minority 
protection in China. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Part 3.1, directors 
duties and their roles in corporate operation, formulated by law, are 
investigated. This part explains what directors should and should not do 
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according to the regulations in both jurisdictions. Part 3.2 reviews the 
power of the board of directors, authorized by law or shareholders‟ 
meeting. With reference to minority protection, it is noted that the UK 
board enjoys more powers in operating the company than its Chinese 
counterpart. Hence, it may be reasonable to conclude that the UK board is 
capable of providing better protection for the interests of minorities. Part 
3.3 focuses on the effectiveness of the board in four aspects: (a) board 
size; (b) terms; (c) composition of the board; and (d) independence of the 
board. Board independence and the institution of independent directors 
will be investigated in detail in Part 3.4. The concluding part presents an 
ideal model of the board of directors, and offers some suggestions for 
further corporate reform in China. 
 
3.1 Directors’ Duties in Law 
 
As mentioned, theoretically the board of directors is designed to protect 
shareholders‟ investment by reducing agency costs. According to Monks 
and Minow, directors are „the middlemen who provide balance and 
mediate the conflicts of interest between a small group of key managers 
based in corporate headquarters and a vast group of shareholders spread 
all over the world‟. 313  It is extremely important to review the directors‟ 
duties formulated by legislation before drawing a conclusion on whether 
directors could help in terms of protection for minority shareholders. This 
thesis holds the view that, as a sound legal arrangement with the purpose 
of minority protection, the duties of the board of directors should be 
explicitly laid out in law, so as to ensure accountability of the directors to 
shareholders. 
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3.1.1 Traditional Directors’ Duties in the UK 
 
Traditionally, a director, as a fiduciary of the company, has a fiduciary duty 
whereby he should act bona fide in the interests of the company. 
Meanwhile, he must also fulfil the common law duties of care and skill.314 
However, it is worth noting that, in practice, it is rare for directors to be 
challenged based on breach of directors‟ duties. One reason is the 
difficulty for claimant shareholders of proving that the director in question 
has not acted in good faith. It has been confirmed by the court in Re Smith 
& Fawcett Ltd that a director is to act in what he or she genuinely believes 
to be the best interests of the company, rather than what the court may 
decide to be the best interests of the company.315 In addition, it is similarly 
difficult successfully to accuse a director based on his breach of common 
law duties of care and skill. According to a US business judgment rule, 
unless it can be made clear that a diligent person with similar knowledge 
and skills and sitting in the same position would not act in the same way, a 
court would be reluctant to second guess what could have been done by 
the director, since it is the business of shareholders and directors to 
manage the company, not the court‟s. 
 
Accordingly, this thesis holds the view that shareholders, minorities in 
particular, cannot keep directors accountable to them under traditional 
legal regulations. 
 
3.1.2 Statutory Duties of Directors 
 
With the implementation of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), directors‟ 
duties from the common law and equity were codified into seven statutory 
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duties. The rationale of codification is mainly to improve comprehensibility, 
since the relevant case law was quite complex.316 Generally speaking, the 
statutory duties are not significantly different from those under common 
law, except in two respects. First, the statutory duty requires a director to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
instead of the interests of the company; and secondly, there is now a 
requirement for directors to consider the interests of stakeholders.317  
 
(1) Duty to Act within the Company’s Powers 
This duty echoes the common law rules, requiring the directors to act in 
accordance with the articles of association of the company and exercise 
powers only for the purposes for which they were conferred.318 
 
(2) Duty to Promote the Success of the Company 
CA2006, section 172 is one of the core developments of directors‟ duties. 
Under common law, a director was required to act in good faith in the 
company‟s interest. By contrast, the new statute provides that a director 
must „act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole‟.319  
 
Rose has questioned how directors can balance the two targets of profit 
maximization and shareholder equality, in terms of promoting the success 
of the company.320 Such concern originates from real business practice, 
where profit maximization will not unconditionally benefit all parties. 
Therefore, the question could be put another way, asking which should be 
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the priority of directors in order to achieve success for the company: to 
pursue maximal profit or to ensure that all shareholders are treated equally 
with regard to corporate benefits? 
 
This is, indeed, a tough question to answer, since both targets fall within 
the remit to be fulfilled by directors. In the view of this thesis, the target of 
achieving shareholder equality requires more input from directors. There is 
little doubt that executives would pursue corporate profits in order to 
bargain for better positions and remuneration packages. Shareholders, 
whether majority or minority, would act in concert to put pressure on the 
managers or even to discharge them if their performance were really poor. 
However, it is necessary to have a monitor to ensure the interest of all the 
shareholders in day-to-day operations, because minority shareholders 
would have little ability to dismiss executives. Shareholders who enjoy 
corporate benefits might not stand with the infringed minority to challenge 
executives. Therefore, this thesis insists that directors ought to put more 
emphasis on the equality of shareholders than on maximization of 
corporate profits. Only in this way could minority shareholders receive 
adequate protection from internal monitors, and consequently the quality 
of corporate governance could be improved. 
 
The question remains as to whether the test to be applied to determine 
whether the director has promoted the success of the company should be 
a subjective or an objective one. Again, similar to the common law duty to 
act in good faith, what is important is what the director, rather than the 
court, believes to be in the best interests of the company. Consequently, it 
is still difficult for shareholders to successfully establish a breach of 
director duty. 
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To fully discharge their duty, directors must have regard to certain factors, 
provided by CA 2006, including:321 
 
a) The likely consequences of any decision in the long term; 
b) The interests of the company‟s employees; 
c) The need to foster the company‟s business relationships 
with suppliers, customers and others; 
d) The impact of the company‟s operations on the community 
and the environment; 
e) The desirability of the company maintaining a reputation 
for high standards of business conduct; and 
f) The need to act fairly as between the members of the 
company. 
 
The list is not exhaustive, and it remains open for directors to determine 
what other factors should be taken into account. However, there is no 
guidance to show how to weigh these factors if an inherent conflict of 
interest occurs. Moreover, Mukwiri claims that this list may limit good 
judgment by directors, because they would define it as a rule book, with 
points to be ticked off.322 
 
(3) Duty to Exercise Independent Judgment 
This duty requires the directors to exercise their judgment independently, 
which reflects the common law principle that directors should not be 
fettered in exercising their discretion. 323  Directors, especially the non-
executive directors, may not claim the defence that they relied upon the 
judgment of others in areas in which they were not expert, and cannot 
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absolve themselves of responsibility by delegating matters to committees 
or appropriate individuals.324 
 
(4) Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care, Skill, and Diligence 
Another statutory duty which restates the common law is the duty to act 
with reasonable care, skill and diligence.325 This means the care, skill and 
diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with: (a) 
the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director 
in relation to the company; and (b) the general knowledge, skill and 
experience that the director has.326 
 
(5) Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest 
A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can 
have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, 
with the interests of the company.327 The interests of the company refer to 
any property, information or opportunity, regardless of whether the 
company could take advantage of them.328 
 
In addition, section 175 provides three situations in which directors could 
be indemnified for breach of duty: (a) if the matter has been authorised by 
members of the company; (b) if the situation cannot reasonably be 
regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest; or (c) if the matter 
has been authorised by disinterested directors where the company is a 
private company and nothing in the company's constitution invalidates 
such authorisation, by the matter being proposed to and authorised by the 
directors; or where the company is a public company and its constitution 
                                                             
324 Perry and Gregory (n 323) 28. 
325 The Companies Act 2006, s 174. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Ibid, s 175. 
328 Ibid. 
Chapter Three: The Board of Directors 
Page 133 of 415 
 
includes provision enabling the directors to authorise the matter, by the 
matter being proposed to and authorised by them in accordance with the 
constitution.329 
 
(6) Duty Not to Accept Benefits from Third Parties 
The duty not to accept benefits from third parties derives from the duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest. It is not infringed only if the acceptance of the 
benefit cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of 
interest.330 
 
(7) Duty to Declare Any Interest in Proposed Transactions or 
Arrangement 
If a director of a company is in any way, directly or indirectly, interested in 
a proposed transaction or arrangement with the company, he must declare 
the nature and extent of that interest to the other directors before the 
company enters into the transaction or arrangement.331 However, he does 
not need to do so: (a) if it cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give 
rise to a conflict of interest; or (b) to the extent that the other directors are 
already aware of it (and for this purpose the other directors are treated as 
aware of anything of which they ought reasonably to be aware); or (c) to 
the extent that it concerns terms of his service contract that have been or 
are to be considered by a meeting of the directors or by a committee of the 
directors appointed for the purpose under the company's constitution.332 
 
3.1.3 Director Duties under Chinese Law 
 
The directors of Chinese listed companies shall comply with laws, 
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administrative regulations and the company articles of association. They 
shall bear the obligations of loyalty and diligence to the company as well. 
Accepting bribes or any other illegal gains by taking advantage of their 
authority or expropriating the properties of the company is prohibited.333 
Furthermore, a list of forbidden activities is provided in Article 149, as 
follows:334 
 
(1) To misappropriate any funds of the company;  
(2) To deposit funds of the company in bank accounts opened in 
their own names or in the names of others;  
(3) To lend funds of the company to others or put up assets of 
the company as security for others in violation of the articles 
of association of the company or without approval of the 
shareholders‟ meeting, the shareholders‟ general meeting or 
the board of directors;  
(4) To enter into any contract or transaction with the company in 
violation of the articles of association of the company or 
without approval of the shareholders‟ meeting or the 
shareholders‟ general meeting;  
(5) To take advantage of their positions to obtain for their own 
benefit or the benefit of others any business opportunities that 
belong to the company or to engage in the same type of 
business as that of the company for their own account or for 
the account of others without approval of the shareholders‟ 
meeting or the shareholders‟ general meeting;  
(6) To accept commissions on transactions between others and 
the company and keep such commissions as their own;  
(7) To disclose any secret of the company without authorisation; 
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or  
(8) To commit any other act that is in violation of their duty of 
loyalty to the company. 
 
According to the provisions, directors‟ duties in Chinese company law can 
be summarized as the duties of loyalty and diligence, which resembles a 
hybrid of fiduciary duty to act in good faith and common law duty of care 
and diligence. However, in China, a jurisdiction with no case law tradition, 
there remains uncertainty about the operation of directors‟ fiduciary duties 
in practice. Consequently, it is difficult for shareholders in China, especially 
minorities, to determine whether a director has breached his duties so that 
they would be able to bring a lawsuit against him. Even courts in the UK 
are reluctant to second guess directors‟ activities and decisions if there 
has been no apparent self-interested activity or obvious breach of duty of 
care and diligence. How then can we expect the Chinese courts to 
properly balance the personal business judgment of the director and the 
accountability of directors to the shareholders? 
 
Moreover, to what extent can shareholders keep directors accountable if 
they indeed breach their duties? Legal remedies are inadequate in 
practice. Only when actual loss occurs can a shareholder bring individual 
litigation against a problem director. Otherwise, the derivative claim could 
be the only option. Although the derivative claim was introduced into 
Chinese corporate legislation in 2005, and this thesis argues that this 
mechanism could be helpful for minority protection if improved (as argued 
in Chapter Two) its present defects mean that it is hard to find a case in 
which claimant shareholders have successfully established breach of duty 
by directors through a derivative claim. 
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In short, as the Corporate Governance Assessment Report of the 100 Top 
Chinese Listed Companies (2006) makes clear, legal regulations relating 
to director duties are generally inadequate in China.335 
 
3.2 Powers of the Board of Directors 
 
In Anglo-American countries, powers authorised to the board of directors, 
either by law or by constitution of the company, can be classified into two 
categories: (a) decision-making powers relating to corporate operations; 
and (b) managerial powers towards executives, including electing and 
appointing managers or dismissing them, determining managers‟ 
compensation, and evaluating the performance of managers. By 
exercising such powers, the board of directors could, in theory, ensure that 
the company is run in the interests of shareholders and keep the 
executives accountable, urging them to operate the business in 
accordance with board strategies. Accordingly, the board of directors can 
be regarded as the core institution of the corporate structure in those 
jurisdictions, and this will also become the key mechanism in the ideal 
model provided by this thesis. 
 
However, currently in China, the powers granted to the boards of listed 
companies are relatively limited. According to Article 47 of the Chinese 
Company Law, the board of directors shall be responsible for the 
shareholders' meeting and exercise the following authority: 336  
 
(1) Convening shareholders' meetings and reporting the status 
on work thereto;  
                                                             
335 Jingchen Zhao and Shuangge Wen, 'Promoting Stakeholders' Interests in the Unique Chinese Corporate 
Governance Model: More Socially Responsible Corporations?' (2010) 21 International Company and 
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(2) Carrying out the resolutions made at the shareholders' 
meetings; 
(3) Determining operating plans and investment plans;  
(4) Formulating the company's annual financial budget plans 
and final account plans;  
(5) Formulating the company's profit distribution plans and loss 
recovery plans;  
(6) Formulating the company's plans on the increase or 
decrease of registered capital, as well as on the issuance 
of corporate bonds;  
(7) Formulating the company's plans on merger, split-up, 
change of company form, dissolution, etc.;  
(8) Making decisions on the establishment of the company's 
internal management departments;  
(9) Making decisions on hiring or dismissing the company's 
manager and on his remuneration, and, according to the 
nomination of the manager, deciding on the hiring or 
dismissing of vice manager(s) and the person in charge of 
finance, as well as their remuneration; 
(10) Establishing the company's basic management system; 
and 
(11) Other functions as prescribed in the articles of association. 
 
It can be seen that, in China, material decision-making powers are still 
held by shareholders, through the general meeting. Consequently, those 
who hold majority voting rights can control the operation of the company 
directly. In order to provide better protection of minorities, this thesis urges 
Chinese legislators to reinforce the powers held by the board of directors 
to prevent wrongs to minority shareholders being committed by the 
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controlling shareholder.  This would be possible if the independence of the 
board could be guaranteed, although it remains one of the toughest issues 
in Chinese corporate governance. 
 
3.3 The Effectiveness of the Board of Directors 
 
In this section, four aspects which may influence the effectiveness of the 
board of directors are investigated, namely: (1) board size; (2) terms; (3) 
composition of the board; and (4) the independence of the board. Finally, 
several factors which may result in ineffectiveness of the board are 
summarised. 
 
3.3.1 Board Size 
 
The size of the board has long been an important issue for corporate 
scholars. It can exert a crucial impact on board effectiveness. In theory, a 
small board would be easily controlled by insiders and be unable to 
provide appropriate professional guidance and internal supervision; while 
a large board may be better able to exercise the monitoring role, due to 
the reduced likelihood of the CEO controlling every single director. 337 
However, a large board may be inefficient. It has been suggested by the 
Higgs Report that „an effective board should not be so large as to become 
unwieldy. It should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and 
experience is appropriate for the requirement of the business and that 
changes in the board‟s composition can be managed without undue 
disruption‟.338  
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Therefore, many empirical studies have been carried out with the intention 
of finding the optimal size of the board of directors. According to Koontz‟s 
research, a range from five to 13 members is desirable.339 In his view, 
boards with fewer than five members could not cover all the duties 
formulated by law; but where there are more than 13 members it may not 
be possible to provide every member with an adequate chance to 
participate. Similarly, Rebeiz finds that a relatively small board of directors 
would bring about better internal monitoring and corporate strategies in 
favour of all shareholders.340 Some scholars have suggested that the ideal 
board size should be eight or nine members, so that directors can know 
each other and communicate effectively.341 
 
Research by Stuart shows that the average board size in the United 
States dropped from 15 members in 1988 to 10.9 members in 2002.342 
According to Yang‟s empirical research, the average size of UK board was 
7.5 members in the fiscal year 2002-2003, with a range from four to 15.343 
By contrast, during the same period more than 80 per cent of Chinese 
listed companies had a board comprising more than 9 members, and the 
average size was 10 directors.344 At this point, this thesis suggests that 
more specific empirical research focusing on the best board size for 
Chinese listed companies should be carried out, in order to improve the 
effectiveness of the board of directors. 
 
3.3.2 Terms 
                                                             
339 H Koontz, The Board of Directors and Effective Management (McGraw-Hill Book Co 1967), 121. 
340 Rebeiz concluded in his survey that a small board size of about seven or eight directors is more likely to be 
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The terms offered to directors, together with financial incentives, can 
influence the effectiveness of the board. A short service term, such as a 
one-year contract, may generate short-term activities in order to obtain as 
much compensation as possible. By contrast, a long-term contract may 
encourage the directors to promote long-term strategies in the boardroom; 
however, it would also increase the possibility of insider control. Scholars 
have noted that, after the Enron scandal, many large companies in the US 
switched the service term back to an annual basis to reduce the risk of 
insider control.345 
 
3.3.3 Composition of the Board 
 
In most companies, the board of directors consists of current or retired 
executives, academics, leaders of non-profits organisations, and former 
government officials or military leaders.346 In China, the board may include 
some other special members, such as employee representatives and 
members of the party committee of the company. 
 
The most controversial concerns with regard to the composition of the 
board are how to guarantee those professional outsiders will devote 
enough time and attention to board issues, and how to ensure those 
members who have never run a company have adequate business 
knowledge and skills. As Monks and Minow suggest, „not every director 
has to come from a business background but everyone has to be willing to 
learn what is necessary‟.347 In practice however, unfortunately, they may 
not have the time to learn due to their having full-time jobs. 
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Therefore, it is extremely important to put highly qualified candidates on 
the board of directors, to make the board as effective as possible. 
 
3.3.4 Independence of the Board 
 
One of the most important issues to determine the effectiveness of the 
board of directors is its independence. Only an independent board can 
appropriately fulfil the monitoring role over the management and challenge 
them when necessary, in order to protect the interests of the company and 
all shareholders. Moreover, an ideal board should be independent from the 
controlling shareholder of the company to prevent the infringement of 
minorities‟ rights. In other words, to discharge their duties properly, 
directors should not exercise them on behalf of the majority shareholder 
only. Instead, the board must put special emphasis on whether minorities 
have been treated fairly in corporate operations. 
 
It should be noted that the independence of the board is not the same as 
the institution of independent directors. The latter is a method to increase 
the board independence which has been widely used in different 
jurisdictions around the world, although there remain some criticisms. For 
example, despite the uncertainty of the criterion of „independence‟, Monks 
and Minow point out that interlocks and network links among shared 
directors would decrease the independence of the board.348 This might be 
the case when a company allows its executive directors to serve for 
another company as independent directors, or when several companies 
share the same independent director. Despite the difficulty in identifying 
what interests may become conflicted, this situation is not in accordance 
with the intention of the rule on „independence‟. The institution of 
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independent directors will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
 
Another important issue with regard to improving board independence is 
the separation of the CEO and Chairman of the Board. The activities of the 
Chairman are crucial to the effectiveness of the board. Although his voting 
power is the same as that of other board members, he has an important 
power to decide the topics and agenda of board meetings. In other words, 
it is the chairman of the board who determines what the board will and will 
not do. As Dalton and Kesner note, the real threat to the independence of 
the board of directors is „the dual role of the CEO as board chairman‟.349 It 
could be unrealistic to expect that the outside board members could 
challenge the executives if the CEO controls the information and agenda 
of the board, because those issues which need to be investigated and 
discussed would not be presented at the board meetings. As pointed out 
by Nadler et al., „in truth, the humble agenda constitutes the single most 
important tool for either empowering or emasculating the board. Simply 
stated, whoever controls the agenda controls the board‟s ability to do 
meaningful work.‟350 
 
Therefore, it is now widely acknowledged that the separation of the CEO 
and Chairman of the Board could increase the independence of the board 
by limiting the controlling power of the CEO, and eventually improve the 
protection of shareholders‟ interests.  
 
In the United Kingdom, since the release of the Cadbury Report in 
1990,351 many large companies have brought about a separation of the 
                                                             
349 D R Dalton and I F Kesner, 'Composition and Duality of Boards of Directors: An International Perspective' 
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CEO and Chairman, while in the United States it is still quite common to 
see the combination of CEO and Chairman. In China, surprisingly, more 
than 80 per cent of the listed companies separate the role of CEO and 
Chairman of the Board, in spite of the fact that there is no legal 
requirement to do so.352 However, this does not mean that Chinese boards 
of directors have a higher level of independence. This is because, first of 
all, most chairmen of the board in Chinese listed companies serve as full-
time members of staff, which means that the Chairman is, in fact, an 
executive of the company. 353  Furthermore, most chairmen in Chinese 
listed companies are nominated and appointed by the controlling 
shareholder. Accordingly, those powerful chairmen may challenge the 
management, but only on behalf of the majority shareholder rather than all 
shareholders as a whole.354 Hence, in short, the independence of Chinese 
boards is still in question. 
 
3.3.5 Challenges to the Effectiveness of the Board 
 
Much has been expected of the board of directors in terms of resolving the 
agency cost problem. However, there have also been critical challenges. 
Some critics have focused on the defects of institutional design in 
jurisprudence, while others have pointed to the practical failures to realize 
its role as intended. According to Williams, „a few boards of directors 
establish company objectives, strategies and broad policies; but most do 
not. A few boards ask discerning questions; but most do not. A few boards 
evaluate the measure and the performance of the CEO and select and 
deselect the CEO; but most do not.‟355 
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There are a number of factors which may exert a negative influence on the 
effectiveness of the board of directors. According to research carried out 
for this thesis, these can be divided into four main categories: (1) the 
incapability of board members; (2) low motivation to perform well; (3) 
limited working hours; and (4) insufficient necessary information. 
 
(1) The Incapability of Board Members 
Warren Buffett, one of the most successful investors of the 20th century, 
served as outside director in several giant companies. However, he holds 
a less than optimistic attitude towards the effectiveness of the board, 
admitting that many directors he worked with lacked the necessary 
abilities to perform as well as they should, even though they would have 
qualified as „independent‟ as defined by today‟s rules.356 
 
In theory, the board of directors should not only make strategies to guide 
management, but should also investigate and evaluate the performance of 
management on behalf of shareholders as a whole. Therefore, it is 
important for directors to understand the market well in order to make 
strategies, and to be equipped with managerial knowledge and 
experience, especially professional knowledge of corporate finance, in 
order to determine whether the executives are performing in accordance 
with the interests of the company and its owners. 
 
As mentioned above, in current corporate practice, many Chinese board 
members have no business background. It could be rational to have them 
on the board because they may extend the professional scope of the 
board. As such, the board may be able to make better corporate decisions. 
For instance, academics may provide theoretical support for corporate 
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practice and government officials may help the company to perform better 
in terms of fulfilling its social responsibility. However, the use of outside 
directors for the monitoring function is open to question. It could be difficult 
for them to identify inappropriate management behaviours which may 
negatively affect. Hence, the intention behind having the board in the 
corporate structure may not be realised.  
 
Therefore, this thesis will suggest that it is crucial to set a rational 
proportion of outside directors with no business background on the board, 
and equally important to provide them with relevant professional training, 
including the knowledge and skills of management and corporate finance. 
A board consisting of both types of director, with and without a business 
background, would be able to formulate the most appropriate strategies for 
the company, while also guaranteeing professional supervision over 
company operations to safeguard the interests of all shareholders, and the 
minority in particular. 
 
(2) Low Motivation to Perform Well 
In practice, while some directors are capable of fulfilling their roles, some 
do not perform as well as they should. Even Warren Buffett, whose 
professional reputation is undoubtedly high, once admitted that he 
sometimes failed to fulfil all the directors‟ duties, stating that „…too often I 
was silent when management made proposals that I judged to be counter 
to the interests of shareholders. In those cases, collegiality trumped 
independence.‟357 Such collegiality is just one of the elements which may 
influence the motivation of directors to perform well. Others include 
benefits, incentives and accountability to shareholders. 
 
                                                             
357 Ibid. 
Chapter Three: The Board of Directors 
Page 146 of 415 
 
First, some argue that the reason directors lack motivation to monitor the 
management is that they themselves are not the capital providers, but the 
representatives of the investors. Accordingly, they can hardly be expected 
to protect others‟ investment as if it were their own money. In order to 
resolve this problem, a corporate-shares scheme has been widely used in 
directors‟ remuneration packages, especially in the US and the UK. 
Making corporate shares a major part of the remuneration package could 
bind the interests of board members with the interests of shareholders, 
and help to promote directors‟ motivation to discharge all their duties 
appropriately.358  
 
It worth noting, however, that in order to improve the effectiveness of the 
board of directors, directors‟ remuneration packages with corporate shares 
should be designed based on empirical results. This is because the 
corporate-shares scheme is just one part of the remuneration package. If 
this part is too small, the aim of binding board members‟ interest with that 
of shareholders will not be realised; if it is too large, it may result in the 
manipulation of the corporate share price by the directors. This is why the 
government is moving towards share option schemes for banks in which 
shares can be paid as a part of the remuneration package only many 
years later. 
 
Secondly, the desire to maintain the position as director may drive the 
board member to compromise with the management by not challenging 
their activities. As mentioned, in most cases the executives, especially the 
CEO, have decisive power over the nomination and appointment of 
directors. To retain the tangible or intangible benefits of being a director, 
for instance a six-figure payment, complimentary services based on the 
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position, prestigious reputation, and a network of business contacts, some 
board members would choose to stand with the executives, ignoring 
problems in corporate operations.359 
 
Last but not least, it is still difficult for shareholders to keep the directors 
accountable. In theory, shareholders could control the board members by 
three methods: (a) selection and appointment; (b) good contract writing, 
including terms and remuneration; and (c) possible dismissal.360 However, 
in practice, the first two methods are normally influenced by the board of 
directors or the CEO; while the last option can only be exercised by those 
shareholders with a large voting power. Moreover, Okoli argues that 
dismissing a director is not a wise choice for shareholders, because it may 
bring about an extra cost. The dismissed director may „go home with three 
years‟ remuneration for work undone or badly done‟.361 That is to say, 
board members will not be punished even if they do not discharge their 
duties, except in cases of corporate scandal, such as Enron. Hence 
shareholders, minority shareholders in particular, cannot keep directors 
accountable by these methods. 
 
In short, how to motivate the board members to perform as well as 
expected is still an important issue with regard to improving the 
effectiveness of the board of directors. 
 
(3) Limited Working Hours 
The limited working hours of directors have been criticised as a significant 
obstacle to board effectiveness. Board members, particularly the non-
executive outsiders, have to spend most of their time and energy on their 
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own full-time jobs, so that less attention is paid to their work as directors. 
As a result, the effectiveness of the board is diminished.  
 
Lipton and Lorsch argue that lack of time is the most widely shared 
problem for directors in fulfilling their duties.362 They further note: 
 
The typical board meets less than eight times annually. 
Even with committee meetings and informal gatherings 
before or after the formal board meeting, directors rarely 
spend as much as a working day together in and around 
each meeting. Further, in many boardrooms too much of this 
limited time is occupied with reports from management and 
various formalities. In essence, the limited time outside 
directors have together is not used in a meaningful 
exchange of ideas among themselves or with 
management/inside directors.363 
 
Some scholars also note that directors, especially the non-executive 
outside directors, will only get involved in corporate affairs when crisis 
occurs. They do not exercise constant monitoring of management to 
safeguard the interests of shareholders. Supporting this point, Judge 
William T. Allen stated in a speech that „the view of the responsibilities of 
membership of the board of directors of public companies is, in my 
opinion, badly deficient... Directors should function as active monitors of 
corporate management, not just in crisis, but continually.‟364 
 
Therefore, this thesis will suggest that legislation should set out minimum 
working hours and a requirement of keeping a diary, in order to improve 
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the effectiveness of the board. 
 
(4) Insufficient Information 
To fulfil their monitoring role, directors have to rely on the information given 
to them. In practice, such information is usually prepared by the 
executives, in particular the CEO, because no one knows the company 
better than the executives. Hence, it could be understood that the 
executives control the eye of the board of directors, unless the board 
members collect the valuable information by themselves. 
 
Sarah A.B. Teslik points out that: 
 
there isn‟t much point in fussing over the definition of an 
independent director, or the existence or makeup of board 
committees, or the procedures for electing directors if the 
information they get is inadequate. What can even the most 
brilliant and properly motivated director do if he or she lacks 
needed, accurate, or timely information?365 
 
Walter Salmon, an experienced director, has provided the following 
checklist of the necessary information for board members to discharge 
their duties appropriately:366 
 
(a) Operating statements, balance sheets, and statements of 
cash flow that compare current period and year-to-date 
results to plan and last year. Management comments about 
the foregoing that explain the reasons for variations from 
                                                             
365 CII Central, The Governance of Oozcskblnya: Newsletter for Members of the Council of Institutional 
Investors (1993), 8. 
366 Walter Salmon, 'Crisis Prevention: How to Gear Up Your Board' (1993) Jan-Feb Harvard Law Review 68, 
69. 
Chapter Three: The Board of Directors 
Page 150 of 415 
 
plan and provide a revised forecast of results for the 
remainder of the year; 
(b) Share of market information; 
(c) Minutes of management committee meetings; 
(d) Key media articles on the company and competition; 
(e) Financial analysts‟ reports for the company and major 
competitors, plus consumer preference surveys; and 
(f) Employee attitude surveys. 
 
According to the viewpoint of this thesis, it will be suggested that a stricter 
standard of timely provision of accurate and complete information to board 
members should be introduced into current legislation. If the executives, 
including the CEO, failed to achieve this, they would be penalized 
personally. At the same time, the responsibility of directors to equip 
themselves with accurate, complete and timely information should also be 
reinforced. Board members could use various methods to collect corporate 
information, such as implementing surveys in retail stores or interviewing 
line managers or other employees. Lack of sufficient information should 
not be accepted as an excuse for directors to be exempt from discharging 
their duties, unless they are able to prove that acquisition of such 
information is impossible in the circumstances. 
 
3.4 Board Independence and Independent Directors 
 
With the exposure of financial scandals such as Enron, the inefficiency of 
internal supervision has become a matter of increasing attention. 
Executives, especially the executive directors, are so powerful that they 
can use the controlling power inappropriately in their own self-interest, 
taking advantage of information asymmetry. Such activities misappropriate 
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the interests of the company and the shareholders. 
 
To resolve this agency cost problem, it has been suggested that 
shareholders should take on the role of internal monitoring. However, in 
the view of this thesis, an independent board should be the most important 
institution to improve internal supervision. This is because, first of all, the 
board of directors knows the company better than any shareholder. 
Traditionally, in business, the board of directors is the command 
headquarters of corporate decision making. It drafts and decides 
commercial strategies, determines corporate culture and resolves 
company financial issues. According to the „team production‟ theory 
proposed by Blair and Stout, the directors are the mediators of the 
team.367 On the one side, the director is the agent of capital providers, 
namely the shareholders, managing the investment of those providers. On 
the other side, the director is an advisor to the professional skill providers, 
namely the managers, and the labour providers, namely the employees. 
 
If we compare the company to an item of PC software, the shareholder, as 
the user, neither needs nor wishes to familiarise himself with the internal 
programming or running methods of that software. All he needs to do is 
waiting for the outcome of using the software and update it regularly.368 
The board of directors is like the command centre of the software. 
 
Moreover, legislators are not willing to allow shareholders to have too 
much decisive influence in day-to-day corporate operations. Greer L.J. 
claimed in Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw: 
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A company is an entity distinct alike from its shareholders 
and its directors. Some of its powers may, according to its 
articles, be exercised by directors, certain other power may 
be reserved for the shareholders in general meeting. If 
powers of management are vested in the directors, they and 
they alone can exercise these powers… [Shareholders] 
cannot themselves usurp the powers which by the articles 
are vested in the directors any more than the directors can 
usurp the powers vested by the articles in the general body 
of shareholders.369 
 
It can be seen from this statement that the court itself is reluctant to be 
involved in the assessment of business decisions. It is not the court‟s job 
to judge how bad a commercial decision is, as long as that decision is not 
a suspected breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
Therefore, there has been much heated debate on the matter of improving 
the independence of the board so as to improve the internal monitoring 
function. An independent board could ensure that each decision made by 
the board is rooted in the aim of maximising corporate interests and 
shareholders‟ investment return.  
 
In seeking ways to improve board independence, different jurisdictions 
have introduced various legal mechanisms. 
 
An empirical development in the US corporate governance over the past 
half century has been the shift in board composition away from insiders 
(and affiliated directors) toward independent directors. 370  In 2002, the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereinafter the SOA) adopted the concept of 
independent directors, in order to rectify the systematic defects reflected 
by financial scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. One of the SOA 
reforms is that audit committees should be composed entirely of 
independent directors, and these independent directors are completely 
independent, receiving no financial benefits from the company other than 
their payment as directors.371 
 
In accordance with the SOA, the listing rules of the New York Stock 
Exchange (hereinafter the NYSE) and NASDAQ require a board with a 
majority of independent directors.372 In addition, the sub-committees such 
as the audit committee, the nomination committee and the remuneration 
committee should be composed entirely of independent directors.373  
 
In the United Kingdom, the suggestions relating to non-executive directors 
first appeared in the Cadbury Report of December 1992, which 
recommended a Code of Best Practice with which the boards of all listed 
companies registered in the UK should comply, and utilized a „comply or 
explain‟ mechanism. 374  According to the Code of Best Practice, non-
executive directors should bring an independent judgment to bear on 
issues of strategy, performance, resources, key appointments, and 
standards of conduct.375 The Report expressed high expectations of non-
executive directors, stating that „the Committee believes that the calibre of 
the non-executive members of the board is of special importance in setting 
and maintaining standards of corporate governance‟.376 
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More recently, the Combined Code has amended the regulations referring 
to non-executive directors in more detail. It suggests that (1) at least half 
of the seats on the board should be taken by independent non-executive 
directors; (2) a nomination committee should consist of a majority of 
independent directors; and (3) the position of Chairman and CEO should 
be separated.377 
 
In a jurisdiction such as China, which has a concentrated shareholding 
structure, the core issue of corporate governance is not the conflict of 
interests between the executives and shareholders, simply because the 
controlling shareholder has the final say on the appointment of executives. 
In this circumstance, the executives are performing in accordance with the 
will of the controlling shareholder. Therefore, the primary concern of 
Chinese corporate governance is that the majority shareholder, who in 
most cases is the controlling shareholder, is too powerful to intervene in 
the day-to-day operation of the company. As the consequence, he would 
be able to make corporate decisions at the expanse of the interests of the 
minorities, in order to purchase his private benefits. 
 
To improve the independence of the board and consequently the quality of 
Chinese corporate governance, Chinese legislators have adopted the 
institution of independent directors from the USA. Moreover, in addition to 
the supervisory function as exercised in the US, Chinese independent 
directors have been charged with another important target, standing for 
the interests of minority shareholders. It is claimed in the Guiding Opinion 
on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System in Listed 
Companies that „an Independent Director should, pursuant to the 
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requirements of the relevant laws and regulations, these Guiding Opinions 
and the company's articles of association, conscientiously perform his 
duties and responsibilities, safeguard the company's overall interests and, 
in particular, pay attention that the lawful rights and interests of small and 
medium shareholders are not prejudiced‟.378 
 
The first regulatory document concerning the concept of independent 
director in China was the Guideline of Articles of Association of Listed 
Companies, issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(hereinafter „CSRC‟) in 1997. Under Article 112: „A listed company has the 
option to appoint independent directors into the board.‟379 
 
A few years later, in 2001, the CSRC issued the Guiding Opinion on the 
Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed Companies 
(hereinafter the „Opinion‟), which has been widely acknowledged as the 
formal legal implantation of such an institution to improve the quality of 
Chinese corporate governance. Under the timetable set by the Opinion, no 
fewer than two independent directors, including at least one accounting 
professional, were to be nominated to the board before June 30th, 2002; 
and the proportion of independent directors was to be increased to no less 
than one third before June 30th, 2003.380 
 
In this section, mechanisms for improving the independence of the board 
of directors, both in the Anglo-Saxon system and in the Chinese context, 
are investigated in detail. Through comparative study, this thesis 
concludes that independent directors, despite current defects, would be a 
proper institution to improve the quality of corporate governance of 
                                                             
378 The Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System in Listed Companies, 
issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on 16th August, 2001, Section 1(2). 
379 The Guideline of Articles of Association of Listed Companies, Article 112. 
380 The Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System in Listed Companies (n 
378), Section 1(3). 
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Chinese listed companies, especially those that are state-controlled. An 
ideal theoretical model of such institution is established and illustrated in 
part 3.4.1. The provisional name, „All-Right model‟, refers to putting the 
Right Person in the Right Position, authorised with the Right Power under 
the Right Supervisory System. In part 3.4.2, the current defects of 
corporate governance which lead to a lack of board independence are 
noted, followed by some discussion about specific issues, including why 
China transplanted the institution of independent directors into its 
corporate governance regime.  
 
3.4.1 The Ideal: The ‘All-Right Model’ 
 
Informed by comparative study of laws relating to the institution of 
independent directors, this research concludes with the ideal design of 
such a legal institution. To improve the board independence so as to fulfil 
the internal monitoring mission in the interests of shareholders, the Right 
Person should be put in the Right Position armed with the Right Power.  
 
(1) Right Person 
Responses to the question of who should serve on the board of a large 
public company have varied over the years. Circa 1950, the consensus 
was that such boards should be composed of senior officers, affiliated 
outsiders such as bankers, audit consultants or legal consultants, and a 
few independent directors. 381  Langevoort, using his tripartite board 
structure, suggests that a functional board should consist of independent 
monitors, „grey‟ mediators,382 and managers.383  
 
                                                             
381 Gordon (n 367) 1468. 
382 „Grey‟ mediators are those board members holding good relationships with different interest groups. See, 
D C Langevoort, 'Beyond "Independent" Directors: A Functional Approach to Board Independence' (2006) 
119 Harvard Law Review 1553, 1566. 
383 Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, half a century later, the consensus is that the board should 
comprise only independent directors, whose independence is buttressed 
by a range of rule-based and structural mechanisms.384  
 
The reason for such a change in attitude is the change in the board‟s 
function. The major role of a modern board is as a safeguard on behalf of 
shareholders‟ interests. Therefore, it seems clear that a director with 
independence de facto could be deemed as the Right Person in the All-
Right Model. 
 
However, this raises the more difficult question of who can be defined as 
an independent director? In other words, what is the test of 
independence?  
 
Rules around the world use different terms to name such independent 
persons, for example, independent director, disinterested director, or 
independent non-executive director. Commentators and courts in different 
countries also talk about „independence‟, but it has been argued that they 
use this term to mean different things at different times for different 
reasons.   385  
 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Act (2002) 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Act is a set of changes embodied 
in the Accounting Industry Reform Act 2002, which followed directly from 
the financial scandals of Enron and WorldCom.  
 
The Act marked the first use in US statute of the concept of independent 
director. Under the SOA, an independent director receives no financial 
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benefits from the company other than his payment as director.386  
 
With reference to the independent directors sitting on the company‟s audit 
committee, Section 301 of the SOA provides that: 
 
In order to be considered to be independent for purposes of 
this paragraph, a member of an audit committee of an issuer 
may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of 
the audit committee, the board of directors, or any other 
board committee - (i) accept any consulting, advisory, or 
other compensatory fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an 
affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.387 
 
Such provision became the original script of the listing rule of the NYSE. 
 
 Delaware General Corporation Law 
In order to deal with „conflicts of interest‟, Article 144 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, relating to interested directors, provides that no 
transaction between the corporation and its directors, or between the 
corporation and any other corporation in which its directors are directors, 
or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for the reason 
of conflict of interest if one of the following conditions is fulfilled:388  
 
(a) the material facts of such transaction are disclosed to the 
board of directors and a majority of disinterested directors 
authorize it in good faith; or 
(b) the material facts of such transaction are disclosed to the 
stockholders entitled to vote thereon, and an approval has 
                                                             
386 Huang (n 371) 401. 
387 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 301.  
388 Delaware General Corporation Law, Article 144. 
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been reached in good faith by vote of stockholders; or 
(c) the contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of 
the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board 
of directors, a committee or the stockholders. 
 
It should be mentioned that the Delaware General Corporation Law does 
not provide a definition of independence, nor does it set up a detailed 
independent director system by law. Instead, it requires scrutiny, 
transaction by transaction, on transparency or disinterest in a particular 
dealing involving conflict of interest.389  
 
 American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance 
One of the most important contributions of the American Law Institute‟s 
Principles of Corporate Governance (hereinafter „Principles‟) to the 
institution of the „independent director‟ is that it provides the first 
interpretation of „significant relationship‟. According to Article 1.34 of the 
Principles, „significant relationship‟ refers to a situation where: (i) the 
director has been under the corporation‟s employment within the two 
preceding years; (ii) the director is an immediate family member of 
someone who has been an officer or a senior executive within the two 
preceding years; (iii) the director has engaged in certain monetary 
activities which exceeded $200,000 during the two preceding years; or (iv) 
the director is affiliated in a professional capacity with a law firm or an 
investment banking firm to the corporation or has acted as a managing 
underwriter in an issue of the corporation‟s securities within the two 
preceding years.390  
 
Although it cannot be stated definitively that these significant relationships 
                                                             
389 Huang (n 371) 395. 
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would be bound to involve self-interested activities, ruling them out makes 
it easier to improve the independence of directors.  
 
 Rules of the New York Stock Exchange 
The New York Stock Exchange is one of the leading equities markets 
around the world, with approximately 8000 issuers.391 Thus, the listing rule 
of the NYSE has been deemed as an advanced corporate model for listed 
companies. 
 
Consistent with the NYSE‟s traditional approach, in addition to the 
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the NYSE regulates a 
set of rules relating to independent directors. The NYSE Listed Company 
Manual establishes certain tests of independence. Generally speaking, an 
independent director should have no material relationship with the listed 
company, either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an 
organisation that has a relationship with the company.392  
 
This raises the question of the definition of „material relationships‟. Based 
on business common sense, material relationships can include familial, 
financial, commercial, consulting (legal, accounting or corporate strategy) 
and industrial relationships, among others. Because of the existence of 
complicated social relationships, it seems impossible for regulators to 
formulate explicitly all circumstances that might lead to potential conflicts 
of interest. Consequently, smart legislators provided the board of directors 
with the power to determine what constitutes „independence‟, taking broad 
consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances.393 
 
                                                             
391 New York Stock Exchange, „Company Overview‟ <http://corporate.nyx.com/en/who-we-are/company-
overview> accessed 10-12-2011. 
392 New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, Section 303A.02 (a). 
393 Ibid. 
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To provide detailed guidance to the board of directors, in addition to the 
general independence test, the NYSE also stipulates several 
circumstances in which a director is not independent, specifically if: 
 
(i) the director is, or has been within the last three years, an 
employee of the listed company, or an immediate family 
member is, or has been within the last three years, an 
executive officer, of the listed company; (ii) the director has 
received, or has an immediate family member who has 
received, during any twelve-month period within the last 
three years, more than $120,000 in direct compensation 
from the listed company, other than director and committee 
fees and pension or other forms of deferred compensation 
for prior service; (iii) (A) the director is a current partner or 
employee of a firm that is the listed company‟s internal or 
external auditor; (B) the director has an immediate family 
member who is a current partner of such a firm; (C) the 
director has an immediate family member who is a current 
employee of such a firm and personally works on the listed 
company‟s audit; or (D) the director or an immediate family 
member was within the last three years a partner or 
employee of such a firm and personally worked on the listed 
company‟s audit within that time; (iv) the director or an 
intermediary is or has been within the last three years, 
employed as an executive officer of another company where 
any of the listed company‟s present executive officers at the 
same time serves or served on that company‟s 
compensation committee.394 
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 Combined Code 
The Combined Code draws together the recommendations of the Cadbury, 
Greenbury, and Hampel reports. 395  The Combined Code (2008) states 
that: 
 
The board should identify in the annual report each non-
executive director it considers to be independent. The board 
should determine whether the director is independent in 
character and judgment and whether there are relationships 
or circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to 
affect, the director‟s judgment.396 
 
Such an independence requirement could be deemed as a mirror to the 
proposal in the Cadbury Report that independent directors should be „free 
from any business or other relationship which could materially interfere 
with the exercise of their independent judgment‟. 
 
 Guideline of Articles of Association of Listed Companies 
In 1997, the CSRC issued the Guideline of Articles of Association of Listed 
Companies, which is the first formal document relating to independent 
directors in China. Notwithstanding its failure to set out a detailed 
institution of independent directors, this document does provide a negative 
independence test whereby certain persons are banned from serving as 
independent directors: (a) shareholders or those employed by 
shareholding entities; (b) „internal personnel‟ of the company (e.g. the 
executive director, senior manager or employees); and (c) persons with 
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ties with the company‟s affiliates or managers.397  
 
 Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Director 
System in Listed Companies 
The landmark document in the development of Chinese corporate 
governance, the Opinion, provides the first definition of „independent 
director‟. An independent director in a listed company is one who does not 
take up any other position than that of director, and has no relationship 
with the company or its major shareholders, which may interfere with his 
offering independent objective judgment. 398  Moreover, independent 
directors must have a basic knowledge of operating a company and no 
less than five years‟ professional experience. 
 
In addition to the positive requirement, the Opinion also puts forward a set 
of negative independence tests to disqualify certain persons from 
becoming an independent director:399 
 
(a) employees of the listed company or its subsidiary 
corporations as well as their direct relatives (such as 
spouses, parents and children) and major social relations 
(such as brothers or sisters, parents-in-law, children-in-law); 
(b) a natural person or a direct relative of a natural person who 
directly or indirectly holds more than one per cent of the 
company‟s shares, or a natural person who is one of the top 
10 largest shareholders of a listed company; 
(c) an employee or a direct relative of an employee of a 
company which is a corporate shareholder of the listed 
                                                             
397 Donald C Clarke, 'The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance' (2006) 31 Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law 125, 183. 
398 The Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System in Listed Companies, 
Section 1(1). 
399 Ibid, Section 3 (author‟s translation). 
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company, directly or indirectly holding more than five per 
cent of the company‟s shares, or of a company that is one of 
the top five largest corporate shareholders of a listed 
company; 
(d) a person who has fulfilled any of the three conditions above 
in the last year; 
(e) a person who provides financial, legal or consultant services 
to the listed company or its subsidiary corporations; 
(f) other individuals regulated by the articles of association of 
the listed company; and  
(g) other individuals designated by CSRC. 
 
Taking account of the regulations in different jurisdictions, it can be found 
that legislators in different countries have chosen to attempt to list and rule 
out those relationships which may influence directors‟ independence. 
Zattoni and Cuomo collected corporate governance codes developed 
worldwide by the end of 2005, and identified several relationships that 
must be avoided for the purpose of keeping directors‟ independence. 
Details are shown in Chart 1 below.400 
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Chart 1: Relationships to Avoid for Independent Directors 
 
Given the very many different relationships mentioned by various 
corporate codes, it is unrealistic to expect any one country to rule out all of 
them. Moreover, a recent study offers important empirical evidence that 
existing definitions of independence might not cover all the potential 
influences that may affect directors‟ independent judgment. 401  Some 
potential benefits-related considerations, for example, friendship, 
reputation or personal relationship, would not be expressed via 
                                                             
401 Frederick Tung, 'The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning' (2011) 91 Boston University Law 
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employment or economic ties. However, it is quite obvious that the 
relationships between the independent directors and the managers, 
company and shareholders are the top three most important concerns, 
which should be cut off by legislations. In terms of the relationships to 
avoid, the business relationship, family relationship and general 
relationship listed on the top. 
 
As a partial conclusion, in order to ensure the independence of directors, 
emphasis should be put on improving the independence test. In addition, 
the transactions involving a conflict of interest should be investigated, case 
by case, to ensure the business decisions made by the board are in the 
interests of the company, and ultimately benefit the shareholders. 
 
(2) Right Position 
Corporate affairs can be divided into two classes: the general issues which 
are decided in the board meeting; and specific issues which are handed to 
specific professional committees to determine. Generally speaking, the 
position of independent director is an ideal position for a person to 
safeguard the interests of shareholders as a whole. This is because, in 
most countries, the board of directors is the most powerful governance 
mechanism in modern corporate governance structure. (China sits in a 
different group, which will be discussed in detail later.) 
 
In addition to normal functions of the board, discussing and voting upon 
issues in the board meeting, there are also board sub-committees, which 
can have great influence on corporate operations. Examples of such 
committees include the audit committee, nomination committee, 
remuneration committee and special litigation committee.  
 
Chapter Three: The Board of Directors 
Page 167 of 415 
 
Among all the sub-committees, the audit committee is the most important. 
According to Smith, „while all directors have a duty to act in the interests of 
the company, the audit committee has a particular role, acting 
independently from the executive, to ensure that the interests of 
shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial reporting and 
internal control‟.402  An empirical study by Chan and Li, in 2008, indicates 
that expert independence of the audit committee with a majority of 
independent experts results in positive firm value.403  
 
The remuneration committee determines the remuneration packages of 
executives or senior managers, including pension rights and any other 
compensation.404   Meanwhile, the nomination committee, as the name 
suggests, is designed to lead the process for board appointments and 
make recommendations to the board. 
 
Reviewing various corporate governance codes in both the Anglo-Saxon 
and Chinese systems, certain rules can be suggested to introduce or 
strengthen such board sub-committees.   
 
One of the important objectives of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to reinforce 
the company‟s audit committee. The audit committee stipulated by the 
SOA should comprise only independent members, and the company must 
also disclose whether it has at least one „audit committee financial expert‟ 
on the audit committee.405  
 
Section 303A.01 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual sets out the 
                                                             
402 Sir Smith Robert, „Audit Committee Combined Code Guidance‟ (2003) Financial Reporting Council, para 
1.5. 
403 Kam C Chan and Joanne Li, 'Audit Committee and Firm Value: Evidence on Outside Top Executives as 
Expert-Independent Directors' (2008) 16 Corporate Governance 16, 17. 
404 Mallin (n 374) 170. 
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general requirement of board independence that listed companies, with 
the exception of controlled companies, 406  must have a majority of 
independent directors.407 Moreover, the nominating/corporate governance 
committee, compensation committee and the audit committee are required 
to be composed entirely of independent directors.408 
 
Under the UK Combined Code, the board should establish an audit 
commit and a remuneration committee of at least three, or in the case of 
smaller companies, two, independent non-executive directors.409 For the 
nomination committee, a majority of independent non-executive directors 
is required.410 Moreover, the board should satisfy itself that at least one 
member of the audit committee has recent and relevant financial 
experience.411 
 
In China, the proportion of seats on the board for independent directors 
required by the Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent 
Directors System in Listed Companies is not less than one third. If a board 
sets up any sub-committee, for example, an audit committee or a 
nomination committee, that committee must have a majority of 
independent directors.412  
 
In addition, since empirical evidence shows that the integration of CEO 
and Chairman of the Board significantly negatively impacts firm value,413 it 
has been argued that an independent director should chair the board of 
                                                             
406 A controlled company is a listed company of which more than 50% of the voting power for the election of 
directors is held by an individual, a group or another company. According to Section 303A.00 of the NYSE 
Listed Company Manual, such a controlled company is not required to comply with the requirements of 
Sections. 303A.01, 303A.04 or 303A.05, but must comply with the remaining provisions of Section 303A. 
407 New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, Section 303A.01. 
408 Ibid, Section 303A.04, 303A.05, and 303A.07. 
409 The Combined Code (2008), para C.3.1, B.2.1. 
410 Ibid, para A.4.1. 
411 Ibid, para C.3.1. 
412 The Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System in Listed Companies, 
Section 1.3 and Section 5.1. 
413 Chan and Li (n 403) 29. 
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directors.414  
 
To conclude, nominating more independent directors to the board, 
especially the board sub-committees, would improve the efficiency of 
internal monitoring by the board. As a consequence, better corporate 
governance would ensue, and the likelihood of misappropriation of 
shareholders‟ interests by executives would be reduced. 
 
(3) Right Power 
The independent director is not a new creation of company law, but a 
director with the additional characteristic of independence. The voting 
rights of independent directors are no different from those of normal 
directors. In most cases in Anglo-American companies, the weapon held 
by independent directors to challenge the executives is their right to vote 
in the board meeting; while in China, independent directors are granted 
more powers. 
 
The question raised here is, given that the independent directors have 
been charged with higher expectation of improving governance quality and 
a requirement of independence, how can they achieve governance targets 
in Anglo-American companies without more powerful rights or privileges? 
Research for this thesis suggests that it could make sense in theory. As 
mentioned above, the US and the UK rules require the company to have a 
board with a majority of independent directors or independent non-
executive directors. Therefore, a consensus among independent 
shareholders would become the decision of the board by voting, under a 
majority rule. Although there will inevitably be differences between 
independent directors, it is clear that the institution of director, even with 
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normal voting power, can also fulfil the monitoring mission, as long as 
each independent director can exercise independent judgment in 
accordance with the company‟s interests or shareholders‟ will. 
 
On board sub-committees, the proportions of independent directors are 
normally even higher. In Anglo-American countries, the audit committee, 
nomination committee, and remuneration committee are usually required 
to be composed entirely of independent directors.415 Therefore, there can 
be no doubt that decisions made by such committees comply with the 
interests of the company.  
 
Nevertheless, merely authorising voting rights for independent directors 
seems inadequate to improve board independence in China. In contrast to 
the board structure in the US and the UK, in Chinese listed companies the 
only requirement is that independent directors make up no less than one 
third of the board.416 Moreover, under Chinese Company Law 2005, the 
method of decision making on the board is based on a conditional majority 
rule whereby a decision should be approved by more than half of the vote 
in the board meeting, and the number of board members who attend the 
meeting should be over half of the total.417  As a result, there is little 
possibility that independent directors could influence corporate decision 
making without any other support. Therefore, increasing board 
independence cannot achieve the aim of improving internal monitoring, 
even if those independent directors are the right people in the right 
position. Hence, it is necessary to increase the minimum proportion of 
independent directors on the boards of Chinese companies. 
 
                                                             
415 Specific rules are discussed in the previous section (Right Position). 
416 The Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System in Listed Companies, 
Section 1.3. 
417 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 112. 
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According to the Opinion, Chinese legislators have created some special 
powers for independent directors. Independent directors in Chinese listed 
companies can provide suggestions to the board on the issues of 
appointing or dismissing an accounting firm and convening an 
extraordinary shareholders‟ meeting; suggest a board meeting be 
convened; and appoint an external audit institution and consultants. 418 
More importantly, important related-party transactions should be approved 
by independent directors before discussion by the board.419 
 
However, this thesis does not believe that the Chinese independent 
director system is better than its western counterparts on account of these 
simple requirements. It should be noted that most special powers 
authorized to independent directors are no more than a set of 
recommended rights, having no direct effect on corporate operations. 
Furthermore, the approval right regarding related party transactions is also 
impractical, owing to the absence of remedies if the views of the 
independent directors are ignored.  
 
From the discussion above, power of voting could be deemed as the 
fairest and most practical mechanism for independent directors to fulfil the 
ideal monitoring function. Of course, this should be assisted by a helpful 
board structure. It is suggested that the board should have a majority of 
independent directors. Alternatively, some more effective powers could be 
granted to independent directors in China, for example, the power of 
dismissing executives. It may bring about a substantial effect in improving 
the monitoring quality.    
 
                                                             
418 The Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System in Listed Companies, 
Section 1.3 and Section 5.1. 
419 Important related party transactions refer to any amount over three million RMB or over 5% of the listed 
company‟s latest audited net asset value. Ibid. 
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As a brief conclusion, according to the All-Right Model, the board should 
comprise a majority of independent directors, as should the board sub-
committees, to improve the independence of the board as a whole. 
Meanwhile, in terms of the powers granted to the board of directors to fulfil 
its internal monitoring duty, this thesis suggests that more substantial 
rights are required. However, equally important is the point that the board 
of directors should be accountable to shareholders. 
 
3.4.2 Current Deficiencies of the Institution of Independent Directors 
 
As has been mentioned, many empirical researchers have questioned the 
effect of the system of independent directors. Bhagat and Black survey the 
literature of independent directors and conclude that „studies of overall 
performance have found no convincing evidence that firms with majority-
independent boards perform better than firms without such boards‟. 420 
Furthermore, Tan regards the presence of independent directors as „a 
smokescreen and a snare for the unwary investor who may pay a higher 
price for the equity on the basis of a supposedly better corporate 
governance structure‟.421 
  
Such challenges to the effectiveness of non-executive directors have been 
raised not only in the US, but also in the UK. The Treasury Committee 
looking into the failure of Northern Rock noted that: 
 
the non-executive members of the Board, and in particular 
the Chairman of the Board, the Chairman of the Risk 
Committee and the Senior non-executive director, failed in 
                                                             
420 Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, 'The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance' (1999) 54 The Business Lawyer 921, 922. 
421 Cheng Han Tan, 'Corporate Governance and Independent Directors' (2003) 15 Singapore Academy of Law 
Journal 355, 378; also see, JiangYu Wang, 'The Strange Role of Independent Directors in a Two-tier Board 
Structure of China's Listed Companies' (2008) 3 Compliance & Regulatory Journal 47, 51.  
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the case of Northern Rock to ensure that it remained liquid 
as well as solvent, to provide against the risks that it was 
taking and to act as an effective restraining force on the 
strategy of the executive members.422 
 
Reviewing corporate governance in the UK banking industry in the wake of 
the financial crisis in 2009, Lord Turner indicated that the levels of skill and 
time commitment of non-executive directors should be raised.423  
 
However, this thesis wishes to defend the institution of independent 
directors by stating that such empirical studies may not give enough 
weight to the change in the board‟s function from consulting to monitoring. 
In other words, the institution of independent directors is designed 
specifically to increase board independence. Hence its success may not 
be directly reflected in corporate performance, at least not in the short 
term. However, it could still be regarded as effective if it has fulfilled the 
internal monitoring role. 
 
Of course, the defects of the institution of independent directors should 
also be investigated in detail, so as to find strategies for improvement. 
 
(1) Absence of Incentives 
Appointment as an independent director does not mean that the candidate 
would successfully meet the supervision target. There should be some 
positive incentives, for example economic and reputation incentives, and 
even some negative incentives, such as the threat of being dismissed or 
sued. However, in practice it is difficult to assess how an independent 
                                                             
422 House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock < http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.com/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56i.pdf> accessed 23-01-2014; also see, Anu Arora, 'The 
Corporate Governance Failings in Financial Institutions and Directors' Legal Liability' (2011) 32 Company 
Lawyer 3, 4. 
423 Ibid. 
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director works without exploring recent financial scandals. In the view of 
this thesis, lack of incentives is one of the key defects which results in the 
ineffectiveness of the current independent director mechanism. 
 
There are two reasons leading to low incentives among independent 
directors to devote themselves to the monitoring mission. First, their 
relationships with the executives or controlling shareholders make them 
unwilling to act as hostile colleagues. Second, the economic incentives are 
not sufficiently attractive to encourage them to do their best.  
 
 Relationships 
While it is true that the corporate codes in different countries have 
attempted to eradicate improper relationships between independent 
directors and the company, executives or the company‟s controlling 
shareholders, especially through financial or family ties, as argued above it 
is impossible to cover all possible relationships. Therefore, to ensure the 
independence and the efficiency of independent directors, in addition to 
the independence test, the rules on nomination and election are crucial. 
Furthermore, the power to decide the remuneration of independent 
directors is also an important concern. 
 
With regard to nomination and election, independent directors must first be 
nominated by someone before being placed before shareholders. It has 
been argued that the management traditionally had a great influence on 
the nomination and selection of directors. If this scenario were repeated in 
relation to independent directors, the reform would become nonsense.424  
 
Executives and majority shareholders continue to have an influential say 
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at the nomination stage, especially in China. In 2003, ninety per cent of 
independent directors in China were found to be nominated by the 
controlling shareholder or by executives.425 Other research has found that 
63% of independent candidates were nominated by the board, and 36% 
directly by the controlling shareholder.426 
 
In 2003, a famous TV producer was appointed as independent director of 
an entertainment company based in Xi‟An province. When questioned as 
to his qualification to fill that position, the producer declared publicly that 
the manager was his good friend. 427  This brief illustration is perhaps 
representative of the way in which many „independent‟ directors are 
chosen. 
 
The reason behind this unsatisfactory situation is the problematic 
nomination and election system. According to the Guiding Opinion on the 
Establishment of an Independent Directors System in Listed Companies, 
an independent director can be nominated by the board of directors, the 
supervisory board, or by a shareholder or shareholders who individually or 
collectively hold at least one per cent of the shares of the company,428 and 
be elected at the general meeting, normally under a simple majority 
rule.429 As such, it is hardly surprising to see the independent directors 
affiliated with the executives or controlling shareholders who nominated 
                                                             
425 Anonymous Author, 'Dui Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Duli Dongshi Zhidu Shishi Zhuangkuang de Fenxi ji 
Jianyi [Analysis and Suggestions Concerning the Situation of Implementation of the Independent Director 
System in China's Listed Companies]' Jin Xin Securities Newspaper (08-08-2003). 
426 Ying Tong, „Zhongguo Dudong Shengcun Xianzhuang [The Status Quo of Independent Directors in 
China]‟, (2004) May Shanghai Zhengquan Bao [Shanghai Securities Newspaper]; also see Jie Yuan, 'Formal 
Convergence or Substantial Divergence? Evidence from Adoption of the Independent Director System in 
China' (2007) 9 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 71, 104. 
427 Sibao Shen and Jing Jia, 'Will the Independent Director Institution Work in China?' (2005) 27 Loyola of 
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 223, 238. 
428 The Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System in Listed Companies, 
Section 1.3 and Section 4.1. 
429 The Cumulative Voting System is recommended to Chinese listed companies by the Company Law (2005) 
and several administrative regulations. However, it is not compulsory for the company to introduce such a 
voting system into their shareholders‟ meeting. Shareholders can vote to adopt such a system by amending the 
articles of association.  
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them and for their independence to be questioned. As Xie has noted, „it is 
inevitable that an independent director would be very reluctant to offend 
his friend, namely the chairman or CEO of the company, although the 
chairman or CEO has [done] something which is detrimental to the interest 
of the company and its shareholders‟.430 
 
In order to change this situation, first of all a nomination committee led by 
independent directors should be required by law, and the independence of 
those committee members should be guaranteed. In addition, it is 
recommended that an external search consultancy or open advertising 
should be used. 
 
Next, with regard to remuneration, it has been observed that the 
executives or controlling shareholders have a great say in the payment of 
independent directors in practice. According to a report by China Securities 
Daily, in 2005 „52.5% of the independent directors under survey said that 
their remuneration was determined by the company‟s “senior managers”, 
while 37.5% of those revealed that it was the “controlling shareholders” 
who decided their remuneration‟.431  
 
It is not reasonable to expect people to do their best when they are called 
upon to challenge those who decide their pay. In order to ensure good 
remuneration and avoid the difficulty of being called to account, an 
independent director might act in favour of the executives or controlling 
shareholder, leaving the monitoring mission aside.  
 
Therefore, this thesis calls for a truly independent remuneration 
committee, to cut the financial tie between the monitors and the executives 
                                                             
430 C Xie, Duli Dongshi Falv Zhidu Yanjiu [A Study of the Independent Director System]  (Law Press China 
2004), 320. 
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or controlling shareholders, in order to ensure the monitors‟ independence.  
 
 Economic Incentives 
In order to fulfil their monitoring role, the independent directors must invest 
considerable time and effort.  Therefore it is rational and inevitable for 
independent directors to take account of their economic incentive. This will 
be decisive not only with respect to their willingness to become 
independent directors, but also with respect to how the directors fulfil their 
monitoring roles. 
 
However, there is a paradox whereby, if the economic incentive is too high, 
the independence of directors would be eroded; in contrast, if it is too low, 
directors would lack motivation to challenge the executives.  
 
Facing this tough issue, legislators around the world continue to seek 
ways to find a better balance. One appropriate solution would be to link 
the economic incentive to certain other incentives as an incentive 
package, to attract and encourage independent directors to fulfil their 
monitoring role.  
 
(2) Deficiency of Time and Experience 
For those independent directors who do have the intention to act as a 
safeguard of shareholders‟ interests, it is important that they have 
sufficient working time and necessary experience of operating a company.  
 
 Working Hours 
Seeney-Baird points out that the monitoring function of the independent 
director is time-consuming and creates an essential conflict.432 As a part-
                                                             
432 Margarita Seeney-Baird, 'The Role of the Non-executive Director in Modern Corporate Governance' 
(2006) 27 Company Lawyer 67, 70. 
Chapter Three: The Board of Directors 
Page 178 of 415 
 
time director, such an independent member would have only limited time 
to serve on the board, so that he could not ensure the company is properly 
managed all the time. Conversely, if the independent director were full-
time, with ample time to spend on overseeing the corporate operation, his 
independence would be questioned because of the close connection with 
the executives.  
 
Research has shown that, even in the US, the average working time of an 
independent director on supervisory affairs is only 123 hours a year, 
approximately equal to 1.5 working days per month, or less than 3 hours 
per week.433 
 
Although the monitoring role of an independent director is not a 24/7 
mission, it could still be argued that, if the hours of work are too few, the 
monitor would not be able to establish an overall understanding of the 
business. As a result, his judgment might be questioned, even if it were 
independent. 
 
 Experience  
Notwithstanding that legislators vest the internal monitoring function in the 
independent directors, there remain some companies which do not fully 
understand the monitoring role of independent directors, and place the 
expectation of good monitoring on technical advisors. A survey has shown 
that in Chinese listed companies, more than 40% of independent directors 
are technical experts.434 While it could be argued that technical experts 
are capable of advising on corporate technical innovation and strategy, 
their monitoring skills and experience of corporate operations cannot be 
guaranteed.  
                                                             
433 D S Lewis (ed), Corporations Law and Policy (3rd edn, West Publishing Corporation 1994), 656-667. 
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Apart from technical experts, the other main group of independent 
directors in Chinese listed companies are scholars. Further recent 
research based on a random sample of 500 Chinese listed companies has 
found that 45% of independent directors are university professors or 
academics.435 Facing the same difficulty as technical experts, scholars 
may be capable of giving advice from a theoretical point of view, but may 
not be competent to monitor corporate operations, since they lack 
experience in practice.  
 
 Shortage of Information 
One of the most important obstacles for shareholders to monitor the 
executives by themselves is the asymmetry of information between 
insiders and outsiders. However, it is not necessarily the case that the 
independent directors can get more corporate information than 
shareholders. 
 
Although the monitoring role has been place upon independent directors, it 
is undertaken on the basis of information provided by the executives. In 
other words, the quality of judgment made by independent directors is 
dependent on the quality and volume of the flow of information which the 
executives make available to them. 436  Research has shown that, in 
practice, the independent directors have much less information than 
insiders. 437  As such, if the executives want to conceal inappropriate 
activities, they can simply keep the crucial information away from the 
                                                             
435 Qingtang Yue, 'Dui 500 Jia Shangshi Gongsi Duli Dongshi Nianling Zhuanye Deng Goucheng de 
Shizheng Yanjiu [An Empirical Study of the Age and Occupational Composition of the Independent Directors 
in 500 Listed Companies]' (2004) 2 Jingji Jie [Economic World] 80, 86-88; Also see Clarke, 'The Independent 
Director in Chinese Corporate Governance' (n 397) 207. 
436 M J Nowak and M McCabe, 'Information Costs and the Role of the Independent Corporate Director' 
(2003) 11 Corporate Governance-an International Review 300, 303. 
437 E Ravina and P Sapienza, 'What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading' (2010) 
23 Review of Financial Studies 962, 963. 
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independent directors. 
 
However, in an interesting research, Ravina and Sapenza compared the 
profits earned by independent directors and the average profit on the 
market in relation to company shares. They found that, although 
independent directors complained of insufficient information to discharge 
their monitoring role, they did earn significantly higher returns than the 
market.438 This might prompt the question of whether the independent 
directors know something that the public do not. 
 
Of course, as this thesis argues, the empirical research mentioned above 
may not be sufficient evidence to conclude that independent directors 
have enough information to fulfil their monitoring role. But, at least, 
compared with the market or minority shareholders, it could be concluded 
that independent directors know the company better. Such a conclusion 
will become a logical foundation of my final suggestion in relation to 
Chinese corporate governance reform, that Chinese listed companies 
should change to a board-centralised structure and the institution of 
independent directors should be further improved to protect the interests 
of minority shareholders. 
 
To conclude this section, the main defects of the current institution of 
independent directors are: (1) lack of independence due to the concealed 
relationships with executives or controlling shareholders; (2) lack of 
incentives, especially economic incentives, to encourage independent 
directors to challenge the executives; (3) lack of time or essential 
experience to monitor corporate operations; and (4) lack of necessary 
information to reach independent judgments. 
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3.4.3 Specific Issues Relating to the Institution of Independent 
Directors in China 
 
In common with many scholars, this thesis holds the view that legal 
transplantation of the institution of independent directors into China would 
be helpful to improve corporate governance quality, if the defects 
mentioned above could be overcome.  
 
However, it should be pointed out again that the core issue of Chinese 
corporate governance is not agency costs as between the executives and 
shareholders, but the conflict of interests between the controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders. Most listed companies in China 
have a concentrated shareholding structure and are under the control of 
the state. An empirical study has indicated that 81.6% of companies are 
directly or indirectly controlled by the state, and, on average among all 
listed companies the single largest owner holds 36% of shares.439  
 
Although the institution of independent directors originated as a specific 
legal mechanism to reduce agency costs as between executives and 
shareholders, independent directors in China not only have to fight against 
the executives, as do their Anglo-American counterparts, but also face 
challenges in improving legal protection for minority shareholders. 
 
Moreover, in an empirical study Kim has demonstrated that ownership 
concentration and board independence are negatively related.440 In other 
words, the more concentrated the shareholding structure is, the less 
                                                             
439 Min Yan, 'Obstacles in China's Corporate Governance' (2011) 32 Company Lawyer 311, 312. 
440 Kenneth A Kim, P Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard and John R Nofsinger, 'Large Shareholders, Board 
Independence, and Minority Shareholder Rights: Evidence from Europe' (2007) 13 Journal of Corporate 
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independent the monitors are.  
 
Hence, before providing any suggestions for the next reform of Chinese 
corporate governance, two questions should be addressed: (1) Can 
anyone challenge the will of the controlling shareholder in Chinese listed 
companies? (2) If not, what can independent directors provide in terms of 
minority protection? 
 
(1) Can Anyone Challenge the Will of the Controlling Shareholder in 
Chinese Listed Companies? 
 
Under the current corporate governance structure in China, there is no 
doubt that the controlling shareholder has decisive influence over 
corporate affairs. In other words, the company is operated in accordance 
with the will of the controlling shareholder, the state.  
 
According to Chinese Company Law, appointment of directors, important 
corporate decision making and directors‟ remuneration are all determined 
by the voting outcome in the shareholders‟ general meeting.441 Therefore, 
the controlling shareholder can have a final say on most corporate 
decisions, both by voting and through a corporate decision-making body 
elected by him and acting in his interests.  
 
The situation is not substantially different when an independent director 
acts as monitor of the company. Such a director may be affected, to a 
large extent, by the will of the controlling shareholder. Although 
independent directors are apparently more „independent‟ than executive 
insiders, they are still not as independent as they should be. In a survey by 
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Wang, 65% of the independent directors never said „no‟ in the board 
meeting, and all admitted that they did, at least „occasionally‟, vote yes 
when they should have voted no based on the merits of the proposal.442 
Moreover, as indicated by Andrews and Tomasic, independent directors 
need support from the controlling shareholder in order to be elected and to 
remain as directors.443 
 
A Dean of the Changjiang School of Business, also appointed as an 
independent director, has stated that: 
 
I have never thought that the independent director is the 
protector of medium and small shareholders; never think 
that. My job is first and foremost to protect the interests of 
the large shareholder, because the large shareholder is the 
state.444 
 
To conclude, current independent directors in Chinese listed companies 
are not likely to challenge the will of the controller shareholder. The 
reasons for this include, but are not limited to: (a) The standard of 
„independence‟ is still imperfect; (b) The proportion of such directors on the 
board is too low; and (c) the attitudes and deference towards the 
perceived wishes of the state are still in question. This thesis holds that, if 
those defects could be overcome, the institution of independent directors 
would be one of the most important mechanisms to ensure the decisions 
made by the board are on behalf of all shareholders rather than just the 
majority shareholder. The suggestions for reform will be illustrated later in 
this thesis. 
                                                             
442 Wang (n 421) 52. 
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Governance in an Emerging Market Economy' (2006) 2 Corporate Governance Law Review 245, 291. 
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(2) What Can Independent Directors Provide in Terms of Minority 
Protection? 
 
Minority shareholders in China are normally institutional and individual 
investors, with little experience of participating in corporate governance. 
Individual stock investors in China are nicknamed „stock-citizens‟, meaning 
citizens in the stock market. Due to their limited investment experience 
and lack of reliable information, the minority shareholders usually play the 
role of silent investors, who wait for a free ride on complicated corporate 
affairs. Therefore, although it might be better if the minorities could be 
more involved in running the business, they would also be happy to see 
higher corporate transparency. By knowing more about the company, 
minority investors would be able to make better investment decisions.  
 
Therefore, this thesis suggests that, independent directors could be an 
appropriate institution to improve the accuracy and timeliness of corporate 
information published to all shareholders, even though they would not be 
in a position to challenge the corporate controller at this stage. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Upon an overall review of corporate governance issues in Chinese listed 
companies, this thesis concludes that the board of directors should be the 
core of corporate operations as well as the key institution in terms of legal 
protection of minorities. Although it is argued in Chapter Two that minority 
shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, should participate more 
in corporate management to safeguard their own interests, the board of 
directors should also take on a more important role.  
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A well-designed board of directors could balance all the interests relating 
to the company in the boardroom, including the interests of the majority 
shareholder, minority investors, employees, creditors and other 
stakeholders. As such, decisions made by the board would be more likely 
to be in the best interests of the company. 
 
In order to realise this expectation, scholars around the world have offered 
ideas which could be used by Chinese policy makers. Smerdon suggests 
that a new body, named „observers‟, should be introduced into the board 
structure in non-profit organisations. 445  According to his suggestion, 
observers should be granted the right to attend and speak at board 
meetings.446 This thesis suggests that such a mechanism could be applied 
for the purpose of minority protection. Observers, selected by different 
groups of shareholders according to their shareholding, could be granted, 
either by law or by the articles of association of the company, the right to 
attend and speak at the board meeting on behalf of the interests of his 
group. Although such observers would have no right to vote in decision 
making, they could at least voice the interests of a certain group of 
shareholders, in particular the minorities, to the board, and provide 
feedback relating to the actual board meeting to the shareholders who 
appointed him. As a consequence, the transparency and independence of 
the board may be increased. However, there should be careful attention 
here to the issue of confidentiality, so that business secrets remain 
protected by suitable undertakings.  
 
Lipton and Lorsch‟s suggestion from 1992, that a lead director should be 
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446 Ibid. 
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introduced into a modern board of directors,447 could also be useful. In 
their conception, such a lead director should be consulted by the CEO or 
the Chairman of the Board on „the selection of board committee members 
and chairpersons; the board‟s meeting agendas; the adequacy of 
information directors receive; and the effectiveness of the board meeting 
process‟. 448  Accordingly, the introduction of a lead director would be 
expected to make a significant contribution to corporate governance 
quality, through: (a) taking responsibility for improving board performance: 
(b) building a productive relationship with the CEO: and (c) providing 
leadership in crisis situations.449 
 
Indeed, in practice, the institution of lead director has been proved 
effective. A survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2010 shows that lead 
directors have improved the quality of corporate governance in listed 
companies, particularly by „focusing the board‟s talent and wisdom when 
difficult situations arise: management performance and succession, risk 
management, mergers and acquisitions, and a host of other internal and 
external matters‟.450 
 
This thesis will put forward an ideal model of corporate structure in the 
concluding chapter, based on a key ingredient of board-centralization. In 
terms of the reform of the board of directors, two aspects should be 
improved in particular: decision powers and board independence. As 
argued by this thesis, more decisive rights relating to corporate operations 
should be moved from the shareholders‟ meeting to the boardroom. More 
importantly, the independence of the board should be increased. Certainly, 
this would be a tough project, which would require a restructuring to 
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increase the proportion of independent directors on the board. However, 
as a result, the interests of minority shareholders would be weighted more 
fairly in decision making, and the transparency of listed companies could 
be improved. 
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Chapter Four: The Supervisory Board in China 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This thesis argues that the internal monitoring mechanism is crucial in 
modern corporate governance. The two main institutions of internal 
monitoring currently in operation are the supervisory board, which 
originated in Germany, and independent directors, an idea adopted from 
the US. Although the Chinese capital market was established only 
relatively recently, both these internal monitoring mechanisms have been 
transplanted into Chinese company law. However, this thesis argues that 
their operation has not brought about better internal monitoring in Chinese 
listed companies, because the relevant legislation fails to clarify the duties 
and responsibilities of each institution.  
 
Through comparative research of the design of the supervisory board in 
Germany and in China, this thesis identifies a fundamental divergence, 
which means that the Chinese supervisory board cannot achieve the same 
effectiveness as its German counterpart. The supervisory board in 
Germany is an intermediary between shareholders and the management 
board, and represents the company. In that conception, management 
should be accountable to the supervisory board. However, the Chinese 
supervisory board is at the same level in the corporate structure as the 
board of directors. There is no direct accountability between the two. 
Hence, the board of directors in a Chinese listed company will be 
unconcerned about supervision by the supervisory board, as long as it can 
satisfy the controlling shareholder. 
 
This thesis argues that, there are four main defects leading to the 
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ineffectiveness of the supervisory board: (1) the insufficiency of substantial 
rights; (2) low motivation; (3) the absence of independence; and (4) the 
lack of professional knowledge and skills. 
 
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the supervisory board cannot simply 
be replaced, either by independent directors or by the party committee of 
the CCP. Theoretically, the co-existence of supervisory board and 
independent directors could improve minority protection, if legislation could 
clarify the duties and responsibilities of both institutions. In addition, the 
accountability of the supervisory board should be reinforced. Finally, but 
equally importantly, compulsory training to provide supervisors with 
professional knowledge and skills could improve the effectiveness of the 
supervisory board. 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
To achieve good corporate governance in practice, a mature market is 
both an invigorating factor and an effective internal monitoring system. 
Since minority shareholders are unable to get involved in day-to-day 
corporate operations, internal monitoring could be the first line of defence 
to prevent the infringement of minority interests by executives. Internal 
monitoring mechanisms vary from one jurisdiction to another in 
accordance with commercial practice, legal system and culture. 
 
Most common law countries, such as the US and the UK, have a 
dispersed shareholding structure, which means that almost all 
shareholders in a company are minority shareholders.451 Consequently, 
the agency cost problem between shareholders and executives, or 
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alternatively, the capital providers and professional knowledge providers, 
has been considered the core issue of corporate governance.452 In this 
context, the institution of the independent director has been introduced in 
order to improve the independence of the board, minimise the negative 
effect of information asymmetry and, eventually, achieve better protection 
of shareholders‟ interests. 
 
However, in civil law countries such as Germany, the shareholding 
structure is relatively more concentrated. In contrast to Anglo-American 
countries, where the success of the company is widely equated with 
maximizing shareholders‟ interests, much more attention in Germany is 
paid to the interests of other stakeholders, including banks, institutional 
investors, employees, suppliers, customers and the public.453 Therefore, a 
legal mechanism has been introduced to protect the interests of all 
stakeholders. Specifically, there is a two-tier board structure, usually a 
board of directors and a supervisory board, where the latter acts as an 
internal safeguard to monitor the former. 
 
The case of China is quite special. Its market-oriented economy started 
relatively late, but has experienced dramatic development over the last 
two decades. To fit the flourishing market, Chinese legislators have 
transplanted certain institutions into the Chinese corporate governance 
regime. In terms of the internal monitoring mechanism, both the 
supervisory board and the institution of independent directors have been 
integrated into the Chinese legal system. Ironically, however, despite the 
co-existence of those two institutions as safeguards, China has 
experienced numerous corporate scandals, in which the rights of minority 
shareholders have been expropriated by the majority shareholders and 
                                                             
452 It has been discussed above in Chapter Two. 
453 Thomas J Schoenbaum and Joachim Lieser, 'Reform of the Structure of the American Corporation: The 
"Two-Tier" Board Model' (1973) 62 Kentucky Law Journal 91, 92. 
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executives.454 
 
This chapter investigates and evaluates the institution of the supervisory 
board in China. Through the analysis, this thesis concludes that 
supervisory boards in Chinese listed companies have not fulfilled their 
function as expected, and the co-existence of supervisory board and 
independent directors results in an overlap and ambiguity in rights and 
responsibilities. Therefore, the internal monitoring mechanism is not likely 
to be effective in the future without fundamental improvement.  
 
This chapter begins by giving a brief theoretical introduction to the 
supervisory board and how it has been transplanted into the Chinese 
corporate governance structure. Part 4.2 investigates the current 
performance of supervisory boards in practice. The third part analyses the 
reasons for the failure of the supervisory board as an internal monitor. Part 
4.4 focuses on the problematic co-existence of supervisory board and 
independent directors. The chapter concludes by discussing several 
issues, in an attempt to find a solution to improve currently inefficient 
internal monitoring mechanism that includes both supervisory board and 
independent directors.455 
 
4.1 The Transplantation of the Institution of Supervisory Board 
 
4.1.1 Proposal to Establish a Supervisory Board 
 
It has been noted that a „third party‟ should be put in place as an internal 
monitoring mechanism of a company, to oversee the corporate business 
operated by potentially opportunistic agents, the executives, and to 
                                                             
454 Shujun Ding and others, 'Executive Compensation, Supervisory Board, and China's Governance Reform: 
A Legal Approach Perspective' (2010) 35 Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 445, 446. 
455 The issues concerning independent directors are discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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mitigate the vulnerability of the principals, the shareholders.456 Since such 
a third party normally has no obvious conflict of interest with either the 
shareholders or the executives, it is expected to fulfil the monitoring 
function more fairly, so as to reduce the agency cost problem. In 
accordance with this concern, civil law countries such as Germany have 
adopted the institution of the supervisory board,457 whereas common law 
countries have introduced independent directors as internal watchdogs. 
 
It is not only very difficult to compare the two internal monitoring 
mechanisms to try to establish which is better; it is also pointless. They are 
rooted in different environments. However, it is worth noting that, 
whichever internal monitoring mechanism is chosen, a sound corporate 
structure design must separate decision management and decision 
control.458 Decision management refers to the activities of initiating and 
implementing corporate decisions, which are normally exercised by the 
board of directors. Decision control, on the other hand, refers to ratification 
and supervision of corporate decisions and operation. In a one-tier board, 
such decision control is allotted to independent directors, while in a two-
tier board it becomes the job of the supervisory board. 
 
As pointed out by Maassen and van den Bosch, reformers in the United 
States emphasise strongly that a one-tier board is not sufficiently 
independent.459 The so-called independent director mechanism has been 
criticised on the grounds that „there is an uncomfortable untidiness in 
                                                             
456 S H Goo and Fidy Xiangxing Hong, 'The Curious Model of Internal Monitoring Mechanisms of Listed 
Corporations in China: The Sinonisation Process' (2011) 12 European Business Organization Law Review 
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457 The institution of supervisory board originated with the incorporation of the Dutch East India Company. 
Shenshi Mei, Xiandai Gongsi Jiguan Quanli Gouzao Lun [Studies on the Structures of the Modern Corporate 
Organs' Powers] (China University of Political Science and Law Press 2000), 556. 
458 E F Fama and M C Jensen, 'Separation of Ownership and Control' (1983) 26 Journal of Law and 
Economics 301, 301. 
459 Gregory F Maassen and Frans A J Van Den Bosch, 'On the Supposed Independence of Two-tier Boards: 
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having one group of directors supervising or controlling another group on 
the same board, which is meant to be the collective for managing the 
company‟.460 From this point of view, investigation by another board may 
be more reasonable, since, in that case, the atmosphere of the 
management board would be more collegiate. In addition, some scholars 
believe that a supervisory board could help to improve earnings‟ 
informativeness, so increasing the likelihood that minority shareholders 
would receive reliable investment information to protect their own 
interests.461 
 
Mintz illustrates an ideal conception of functional distribution of a two-tier 
board, as shown in Table 1 below: 
An Ideal Two-tier Board 
 Supervisory Board Executive Board 
Composition Representatives of 
Shareholders and 
Employees 
(1) Top managers 
including CEO, CFO 
and COO 
(2) Other members 
should be 
independent 
directors462 
Responsibilities (1) Evaluate executives‟ 
performance and decide 
their remuneration; 
(2) Review and approve the 
corporate governance 
compliance report; 
(1) Review and approve 
the financial 
statements and 
management‟s report 
on internal controls; 
(2) Monitor the internal 
                                                             
460 Sheridan Thomas and Kendall Nigel, Corporate Governance: An Action Plan for Profitability and 
Business Success (Pitman Publishing 1992), 161. 
461 M Firth, P Fung and O Rui, 'Ownership, Two-tier Board Structure, and The Informativeness of Earnings: 
Evidence From China' (2007) 26 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 463, 493. 
462 Mintz suggests that in an ideal board structure, an independent director should serve as the chair of the 
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(3) Review and approve 
accounting and financial 
statement; 
(4) Hire external auditors; 
and 
(5) Establish specific 
committees including 
audit committee, 
nomination committee 
and remuneration 
committee. 
control system 
including risk 
assessment; 
(3) Report to the 
supervisory board on 
operational 
strategies and major 
questions about 
corporate planning, 
financial and 
investment activities, 
and human resource 
issues; 
(4) Report to the 
supervisory board on 
the profitability of the 
business, particularly 
the return on equity; 
and 
(5) Report to the 
supervisory board on 
business 
development. 
Table 1: An Ideal Two-tier Board 
       (Resource from: Minz) 463 
 
However, other scholars have reviewed the role of the supervisory board 
and concluded that this internal monitoring institution is also dysfunctional 
in some respects. 464  Similarly, Xiao et al. define the members of the 
supervisory board as honoured guests, friendly advisors or censored 
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464 Chao Xi, 'In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model: Board Reforms and the Political Economy 
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watchdogs.465 
 
With specific reference to the supervisory board in Germany, which is 
based on the concept of codetermination,466 some critics have claimed 
that it would result in a less efficient or at least delayed decision-making.467 
Jensen and Meckling argue that if such codetermination were beneficial to 
the company, it would be introduced voluntarily into corporate governance. 
In fact, however, in those countries which have no codetermination laws, 
very few companies choose to adopt a supervisory board as an element of 
codetermination in the corporate structure.468 
 
In short, despite some shortcomings, in theory at least the supervisory 
board is expected to provide a fair investigation of executives‟ 
performance, and better protection for stakeholders. 
 
4.1.2 The Systematic Design of the Supervisory Board in Germany 
 
The institution of the supervisory board originated in Germany. The 
German Aktiengesellschaft, a corporation limited by shares that may be 
traded on the stock market, has a two-tier board. Power is vested in three 
separate bodies: the shareholders‟ meeting (Hauptversammlung), the 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and the management board (Vorstand). 
The rights and responsibilities of all three bodies are interrelated.469  
 
                                                             
465 Jason Zezhong Xiao, Jay Dahya and Z Jun Lin, 'A Grounded Theory Exposition of the Role of the 
Supervisory Board in China' (2004) 15 British Journal of Management 39, 42. 
466 Codetermination is based upon the theory that workers in an enterprise should be provided with the 
opportunity to „co-decide‟ questions which affect them individually and the work-force of the enterprise as a 
whole. For more detail see Schoenbaum and Lieser (n 453) 100. 
467 Simon Renaud, 'Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board Codetermination in Germany' (2007) 21 
Labour 689, 691. 
468 M C Jensen and W H Meckling, 'Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labour-managed 
Firms and Codetermination' (1979) 52 Journal of Business 469, 474. 
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(1) General meeting of shareholders elects the members of 
the supervisory board; 
(2) Supervisory board appoints and removes if necessary the 
members of the management board; 
(3) Management board reports to and is accountable to 
supervisory board; and  
(4) Supervisory board reports to and is accountable to 
shareholders‟ meeting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Corporate Structure in German Companies 
 
 
As shown in Chart 1 above, the two-tier board in Germany is a structure 
with a supervisory board between the shareholders‟ meeting and 
executive board. As such, the management board has no direct link to the 
shareholders, which should help them to focus on business operations. In 
practice, shareholders may participate in corporate decisions at the 
request of the management board, but their decision would not be binding 
on the executives. 470  According to the German Company Law, 
Aktiengesetz (AktG), the supervisory board in this structure is the 
                                                             
470 Ibid 107. 
General Meeting of Shareholders 
Supervisory Board 
Management Board 
(1)
(2)
(4)
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representative of the company in dealing with the management board.471 
In other words, it is the monitor which investigates the performance of the 
management board. It may appoint and dismiss members of the 
management board and enter into employment agreements with its 
members. 
 
The members of the supervisory board should be elected by 
shareholders.472 Members totalling two-thirds of the board may be freely 
chosen by the shareholders, while the remaining one-third should come 
from the labour force of the company, determined by the shareholders.473 
There should be no fewer than two company employee representatives.474 
 
As set out in para.90 (3) of AktG, the supervisory board may request a 
report from the executives on any matter to do with the company, including 
business decisions, legal relationships with connected undertakings, and 
circumstances concerning the business of such undertakings that may 
have a significant influence on the company‟s condition.475 Furthermore, 
the profitability of the company and, in particular, the return on its equity 
capital, should be reported to the supervisory board.476 
 
Section 3 of the German Corporate Governance Code regulates the co-
operation between the management board and supervisory board. It 
provides that the supervisory board is responsible for ensuring that the 
executives fulfil their duty to provide information and make reports to it.477  
 
In addition, the Code requires each executive on a board of directors to 
                                                             
471 Aktiengesetz (AktG), German Company Law, Para 84(1). 
472 Ibid, Para 101(1). 
473 Schoenbaum and Lieser (n 453) 99. 
474 Ibid. 
475 Aktiengesetz (AktG), German Company Law (n 471), Para 90(3). 
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inform other directors and the supervisory board without delay when a 
conflict of interests between himself and the company occurs. 478 
Moreover, significant transactions require the consent of the supervisory 
board.479 
 
Section 5 of the Code formulates the position and powers of the 
supervisory board in detail. To summarise, the supervisory board in 
German companies should (1) act as a regular consultant of the executive 
board in terms of corporate operations, especially in long-term planning; 
(2) supervise the performance of executives; (3) appoint or discharge the 
members of the executive board;480 and (4) set up the remuneration of 
members of the executive board.481 
 
Although it needs certain revisions, the operation of the supervisory board 
system in Germany has been deemed satisfactory in general, in terms of 
allocation of powers and responsibilities. Moreover, employee participation 
and harmony of the management board can be encouraged and achieved 
under this arrangement. 
 
4.1.3 The Supervisory Board in the Context of the Chinese Legal 
System 
 
Following the establishment of the stock exchanges in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, in 1990 and 1991 respectively, in 1993 the Chinese Company 
Law conferred the internal monitoring function on the supervisory board.482 
 
                                                             
478 Ibid, Section 4.3.4. 
479 Ibid. 
480 Ibid, Section 5.1. 
481 Jean J du Plessis and others, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context (2nd 
edn, Springer 2007), 81. 
482 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (1993), Article 54. 
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Given the particular political concerns in China, it is not difficult to 
understand the choice of the supervisory board as internal monitor. First of 
all, the legal system in China is to a large extent inherited from continental 
law. Therefore, it would be relatively easy to transplant the supervisory 
board by statute into the Chinese system. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
importantly, the philosophy behind this institution, for example, the system 
of codetermination that allows employees to take part in corporate 
decision making, is conducive to that of the CCP, the Chinese political 
governor self-defined as a vanguard of the Chinese working class. 
According to socialist ideals, the working class is deemed the owner of the 
means of production. 483  Therefore, its interests in particular should be 
protected. 
 
Under the Company Law 1993, the supervisory board became compulsory 
for all joint stock companies, including all listed companies.484 With regard 
to the internal monitoring functions performed by the supervisory board, 
the Law stipulates four main tasks:485 
 
(1) To scrutinise the financial affairs of the company; 
(2) To oversee the executives‟ actions with regard to 
compliance with the laws, administrative regulations and 
articles of association of the company. If any violation is 
found that would be detrimental to the company‟s interest, 
the supervisory board may request the executive to rectify 
his acts; 
(3) To propose a provisional shareholders‟ general meeting; 
and 
                                                             
483 Z Jun Lin, Ming Liu and Xu Zhang, 'The Development of Corporate Governance in China' (2006) 1 Asia-
Pacific Management Accounting Journal 29, 31. 
484 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (1993), Article 124. 
485 Ibid, Article 126. 
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(4) To attend the meeting of board of directors.486 
 
With regard to the composition of the supervisory board, there should be 
no fewer than three supervisors, and the members should include 
representatives of both the shareholders and the employees.487 Therefore, 
the institution of the supervisory board established a new channel for 
employees to participate in corporate operations, in addition to the already 
existing trade unions. 
 
The Company Law was revised in 2005.  However, despite evidence of 
supervisory board inefficiency, the institution was not replaced by 
independent directors as the internal monitor. On the contrary, the 
Company Law 2005 reinforced the supervisory board by conferring upon it 
several new rights. 
 
(1) Supervisors can bring forward proposals on the removal of 
any director or senior manager who violates any law, 
administrative regulation, the articles of association or any 
resolution of the shareholders' meeting.488 
(2) Supervisors can bring forward proposals at shareholders' 
meetings.489 
(3) Supervisors can initiate derivative actions against directors 
or senior managers at the request of shareholders.490 
(4) Supervisors can raise questions or suggestions on the 
matters to be decided by the board of directors.491 
(5) Where necessary, supervisors may hire an accounting firm 
                                                             
486 The right to attend the meeting of board of directors does not imply any voting right, nor the right of 
inquiry as to the affairs being discussed. 
487 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (1993), Article 124. 
488 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 54(2). 
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to help them, at the expense of the company.492 
 
It should be noted that, despite the clear improvement in the monitoring 
powers held by the supervisory board, its effectiveness in practice is still in 
doubt. This is because the powers newly authorised to the supervisory 
board could be defined as soft powers, which pose no direct threat to the 
executives. The most powerful right conferred upon the supervisory board 
under the Company Law 2005 is that of bringing a proposal on the 
removal of a director to the shareholders‟ meeting. 493  In this case, 
shareholders will have the final say by voting; hence, a director who has 
not satisfied the supervisory board will not be affected, as long as he can 
guarantee support by a majority of shareholders. 
 
It is important to note that legal transplantion is not simply copying another 
jurisdiction. Indeed, as Mintz argues, any attempt to establish a global 
corporate governance structure would be a mistake.494 Although China 
learnt a great deal from Germany in terms of the supervisory board 
design, there remain clear differences, due to the different cultures and 
backgrounds. Goo and Hong term this divergence „sinonisation‟. 495 
According to their research, they assert that it stems from differences 
present at the very beginning, when Chinese legislators integrated the 
internal monitoring mechanisms into the Chinese corporate structure, and 
applies not only to the supervisory board system but also to the institution 
of independent directors.496 
 
Among these differences, it is necessary to note that the governance 
structure of Chinese companies in accordance with the Company Law 
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1993 is quite different from the German system. In Germany, the 
supervisory board stands between the shareholders and executives, as 
shown in the chart above. The management board is accountable to the 
supervisory board, while the supervisory board reports to shareholders. 
Holding the power of appointment and dismissal, as well as the right to 
determine remuneration, the supervisory board in Germany is equipped to 
discharge its monitoring function effectively. 
 
However, the structure in China is different, as shown in Chart 2 below: 
 
(1) General Meeting of Shareholders elects the members of 
Board of Directors; 
(2) Board of Directors reports to and is accountable to General 
Meeting of Shareholders; 
(3) General Meeting of Shareholders elects the members of 
Supervisory Board; 
(4) Supervisory Board reports to and is accountable to 
General Meeting of Shareholders; and 
(5) Supervisory Board investigates the performance of Board 
of Directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2: Corporate Structure in Chinese Companies 
 
 
General Meeting of Shareholders 
Supervisory Board 
Management Board (Board of 
Directors) 
(2) (1) (3) (4)
(5)
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As shown, both the supervisory board and the board of directors are 
responsible to shareholders. The board of directors has no accountability 
to the supervisory board. Moreover, lack of substantial powers would 
inevitably result in inefficient monitoring in practice. These problems are 
investigated in detail in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
 
4.2 How Does the Supervisory Board Work in China? 
 
Since 1993, the supervisory board has been the compulsory monitoring 
body in the Chinese corporate structure. Despite certain criticisms, the 
institution of the supervisory board has not been abolished but has instead 
been reinforced. In 2008, the average size of supervisory board was 
4.95.497 In the same year the average number of external supervisors, 
introduced in order to improve the independence and professional 
capability of the supervisory board, was 1.97.498  Based on these figures 
alone, it might be concluded that the supervisory board in China has 
developed to become capable of internal investigation. However, this 
remains in doubt.  
 
Some scholars continue to question the effectiveness of the supervisory 
board in China.499 It has been claimed that the supervisory board is more 
decorative than functional in practice.500 Dehya et al. classify supervisory 
boards into four categories: (1) honoured guest; (2) friendly advisor; (3) 
censored watchdog; and (4) independent watchdog.501 Among these, only 
an independent watchdog could fulfil the internal monitoring function as 
                                                             
497 Tong Lu, Jiyin Zhong and Jie Kong, 'How Good Is Corporate Governance in China?' (2009) 17 China & 
World Economy 83, 96. 
498 Ibid. 
499 J Z Xiao, J Dahya and Z Lin, 'A Grounded Theory Exposition of the Role of the Supervisory Board in 
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500 Lin, Liu and Zhang, 'The Development of Corporate Governance in China' (n 483) 39. 
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theory would expect. However, unfortunately, the researchers find that 
most supervisory boards in China tend to be of the other three types. 
 
According to a survey by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in early 2000, the 
performance of supervisory boards in listed companies was disappointing.  
Only 3.4% of the respondents believed the supervisory board had 
achieved its monitoring function.   502 
 
A series of corporate scandals in the Chinese market offers more evidence 
of the ineffectiveness of the supervisory board. As a watchdog, the 
supervisory board is expected to discover the problems of the company 
and expose these to shareholders and the public when necessary. 
However, in almost all cases of corporate scandal, the supervisory boards 
have failed to do so. 
 
More ironically, although the design of the supervisory board takes 
particular account of the interests of stakeholders, including creditors and 
employees, it has been reported that in the years since the introduction of 
supervisory boards in China, there has been no improvement in 
employees‟ benefits or corporate social responsibility. According to 
research by Lu et al. examining the quality of supervisory boards, 50% of 
the companies involved made no mention of employees‟ safety and 
benefits in their supervisory board report, and 47% had not introduced 
employee share schemes or other long-term employee incentive 
compensation plans.503 In other words, the establishment of supervisory 
board failed both to provide special protection for employee‟s interests and 
to establish a channel for employees‟ participation.  
                                                             
502 Shanghai Stock Exchange, 'Shanghai Gongsi Zhili Wenjuan Diaocha Jieguo Yu Fenxi [Results and 
Analysis of the Survey of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies]' (2000) Shangshi Gongsi [Listed 
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Conversely, certain empirical studies have shown that the supervisory 
board in China has had some positive effects. For example, Dahya et al. 
conclude that lack of a supervisory board report in a company‟s annual 
report would lead to a negative market reaction.504 Firth et al. find that the 
existence of the supervisory board improves the quality of corporate 
accounting information so as to increase corporate transparency.505 More 
recently, a study has shown that the size of supervisory board can affect 
the remuneration of the board of directors. 506  Additionally, Li and Hao 
conclude in their empirical research that the monitoring function carried 
out by the supervisory board cannot be replaced easily by any other 
institution.507 
 
A survey by the CFA Institute in Hong Kong in 2006 focused on the 
practice of corporate governance in mainland China and showed that the 
performance of the supervisory board has improved since the Company 
Law reform in 2005.508 The rating of effectiveness of supervisory board 
reached 3.85, the historical high point, on a scale of one (extremely 
unimportant) to five (important).    509 
 
While the number of cases showing that the supervisory board has 
positive influence on corporate operations are few, it is worth mentioning 
some of them. For example, the supervisory board of Jiabao Group 
(600622) initiated a proposal to withdraw two decisions concerning 
related-party transactions, which were approved by the board of 
                                                             
504 Dahya and others (n 501) 309. 
505 Firth, Fung and Rui (n 461) 493. 
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directors, 510  while the shareholders‟ meeting of ST Kaidi upheld a 
supervisory board proposal to dismiss a director. In another case, three of 
the five supervisors of Sisha Stock (000611), representing the second 
largest majority shareholder and employees, took the lead in fighting 
against the majority shareholder and successfully protected the interests 
of employees and public minority investors.511 
 
Certainly, no structural design can balance perfectly the various interests 
in a company, and nor can a supervisory board achieve this. Even in 
Germany, the institution is subject to challenge. For example, critics have 
questioned the independence of supervisors and the shortness of working 
time over a year.512 Therefore, it is more important to discuss how to 
improve the internal monitoring mechanism rather than to evaluate it 
further. The remaining sections of this chapter will focus on the causes of 
failure and possible solutions in the Chinese context. 
 
4.3 Analysis of Supervisory Board Failure to Perform Well in China 
 
This part investigates in detail the failure of the supervisory board in 
China, and highlights several problems in this corporate governance 
mechanism.  
 
4.3.1 The Insufficiency of Substantial Rights 
 
To become an effective monitor, the supervisory board should be equipped 
with a set of important powers: (1) the power to threaten any complacency 
on the part of the executives; and (2) the substantial ability to influence 
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corporate decisions. 
 
Sufficient supervisory power would guarantee that executives would not 
easily ignore or challenge these monitoring activities. Such power would 
include the right to appoint and remove executives, and the right to 
determine their remuneration. If executives were unable to satisfy the 
supervisory board, they might suffer reduced remuneration or even 
immediate dismissal. 
 
Substantial ability to influence corporate decisions could improve the 
efficiency of supervision so as to provide better protection of corporate 
interests. Such ability could be exercised through a voting right on 
corporate decisions or a right to veto decisions. It should be pointed out 
that this thesis does not support giving voting rights to the supervisory 
board, owing to concerns regarding separation of decision management 
and decision control. The board of directors should be authorised to deal 
with corporate affairs independently. However, this thesis suggests that the 
supervisory board be granted a right of veto under a set of conditions. In 
this way, the risks of wrong-doing could be reduced and the interests of 
the company could be better protected. 
 
With regard to the veto right, China could draw upon the German 
experience. In Germany, the company articles of association or the 
supervisory board itself may determine that certain transactions be 
conducted with the consent of the supervisory board, or if the supervisory 
board refused to grant such consent, these transactions could be 
proposed to the shareholders‟ meeting, seeking a majority vote.513 Such 
power is similar to a right of veto, whereby the supervisory board would be 
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able to exert substantial influence when it considered the company‟s day-
to-day operations were being compromised. Consequently, the interests of 
shareholders, especially minority ones, could be protected. 
 
Despite reinforcement under the Company Law 2005, the Chinese 
supervisory board is still weak. It has little say on the issues of nomination 
and appointment of directors, or of their removal. It is not always possible 
to remove the executive in question from his position. All the supervisory 
board can do is to bring a proposal for dismissal to the shareholders‟ 
meeting and seek approval under the majority rule. 514  As a result, 
executives tend to show respect to shareholders rather than monitors, and 
even ignore requests from the supervisory board. 
 
It might be asked why, if the performance of management can satisfy the 
shareholders who appointed the managers, it might not satisfy the 
supervisory board? The key issue here is the concentrated shareholding 
structure in China. In most cases, it is the majority shareholder who holds 
the majority voting right to determine the appointment and removal of 
executives, not the shareholders as a whole. However, the interests 
represented by the supervisory board are not limited to majority 
shareholders, but should also include the interests of minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Therefore, the supervisory board 
may challenge the managers when corporate operations only benefit the 
majority shareholder. 
 
As to the remuneration of directors, once again this is determined by 
shareholders voting in the general meeting.515 Therefore, the assessment 
of management performance by the supervisory board cannot threaten the 
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directors‟ individual income. 
 
In addition to the lack of real power, it is important to note that currently the 
powers granted to the Chinese supervisory board should be exercised 
collectively. While apparently in accord with corporate internal democracy, 
in practice this would limit the internal monitoring function. Goo and Hong 
argue that it could be better to allow the supervisors to act individually 
rather than collectively, especially on the issue of financial auditing, which 
requires significant time and energy.516 It would be impossible to exercise 
such monitoring power collectively in the supervisory meeting, which only 
convenes a few times a year.517 
 
4.3.2 Low Motivation 
 
Although, in China, the supervisory board and the board of directors are at 
the same level in the corporate structure, as shown in Chart 2 above, and 
both report to the shareholders, their status and influence are entirely 
different. 
 
Under Chinese company law, the general meeting of shareholders is the 
most powerful body in the corporate governance structure. Corporate 
decisions that should be approved by shareholders‟ vote518 include: (1) the 
company‟s operating guidelines and investment plans; (2) appointment 
and removal of directors and supervisors; (3) remuneration of the board; 
(4) the reports of both boards; (5) annual financial budget plans and final 
accounting plans of the company; (6) profit distribution plans and loss 
recovery plans; (7) increases or reductions in registered capital; (8) issuing 
of corporate bonds; (9) issues of assignment, split-up, change of form, 
                                                             
516 Goo and Hong (n 456) 480. 
517 Ibid. 
518 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 38. 
Chapter Four: The Supervisory Board 
Page 210 of 415 
 
dissolution, liquidation of the company; and (10) revision of articles of 
association. 
 
The management, including directors and senior managers such as the 
CFO or the COO, are placed second in terms of influence over corporate 
operations. They are entitled to a substantial remuneration package, 
including annual salary, stock option incentives and other benefits. 
Meanwhile, because of their decisive position, they also enjoy high status 
within the company. 
 
Supervisors, on the other hand, have far less incentive to perform well 
compared with the two bodies above. As mentioned, on the one hand, 
they have not been granted sufficient powers to influence corporate 
decisions, nor can they encourage the executives to perform well through 
their supervision. Hence the importance and effectiveness of their function 
is in doubt. On the other hand, there is no specific provision on payment 
for supervisors. Article 57 states merely that the cost of supervisory board 
activities should be paid by the company.519 In practice, supervisors are 
normally paid a small allowance for their part-time monitoring job. 
Therefore, with little individual benefit, supervisors lack motivation. 
 
Another important reason why supervisors fail to act energetically is the 
lack of any legal penalties for poor performance under Chinese company 
law.  So far, there have been few cases in which a supervisor has been 
held responsible for corporate failure due to his inefficient supervision. As 
a consequence, supervisors might feel that they do not have to perform 
well. 
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To overcome this problem, Li and Hao suggest that an effective 
assessment of the performance of the supervisory board in China should 
be established. 520  Such an assessment or ranking should include: (1) 
operation of the supervisory board; (2) composition and size; and (3) 
capability of supervisors. Furthermore, a set of regulations should be 
added to current company law to keep supervisors accountable in the 
same way as directors. 
 
4.3.3 The Absence of Independence 
 
Under statute, members of the supervisory board are elected either by 
general meeting of shareholders or by general meeting of employees.521 
Given the current shareholding structure, it is likely that the supervisors 
elected by shareholders will be dominated by the majority shareholder(s), 
while the members elected by employees of the company will be 
influenced to a large extent by the executives, the leading company 
employees. Therefore, lack of independence has been argued by this 
thesis as one of the most important reasons for the failure of the 
supervisory board mechanism in China. 
 
Recent data show that Chinese state-controlled companies, especially the 
listed companies, retain a highly concentrated shareholding structure. In 
94 of the top 100 listed companies in China, the five largest shareholdings 
make up more than 30% of the total.522 Indeed, in 78 of these companies 
the five largest shareholdings make up over 50% of the total.523 A survey 
in 2002 showed that 72% of the listed companies on the Shanghai Stock 
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Exchange had no supervisor nominated by minority shareholders. 524 
Further empirical evidence shows that in 2004, 60% of supervisors were 
appointed by non-tradable shareholders, usually the majority shareholders 
in the company, and 38.38% were representatives of employees. 525 
Inevitably, in such a shareholding structure, supervisors appointed by 
shareholders represent the interests of the majority shareholder, rather 
than the interests of the company as a whole. Hence the independence of 
the institution is open to challenge. 
 
In fact, it has been noted by German scholars that the supervisory board 
system may not suit all kinds of companies, especially small or medium-
size companies, because it is too easy for the majority shareholder to 
dominate and control the board.526 The problem is almost the same in 
Chinese state-controlled companies, where the state takes the dominant 
position. 
 
In practice, however, the supervisory board in China is dominated not only 
by the company‟s majority shareholder, but also by the executives and 
party committee. The issues relating to the CCP are illustrated in detail in 
Chapter Five of this thesis. With regard to the influence of executives, 
especially the chairman of the board of directors, it should be noted that in 
most cases, supervisors are either employees of the companies or close 
friends of the chair. 527 In the former situation, supervisors might worry 
about losing their employment if they were to challenge their leader to fulfil 
the supervisory function; in the latter case, concerns about the personal 
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relationship would inhibit full effectiveness in the role. 
 
4.3.4 Inadequate of Professional Knowledge 
 
To fulfil the statutory requirements, most supervisors are the 
representatives of shareholders and employees. This raises the question 
of whether they are competent to carry out their monitoring task, which 
requires certain professional knowledge and skills. The answer, 
unfortunately, is in the negative. 
 
A survey in 2004, focusing on the 40 composite index companies on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, showed that a mere 3.24% of supervisors had 
a legal background, and only 23.78% had professional accounting 
knowledge. 528  The same survey revealed that 85% of the companies 
involved had no supervisor with a legal background, and 32.5% had no 
supervisor with an accounting background.529 
 
A financial controller of a large state-controlled company in China enlarged 
upon these defects in an interview, stating that: 
 
the supervisory board generally does nothing. Even with 
the annual report, I was the one who briefed them. They 
don‟t understand anything. The supervisory board meets 
twice a year, once before the interim report is issued and 
the other [time] before the annual report is published. Each 
meeting lasts about half an hour. It is basically a formality. 
They cannot discuss serious issues. Our secretary to the 
board of directors, after all, drafts the supervisory board 
                                                             
528 Yao (n 525) 215-219. 
529 Ibid. 
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report.530 
 
Moreover, Lu et al. note that out of 100 companies surveyed, only two 
provided training to supervisors.531 
 
As a means to improve the capability of supervisors in China, this thesis 
draws attention to some experience in practice in the Netherlands. 
Maassen and van der Bosch report that 74% of the chairmen interviewed 
for their research approve of the appointment of a former executive 
director as supervisor.532  The clear rationale is that such a supervisor 
would know more about the company, in particular about the financial 
affairs and long-term corporate strategy.  
 
As a partial conclusion to this section, the failure of the supervisory board 
is caused by a number of reasons, including but not limited to lack of 
substantial powers, motivation, independence and professional 
knowledge. Some of these defects could be overcome via legal reform, by 
granting to the supervisory board the power of veto or by reinforcing the 
accountability of supervisors. Evidence could be found in other 
researches.533 And more importantly, the reinforcement of the power of 
supervisory board in the revised Company Law 2005 shows the attitude 
and expectation of the state to improve such institution. However, some of 
the shortcomings will be more difficult to deal with. For example, it will not 
be easy to guarantee the independence of supervisors appointed by the 
majority shareholder. 
 
                                                             
530 Dahya, Karbhari and Xiao (n 527) 129. 
531 Lu, Zhong and Kong (n 497) 97. 
532 Maassen and Bosch (n 459) 36. 
533 Shujun Ding and others, 'Executive Compensation, Supervisory Board, and China‟s Governance Reform: 
A Legal Approach Perspective' (2010) 35 Rev Quant Finan Acc 445, 469; and Xi, 'In Search of an Effective 
Monitoring Board Model: Board Reforms and the Political Economy of Corporate Law in China' (n 466) 9. 
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4.4 The Co-existence of Supervisory Board and Independent 
Directors 
 
As mentioned in Part 4.1, the Chinese corporate structure has a dual 
internal monitoring mechanism, including both supervisory board and 
independent directors. Generally speaking, the monitoring functions of 
both institutions are the same: checking corporate financial affairs, the 
legitimacy of corporate decisions and the rationality of such decisions.534 
In other words, the introduction of independent directors has resulted in an 
overlap between the two internal monitors.  
 
The question of why a company should have two internal monitoring 
institutions at the same time is extremely difficult to answer.  To date, there 
has been no official explanation.  However, it is worth noting that the 
independent director system was promoted by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) based on certain concerns.535 Until the 
second draft of the Company Law 2005, companies could choose whether 
or not to adopt independent directors. 536 To a certain extent, this fact casts 
doubt upon the necessity of establishing the independent director system 
in China.  
 
The most common explanation for the dual monitoring system is based on 
the inefficiency of the supervisory board. Accordingly, the independent 
directors could supplement internal monitoring.537 Zhang adds that the co-
                                                             
534 Ciyun Zhu, Ji Yang and Jianyong Ding, Gongsi Neibu Jiandu Jizhi: Butong Moshi Zai Biange Yu Jiaorong 
Zhong Yanjin [Inner Supervision Mechanism of Corporations] (Law Press 2007), 2. 
535 There are several reasons to explain the legal transplant of such a common law institution into a civil law 
country: (a) most developed capital markets are in common law countries, so it is necessary to follow the 
leading trends from them; (b) coincidentally or not, officials of the CSRC have educational backgrounds in 
common law jurisdictions; and (c) it is part of a power struggle, aimed at helping the CSRC to have a bigger 
say as a market administrator. 
536 CSRC, 'Opinions on Improving the Quality of Listed Companies' 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ssb/ssflfg/bmgzjwj/ssgszl/200911/t20091110_167758.htm>, Article 3. 
537 Yuan Zhao, 'Independent Directors in China: the Path in Which Direction?' (2011) 22 International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 352, 355. 
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existence of the two institutions provides a second check, which may work 
better than reliance on either one of them.538 
 
However, this thesis cannot agree entirely with such explanations. The 
question remains as to why the supervisory board cannot be made more 
effective by revising the statutes.  Alternatively, if the supervisory board 
has failed to fulfil its mission, why is it not simply abolished and replaced 
by the independent director system? The co-existence of the two 
institutions may be nothing more than a costly waste to the company. 
 
In the next section, the two institutions are compared in detail in Table 2, 
and the problems resulting from their co-existence are highlighted. 
 
4.4.1 Supervisory Board vs. Independent Directors 
 
Comparison of Supervisory Board and Independent Directors 
 Supervisory Board Independent Director 
Composition Representatives of 
shareholders and 
workers 
Specialist experts 
Remuneration No extra payment has 
been mentioned for 
being a member of 
supervisory board 
 
Same as directors or 
managers at the same 
level 
 
Attends meetings of 
board of directors 
√ √ 
Votes in the meetings 
of board of directors 
╳ √ 
                                                             
538 Yihe Zhang, 'Review and Reconstruction: Functional Complement between Systems of Supervisory Board 
and Independent Directors' (2003) 5 Contemporary Law Review 20, 22. 
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Inquiry right on the 
matters to be decided 
by board of directors 
√ Not necessary 
Scrutinises corporate 
financial affairs 
√ √ 
Engages external 
auditor 
√ √ 
Engages external 
consultant 
√ √ 
Brings proposal on the 
removal of director or 
senior manager under 
certain conditions 
√ ╳ 
Brings proposal to 
shareholders‟ general 
meeting 
√ ╳ 
Initiates derivative 
actions at the request 
of shareholders 
√ ╳ 
Relationship to the 
Annual Report 
It has to be approved 
by the supervisory 
board and the 
supervisory board 
should make its own 
report in relation to 
company affairs 
Involved in drafting the 
Annual Report; 
Can issue independent 
statements if 
necessary. 
Relationship to 
Related-party 
Transaction 
N/A It has to be approved 
by independent 
directors 
Table 2: Comparison between Supervisory Board and Independent 
Directors 
 
To summarise, the four main differences between the two monitoring 
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bodies, the supervisory board and independent directors, are as follows: 
(1) The independent directors are more professional. 
(2) Independent directors may help to improve the quality of 
corporate decisions via voting rights in the board meeting. 
However, the supervisory board can only investigate 
corporate decisions after they have been made. 
(3) Certain rights have been granted to the supervisory board 
only; for example, the right to initiate a derivative claim, the 
right to bring a proposal to the shareholders‟ general 
meeting and, more importantly, the right to bring a proposal 
on the removal of executives to the general meeting. 
(4) The operation of the supervisory board is by collective 
action, whereas the independent directors may perform 
their monitoring function individually. 
 
4.4.2 Defects in Co-existence 
 
As stated earlier, although in theory the co-existence of the supervisory 
board and independent directors establishes a double-check internal 
monitoring design, in practice it does not work well. The main reason is 
that legislators in China have failed to integrate the two mechanisms, so 
that some functions are ambiguous and overlap. 
 
In practice, it is not unusual to find the supervisory board waiting for 
independent directors to undertake the monitoring activities, while the 
independent directors expect the supervisory board to act. Neither 
performs their function, although both should do so. In such situations, the 
so-called double-check monitoring becomes no monitoring at all. On the 
other hand, if both bodies do take action at the same time, this might not 
Chapter Four: The Supervisory Board 
Page 219 of 415 
 
represent good governance. For example, according to the Company Law 
2005, both the supervisory board and the independent directors may hire 
external auditors or consultants at the expense of the company, when they 
consider it necessary. 539  A duplication of cost may occur if both the 
institutions exercise their powers. Although the monitoring function might 
be achieved in this way, it is still wasteful for the company, which pays 
twice for the same service. 
 
If the co-existence of the supervisory board and independent directors is 
to continue, this thesis suggests two methods to overcome the core 
defect. First, the Company Law should be revised to clarify the supervisory 
activities of each body, in order to avoid overlap and ambiguity of rights 
and responsibilities. A second, alternative, approach would be via internal 
agreement on the allocation of supervisory powers and responsibilities. 
Comparing the two methods of reform, this thesis would prefer such 
responsibility allocation should be regulated by law. It is because the most 
important concern for an immature jurisdiction is not the corporate 
democracy but minimization of uncertainty in law. Therefore, clarifying the 
supervisory activities of both the supervisory board and independent 
directors by the Company Law would be more effective in practise in 
China.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In concluding, this section seeks to answer the following three questions: 
(1) What are the core targets of the supervisory board in China? 
(2) Is there any institution that can perform better than the supervisory 
board in terms of internal monitoring? 
                                                             
539 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 55 and 57. 
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(3) If not, how can the mechanism be revised so as to achieve a sound 
internal monitoring function? 
 
(1) What are the core targets of the supervisory board in China? 
 
The establishment of the supervisory board in China dates back to the 
corporate reform of the 1990s, when state-owned enterprises were 
transformed into modern companies. The supervisory board undertakes 
three main kinds of responsibilities. 
 
(a) To provide legal protection of shareholders‟ interests 
More specifically, the supervisory board is charged with safeguarding state 
assets. Under the corporate reform, the state has been re-defined as a 
company investor rather than company manager. Theoretically, its 
investments face the problem of agency cost in the same way as 
counterparts in western countries. 
 
According to the National Audit Department, in the year 2000 the loss of 
state assets amounted to RMB 22,900 million.540 The reasons included 
avoidance of bank debt payment, extracorporeal circulation of capital and 
other violations. It has been reported that the price of state assets in a 
public auction is normally 10 per cent higher on average than asset 
valuation, whereas the price of state assets through private transaction or 
appointing transfer is 30 per cent lower than asset valuation.541 Yet, the 
latter method was exercised widely during the reform. Indeed, the World 
Bank estimates that the loss of state assets accounted for approximately 8 
                                                             
540 Jiaxiao Lei, 'Guoyou Zichan Liushi Weixie Guoyou Jingji Anquan [The Threat to Safety of State-owned 
Economy by the Erosion of State Assets]' People 
(<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper2515/8536/801394.html> accessed 20-08-2012. 
541 Ibid. 
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to 12 per cent of GDP.542 
 
Therefore, as the guardian of shareholders‟ interests, the supervisory 
board has been expected to supervise corporate finances as well as 
crucial business decisions, and to, prevent the misuse of state assets. 
 
(b) To reduce mis-information 
False financial statements are a common feature of corporate scandals, 
perhaps most famously in the collapse of Enron. The problem is a familiar 
one in China. According to a survey focusing on the financial reports of 
152 companies in 2002, the under-valuing of assets reached RMB 8,588 
million. Of this total, RMB 4,138 million related to shareholders‟ equity 
while RMB 2,872 million related to profit. More worryingly, for more than 
half of the companies involved the inaccuracy information of profit 
exceeded 10 per cent.543 
 
To improve this situation, the supervisory board has been expected to 
explore the distortion of financial reports and to increase company 
transparency. 
 
However, according to interviews conducted by Dayha et al.,544 sometimes 
supervisors are forced to pass the annual report without any correction, 
under pressure from executives or majority shareholders. Therefore, as 
mentioned by the Head of the Market Development Division in a top 
Chinese securities company, it does not matter what is written in the 
supervisory board report, because while that is all „true‟, the problems lie 
in „what is missing‟. 
                                                             
542 Minghui Li, 'Lun Guoyou Qiye Jianshihui Zhidu [On the Institution of Supervisory Board in State-Owned 
Enterprises]' (2005) 27 Journal of ShanXi Finance and Economics University 88, 89. 
543 Baichuan Sang, 'Guoyou Zichan Liushi Mengyuhu, Jiada Shehui Pinfu Chaju, Jiaju Fubai [Warning of the 
Erosion of State Assets]' (2004) 3 Huanqiu [Globe] 31, 36. 
544 Dahya and others (n 501) 315-316. 
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(c) To represent the interests of minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders 
As mentioned above, China is a jurisdiction significantly influenced by civil 
law traditions. Therefore, the interests of stakeholders such as creditors 
and employees receive special attention in Chinese law. Moreover, given 
the political context of China, some scholars insist that the participation of 
workers should be enhanced, since this would be a good way to preserve 
the leading role of the working class and China‟s political status as a 
socialist country.545 Furthermore, with the development of the stock market 
in China, an increasing number of citizens now gamble their futures on 
corporate stocks. Therefore, preventing infringement of their interests, and 
thus achieving social harmony, becomes a new target for the supervisory 
board. Hence, the supervisory board is a corporate body that is expected 
to investigate the management on behalf of the interests of creditors, 
employees and the public. 
 
(2) Is there any institution that can perform better than the 
supervisory board in terms of internal monitoring? 
 
In some developed countries, such as Japan and France, there can be 
found a tendency to weaken or even abolish the supervisory board.546 
However, despite the globalisation of corporate governance, supporters of 
the supervisory board in China believe this institution can be made to work 
and will eventually be widely accepted by Chinese citizens.547 
 
To properly address this issue, it would be necessary to review whether 
                                                             
545 Goo and Hong (n 456) 504. 
546 Shiquan Wang and Jinyan Liu, 'The Market for Controlling Rights, Independent Directors System and 
Supervisory Board Governance ------ A New View Based on Comparative Institutional Analysis ' 
(International Conference on Management Science and Engineering, Lille, 5th-7th Oct, 2006), 736. 
547 Ibid 738. 
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there exists an institution equipped with all the rights held by the 
supervisory board. Only through exercising those legal rights can the 
supervisory board achieve its current monitoring function. If any institution 
has the same rights, it is rational to believe that it would not perform worse 
than the supervisory board. If such an institution were granted more 
powerful rights than the supervisory board, it may perform better than the 
supervisory board. 
 
However, the comparison between the supervisory board and independent 
directors in Part 3.4.1 of this thesis reveals that some crucial rights, for 
example the right to initiate a proposal of removal and the right to bring a 
derivative claim, are granted to the supervisory board only. Therefore, 
under the current system, the independent directors are not equipped to 
take over all the functions of the supervisory board.  
 
With regard to the monitoring function exercised by the party committee of 
the CCP, it is pointed out in Chapter Five of this thesis that the committee 
has a crucial problem in the mismatch between its powers and 
responsibilities. As such, replacing the supervisory board by the party 
committee would lead to an even worse mismatch. Furthermore, as a 
political institution, the CCP could not be expected to stand for minority 
shareholders against the majority one, the state. 
 
Therefore, according to the research so far, this thesis concludes that the 
supervisory board in China cannot easily be replaced.  At the moment, 
there is no other institution better able to perform the internal monitoring 
function. 
 
(3) How can the supervisory board be reformed so as to achieve a 
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sound internal monitoring function? 
 
Before answering this question, we should keep in mind that there is no 
„one size fits all‟ model in today‟s diverse business world. With regard to 
internal monitoring, neither the supervisory board originating in Germany 
nor the independent directors created in the US can be perfect for all 
Chinese companies. Clearly, the co-existence regime in current Chinese 
company law needs to be revised, to reduce the overlap of rights and 
responsibilities and to minimise corporate costs, as suggested in Part 
4.4.2. Alternatively, as suggested by Zhao, the statute could be changed to 
allow the company to choose either of the institutions in accordance with 
its own demands and situation.548 
 
Focusing on the Chinese supervisory board in particular, this thesis puts 
forward the following suggestions: 
 
(a) The supervisory board should be granted with more substantial rights, 
including but not limited to the right to dismiss executives immediately 
under certain conditions, and the right to veto corporate decisions. 
(b) Regulations on the accountability of the supervisory board should be 
reinforced to enhance members‟ motivation. 
(c) Professional training should be provided for supervisors, and should be 
compulsory. 
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Chapter Five: The Chinese Communist Party: A Key 
Participant in Chinese Corporate Governance  
 
Executive Summary 
 
Corporate governance in Chinese listed companies is unique in having as 
a participant the party committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
The CCP shares administrative rights with the government, and 
sometimes has an even more powerful influence on corporate 
management. This thesis argues that, notwithstanding the political concern 
to maintain the party committee‟s dominance in corporate operations, this 
two-track governance regime is actually a waste of management 
resources. 
 
The dominance of the party committee extends to three main areas: (1) 
decisive power over personnel; (2) participation in corporate decision 
making via interlocking appointments; and (3) supervision of corporate 
management. 
 
However, the involvement of the party committee in corporate operation 
has no legal ground in Chinese company law. The party committee is 
guided by party documents, known as circulars, which in practice are as 
influential as laws. This thesis argues that, without legal authorisation, 
there is a mismatch between the rights and duties of the party committee 
in Chinese listed companies, because party circulars only formulate what 
the party committee should do, but never prohibit what it should not do. 
 
This thesis uncovers five main problems caused by the participation of the 
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party committee in corporate governance: (1) The mismatch of the rights 
and duties of the party committee is inconsistent with ideal corporate 
governance methods; (2) The criterion of manager appointment used by 
the party committee is based not on performance, but on political 
concerns, which would negatively impact corporate efficiency and the 
development of managers; (3) Participation of the party committee in 
management supervision must result in greater complexity and low 
efficiency of internal monitoring, because Chinese listed companies 
already have two internal monitors; (4) The ideological work of the CCP 
cannot be guaranteed if the party committee puts too much emphasis on 
corporate operations; (5) In the absence of any legal responsibility, 
participation by the party committee may bring about problems of 
corruption and rent seeking, infringing the interests of minority 
shareholders. 
 
Therefore, this thesis argues that participation by the party committee in 
corporate operations does not improve minority protection. Instead, it 
decreases corporate efficiency, and ultimately harms the interests of 
shareholders. Of course, it would not be possible to exclude the party 
committee entirely from corporate governance in the current political 
environment. Nevertheless, if intervention by the party committee could be 
reduced, minority shareholders might suffer fewer problems as a 
consequence. Accordingly, this thesis advances two suggestions: (1) The 
CCP should be distinguished from the government, prohibiting direct 
influence by the CCP on administrative management; (2) The appointment 
of managers should be decided by the board of directors. 
 
5.0 Introduction 
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Modern corporate governance was introduced into China with the 
corporatisation reforms of the 1990s, and was formalised in the Company 
Law 2005. A unique feature in Chinese listed company is the reservation 
of a seat in corporate governance structure for an important and powerful 
participant, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), enabling it to participant 
in the business operation. The rationale for such reservation is rooted in 
the national strategy for economic transition, opening the market to 
promote the state economy while at the same time de-emphasising and 
limiting political liberalisation to maintain the governance of the CCP.549 
 
Under the current Chinese legal system, the CCP committee has a tight 
connection with both the board of directors and the supervisory board, and 
has been authorised with power over corporate decision making. However, 
sound corporate governance is not only about power; it should also 
include accountability: who takes the blame for corruption, misuse of 
funds, or poor performance.550 By measure, Chinese corporate legislation 
is deficient in that it fails to clarify the role the CCP should play in 
companies and the liabilities it should bear, a failure that could lead to 
infringement of the interests of minorities. 
 
The only provision relating to the CCP in the Company Law 2005 is Article 
19, which states that „the Chinese Communist Party may, according to the 
Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, establish its branches in 
companies to carry out activities of the Chinese Communist Party. The 
company shall provide necessary conditions to facilitate the activities of 
the Party‟. 551  More regulations are found in party documents, called 
circulars, issued by the National Congress of the CCP. Nevertheless, all 
                                                             
549 David M Lampton, 'The Faces of Chinese Power' (2007) 86 Foreign Affairs 115, 117. 
550 Peter A Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control (Princeton University Press 
2005), 1. 
551 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 19. 
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these circulars put emphasis on what the CCP committee should do; there 
are almost no restrictions stating what it should not do, nor any regulations 
to make the CCP accountable for the wrongs it has done already. 
 
In practice, the CCP‟s position within the corporate governance structure is 
an ambiguous one. It is not the regulator, as that role is taken by the 
state;552 nor is it the supervisor, because that is the job of the supervisory 
board and independent directors. 553  It is not the decision maker on 
operations, nor is it accountable to the shareholders. However, it is 
charged with certain political tasks, such as being the „political core‟ and 
leading the corporate executives, and is empowered to intervene in 
business decision making. This causes the key problem, discussed later in 
this chapter, whereby the existence of any participant who is equipped 
with powers and does not take any responsibility will eventually erode 
accountability.  
 
It argued that the legal status of the CCP in the current Chinese context 
originated in the history and reform of politics, economy and law. As noted 
by Gourevitch and Shinn, a corporate governance system reflects political 
attitudes, shaped by a mixture of laws, rules and regulations.554 Similarly, 
Lubman points out that, in China, legislation satisfies the needs of politics 
and the economy.555 He notes that China needs a more developed legal 
system to match its market economy, because such an economy should 
be governed by law.556 McNally concludes that many problems in today‟s 
China triangulate between managerial autonomy, political interests, and 
market demands.557 
                                                             
552 Lance L P Gore, The Chinese Communist Party and China's Capitalist Revolution: The Political Impact of 
the Market (Routledge 2011), 85. 
553 Discussed in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. 
554 Gourevitch and Shinn (n 550) 3. 
555 Stanley Lubman, 'Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law' (1995) 141 The China Quarterly 1, 12. 
556 Ibid. 
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Indeed, direct involvement of the CCP in corporate governance would 
unite corporate executives to ensure party control over the company. 
Nevertheless, communist institutions are seen as a weakness in 
promoting market-economic development.558 As Adam Smith argued in 
The Wealth of Nations, as far back as 1776, „the government monitors and 
enforces the regulatory environment in which firms compete for survival 
and profits, but should not directly be involved in a firm‟s decisions and 
transactions‟.559 
 
The question of what role the CCP should play in the Chinese legal 
system is a difficult one to answer.  It is apparent that the CCP, as a 
political actor, is not in keeping with the needs of modern corporate 
governance and business concerns. However, political considerations 
mean that it cannot simply be removed from the system. Just as the 
reform undertaken by China is proceeding gradually,560 participation by the 
CCP will not be changed in the short term.  
 
Accordingly, ensuring that the control exercised by the CCP has a proper 
legal basis is one of most important tasks for the legislature. As argued by 
western observers, the main problem is how to set the legal balance to 
maintain social cohesion amid the vast development of a socialist market 
economy in the long term,561 although they find it hard to understand how 
the Chinese can hold on simultaneously to both socialism and capitalism 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Mechanisms in Chinese State Holding Corporations' (2002) 4 Business and Politics 91, 94. 
558 Sebastian Heilmann, 'Regulatory Innovation by Leninist Means: Communist Party Supervision in China's 
Financial Industry' (2005) 181 The China Quarterly 1, 2. 
559 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (University of Chicago Press 
1976), 208. 
560 Economic reforms in China can be characterized as gradual rather than revolutionary. Therefore, it is 
argued that Chinese political institutions remain unaffected. Shujun Ding and Cameron Graham, 'Accounting 
and the Reduction of State-owned Stock in China' (2007) 18 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 559, 565. 
561 Robert Skidelsky, 'The Chinese Shadow' (2005) 52 The New York Review of Books 1, 3. 
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with no contradiction at all.562 
 
This chapter aims to analyse and evaluate the methods used by the CCP 
to implement its political interest in company operations. By doing so, it is 
hoped that this research might find a balance between achieving CCP 
control in accordance with political concerns on the one hand, and 
improving corporate autonomy on the other. Because in most cases the 
state is the majority shareholder, it will be further concluded that increasing 
corporate autonomy, pursuing the success of the company, is an important 
means to provide better legal protection for minority shareholders. 
 
The chapter begins by discussing the relationship between the state and 
the CCP, which is often confusing to western researchers. The CCP 
circulars, which are not laws but share the same legal effect, are 
introduced in the second part. Part 5.3 gives a brief history of Chinese 
economic reform and legislative changes relating to the CCP in corporate 
governance. Part 5.4 focuses on the two key methods used by the CCP to 
intervene in corporate operations. The negative influences of such 
intervention are illustrated in Part 5.5. The final section offers suggestions 
on how to achieve the required balance. 
 
5.1 The Communist Party and the State 
 
In this section, the relationship between the state and the CCP is 
investigated, before further discussion of the CCP‟s role in corporate 
governance.  
 
Compared with many western countries, the relationship between the 
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People‟s Republic of China and its governing party, the CCP, is unique. 
The CCP is one of the most powerful parties in its territory anywhere in the 
world. For example, it is written into the Constitution of China that the 
country should be under the leadership of the CCP.563 When analysing the 
economic issues of China, there is a strong tendency to treat the CCP as 
something irregular and exogenous to state bureaucracies.564 However, as 
Gore points out: „Never before has a Leninist Party attempted to preserve 
an organizational structure designed for a planned economy while pushing 
for marketization and embracing globalization.‟565 
 
As noted by many scholars, the Chinese reforms, whether economic, legal 
or political, are exercised under a „Top-Down‟ model. Yet, the „Top‟ in this 
model does not always refer to the state council, the supreme executive 
body. In most cases, it refers to the CCP. It is the CCP, in fact, that revived 
China by implementing the „Open Door‟ policy and various social reforms. 
Under its leadership, China has experienced great economic development 
and attracted attention from other countries, including developed countries 
such as the UK and the US. Even so, it cannot be ignored that direct 
leadership by the CCP blurs the distinction between the CCP and the 
state, especially in terms of rights and responsibilities. 
 
According to the Constitution, the National People‟s Congress (NPC) is the 
highest organ of state power;566 it exercises the legislative power of the 
state.567 The State Council, also referred to as central government, is the 
executive body of the highest organ of state power and the highest organ 
of state administration.568 Those two, together with the local governments, 
                                                             
563 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Preamble. 
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are usually regarded as „the state‟. The CCP, as the governing party, is the 
vanguard of the Chinese working class, the Chinese people and the 
Chinese nation, as formulated in its Party Constitution. 569  Its three 
historical tasks are to advance the modernisation drive, to achieve national 
reunification, and to safeguard world peace and promote common 
development.570 The members of the NPC and State Council can be, but 
are not limited to, CCP members. That is to say, it is for the NPC or the 
State Council, not the CCP, to decide national affairs and to govern. The 
interests of the CCP should be realised by the voting power or 
administrative power exercised by its members with a position in the state 
organs. 
 
However, in reality, the CCP holds final decision power and direct 
influence over the government organs. Even the NPC remains heavily 
influenced by the party. Evidence for this influence can be found in the 
removal of Qiao Shi, who disagreed with Jiang Zemin, then Party 
Secretary and State President, over party leadership of law making and 
legal enforcement.571 
 
The organisation of the CCP mirrors that of the state. For example, the 
State Council is the top administrative body, with 28 ministries and 
commissions, 18 special organisations and several related institutions,572 
while the CCP central committee has 15 affiliated departments, in charge 
of different national affairs. Moreover, although there is no connection 
between state ministries or commissions and the party departments in law, 
in practice, the state organs are under the leadership of CCP departments. 
                                                             
569 Party Constitution of Chinese Communist Party, General Program, 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2012-11/18/c_113714762.htm> accessed 18-12-2013. 
570 Ibid. 
571 Pitman B Potter, 'The Chinese Legal System: Continuing Commitment to the Primacy of State Power' 
(1999) 159 The China Quarterly 673, 676. 
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Hence, in terms of corporate governance, in addition to the classical 
bureaucratic channel of intervention common in the East Asian developing 
states, in China party committees provide a second channel of state 
involvement in corporate governance, 573  one that usually displays a 
stronger influence in the company than government bureaus.574 In fact, the 
relationship between the CCP and the state has sometimes been deemed 
a „delegation relationship‟, in which the party is the principal and the 
government departments are the agents.575 
 
This thesis defines the organizational structure just outlined as a two-track 
governing organisation. However, the two-track organisation raises certain 
problems in both politics and corporate governance. 
 
First, the ultra vires actions of the CCP may impact the ordinary operation 
of companies. As mentioned above, it is the state that is authorised by law 
to execise administrative powers over national affairs, including those in 
the commercial area, for example by being the representative investor of 
state assets owned by all citizens as a whole. In theory, such powers 
should not be exercised by the CCP. However, over the past few decades, 
there have been many cases in which the CCP not only participated in, but 
dominated, public management. For instance, the reform of state-owned 
shares should be decided by the shareholders‟ representative, the state, in 
accordance with the theory of corporate governance. 576  However, the 
reform that began in China in 1999 was initiated by a document issued by 
the CCP. „The Decision Regarding Several Important Issues Related to the 
Reform and Development of State-Owned-Enterprises‟ set the tone for 
                                                             
573 Victor Nee, Sonja Opper and Sonia Wong, 'Developmental State and Corporate Governance in China' 
(2007) 3 Management and Organization Review 19, 27. 
574 Ibid. 
575 S L Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (University of California Press 1993), 53. 
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reforming state-owned assets. 577  Another example, relating to legal 
practice, is that many judges report directly to district party committees 
and discuss major cases, including business cases, before they come to 
court. 578  As such, day-to-day operations of the company could be 
influenced by CCP activities beyond its legal authority. A later part of this 
chapter will identify in detail how such intervention may take place. 
 
Secondly, the ultra vires activities of the CCP lead to dual leadership by 
the state and the CCP. Since the organisation of the state mirrors the 
organisational structure of the CCP central committee, it would appear that 
there are two organs in charge of the same matters. Although, as noted 
above, these two organs may have an inherent connection, de jure they 
are two different bodies. Such practice is not only a waste of administrative 
resources, it also results in some inevitable uncertainties, which make it 
more difficult for the company to forecast and plan its business activities. 
 
Furthermore, the two-track governing organisation has been regarded as 
the core reason for the ill-defined status of accountabilities, and the basis 
for the existence of CCP committees in the modern corporate governance 
structure. This thesis argues that, unless the rights and responsibilities of 
the state and the CCP can be clarified in law, the CCP will remain trapped 
in an ambiguous situation. Consequently, the quality of corporate 
governance will be affected negatively, and finally the interests of minority 
shareholders will be infringed. 
 
During the past decade, there has been a welcome transfer of power from 
the CCP organs to state agencies.579 However, this change is not based 
on legislative reform, and more time is needed for China to clarify the 
                                                             
577 Ding and Graham (n 560) 567. 
578 K T Liou, Managing Economic Reforms in Post-Mao China (Praeger 1998), 13. 
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accountability of the CCP in law. For ease of explanation, in this thesis the 
CCP and the state will be integrated into the same interest group. 
 
5.2 Laws, Administrative Regulations and Circulars 
 
It has been noted earlier in this thesis that the Chinese legal system 
features several levels of law-making. Laws are at the top, while 
administrative regulations issued by central government are placed 
second, followed by administrative regulations issued by state ministries 
and local governments. Clearly, the party circular issued by the CCP is not 
a part of the legal system. Theoretically, these circulars should refer only 
to party affairs, and be binding only on party members. 
 
However, it has been pointed out that, in China‟s political context, party 
documents enjoy de facto authority, even if this is not supported in law.580 
For example, the „Party-control-cadres Policy‟, which will be illustrated 
below, has impacted business operations on a wide scale in China, 
despite having no basis in Chinese company law. 
 
The wide use of circulars in national governance can be seen as 
connected to the transitional economy. Although China has implemented 
certain reforms in order to boost the national economy, this is a gradual 
process. As the Chinese saying goes, it is like crossing the river by 
touching the stones. There is no optimal model or legislation for reference; 
indeed, it has been suggested that, for China, it could be more workable to 
carry out second-best policies, rather than implement an optimal model 
directly.581 In addition, Tomasic and Fu argue that „legal reform in China 
may not have been an essential precondition to economic reform, as 
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evidenced by the fact that these reforms actually occurred after economic 
reform gained momentum‟.582  
 
Certainly, legislation usually requires a complicated procedure before 
becoming effective, whereas CCP documents can be passed easily by a 
group of the party elite. It is also simple to revise or abolish the circulars, 
so that the cost of error correction is relatively low. During the reform 
process, this could be a wise choice to achieve large-scale social 
development. However, in the long run, it is the stability and credibility of 
law that can promote stable growth. Accordingly, this chapter would urge 
the Chinese government to decrease the influence of the circulars on 
national governance; alternatively, it should implement the idea of „Rule of 
Law‟ rather than „Rule by Law‟. 
 
5.3 Brief Introduction to CCP Strategies in Chinese Economic Reform 
 
This section provides an introduction to the changing role played by the 
CCP in the Chinese commercial area, in order to establish an overall 
understanding of CCP political concerns in different periods. It is argued 
that the CCP recognises the massive opportunity offered by the flourishing 
market economy, although it retains control over certain products such as 
oil and gas, electricity, railways, banking, telecommunications, and foreign 
exchange.583 Therefore, the CCP has tried to find the right balance to 
ensure both the growth of the national economy and its own control over 
the state and commercial entities. 
 
Ever since the 1950s, the CCP committee had been the most powerful 
                                                             
582 Roman Tomasic and Jian Fu, 'Legal Regulation and Corporate Governance in China's Top 100 Listed 
Companies' (2006) 27 The Company Lawyer 278, 279. 
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management body in China.584 With the implementation of the „Open Door‟ 
policy, a modern management body comprising managers and supervisors 
took its place in corporate operations. During this stage, the CCP central 
committee attempted to reduce its direct influence over companies, and to 
leave business affairs to executives who held more experience of 
productive activities and management thereof.  
 
Nevertheless, such delegation of power did not mean that the CCP gave 
up control of companies in China. It still adopted a prudential role in the 
market economy. According to McKerra, „on the one side were those who 
feared that over-hasty and excessive reform and modernization would 
lead China to capitalism… On the other side stood those who emphasized 
the rise in the standard of living produced by reform and modernization.‟585 
Therefore, the power to appoint executives was retained by the CCP as a 
key safeguard. 
 
The State-Owned Enterprise Law,586 passed in 1986, states: 
 
It must be made clear that enterprises are not government 
organs and the role of enterprise Party organizations is 
different from that of political leadership of central and local 
Party committees. It no longer performs single-pole 
leadership role (Yiyuanhua lingdao); instead, its role is to 
ensure and monitor business operation. Its energy should 
be concentrated on enterprise Party building, on fully 
utilizing Party organizations as the fighting fortress in 
fulfilling tasks, and on mobilizing Party members to serve as 
                                                             
584 Martin Lockett, 'Culture and the Problems of Chinese Management' (1988) 9 Organization Studies 475, 
481. 
585 Colin McKerra, Pradeep Taneja and Graham Young, China Since 1978 (2nd edn, Longman 1998), 27. 
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role models for workers… It should also support the 
manager or CEO in order for them to fully exercise their 
power in accordance with the State-Owned Enterprise Law, 
and offer suggestions on major issues and decisions of the 
enterprise.587 
 
In accordance with this legislation, on April 28th 1986 the CCP central 
committee issued a circular urging the downsizing of party committees in 
enterprises, whereby only large enterprises should have a full-time party 
secretary and a simple party bureaucracy.588 
 
However, the trend towards improving corporate autonomy did not last for 
long. After the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the new General Secretary of 
the CCP, Jiangze Min, reinforced party building, especially in the grass-
roots units. He put forward the „Party-control-cadres Policy‟ (Dang Guan 
Ganbu), requiring the party committee in the company to act as a political 
core, in order to increase the CCP‟s control over enterprises once again. 
 
The rationale for such strategic change, according to Jiang and Zhu 
Rongji, 589  is that most economic problems, especially in the financial 
industry, are caused by ignorance of CCP directives and a general neglect 
of „party construction‟ within supervisory organs and financial firms.590 A 
circular issued by the CCP Central Committee in August 1989 formally 
stipulated the roles that party committees should play in the corporate 
governance structure: (1) to participate in making major business 
decisions; (2) to appoint middle-level management personnel jointly with 
the CEO or top manager; (3) to maintain a team of full-time party affairs 
                                                             
587 CCPCC, 'Circular on Strengthening Party-Building' in, Qiye Dangjian Dashiji [Chronicle of Major Events 
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workers.591 It also made clear that the remuneration of party cadres should 
be comparable with that of management cadres of the same rank.592 
 
Although the party document emphasised the importance of the CCP 
committee in corporate operations, the Company Law that came into force 
in 1993 did not touch upon what rights would be granted to the CCP 
committee, nor did it clarify the responsibilities of the CCP. Therefore, the 
participation of the party committee in major business decisions, as urged 
by the circular mentioned above, still lacks a legal basis in company law. 
 
With the implementation of the Company Law 1993, most SOEs in China 
restructured themselves into modern companies, a development known as 
„corporatisation reform‟. Under this reform, a western style corporate 
governance structure was introduced into the Chinese legal system. 
Corporatisation reform was expected to separate state ownership from 
state control, and consequently, companies would have complete 
autonomy in day-to-day business operation. Unfortunately, however, it has 
been noted that corporatisation did not bring any such autonomy of 
corporate operations, but enabled the state to maintain the same level of 
control it had before, over an even larger pool of assets.593 
 
In 2001, the CCP updated its strategy in corporate governance by 
changing the role of the enterprise party committee from political core to 
business helper. It held that „the party committee should utilise its 
“comparative advantage” in mobilisation to boost workers‟ morale, to 
mediate conflicts and mend fences, to mobilise mass campaigns to 
improve efficiency and expand sales, to build up the “spiritual 
                                                             
591 The number of such party affairs workers should normally not exceed one per cent of the total workforce. 
592 CCPCC (n587) 52. 
593 Modern corporate structure enables the State to control a company with a shareholding of less than 100 
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civilisation”‟.594 In the same year, to make the strategy more specific, the 
Organisational Department of the CCP Central Committee issued an 
Opinion on the party work in 100 pilot modern enterprises. This circular 
required the party committee to assist the shareholders‟ meeting, board of 
directors and supervisory board to fulfil their tasks by establishing a sound 
connection with employees and by providing internal monitoring, with the 
ultimate aim of achieving the development of a socialist market 
economy.595 However, this thesis argues that such guidelines cannot help 
the party committee to know exactly what it should do in practice, nor do 
they have any binding force over the committee. 
 
In 2004, in order to resolve the ambiguous position of the CCP in the 
corporate governance structure and to obtain controlling power over 
corporate decision making, the Organisational Department of the CCP 
Central Committee and the State Assets Administration Committee jointly 
issued an „Opinion on Strengthening and Improving Party Building in 
Central Enterprises‟.596 In this political document, the CCP reaffirmed the 
importance of acting as the political core, and further urged the 
establishment of a path to help the party committee get involved in 
decision making on major affairs. The path refers mainly to an interlocking 
of roles: for example, appointing the secretary of the party committee as 
CEO or top executive, and appointing an influential director as vice-
secretary of the party committee. As such, party members would be able 
to exercise decision-making power or operation power legally in the 
interests of the CCP. Such a strategy has been upheld by the Shanghai 
government as follows: 
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Where possible, the party secretary of state holding 
corporations should act as the chair of the board of 
directors. If this requirement cannot be fulfilled, then the 
chair should act as vice-secretary and the secretary as vice-
chair of the board of directors.597 
 
However, the system is still not perfect. In practice, the interlocking 
strategy inevitably results in a confusion of decision maker, decision 
executive and monitor. It has been commented that interlocking 
appointments provide the opportunity for the CCP to join the management 
in „insider control‟.598 
 
Although since 2004 there has been little further change, this does not 
imply that all problems have been resolved. The main issues caused by 
CCP intervention will be discussed in detail in Part 5.5 of this chapter. 
 
5.4 Current Situation of CCP Control over Corporate Operation 
 
According to an empirical survey by Tam, both the board of directors and 
the supervisory board lack the conditions and resources to carry out their 
nominal functions. 599  He further points out that, more significantly, the 
process of corporate governance is dominated by a variety of government 
departments and the CCP.600 Similarly, a survey of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in 1999 found that more than 95 per cent of listed companies 
were under control of the state, directly or indirectly.601 
                                                             
597 Internal materials, from Shanghai State-owned Asset Management Commission. 
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Currently, the CCP exercises ultimate control over three aspects in the 
company: decisions on personnel, business decision making and the 
supervisory function. The power to control can be classified into three 
types: (1) legal rights granted by law; (2) powers mentioned by circular; 
and (3) decisive impact power based on inherent connection. Owing to 
different shareholding structures within companies, these CCP controls 
differ from one company to another (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: CCP Control Over Companies 
 Wholly State-
Owned 
Companies 
Partly State-
Owned 
Companies 
Private 
Companies 
With No State 
Shareholding 
Personnel at 
Director Level 
Rights Authorised 
by Law602 
Decisive 
Impact Power 
Decisive Impact 
Power 
Personnel at 
Manager Level 
Decisive Impact 
Power 
Decisive 
Impact Power 
Decisive Impact 
Power 
Business 
Operations 
Rights Authorised 
by Law603 
Powers 
Mentioned in 
Circulars 
Power 
Mentioned in 
Circulars 
Supervision Rights Authorised 
by Law604 
Powers 
Mentioned in 
Circulars 
Decisive Impact 
Power 
 
Through the table, it can be concluded that the CCP committee is one of 
the key participant in corporate operation in all kinds of companies in 
China. However, only the party committee in wholly state-owned company 
has the legal rights to get it involved in personnel issue at director level, 
                                                             
602 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 68. 
603 Ibid, Article 67. 
604 Ibid, Article 71. 
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business operation and internal supervision. The rest influential powers, 
hold by the CCP committee, are lack of legal ground. 
 
5.4.1 Personnel Decisions 
 
It is argued that, facing the challenges of a transition economy, the CCP is 
not a passive player awaiting the onslaught of new market forces, but a 
continuous controller, keeping power over executive appointments.605 In 
most cases, the party committees possess key knowledge regarding 
suitable candidates and will suggest potential appointees to leadership 
positions. 606  For example, research by Heilmann shows how the CCP 
controlled the appointments of senior executives in China‟s financial 
system in 2003607 (Table 2). 
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Division of Labour in Centralised Cadre Management in March 2003 
CCP Central Organisation Department 
 National state supervisory organs (Central Bank, Banking Regulatory 
Commission, Securities Regulatory Commission, Insurance 
Regulatory Commission) 
 Ten national financial companies under central administration (big four 
national commercial banks, three policy banks, Bank of 
Communications, Everbright Group, CITIC Group) 
Central Bank Party Committee/Organisation Department 
 Regional branch offices of the Central Bank 
China Banking Regulatory Commission Party Committee/Organisation 
Department 
 Four asset management corporations (Huarong, Changcheng, 
Dongfang, Xinda) 
 Merchants Bank and Minsheng Bank 
 Chung Mei Trust & Investment and Government Securities Depository 
Trust & Clearing Co. 
China Securities Regulatory Commission Party Committee/Organisation 
Department 
 Three securities companies (Galaxy, Minzu, Sci-Tech) 
 Individual securities companies undergoing investigation and 
restructuring 
 Stock exchanges; future exchanges 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission Party Committee/Organisation 
Department 
 Six insurance companies (People‟s Insurance, China Life Insurance, 
China Reinsurance, China Export & Credit Insurance, China 
Insurance Group, Minsheng Life Insurance) 
Source: Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (Chinese Securities Press, April 8th, 
2003) 
Table 2: CCP Control over Senior Executives in China’s Financial System 
 
The CCP not only decides the appointments of directors, but also has the 
final say on the nomination of executive managers, either directly or 
indirectly. This important but often indirect link among executives, the 
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CCP, and the government departments, through majority shareholdings, 
has been considered a special characteristic of the insider problem in 
China.608 
 
Hence, the nomination and election procedures found in the Company 
Law 2005 cannot achieve corporate autonomy in practice in China. 
Instead, most personnel decisions are made by party committees at 
different levels, then ratified and announced by state organs or corporate 
institutions, such as the shareholders‟ meeting or board of directors.  
 
5.4.2 Decision Making 
 
A study by Tam in 1999, on the internal decision and operating processes 
of China‟s listed companies, found party influence at the enterprise 
level.609 Further empirical studies have shown evidence that local party 
committees continue to wield significant influence in the corporate 
decision-making process.610 
 
It should be reiterated that there is no provision under the Company Law 
2005 authorising any kind of corporate decision-making power to the party 
committee in the company, nor does the Law identify any situation in which 
the CCP committee could be involved in business operations. However, a 
series of party documents have urged CCP intervention in the decision 
making on major issues, albeit that not one of these circulars has outlined 
the methods the party committee could adopt in the decision-making 
process.611 
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In practice, the decision-making process in China is clearly a result of 
cultural influences.612 Lockett indicates that a key feature of the Chinese 
organisational structure is the tendency to pass decisions to higher levels 
in the hierarchy, based on respect for age and hierarchical position.613 This 
is also explained in terms of giving „face‟ to those higher in the 
hierarchy. 614  Accordingly, in corporate operations, decision making is 
usually pushed up to the highest level, namely the party committee, which 
holds administrative power and the final say on personnel issues. 
 
In order to clarify this further, Figure 1 below demonstrates the typical 
decision-making process in most Chinese companies, especially large 
enterprises with state assets: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
612 Lockett (n 584) 475. 
613 Ibid 476. 
614 „Face‟ is defined as the respect, pride, and dignity of an individual as a consequence of his/her social 
achievement: T K P Leung and Ricky Yee-kwong Chan, 'Face, Favour and Positioning - A Chinese Power 
Game' (2003) 37 European Journal of Marketing 1575, 1575. 
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Figure 1: Decision-making Process in Chinese Large Companies 
(1) Executives find out the major issues to decide in day-to-
day operations and report to board of directors. 
(2) Board of directors passes the issues to party committee 
in the company. 
(3) Party committee seeks the opinion of the trade union. 
(4) Party committee drafts a decision, taking into account the 
opinions of the trade union. 
(5) Party committee reports the decision proposal to relevant 
governmental departments and to high-level party organs, 
seeking views. 
(6) Party committee revises the proposal and reaches the 
final decision based on views at stage (5). (It should be 
Governmental 
Department 
High-level Party 
Organ 
Party Committee in the 
Company 
Board of Directors 
Trade Union 
Executives 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) (5) (6) (6) 
(7) 
(8) 
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noted that view at stage (5) usually have more weight 
than views from the trade union in stage (3).) 
(7) Inform the board of directors of the decision. 
(8) Board of directors ratifies the decision and discloses it to 
executives. 
 
5.4.3 Supervisory Function 
 
According to the corporate governance structure stipulated by the 
Company Law 2005, internal supervision power should be authorised to 
the supervisory board.615 However, de facto, the party committee in the 
company acts as a supervisory body, but with more power than the former. 
 
The rationale for this may be, according to various party documents and 
statements issued by party leaders,616 that the CCP needs more reliable 
safeguards for state assets, which are the foundation of a socialist public-
ownership economy. 
 
Nevertheless, once again, the problem here is not whether the party 
committee in the company should or should not share the supervision 
power, but rather that such power should be authorised by law with 
clarified rights and responsibilities. 
 
5.5 The Negative Impacts of Intervention by CCP Committee 
 
Although an empirical study has found that companies with government 
links provide higher investment returns and do better in many performance 
                                                             
615 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 52 and 54. 
616 Guorong Fan, 'Dangwei Zai Guoyou Qiye Neibu Jiandu Zhong Yingqi Zhudao Zuoyong [The CCP 
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measures, compared with companies without such links,617 it should be 
noted that government-linked companies are distinct from government-
controlled companies.618 A government-linked company is an independent 
business entity which aims to maximise shareholders‟ interests, whereas a 
government-controlled company is more like a political tool to achieve 
some business aims along with more public aims. Unfortunately, many 
Chinese companies, especially most of the listed companies, fall into the 
second category. 
 
It is argued in this thesis that control by the government/CCP leads to 
several defects in Chinese corporate governance, which will block the 
further development of the corporate legal system, and of the national 
economy. 
 
First of all, corporate governance mechanisms transplanted from the west 
has failed in practice due to the intervention of the CCP. The shareholders‟ 
power of determining appointments at director level, the directors‟ of 
appointment at manager level, and supervisory power, have all been 
shared by the party committee. In other words, the existence of the party 
committee replicates the corporate governance structure in practice. As 
such, it has been argued that the party committee is an additional cost to 
the company, and such cost is unlikely to be counter-balanced by any 
benefit that the party committee may bring to the company.619 
 
Taking over the decision power on personnel from the shareholders‟ 
meeting is a direct infringement of minority shareholders‟ rights. Clarke 
points out that the policy of continued state involvement brings about a 
                                                             
617 James S Ang and David K Ding, 'Government Ownership and the Performance of Government-linked 
Companies: The case of Singapore' (2006) 16 Journal of Multinational Financial Management 64, 86. 
618 As mentioned in this chapter, government-controlled means party-controlled. 
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conflict of interest between the state as controlling shareholder and other 
shareholders.620 Minority shareholders invest in the company in exchange 
for voting power that will help them to realise their investment later on. 
CCP intervention makes that voting power worthless. 621  As such, the 
capital market in China will lack the necessary support from individuals for 
its further development.  
 
In terms of CCP involvement in corporate decision making, Ma concludes 
that the management power in practice is often „concentrated in a few 
cadres who do not really understand technology, economics, and 
management, and who are not even prepared to be bothered about these 
issues‟. 622  Consequently, it is questionable whether the company is 
operating with the purpose of achieving success, and in the interests of 
shareholders as a whole. 
 
Secondly, the CCP‟s decisive influence on personnel decisions is an 
obstacle to the establishment of a market for managerial talent. Such a 
market is rooted in performance-linked evaluation, which is different from 
the criterion used by the party to select managers.623 For the party, political 
standpoint and public support are more crucial considerations.  
 
Furthermore, the CCP‟s concern with political considerations undermines 
the incentive mechanism of directors and managers in the western-style 
corporate governance system.624 As long as the directors or managers can 
fulfil the tasks allocated by the party, their employment will not be affected 
by bad corporate results. In fact, it has been reported that most executives 
                                                             
620 Clarke, 'Corporate Governance in China: An Overview' (n 12) 12. 
621 Ibid. 
622 Hong Ma, 'Guanyu Gaige Gongye Qiye Lingdao Zhidu de Tantao [Enquiry into the reform of the 
leadership system of industrial enterprises]' People's Daily (20-11-1980) 5; also see, Lockett (n 584) 482. 
623 Gore (n 552) 81. 
624 McNally (n 557) 93. 
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can be assured renewal of their contracts until retirement.625 
 
Thirdly, rather than helping the supervisory board or the independent 
directors to fulfil supervisory functions, the party committee precludes the 
possibility of internal supervision, since it is the party itself that is involved 
in the decision-making process.626 McNally notes that: 
 
Since all corporate decisions are either made by a 
corporation‟s party committee or handed down through 
party channels, the system of internal checks and balances 
within a corporation envisaged by China‟s Company Law 
has failed to take root.627  
 
Clearly, it is not easy to contradict a decision made by oneself, especially 
for a ruling party. In addition, the supervisory cadres of party committees 
are usually party organisational specialists, not professional staff. For 
example, Zhu Rongji, a former Premier of China, set up the Communist 
Party Central Financial Work Commission (CFWC), a monitoring agency 
to combat any covert actions of party-appointed managers.628 Most of its 
key cadres were not financial professionals, but party organisational 
elites.629 The rationale for such a system is to cut the connection between 
the monitor and professional executives. However, this thesis questions 
the effect on governance efficiency. 
 
Moreover, asymmetry of information and lack of transparency of corporate 
                                                             
625 Ibid 102. 
626 Lockett (n 584) 482. 
627 McNally (n 557) 303. 
628 Heilmann (n 558) 2. 
629 Ibid, 3; Also see research on background of top leaders of the CCP, which argues that, over a long period, 
the CCP and the state were led by a group of technocrats: Cheng Li and Lynn White, 'The Fifteenth Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by 
Jiang Zemin' (1998) 38 Asian Survey 231, 231. 
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operations restrict the effectiveness of coordination of economic activity at 
firm level by the CCP.630 
 
Fourthly, it has also been questioned whether the party committee has 
achieved its ideological task. Ye and Shao argue that, in practice, the party 
committees in many companies have been criticised as dumping grounds 
for old cadres, because the younger cadres with better capability have 
been assigned to management positions.631 
 
To root out incompetent party staff, the CCP top elite introduced the 
interlocking appointment strategy mentioned above. A survey by the 
People’s Daily showed that 57 per cent of all SOEs in China have 
interlocking appointments, for example, the party secretary of the listed 
companies is often appointed as the of corporate executive.632 Yet, while 
this might seem to give the CCP better control over corporate affairs, it has 
been argued that, in fact, those cadres with a dual position in the company 
usually ignore party building owing to preoccupation with business 
affairs.633 
 
Finally, but most importantly, CCP intervention results in ambiguity 
regarding accountability, or a mismatch of rights and responsibilities. As 
mentioned in a World Bank report, accountability is deemed a 
considerable challenge for China in the current stage of development.634 
 
In accordance with company law and sound corporate governance design, 
                                                             
630 Nee, Opper and Wong (n 573) 22. 
631 Wuxi Ye and Yunduan Shao, Xiandai Qiye Dang de Jianshe [Party Building in Modern Enterprises] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Fangzhen Chubanshe 1996), 53. 
632 Xinhua She, 'Guanyu Guoqi Lingdao de Diaoyan Baogao [A Survey Report of Leaders in SOEs in China]' 
The People's Daily (20-10-2002). 
633 Gore (n 552) 82. 
634 The World Bank, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, Creative High-Income Society (2012), 
109. 
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when legal powers are conferred upon directors, managers and 
supervisors, they are also bound with a set of responsibilities, albeit that 
such responsibilities have not been formulated well enough.635 However, 
the law places no responsibilities upon the party committee. Accordingly, 
there is a mismatch of rights and responsibilities in Chinese corporate 
operations. While it is clearly unfair to hold directors or managers 
accountable for what the party committee has done, there is no legislation 
regulating the liabilities of the CCP for decisions made de facto by its 
organs. 
 
Moreover, lack of accountability results in abuse of power, self-interested 
activities and corruption. As argued by a Chinese scholar in the Guangxi 
Provincial Party School, many party secretaries do not participate on 
behalf of party organisations; rather, they do so as individuals. 636  The 
same is true of members of local committees. In order to secure both their 
former political and social status and economic rent-seeking possibilities, 
allowing them to pursue individual utility maximisation and opportunistic 
activities, CCP cadres tend to exercise a power-preserving strategy.637 
That is to say, they would try any possibility to maintain current status and 
corruption might still occur. 
 
On the other side of the coin, Chen found that most companies and their 
executives had not severed their political connections; instead, they used 
such connections to gain a competitive edge.638 For example, they would 
seek to maximise their own budgets,639 or give priority to securing political 
                                                             
635 The inadequacies of legislation relating to the responsibilities of both directors and supervisors have been 
argued in the earlier chapters of this thesis. 
636 Shaofu Wei, 'Xiandai Qiye Zhidu dui Guoqi Dangjian de Yanjun Tiaozhan yu Yingdui Cuoshi [Party 
Building in SOEs Meeting Severe Challenges from the Modern Enterprise System]' (2002) 1 Journal of 
Guangxi College of Education 11, 20. 
637 J Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China (M.E. Sharpe 2001), 86-97. 
638 Min Chen, Asian Management (2nd edn, Thomson 2005), 106-108. 
639 W A Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (University of Chicago Press 1971), 111. 
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support to increase executives‟ chances of staying in power.640 
 
It is further argued by this thesis that the problems caused by CCP 
intervention could be even worse than the breach of duty by directors, 
managers or supervisors in terms of minority shareholder protection. This 
is because, while minority shareholders may seek legal remedies in 
response to wrongdoing by directors, managers or supervisors, there is no 
recourse open to them if the infringement is caused by the party 
committee. 
 
5.6 Solutions and Conclusion 
 
It has been pointed out that, ironically, the current situation is one in which 
the government is seeking various solutions to problems caused by 
political concerns, while at the same time being unwilling to reduce their 
continuing power over commercial enterprises.641 
 
It has been argued that western corporate law and the western 
governance model are inappropriate for China, „because of some basic 
flaws in the assumptions of those advocating “Western-style” corporate 
governance in China… They are based on assumptions about the 
purposes and functions of business enterprises that are not shared by 
most Chinese policy makers‟.642 
 
It is true that the quality of corporate governance could be improved if 
China were to move further towards a market-oriented economy.  For 
                                                             
640 J M Buchanan, R D Tollison and G Tullock, Toward a Theory of The Rent-Seeking Society (Texas A&M 
University Press 1980); also see, Nee, Opper and Wong (n 573) 22. 
641 Leng (n 581) 6. 
642 Colin Hawes and Thomas Chiu, 'Flogging a Dead Horse? Why Western-style Corporate Governance 
Reform will Fail in China and What Should be Done Instead' (2006) 20 Astralian Journal of Corporate Law 
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example, greater liquidity would attract more investors.643 According to an 
advisory report made by the World Bank to the Chinese government, 
going forward, China will need to determine the relative role of the state as 
against the market and the private sector in economic activity. 644  One 
solution provided by the World Bank to sustain economic growth is to 
introduce more competition, enabling more private actors, especially 
minority investors, to get involved in the market.645 
 
Similarly, Tam argues that China should put more emphasis on developing 
market economics, in order to match the precocious corporate 
legislation.646 A successful example in practice is that of the joint-venture 
investment bank, China International Capital Corporation (CICC), which 
has little influence by the state or the CCP due to the existence of large 
private and foreign shareholders, but has very good governance quality 
and investment returns. 647  It can, therefore, be concluded that the 
accelerating entry of private and foreign investors can lead to „de-
partyisation‟ or „de-politicisation‟ in the business sector. 
 
Meanwhile, various institutions should also be established, such as the 
market for corporate control, a human resource market for managers, and 
sound protection for minority shareholders.648 
 
Certainly, while it could be easy to solve all the problems discussed in Part 
5.5 if either the party or the market were powerful enough to convince the 
other,649 the facts force us to seek a difficult balance. As argued by Chen, 
                                                             
643 Tam, 'Models of Corporate Governance for Chinese Companies' (n 115) 53. 
644 Bank (n 634) 110. 
645 Ibid. 
646 Tam, 'Models of Corporate Governance for Chinese Companies' (n 115) 62. 
647 Heilmann (n 558) 13. 
648 Tam, 'Models of Corporate Governance for Chinese Companies' (n 115) 62. 
649 Gore (n 552) 87. The author believes that the overall trend is the decline of the party in corporate 
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transplanting the western corporate governance structure without any 
adjustments may not be the appropriate solution in the Chinese context. 
Chen claims that: 
 
It is unrealistic to expect that in the next twenty years China 
will become like Japan – which has thrived through its 
adoption of American-led Western capitalism. Instead, it is 
likely that the PRC will take a few decades to find a balance 
between Western free-market enterprise and the historical 
influences of communism, nationalism and Confucianism.650 
 
In concluding this chapter, it is argued that simply driving the party out of 
commercial practice is neither a possible nor the optimal solution. First, it 
could be beneficial to maintain the connection with the CCP in business 
operations. For example, this could facilitate access to scarce 
resources, 651  or reduce the uncertainty caused by institutional 
weaknesses. 652  Nevertheless, it should be noted that empirical results 
show that government-enterprise ties are necessary, but not sufficient, for 
improved performance.653 
 
Secondly, CCP involvement would be helpful to achieve a more efficient 
and reasonable social allocation. Indeed, a market-oriented economy 
would improve productive efficiency. However, a harmonious social 
environment, which is urged by the CCP and the state, needs not only 
better productive efficiency, but also, and perhaps more importantly, a 
sound social allocation system,654 which the political ideological education 
                                                             
650 Ming-jer Chen, Inside Chinese Business: A Guide for Mangers Worldwide (HBS Press 2001), 180. 
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of California Press 1997), 21. 
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may help to advance. 
 
Accordingly, the suggestions put forward below are based on a consensus 
that the participation of the CCP and its ultimate control over the national 
governance should be assured. In addition, the proposals take into 
account a specific concern regarding legal protection of minority 
shareholders. 
 
First of all, there should be a separation of the state from the CCP. It is 
outside the scope of this thesis to discuss how the CCP can guarantee its 
status as governing party, but it is argued here that, from the 
jurisprudential perspective, separation of the state from the CCP would 
help to solve the mismatch of powers and accountabilities. 
 
Ultimate control by the CCP could be achieved by a firm control over state 
government. Consequently, the CCP would be able to guide corporate 
operations and the direction of economic development through regulatory 
power, administrative power and supervisory power of different state 
organs. 
 
Under such a regime, the CCP‟s political concerns would be taken into 
account, while at the same time the activities of state organs could be 
bound by law. In the view of this thesis, keeping power holders in the 
company accountable is the core basis of legal protection of minority 
shareholders in China. 
 
Secondly, according to the different businesses they operate, listed 
companies with state assets should be divided into two categories: the 
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non-competitive sector and the competitive sector. 655  Non-competitive 
sector refers to those monopoly industries created because of concerns of 
politics or national safety, such as natural resources and the military, or 
those which otherwise need massive investment with only little return but 
that have an important connection to public welfare.656 Competitive sector 
refers to business areas with a relatively higher extent of openness to 
private companies.657 Companies in the competitive sector are more like 
the modern companies in western countries, seeking maximum profits.  
 
This thesis proposes that in the non-competitive sector, the state could 
continue to maintain its influence by introducing the institution of 
governmental directors.658 CCP political concerns could be taken account 
of through the voting power of governmental directors on the board. 
However, in the competitive sector, companies with national assets should 
be gradually privatised or phased out. In an analysis on the state-
controlled companies in Singapore, Ang and Ding argue that, beyond the 
transition period of development, when the economy is developed and 
other institutions and mechanisms for control are in place, the state-
controlled companies may outlive their usefulness and be phased out.659 
Then, the role of the state or the CCP will be to build a more open and fair 
market environment, in which shareholders will benefit from their 
investment in such companies. 
 
More importantly, the decision power on personnel should be returned to 
                                                             
655 Being a part of the solution suggested by this thesis, distinguishing the non-competitive sector from the 
competitive sector is the foundation of further reform of Chinese state-controlled economy. For more details 
see Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
656 Gairong Hu, Legal System of Board of Directors in State-owned Company (Peking University Press 2010), 
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657 Ibid. 
658 A governmental director is one who has tight links with the government, for example, has another position 
in an administrative department. As an ideal structure, the board of directors of companies in the non-
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more details see the Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
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the power holders under the Company Law. Directors, including the 
governmental directors mentioned above, should be nominated and 
elected through a specified legal mechanism. Decisive influence on 
personnel decisions by party committee should be forbidden by law. 
Nevertheless, Gu argues that at the current stage a temporary veto power 
could be authorised to the party committee so that it can stop the 
appointment of a director if the candidate concerned has been exposed as 
involved in a major political problem.660 With respect to the appointment of 
managers, this chapter argues that this should be decided entirely by the 
board of directors via a specified legal mechanism. It is because, in the 
modern corporate governance, the board of directors is the internal 
monitor over the managers. It could be very difficult for board of directors 
to keep the managers accountable to the board if they are appointed and 
dismissed only by the controlling shareholder.661    
 
The ideal role of the party committee in the company, as suggested by this 
thesis, is to concentrate on ideological affairs. There is no need for 
involvement in corporate decision making or monitoring, because all these 
institutions have delegates working on behalf of the CCP in ways 
prescribed by law. 
 
There are two further points to be made here in regard to the suggestions 
put forward by this chapter. First, such reform would be introduced 
gradually on a macro level. In terms of organisational behaviour, Chinese 
commercial and political exercises can be seen as a set of core values 
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which underlie social interaction among Chinese people. 662  Such core 
values are not eternal, but change only gradually, over generations rather 
than years.663 Any attempt at revolution may only bring about more social 
problems.  
 
Secondly, equally as important as the new design of corporate structure, 
Chinese leaders must pay more attention to how to withdraw powers from 
groups with vested interests. Pearson highlights the difficulty of 
withdrawing power under Chinese multiple leadership. Focusing in 
particular on the telecommunication industry in China,664 she finds that 
companies are regulated by the Ministry of Information Industry (the formal 
regulator), the People‟s Liberation Army (which is responsible for 
information security concerns), the Ministry of Finance (which oversees 
accounting), the State Administration of Radio, Film and TV, the Ministry of 
Public Security, the Ministry of Commerce, and the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce. Each power group strives to keep its power for 
further interest exchange. Accordingly, reform will not be an easy task. 
 
To conclude, reform according to the suggestions made in this chapter will 
not be able to re-define the party committee as a catalyst minority 
protection. However, it could at least remove one potential wrongdoer. As 
mentioned above, owing to the mismatch of power and accountability, the 
party committee is a key element of the Chinese „insider control‟ problem, 
which tunnels the company at the expense of the interests of minority 
shareholders. Cutting off its direct intervention is a suboptimal change, but 
better than nothing. 
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Chapter Six: The Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Committee - An External Helping Hand for Minority 
Protection  
 
Executive Summary 
 
It is argued by this thesis that a sound market environment would promote 
better corporate governance quality. In other words, if the market 
administrator were to fulfil its obligation well, minority shareholders would 
receive better protection of their interests. 
 
Through a case study examining how the Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC), the market administrator in Hong Kong, has prevented 
infringement of minorities‟ interests by majority shareholders, this thesis 
identifies three lessons for China in its further reform: (1) The head count 
test could be transplanted into Chinese company regulations, in order to 
reinforce the voice of minorities; (2) Substantial rights and independence 
of the market administrator in China should be guaranteed; and (3) 
Political intervention should be banned, even when state-owned assets 
are involved.  
 
This thesis has also investigated and evaluated the performance of the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In order to achieve its core 
mission of investor protection, the SEC pursues two main strategies: (1) 
improving market regulations; and (2) developing investor education. 
 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the market 
administrator in China, has put great effort into increasing the governance 
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quality of Chinese listed companies. It has done so through: (1) 
developing awareness of minority protection; (2) increasing the quality of 
IPOs; (3) reducing insider trading; (4) fighting against commercial bribes; 
(5) promoting the split share structure reform; and (6) improving corporate 
information disclosure of listed companies. 
 
However, this thesis argues that, although the CSRC is developing in the 
correct direction, it still has some defects to overcome, in terms of 
providing better minority protection. The main shortcomings are: (1) 
shortage of professional staff; (2) immaturity of regulatory activities; (3) 
absence of powerful rights; and (4) compromised position as a market 
regulator. 
 
Therefore, with the proposal that the CSRC be developed to become the 
external safeguard of minorities‟ interests, this thesis suggests that it can 
learn from its American counterpart, the SEC, in the following three 
aspects: (1) improving independence from government intervention; (2) 
continuing efforts to increase corporate transparency; and (3) developing 
investor education. 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
A well-designed corporate governance system requires not only a sound 
internal monitor to relieve or avoid agency costs, but also a mature and 
fair market. With its own discipline, also called market rules, the market 
would improve the development of corporate governance, in terms of 
pattern and quality. As concluded by Wei, a well-functioning securities 
market and a sound corporate governance system are inter dependent: 
good corporate governance quality is the basis of a mature securities 
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market, while a market with well-designed regulations could become an 
external monitoring mechanism of corporate governance.665 Therefore, as 
the regulator of the market, administrative bodies such as the CSRC in 
China, the SEC in the US, the SFC in Hong Kong and the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom, could be deemed 
important external helpers, particularly in the legal protection of minority 
shareholders. 
 
This chapter begins with a case study of Pacific Century CyberWorks Ltd 
(hereinafter, „PCCW‟) in Hong Kong, to highlight how the market 
administrator, the SFC, is able to prevent infringement of minorities‟ 
interests by the controlling shareholder. 
 
The recent decision by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal on privatisation of 
PCCW has been deemed a significant victory of legal protection for 
minority shareholders in Hong Kong. After a 170-day fight, the privatisation 
scheme set out under s.166 of the Companies Ordinance failed, thanks to 
the intervention of the SFC.666 
 
PCCW is a Hong Kong-based company with businesses in 
telecommunications, media, IT solutions, property development and 
investment. 667  It controls HKT Ltd, which is the dominant provider of 
telecom services in Hong Kong. Among the shareholders of PCCW, China 
Netcom BVI, a wholly owned subsidiary of China United Network 
                                                             
665 Yuwa Wei, 'Maximising the External Governance Function of the Securities Market: A Chinese 
Experience' (2008) 19 International Company and Commercial Law Review 111, 111. 
666 Jie Wang, 'Xianggang Jianguan dui Neimu Jiaoyi Shuo Bu [Administrator in Hong Kong Says No to 
Insider Trading]' Beijing Chen Bao [Beijing Morning Express] (27-04-2009) 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/hkstock/hkstocknews/20090427/09196153104.shtml> accessed 07-11-
2013. 
667 Company Profile on the homepage of PCCW, 
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Communications Group Company Ltd (hereinafter, „CNC‟),668 is listed in 
the top three, with a shareholding of approximately 20 per cent.669 The 
reason for mentioning this is a comparative concern with the differences in 
litigation outcomes between mainland China and Hong Kong, when a 
state-related enterprise is involved.  
 
The rationale for this case study is threefold: 
 
First, the shareholding structure of a listed company in Hong Kong is 
similar to that in mainland China. One or several majority shareholders 
have a decisive impact on corporate operations. Such a similarity is the 
basis of comparative study. In each case the conflict of interests between 
the majority and minority parties is a key issue. However, the key 
difference between the two, that of who holds the majority shares, leads to 
different corporate situations in the two jurisdictions. In most cases, a 
Hong Kong-based listed company is controlled by a powerful private 
family,670 whereas a listed company in China mainland usually maintains a 
government-related majority shareholder. 
 
Secondly, the PCCW case could be a positive example of an external 
monitor making a crucial contribution to minority shareholder protection. In 
the privatisation case examined here, the intervention of the SFC is 
regarded as the turning point. In this case study, it will be argued that a set 
of clear and definite powers should be granted to the CSRC, in order to 
achieve the role of minority shareholders‟ protector.  
 
                                                             
668 Unicom is one of the biggest telecommunications service providers in mainland China. It is also a listed 
company with a large state shareholding.  
669 Angus Young, Grace Li and Tina Chu, 'Case Comment: In the Interest of Minority Shareholders in Hong 
Kong: Case Study on the Privatisation of PCCW via a Scheme of Arrangement: Part 1' (2011) 32 Company 
Lawyer 28, 30. 
670 Ibid 28. The author points out two kinds of dominant shareholding in Hong Kong companies: holding by 
family-owned business and holding by block shareholders. 
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Finally, the case illustrates a good lesson given by the Hong Kong Court of 
Appeal. In the PCCW decision, all three judges placed special emphasis 
on „fairness‟ concerning the business facts and the interests of minority 
shareholders. Unfortunately, the courts in mainland China still lack 
appropriate experience on corporate issues; moreover, judicial 
independence needs to be strengthened. 
 
The second part of this chapter focuses on comparative research between 
the US SEC and the CSRC, in order to find out how the market regulator 
can help in terms of minority investor protection. There are two reasons for 
choosing the SEC as a body for comparative study. First, it is the market 
regulator in the United States, the most developed market in the world. 
With the globalisation of corporate governance, SEC practice has been 
learnt from or transplanted into other jurisdictions. Even though the first 
corporate legislation in China copied the German model, the legal reforms 
in the twenty-first century have followed the US model. Several of the 
institutions introduced into the Chinese corporate governance regime, 
such as independent directors and disclosure requirements, were 
originally designed for the Anglo-American system. Hence, choosing the 
SEC as a subject of study could bring a certain reference value. 
 
In the US, the main mission of the SEC is investor protection. Although it 
has no explicit preferences, SEC documents suggest that the position of 
public minority investors attract most of its attention. The shareholding 
structure in the US market is relatively dispersed, so that it is rare to see a 
shareholder holding more than 50 per cent of a company‟s shares. Even 
institutional investors, such as hedge funds or pension funds are minority 
shareholders in terms of the shareholding percentage. Furthermore, the 
SEC notes on its website that an increasing number of first-time investors 
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are turning to the market with different purposes, such as to secure their 
future financial well-being, to pay for real estate or to send their children to 
college.671 Therefore, it can be concluded that the SEC, as the market 
regulator, plays a crucial role in minority protection in the US. 
 
In China, the CSRC was formed in 1992. Research into its development 
leads this chapter to argue that the CSRC is an important market regulator 
in national economic reform, especially since the establishment of the 
financial market. It has bridged the gaps between the Company Law and 
Securities Law by providing detailed provisions to guide corporate 
operations in practice. 672  Moreover, with the rapid development of the 
securities market, corporate scandals caused by imperfect regulation and 
information asymmetry are appearing more frequently. As a result, the 
CSRC is making great efforts to enhance market regulation, while noting 
explicitly its mission to protect minority shareholders in particular. 673 
Therefore, the disadvantages of minority shareholders as market 
participants, for example lack of professional knowledge and reliable 
information, should be taken into account by the CSRC in any regulatory 
reforms. Rules and policies should favour minority protection. Eventually, 
this will improve the quality of corporate governance. 
 
However, although these market regulators have put special emphasis on 
minority protection, the outcomes of their activities are still in question. 
What have they done? Can the minority shareholders benefit from their 
activities? How can they perform better? This chapter investigates these 
concerns via a comparative study of the SEC and the CSRC, in order to 
find out the best way to improve the minority protection in the Chinese 
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securities market.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Part 6.1.1 describes the 
PCCW privatisation case. In Part 6.1.2, three key issues that determined 
the outcome of this case are highlighted and discussed. Part 6.1.3 offers 
some comments from the case study, relating to legal protection of 
minority shareholders in mainland China. In Part 6.2.1, the strategic goals 
and effectiveness of the SEC with regard to its mission of investor 
protection are reviewed.  Part 6.2.2 describes the development of the 
CSRC in China, while Part 6.2.3 identifies some specific problems in terms 
of minority protection. Part 6.2.4 notes several points where the CSRC 
could learn from its American counterpart, to improve the legal protection 
of minority shareholders and the quality of corporate governance.  
 
6.1 PCCW Case Study 
 
6.1.1 Summary of the PCCW Case 
 
The Financial Times described the PCCW privatisation as „a house built by 
Richard‟,674 an infringement of the minority shareholders by the controller. 
To illustrate the complete blueprint of such a house, this section provides a 
detailed description of the case. 
 
The majority shareholder of PCCW, tycoon Richard Li, son of Li Ka-shing, 
the richest man in Hong Kong, along with his Singapore-listed holding 
company, Pacific Century Regional Developments (hereinafter, „PCRD‟), 
controlled 28 per cent of the company‟s shares.675 The second largest 
                                                             
674 Lex Team, 'PCCW's Privatisation' Financial Times (05-11-2008) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/11940ec6-
ab1e-11dd-b9e1-000077b07658.html> accessed 17-02-2012. 
675 Lina Saigol, 'PCCW's Small Investors Should Make a Stand' Financial Times (09-11-2008) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0385c940-ae8a-11dd-b621-000077b07658.html> accessed 17-02-2012. 
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shareholder, CNC, held approximately 20 per cent of PCCW via its wholly-
owned subsidiary, China Netcom BVI.676 
 
Based on high expectations of its corporate future, the share price of 
PCCW in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange climbed from HK$6.00 to 
HK$19.50 from December 1999, and reached a peak in 2000.677 However, 
the bull market did not continue for long. The share price of PCCW fell by 
around 95 per cent, from HK$28.5 to a mere HK$0.88 in 2003.678 In the 
four years before 2008, when the privatisation scheme commenced, 
PCCW‟s shares were trading below HK$5.00.679 
 
On 3rd November, 2008, a scheme of arrangement to privatise PCCW was 
announced by PCRD, jointly with China Netcom BVI.680 According to the 
Joint Announcement, the Joint Offerors would pay Scheme Shareholders, 
including individual shareholders, a cancellation fee of HK$4.20 in cash for 
each Scheme Share.681  Starvest, a wholly-owned subsidiary of PCRD, 
was to provide 74.27% of this cash consideration, while Netcom BVI would 
pay the other 25.73%.682 
 
According to the Joint 
Announcement, the shareholding 
structure of the PCCW before 
privatisation was as illustrated in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
                                                             
676 Justine Lau, Tom Mitchell and Sundeep Tucker, 'Li Risks veto by Minority Investors in PCCW' Financial 
Times (05-11-2008) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6887772c-ab55-11dd-b9e1-000077b07658.html> accessed 
17-02-2012. 
677 Team (n 674). 
678 Young, Li and Chu (n 669) 29. 
679 Team (n 674). 
680 PCCW, 'Joint Announcement (November 4, 2008)' 
<http://202.66.146.82/listco/hk/pccw/announcement/a081104a.pdf> accessed 20-02-2012. 
681 Ibid 2 and 7. 
682 Ibid 4. 
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Figure 2: Shareholding Structure of PCCW and PCRD before the Scheme 
of Arrangement 
 
If the Scheme of Arrangement were to be approved by the independent 
shareholders, the listing of PCCW shares on the Stock Exchange would 
be withdrawn,683 so that the company would then be classified as a closed 
or private company in law. The shareholding structure after privatisation 
would be as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Shareholding Structure after the Scheme of Arrangement  
 
By way of a scheme of arrangement under s.166 of the Hong Kong 
Companies Ordinance, which would bind all shareholders if approved, a 
proposal must achieve both the following statutory requirements: (1) At 
least a majority in number of the members, or the relevant class, present 
and voting in person or by proxy should be in favour of the scheme; and 
(2) The number must hold at least three-fourths in value of the holdings of 
those present and voting in person or by proxy.684 Moreover, those voting 
                                                             
683 Ibid 5. 
684 Companies Ordinance (Hong Kong), Section 166. 
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against must account for less than 10 per cent of eligible voters.685 
 
According to s.166, the procedure must be in three stages: (1) an 
application to the court for the meeting to be convened; (2) convening the 
meeting and voting; and (3) a petition to the court to sanction the 
scheme.686 
 
According to Michael Todd, counsel to PCCW, this scheme of arrangement 
provided an opportunity for the minority shareholders to realise their 
investment.687 Meanwhile, the executive directors of the PCCW believed 
the proposal was a fair and reasonable offer and in the interest of 
shareholders as a whole.688 
 
However, the public reaction told a different story. It was pointed out that, 
while the proposal appeared at first to represent a 53 per cent premium to 
the last trading date and approximately 6 times enterprise value, in fact, on 
a 180-day average, the „premium‟ was equal to a 9.5 per cent discount.689  
 
In addition, it was reported that a special dividend in cash would be paid to 
PCCW‟s three major shareholders if the proposal completed.690 The total 
amount of such cash dividend would be HK$17bn, HK$2bn more than all 
the expenses the Joint Offerors would pay.691 
 
Relatively early on, an anonymous journalist exposed a share-splitting 
scandal, in which it was alleged: 
                                                             
685 Ibid. 
686 Young, Li and Chu (n 669) 32. 
687 Benjamin Scent, 'It's Outrageous' The Standard (China's Business Newspaper) (21-04-2009) 
<http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_print.asp?art_id=81081&sid=23531732> accessed 18-02-2012. 
688 Young, Li and Chu (n 669) 30. 
689 Team (n 674). 
690 Saigol (n 675) 1. 
691 Ibid. 
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There was a scheme in which hundreds of Fortis insurance 
sales agents would each receive one lot (of 1,000) PCCW 
Limited shares, and that in return, they would sign a proxy 
form (which would allow the holdings to count in favour of 
the deal). If the proposed privatisation succeeds, then of 
course they would each get HK$4,500 for the shares.692 
 
This allegation resulted in SFC intervention in the proceedings.  
 
On 11th February, 2009, a petition was presented for court sanction of the 
scheme.693 
 
6.1.2 Key Issues before the Court 
 
This part discusses in detail three key issues, which proved to be both 
controversial and critical for drawing a conclusion, at first instance and on 
appeal. The issues are: (1) differences between the scheme of 
arrangement under s.166 and compulsory acquisition under s.168; (2) the 
attitude to share-splitting before the vote in the Extraordinary Shareholder 
Meeting (ESM); and (3) the concerns of the court with regard to 
sanctioning the scheme of arrangement. 
 
(1) The Scheme of Arrangement versus Compulsory Acquisition 
There are two main ways to privatise a listed company in Hong Kong, 
namely a scheme of arrangement or a general offer, which may result in a 
compulsory acquisition. 694  Both of these should fulfil the statutory 
                                                             
692 Anonymous Journalist, 'Vote-rigging Plan for PCCW Meeting' 01-02-2009 <http://www.webb-
site.com/articles/pccwrig.asp> accessed 20-02-2012. 
693 Re PCCW Ltd (2008) HCMP 2382/2008, [1]. 
694 Young, Li and Chu (n 669) 31. 
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requirements laid down by the Companies Ordinance (hereinafter „CO‟) 
and by the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers (hereinafter „Codes‟) issued 
by the SFC under the Securities and Futures Ordinance, which contains 
specific tests to protect minority shareholders.695 
 
 Compulsory Acquisition 
Section 168 of the CO means a possibility for those majority shareholders 
who pursue total control of the company to squeeze out the rest, by way of 
a general offer. It provides that once an offeror has obtained acceptances 
which in aggregate represent no less than 90 per cent in value of shares 
within four months of submitting the initial offering documents, he will be 
able to acquire the remaining shares compulsorily.696 Pursuant to r.2.11 of 
the Codes, the shares acquired by the offeror, including those purchased 
by his concert parties, should amount to 90 per cent of the disinterested 
shares.697 
 
 A Scheme of Arrangement 
In the alternative, a privatisation of a listed company may take place by a 
scheme of arrangement, under s.166 of the CO. The statute provides that 
if, a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the members 
or class of members, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the 
meeting, are in favour of the scheme of arrangement, the proposal shall, if 
sanctioned by the court, be binding on all the members.698 
 
In addition, the Codes provide a set of supplementary requirements, 
whereby such a scheme of arrangement should be approved by no less 
than 75 per cent of votes of independent shareholders that are cast either 
                                                             
695 S H Goo, 'Should the Headcount Test for a Scheme of Arrangement Be Abolished?' (2011) 32 Company 
Lawyer 185, 186. 
696 Young, Li and Chu (n 669) 31. 
697 Codes on Takeovers and Mergers (Hong Kong), r.2.11. 
698 Companies Ordinance (Hong Kong), Section 166. 
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in person or by proxy at the court meeting of the holders of the 
disinterested shares.699 Furthermore, the proposal may still be dismissed if 
more than 10 per cent of the voting rights attached to all disinterested 
shares oppose it.700 
 
Comparison of the statutory requirements of the two methods mentioned 
above suggests that it might be relatively easier for the offeror to privatise 
a listed company via a scheme of arrangement, due to the lower threshold 
of votes required for approval. 
 
Having taken into account the opposition by minority shareholders, the 
Joint Offerors of PCCW opted for scheme of arrangement, with its 
relatively lower requirement in terms of voting. As such, the proposal could 
fulfil all the statutory requirements before being sanctioned by the court if 
(i) it obtained approval by those holding at least 75 per cent in value of the 
shareholding present and voting in person or by proxy at the court 
meeting; (ii) it obtained approval by at least a majority in number of the 
independent shareholders present and voting in person or by proxy; and 
(iii) the number of votes cast against the proposal amounted to no more 
than 10 per cent of voting rights attached to all disinterested shares. 
 
Without the consideration of share-splitting, which will be discussed in 
detail later, it was confirmed by the court at the first instance that: (i) The 
total number of independent shareholders who attended and voted at the 
court meeting, in person or by proxy, was 2,256.701 Among these, 1,404 
independent shareholders, holding approximately 83 per cent of shares 
held by all the independent shareholders present and voting either in 
person or by proxy, voted in favour of the scheme; while 859 independent 
                                                             
699 Codes on Takeovers and Mergers (Hong Kong), r.2.2a. 
700 Ibid, r.2.2b. 
701 Re PCCW Ltd (n 693), [23]. 
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shareholders, holding approximately 17 per cent of such shares, but 
approximately 8 per cent of the number of shares held by all the 
independent shareholders whether or not present and voting, 702  voted 
against. 
 
Based solely on the voting result, the scheme of arrangement satisfied the 
statutory requirements under s.166 of the CO and r.2.2b of the Codes. 
However, questions remain as to whether, in sanctioning a scheme, weight 
should be given to share-splitting, and exactly what should be taken into 
account by the court in order to sanction a proper scheme. 
 
(2) The Attitude to Share-splitting Before the Vote in the 
Extraordinary Shareholder Meeting (ESM) 
With the intervention of the SFC, the allegation of improper share 
transfers, termed share-splitting by the public media, became the decisive 
issue for the court‟s decision on whether to sanction the scheme. 
 
At the first instance, Mr Steward, the executive director, enforcement, of 
the SFC, exhibited 32 bundles containing the records of interviews 
conducted by the SFC and transcripts of audio-taped interviews.703 The 
investigation by the SFC focused on 726 persons who became members 
of the company between 30 December, 2008, the day the court meeting 
was adjourned, and 30 January, 2009.  Each held one lot of shares, the 
amount stated by an anonymous journalist before the first instance, as 
mentioned above, and voted in favour of the scheme.704 
 
The SFC investigation highlighted the abnormal share-transferring 
activities. However, unfortunately, Kwan J ruled that such activities were 
                                                             
702 Ibid, [25]. 
703 Ibid, [59]. 
704 Ibid, [61]. 
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merely a matter of conjecture.705 In response to the allegations, Kwan J 
held that such a serious allegation should be proved by strong and cogent 
evidence before the court.706  
 
Moreover, Kwan J held that the splitting of shares is not a prohibited 
activity in Hong Kong, where arbitrageurs are very active.707 Quoting an 
earlier case, she noted that a shareholder is entitled in common law to 
transfer some of his share to nominees to increase his voting power at 
meetings.708 
 
In a similar case, Re Direct Acceptance Ltd.,709 McLelland J claimed: 
 
Regardless of the purpose of these transfers, it is quite clear 
that the transferees were members of the company at the 
time of the meeting and entitled to vote. Accordingly their 
votes had to be counted… 
 
As a result, Kwan J was reluctant to denigrate the unusual share transfers 
as a manipulation to boost the head count. In addition, she agreed that it 
would be unfair and wrong for the court to lay down, for the first time, a 
policy on share-splitting in a scheme.710 
 
However, on appeal, Rogers VP took the view that the conclusion was 
inescapable that, by buying shares and distributing them to individuals to 
increase the number of supporters of the scheme, Mr Lam‟s actions were 
a manipulation of voting.711 It was, indeed, a successful operation, which 
                                                             
705 Ibid, [90]. 
706 Ibid, [163]. 
707 Ibid, [142]. 
708 Re Stranton Iron and Steel Company [1873] LR 16 Eq 559. 
709 [1987] 5 ACLC [1041]. 
710 Re PCCW Ltd (n 693), [151]. 
711 Re PCCW Ltd (2009) CAVA 85/2009 [43]. 
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created 494 individual shareholders to vote in favour of the scheme in a 
very short space of time. 
 
Unlike Kwan J, who refused to reach a conclusion of manipulation of 
voting in response to a set of abnormal coincidences, Rogers VP pointed 
out that the multiple series of coincidences, of both timing and the 
collection of proxy forms, provided evidence that Mr Yuen had been 
involved with the activities of share-splitting operated by Mr Lam.712 
 
According to Rogers VP, it was impossible for the court to give its sanction 
to the proposal given its knowledge of some form of manipulation of the 
vote, and the fact that it could not be satisfied that the result of the vote 
had not been achieved by manipulation.713  Moreover, Rogers VP noted 
that if such manipulation of voting were to be accepted by the court, any 
vote would be meaningless.714 
 
Lam J took a similar attitude to share-splitting, stating that the court should 
accord less weight to the voting result at a court meeting when there has 
been any form of manipulation. 715  His viewpoint was rooted in the 
legislative intent of the dual majority requirements in s.166 of the CO. He 
noted that the threshold settled by the provision requires a scheme to 
satisfy the majority in value as well as the majority in number. 716 
Theoretically, these are two separate requirements. Condoning 
manipulation of the vote, such as by share-splitting, would make the 
threshold of majority in number meaningless. Those who hold the majority 
in value could easily achieve the majority in number by simply splitting 
their shares to any number they wished, to fulfil the statutory requirement. 
                                                             
712 Ibid, [60]. 
713 Ibid, [70]. 
714 Ibid, [75]. 
715 Ibid, [142]. 
716 Ibid, [136]. 
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In this manner, the special mechanism for legal protection of minority 
shareholders would be diminished. 
 
Accordingly, in respect of share-splitting, three judges on the appeal 
reached a consensus that such activity is a form of manipulation of the 
vote, and thus should be rebuked when the court exercised its discretion 
to sanction a scheme of arrangement. 
 
(3) The Concerns of the Court with Regard to Sanctioning the 
Scheme of Arrangement 
To some extent, Kwan J, at the instance, reached her conclusion on the 
attitude to the functions of the court in relation to the proceeding under 
s.166 of the CO. She pointed out that the function of the court in petition 
for the sanction of a scheme of arrangement contains three aspects, as 
illustrated by Buckley: 
 
In exercising its power of sanction the court will see, first that 
the provisions of the statute have been complied with, second 
that the class was fairly represented by those who attended 
the meeting and that the statutory majority are acting bona 
fide and are not coercing the minority in order to promote 
interests adverse to those of the class whom they purport to 
represent, and thirdly, that the arrangement is such as an 
intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned 
and acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably 
approve.717 
 
This was also the consensus among the three judges on the Court of 
                                                             
717 Re PCCW Ltd (n 693); also see, Thomas Stockdale and others, Buckley on the Companies Acts (14th 
edn,2000), 473. 
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Appeal. 
 
However, based on her attitude to share-splitting mentioned above, Kwan 
J rejected the submission that the court should exclude all votes in favour 
of the scheme as a result of share-splitting in the wide sense.718 She 
concluded that there were no procedural irregularities,719 and her honour 
was finally satisfied that „the scheme is one as to which an intelligent and 
honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his 
interest, might reasonably approve‟. 720  Therefore, the scheme was 
sanctioned by her.721 
 
On appeal, Rogers VP mentioned that there were many cases reflecting 
the two major functions of the court to exercise its discretion to sanction a 
scheme: first of all determining that the statutory provisions had been 
complied with, and secondly asking whether the class had been fairly 
represented by those who attended the meeting.722  
 
As to the PCCW case, Rogers VP confirmed that the scheme involved had 
satisfied the first part of the inquiry, since all those who voted at the court 
meeting, whether in favour of or against the scheme, were registered 
shareholders.723 
 
However, it could not be so easily concluded that the required threshold 
had been achieved, because the existence of a clear manipulation of the 
vote should not be ignored by the court. Rogers VP agreed Lindley LJ‟s 
view in Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway 
                                                             
718 Re PCCW Ltd (n 693), [153]. 
719 Ibid, [173]. 
720 Ibid, [80]. 
721 Ibid, [81]. 
722 Re PCCW Ltd (n 711), [38]. 
723 Ibid, [66]. 
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Company,724 that: 
 
 
…although on a meeting which is to be held under this 
section it is perfectly fair for every man to do that which is 
best for himself, yet the Court, which has to see what is 
reasonable and just as regards the interests of the whole 
class, would certainly be very much influenced in its decision, 
if it turned out that the majority was composed of persons 
who had not really the interests of that class at stake.725 
 
When Rogers VP investigated the nature of the scheme in question, to 
consider whether it could be one in which an intelligent and honest man, a 
member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest might 
reasonably approve, he noted that, although the explanatory statement in 
the first document issued by the company described the scheme as an 
opportunity to realise the investment in PCCW with a significant premium 
to the market price prevailing on the last trading date, the price on that 
day, in fact, was at an almost historic low. 726 According to the figures 
provided by the IFA, in the three-year period before the offer, the highest 
value for the shares of PCCW had been $5.75 and the average closing 
price had been $4.83, significantly higher than the offer price.727 
 
Rogers VP agreed with the view expressed by proxy advisors, similar to 
that of many independent shareholders, stating that he failed to find any 
reason why PCCW, as a standalone company, could not to continue. 
Moreover, according to the scheme document, the Joint Offerors would 
                                                             
724 Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Company (1891) 1 Ch 213, 243. 
725 Re PCCW Ltd (n 711), [36]. 
726 Ibid, [79]. 
727 Ibid, [80]. 
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maintain the existing business and no significant change would be 
introduced to the company after the privatisation.728 In other words, the 
Joint Offerors, who were the major shareholders of PCCW, were confident 
of the future of the company. Therefore, the key question arose as to why 
independent shareholders should decide to realise their investment and 
accept the scheme of arrangement at this time. 
 
In addition, referring to the special dividend in the scheme document, 
Rogers VP noted that „not only are they [the independent shareholders] 
being treated inequitably and being bought out when the share price has 
reached an historical low, but the Joint Offerors would receive a dividend 
which should be payable to all shareholders‟.729 
 
Accordingly, Rogers VP concluded that such a scheme should not be 
sanctioned by the court, not only because the court could not be satisfied 
that the vote had been reflective of the proper majority, in view of the 
manipulation of voting, but also because the scheme itself would not be 
approved by any intelligent and honest member. Instead, in the view of 
Rogers VP, such a scheme would have the effect of forcing those 
shareholders out of the company and depriving them of the opportunity to 
benefit from any potential increase in value and share price.730 
 
In a similar judgment, Lam J noted that the proceeding to seek the court‟s 
sanction for a scheme of arrangement is summary in nature.731 Unlike 
other ordinary civil litigation, it is the petitioner who should satisfy the court 
that the scheme is rational before being approved. 
 
                                                             
728 Ibid, [95]. 
729 Ibid, [94]. 
730 Ibid, [97]. 
731 Ibid, [106]. 
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With a special concern of legal protection of minority shareholders, the 
court can only sanction those schemes that are legally correct, since once 
the scheme has been sanctioned by the court, it will bind all members, 
even the dissenting shareholders. The importance of this process is 
pointed out by Buckley, and consequently the court cannot simply look at 
whether a statutory majority has been achieved. Rather, the court will 
„have regard to the amount and quality of information which has been 
supplied and conduct of the meeting‟.732 
 
In Re BTR Ltd,733 Chadwick LJ, on appeal, claimed: 
 
Minority shareholders are protected in this class of case by 
the fact that the court has discretion whether or not to 
approve the scheme having regard to all the circumstances of 
the case.734 
 
Therefore, Lam J held to his view in respect of the summary nature that 
the court in such a case should investigate the scheme with a wide lens 
and that the petitioner must satisfy the court that the application is one 
which, as an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned 
and acting in respect of his interest might reasonably approve of.735 
 
Considering the protection given to the minority shareholders under s.168, 
Lam J held that good reason should be provided by the petitioner for the 
acquisition, rather than simply relying on the majority approval. 736 
However, in common with Rogers VP, Lam J concluded that: „I do not see 
any good rationale for the scheme as far as those shareholders whose 
                                                             
732 Stockdale and others (n 717) 425. 
733 Re BTR Lted (2000) 1 BCLC [740]. 
734 Ibid, [749]. 
735 Re PCCW Ltd (n 711), [107]. 
736 Ibid, [161]. 
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shares are to be compulsorily acquired are concerned.‟737 
 
Barma J agreed with the judgments of Rogers VP and Lam J, especially in 
the concern that the voting result of the court meeting could not fairly 
represent the class of scheme shareholders as a whole. He further pointed 
out, in particular, that if a class member is a mere nominee, it is difficult to 
see how such a nominee could vote in the interests of the class as a 
whole. Rather, he represents his principal and the interests of his 
principal.738 
 
Thus, in such circumstances, Barma J held that: „It would be entirely 
proper for the court, when considering whether or not to give its sanction 
to a proposed scheme of arrangement, to discount the votes of members 
of the class who are shown to be nominees for other members of the 
class, with a view to seeing whether or not there is truly a majority of 
members of the class favouring the scheme.‟739 
 
His Honour ultimately had not been satisfied that such scheme was a 
rational and reasonable arrangement, which the court should sanction. 
 
6.1.3 Summary 
 
The PCCW case has been deemed a successful example of protection of 
minority shareholders in Hong Kong. Despite some differences in 
legislation between the two jurisdictions, it provides a good lesson for the 
practice in mainland China. 
 
Based on the PCCW case study, this thesis makes three 
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recommendations for practice in mainland China: (1) The head count test 
should be introduced into Chinese Company Law; (2) The CSRC should 
be granted the power to protect public minority investors; and (3) The 
independence of the court should be guaranteed when an interest of the 
state is involved. 
 
(1) Head Count Test 
The heated discussion as to whether the head count test involved in s.166 
of CO should continue to be used has had a profound impact on the legal 
system of Hong Kong. 
 
The head count test was originally adopted in the 1870 legislation, along 
with the share value test, and applied only to compromises or 
arrangements with creditors, to help small creditors fight against their large 
counterparts to carry the day. 740  In 1900, when the compromises or 
arrangements were extended to members, the test was retained.741  
 
The combination of the head count test and share value test had been 
deemed an effective design for specific protection of minority shareholders 
for a hundred years or so before the PCCW privatization case. In ANZ 
Executors and Trustees Ltd. v. Humes Ltd.,742       Brooking J in the 
Supreme Court of Victoria stated: 
 
A balance is struck between the notion that one is simply to 
count heads and the notion that one is simply to tot up the 
amounts invested. When the vote is taken, there must be 
both a preponderance of investors and a preponderance in 
the case of the former and a three-fourths preponderance in 
                                                             
740 Re PCCW Ltd (n 711) [132]; also see, Goo (n 695) 185. 
741 Ibid. 
742 ANZ Executors and Trustees Ltd. v. Humes Ltd. (1990) VR 615, [622]. 
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the case of the latter. This is, as I say, a fair and sensible 
formula, and one well known in company and insolvency law. 
 
However, the effectiveness of the safeguard established by s.166 has 
since been challenged, and it has been argued that this requirement 
should be abolished. The opposing concerns are discussed in detail 
below. 
 
First, opponents question whether the voting result through a head count 
test could truthfully represent the will of the voting group because, 
especially in Hong Kong, a majority of shareholders in public listed 
companies hold their shares through the Central Clearing And Settlement 
System (CCASS).743 Because they are not registered shareholders, those 
nominees are not qualified to vote for or against the scheme. That is to 
say, the real disinterested shareholders may not exercise their rights to 
block a scheme using the head count test, a fact that favours the majority 
members. 
 
In the PCCW case, the total number of shares held by the independent 
shareholders who attended and voted at the court meeting, in person or by 
proxy, was 1,628,013,122, approximately 98% of which were held in 
CCASS.744 Although it seems there was nothing controversial in the share 
value test, since CCASS voted both in favour of and against the scheme 
on behalf of different ultimate beneficial independent shareholders, 
according to their instructions (if any), an issue arose when counting 
heads. In terms of head count, CCASS would be counted on both sides, 
once as supporter and once as opponent, consequently cancelling itself 
                                                             
743 Goo (n 695) 187. 
744 Re PCCW Ltd (n 693), [23]. 
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out.745 In other words, nominees represented by CCASS, either for or 
against the scheme, had not effectively voted according to the head count 
requirement. 
 
However, Kwan J in PCCW did not take this issue into account at all, as 
she concluded that „the statutory majority who voted for the scheme were 
acting bona fide and were not coercing the minority in order to promote 
interests adverse to those of the class whom they represented‟.746  From a 
similar viewpoint, Goo has argued that such concern cannot be 
considered a strong reason for abolishing this special protection for 
minority shareholders. He points out that shareholders who want to have 
their vote counted could take steps to bring the shares registered under 
their own names; otherwise, they could be deemed to have given up their 
individual vote.747 
 
Secondly, the requirement of a majority of members accompanied with a 
share value test is inconsistent with the majority rule.  
 
Some scholars have argued that the threshold of majority in number 
places significant veto power in the hands of minority shareholders. As a 
result, a speculative situation may occur, whereby a certain number of 
small shareholders, who have contributed only a small part of the 
company‟s equity capital, hold the power to block a scheme that is 
supported by the majority of shareholders, who have invested much 
more.748 
 
                                                             
745 Goo (n 695) 188. 
746 Re PCCW Ltd (n 693), [177]. 
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That the risk a shareholder takes should be connected to the amount he 
has invested is undeniable. However, the issue covered by s.166 is not 
one of ordinary business decision making, but a scheme that would bind 
all members if sanctioned by the court. In other words, minority 
shareholders might be squeezed out of the company compulsorily without 
the legal protection provided by s.168 that the offeror should obtain 
approval by not less than 90% of share value of the company. Therefore, 
as argued by this thesis, it is reasonable to give a specific veto power to 
minority shareholders to defend themselves to remain members of the 
company. 
 
Thirdly, owing to the use of different yardsticks in the Takeover Code to 
supplement the threshold of majority in number, a weakness arises in 
respect of the head count test in practice. The PCCW case is one of the 
best examples to illustrate this defect. As mentioned above, there were 
3,473 million or so shares held by independent shareholders who were 
eligible to vote under the Code. Among those shares, approximately 1,628 
million were involved in the voting at the court meeting. The 1,348 million 
shares voting in favour of the scheme represented 83 per cent of the 
shares held by independent shareholders present and voting either in 
person or by proxy, but only 38 per cent of the shares held by all the 
independent shareholders whether or not present and voting. 749 
Meanwhile, the 859 independent shareholders who voted against the 
scheme held shares representing approximately 17 per cent of the number 
of shares held by all the independent shareholders present and voting 
either in person or by proxy, but approximately 8 per cent of the number of 
shares held by all the independent shareholders whether or not present 
and voting.750 
                                                             
749 Goo (n 695) 186. 
750 Re PCCW Ltd (n 693), [25]. 
Chapter Six: The Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee 
Page 288 of 415 
 
 
This situation clearly satisfied the statutory requirements under the Code 
in that (i) there was approval by 83 per cent of the number of shares held 
by those independent shareholders present and voting either in person or 
by proxy; and (ii) only 8 per cent of the number of the shares held by all 
independent shareholders whether or not present and voting opposed the 
scheme. 
 
Yet this dual requirement involved the use of a dual yardstick. On the one 
hand, the number of shares in value voting in favour of the scheme was 
counted based on the independent shareholders present and voting in 
person or by proxy at the meeting; while on the other hand, the number of 
shares in value voting against the scheme was calculated based on the 
independent shareholders as a whole, whether or not present and voting. 
In the view of this thesis, neither calculation method is rational. 
 
If just one of these methods had been used in the PCCW, that is, either (i) 
based on the persons present or voting in person or by proxy at the 
meeting, or (ii) based on the independent shareholders as a whole, the 
scheme of arrangement would not have satisfied the statutory threshold at 
all. 
 
(i) By using the independent shareholders present and voting 
in person or by proxy at the meeting as the measure, the 
scheme of arrangement involved in the PCCW privatisation 
case would acquire approval from 83 per cent of shares in 
value, but would fail to satisfy the negative requirement 
because 17 per cent of shares in value held by the 
independent shareholders present and voting either in 
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person or by proxy voted against the scheme, more than the 
statutory threshold of 10 per cent. 
 
(ii) By using all the independent shareholders whether or not 
present and voting as the measure, the scheme would be 
blocked because it had been approved by only 38 per cent 
of shares in value. 
 
Therefore, to some extent, it is the imperfect statutory voting mechanism 
that led to the controversy in the PCCW case. 
 
As a partial conclusion relating to the head count test in Hong Kong, it is 
undeniable that shareholding by nominees and inconsistent yardsticks in 
regulations would have a negative effect. However, the solution is not to 
abolish the head count test, but to improve the veracity of voting. In 
addition, the yardstick should be amended to be coherent.  
 
There have been similar arguments in relation to abolishing the head 
count test in the United Kingdom. However, the decision in 2006 to resist 
such an amendment attested to the belief that such design achieves „the 
right balance‟.751 
 
In the context of mainland China, there is no similar voting mechanism in 
the Company Law 2005, which states that, unless otherwise provided for 
by this Law, the discussion of issues and voting procedures of the 
shareholders' meeting in a limited liability company shall be provided for in 
the bylaw. 752  Further, Art.44 provides: „A resolution made at a 
shareholders' meeting on revising the bylaw, increasing or reducing the 
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registered capital, merger, split-up, dissolution or change of the company 
form shall be adopted by the shareholders representing 2/3 or more of the 
voting rights.‟753 
 
As to a joint stock limited company, similar to a limited liability company, 
any resolution shall be adopted by shareholders representing more than 
half of the voting rights of the shareholders present, and should have 2/3 
or more of the voting rights held by shareholders present in favour of the 
specific issues listed above.754 
 
However, the head count test can be found in the Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law of the People's Republic of China. Art.84 stipulates that „where 1/2 or 
more of the creditors in the same voting group at the creditors‟ meeting 
agree to a draft of rectification plan, representing 2/3 or more of the total 
amount of the creditors‟ right, it shall be deemed as an adoption of the 
draft of rectification plan‟.755 However, it is difficult to determine whether 
such scheme of arrangement in the Bankruptcy Law of China could be 
used as a method of privatisation, and there is no evidence to show that 
such a head count test could be applicable to members of the company. 
 
As a partial conclusion in respect of legal protection of minority 
shareholders, it should be accepted that a dual threshold, combining a 
share value test and a head count test, could be an important mechanism 
to reinforce the veto power of minority shareholders to protect their 
shareholding in the company from a compulsory buy-out by the majority. 
Therefore, it could be introduced into Chinese Company Law in the next 
legal reform. 
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(2) Role and Power of the SFC 
The SFC is an independent non-governmental statutory body outside the 
civil service, responsible for regulating the securities and futures markets 
in Hong Kong.756 The statutory objectives as set out in the Securities and 
Futures Ordinance (SFO), which came into operation on 1 April 2003, 
are:757 
 
(a) To maintain and promote the fairness, efficiency, 
competitiveness, transparency and orderliness of the 
securities and futures industry; 
(b) To promote understanding by the public of the operation and 
functioning of the securities and futures industry; 
(c) To provide protection for members of the public investing in 
or holding financial products; 
(d) To minimise crime and misconduct in the securities and 
futures industry; 
(e) To reduce systemic risks in the securities and futures 
industry; and 
(f) To assist the Financial Secretary in maintaining the financial 
stability of Hong Kong by taking appropriate steps in relation 
to the securities and futures industry. 
 
As a part of its mission, the SFC did its best in the PCCW privatisation 
case to protect the interests of individual public investors. Without the 
intervention of the SFC, the ultimate outcome of PCCW‟s scheme of 
arrangement would have been different. Therefore, the result of that 
appeal was not only a victory for minority shareholders, but also a good 
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example of how the SFC can fulfil its responsibility to provide legal 
protection to minority shareholders. One reason for its success, in the view 
of this thesis, is that the SFC is independent from government, so it will 
not be influenced by any political power, which in the context of mainland 
China may have interests contrary to those of the minority shareholders. 
 
The equivalent organisation in mainland China, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, is a ministry-level unit directly under the State 
Council. 758  As an administrator of the market, the CSRC is under the 
leadership of the State Council, as well as the State Assets Administration 
Committee, a key player in the market. The question then arises of how 
fairness can be guaranteed in respect of the operation of the CSRC. 
Furthermore, it is uncertain to what extent the CSRC would intervene in a 
conflict between a listed company controlled by the state and a certain 
number of individual minority counterparts. The issues relating to the 
CSRC will be discussed in detail, in comparison with the SEC in the United 
States. 
 
(3) Independent Judgment of the Court 
The reason for considering this issue here, although without the availability 
of an appropriate proof, is the supposition that there would have been a 
different legal outcome had the PCCW privatisation case been presented 
to a Court in mainland China. 
 
As mentioned in the Scheme document, one of the Joint Offerors was 
China Netcom Corporation (BVI) Limited, held by China Network 
Communications Group Corporation, a listed company dominated by the 
state. Hence, the state had an interest in the case, against the interest of 
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minority shareholders. Given the close relationship between the court and 
the government in mainland China, it is reasonable to doubt whether 
fairness could have been achieved by the court, with full consideration of 
minority shareholders, as happened in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal. 
Therefore, this thesis insists that the independence of the court is also 
crucial for minority protection in China. 
 
6.2 Comparative Study of the SEC and the CSRC 
 
6.2.1 A General Review of the Operation of the SEC 
 
The SEC was established during the Great Crash, in 1929, in order to help 
reform the federal regulation of securities markets and to restore investor 
confidence in the capital market. Under the Securities Act 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act 1934, it is required that: (a) companies publicly 
offering securities for investment dollars must tell the public the truth about 
their businesses, the securities they are selling, and the risks involved in 
investing; and (b) people who sell and trade securities - brokers, dealers, 
and exchanges - must treat investors fairly and honestly, putting investors‟ 
interests first.759 
 
Therefore, the SEC considers transparency of information as the most 
important safeguard for investors.760 It believes that all investors, including 
both institutional shareholders and individual minority shareholders, should 
have the same access to vital corporate data, based on which they can 
make a judgment to buy, hold, or sell. Based on this consideration, the 
SEC holds that the institution of independent audit is one of the most 
important mechanisms to guarantee information disclosure and to realise 
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investors‟ protection.761 
 
The mission of the SEC comprises three targets: (1) to protect investors; 
(2) to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and (3) to facilitate 
capital formation. Investor protection is the core of its mission. Mary L. 
Schapiro, the chairman of the SEC, has stated explicitly: „Protecting 
investors is our core mission. And, everything we do is with that goal in 
mind. When we shut down an insider trading scheme, we are protecting 
investors. When we detect fraud during an examination, we are protecting 
investors. When we adopt rules or provide guidance to ensure fair markets 
or to provide investors with the information that they need, we are 
protecting investors.‟762 
 
To realise its mission, the SEC has set out four strategic goals for Fiscal 
Years 2010-2015.763 Of these goals, one emphasises self-improvement, 
while the other three are aimed at providing investors with a more 
successful securities market. The two main ways to achieve this are 
promoting market regulations and developing investor education. 
 
 Promoting Market Regulations 
As noted by Cathleen L. Casey, Commissioner of the SEC, the market 
needs „a strong, vigorous, independent and fair regulator. The SEC must 
craft clear and understandable regulations, actively promote a culture of 
compliance by all market participants, and enforce aggressively and 
impartially the laws and regulations on the books. In the end, the vitality of 
                                                             
761 Research by Campbell and Parker concludes that the SEC believes the independent audit is a critical 
aspect in protecting the interest of the investing public and a vital component of the capital markets disclosure 
mechanism. See David R Campbell and Larry M Parker, 'SEC Communications to the Independent Auditors: 
An Analysis of Enforcement Actions' (1992) 11 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 297, 298. 
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our securities markets depends on the success of these efforts.‟764 
 
Therefore, the SEC should first help to set up a sound regulatory 
environment. Apart from the federal securities laws, more rules and 
policies are needed, in order to improve disclosure of corporate affairs, 
achieve better corporate governance, promote high quality accounting 
standards, and enhance the accountability of financial intermediaries and 
other market participants. More importantly, these regulations should be 
clear and easily understood by the public.  
 
Secondly, the SEC should foster and enforce compliance with these 
regulations, including by investigation of illegal activities. Emphasis will be 
placed on, but not limited to, corporate disclosure, securities offerings, 
insider trading and market manipulation.765 Once illegal activity has been 
confirmed, it will be disclosed to the public, so that investors can make 
changes or keep their holding based on their own judgment. 
 
 Developing Investor Education 
The SEC believes that many investors in the United States are naïve 
individuals. They and their families bet their futures on a healthy securities 
market. Hence, providing fair access to crucial information and imparting 
knowledge of how to use that information are important tasks for the SEC. 
 
In order to get a better understanding of various investor needs, the SEC 
has highlighted a set of initiatives, including: (a) informing rulemaking with 
research on investor behaviour; (b) reshaping how agency information is 
made available to investors; (c) addressing Investor Advisory Committee 
input; (d) modernising technology and service offerings targeted at 
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assisting the investing public; and (e) expanding collaborative 
partnerships.766 
 
Along with the persistent effort on improving corporate disclosure, investor 
education could help individual investors in particular to understand rules 
and policies, and to know more about their investment; for example, where 
they can get the corporate information they need, and how to understand 
the information being disclosed.  
 
When reviewing its effectiveness, it should be noted that the SEC has 
made some mistakes in the past. For example, in 1935 the SEC 
promulgated a set of rules relating to proxy voting. This was intended to 
ensure that accurate information was explained fairly to the investors, and 
that voting was not manipulated by any party in the company.767 However, 
while the provision of accurate information before voting should have 
benefited shareholders, in practice these rules increased communication 
costs, so that shareholders became isolated and joint activities became 
more difficult.768 
 
Under pressure from opponents, the SEC eased the proxy voting rules, in 
the following respects: (a) As long as there is no direct interest involved, 
market participants were free to communicate with each other in relation to 
voting issues; (b) With regard to the proxy contest, the power of the SEC 
to secure changes would be mitigated by outside public monitoring; and 
(c) Public companies were required to offer their shareholders‟ lists, which 
would make it easy for shareholders to communicate.769 In short, in order 
to resolve the collective choice problem, it was necessary to diminish the 
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obstacles to shareholders‟ communication. 
 
With reference to the current operation of the SEC, legal economists use 
the cost versus benefits approach to evaluate the effectiveness of its 
regulatory activities. The implementation of a certain regulation may bring 
benefits for investors, but will also involve some cost. Scholars have 
concluded that the regulations issued by the SEC are generally inefficient, 
since, although they have helped to increase corporate transparency, they 
generate more costs than benefits.770  
 
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that if regulations are not 
implemented, corporate scandals will occur. The case of Enron was a rare 
exception. On the other hand, even with such rules and policies, it is not 
possible to say that all kinds of corporate scandals would be completely 
eradicated. A surprise $2 billion loss of JPMorgan on credit derivatives 
trading, reported in the middle of 2012,771 testifies to this. The costs of new 
regulations are inevitable and massive, especially the cost of disclosure of 
information on corporate affairs. Sometimes, such costs could even 
exceed the loss investors might incur. 
 
More interestingly, Langevoort reviewed the Enron case in detail and held 
that the SEC should take partial responsibility for the financial loss caused 
to investors. Because the SEC painted a too perfect picture, in which 
market regulations were strong enough to prevent almost all corporate 
scandals, it created a gap between investors‟ expectation and the real 
corporate governance status. 772  Therefore, Langevoort suggests, in 
                                                             
770 Stephen J Choi and A C Pritchard, 'Behavioral Economics and the SEC' (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 1, 
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addition to continued effort to increase corporate transparency, the SEC 
should improve investor education, in particular to reduce the gap between 
investors‟ expectations and the real situation. In that way, investors will not 
be misled into believing that there is no risk, but will be able to make an 
objective assessment of the actual risk. Similarly, Pound argues that many 
new investors are relatively naïve, so that teaching capital providers how 
to invest is equally as important as improving the market itself.773   
 
Langevoort also claims that the SEC has intervened in market 
development too much. He argues that tighter control systems may lead to 
worse outcomes.774  
 
Of course, the SEC also has its supporters. The Public Oversight Board 
has noted the important role played by the SEC as a link between self-
regulation and government regulation.775 Moreover, Langevoort points out 
that the workings of the SEC are far more complicated than its critics can 
imagine, since „the SEC operates in a complex political ecology, making 
law in response to a multitude of shifting incentives, both external and 
internal‟.776 
 
Generally speaking, the regulatory work of the SEC, which is not all 
composed of economists, could be judged fairly well in accordance with its 
distinctive identity as the „investor‟s champion‟,777 at the expense of a 
certain amount of productivity. The global financial crisis in 2008 taught the 
SEC several lessons through which it can improve its performance in the 
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future. For example, the SEC is enhancing risk-based examinations of 
financial firms, improving fraud detection techniques, and safeguarding 
investors through proposed rules related to custody of assets held by 
investment advisers.778 
 
However, the SEC has realised that its effectiveness is inevitably 
restrained by certain factors. Therefore, instead of drawing a perfect 
picture to the public, it has highlighted certain of these factors in its 
strategic plan, including (a) resources, in terms of number of staff, 
expertise, and information systems; (b) the delayed recovery of the global 
financial system; (c) the understanding of systemic risk and effective use 
of risk-management tools; (d) regulatory changes that may affect the 
outcomes of current activities, even those outcomes that would benefit the 
market and investors at this stage; (e) the risks of over-regulation or 
under-regulation; and (f) the lack of care and diligence in the decision 
making by investors.779 
 
6.2.2 The Development of the CSRC 
 
Established in 1992, the Chinese CSRC is a ministry-level government 
agency led directly by the State Council. It carries out regulation and 
supervision of the securities and futures markets nationwide pursuant to 
the Securities Law, the Securities Investment Fund Law, the Regulations 
for the Supervision and Administration of Securities Firms, the Regulations 
for the Administration of Futures Trading and other applicable laws and 
regulations for the purpose of maintaining fair, efficient and transparent 
operation of the securities and futures markets.780 
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The CSRC comprises 22 functional departments; 4 affiliated institutions; 4 
special committees; 36 regional offices located in various provinces, 
autonomous regions, direct-controlled municipalities and independent-
budget cities; and 2 securities supervision offices stationed at the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.781 
 
The statutory duties of the CSRC are stated in Article 179 of the Securities 
Law:782 
 
(a) Formulating, according to the law, rules and regulations 
related to the supervision and regulation of the securities 
market and lawfully exercising its authority of approval; 
(b) Supervising and regulating, according to the law, the offering, 
listing, trading, registration, securities depository and clearing 
services; 
(c) Supervising and regulating, according to the law, the 
securities-related business activities of issuers, listed 
companies, securities firms, securities investment fund 
management firms, securities service providers, stock 
exchanges, and securities depository and clearing agencies; 
(d) Formulating, according to the law, qualification criteria and 
code of conduct for practitioners in the securities industry, and 
supervising the implementation thereof; 
(e) Supervising and inspecting, according to the law, information 
disclosures in connection with securities offering, listing and 
trading; 
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(f) Providing guidance to and supervising activities of the 
securities industry associations according to the law; 
(g) Investigating into and imposing sanctions on violations of 
laws and administrative regulations on the supervision and 
administration of the securities market; and 
(h) Other duties provided by laws and administrative regulations. 
 
In order to discharge its statutory duties, the CSRC is provided with certain 
rights:783 
 
(a) Conducting on-site inspections on securities issuers, listed 
companies, securities firms, securities investment fund 
management firms, securities service providers, stock 
exchanges and securities depository and clearing agencies; 
(b) Entering the premises where a violation is suspected to have 
been committed in order to conduct investigation and take 
evidence; 
(c) Inquiring into the parties concerned and any entity and 
individual involved in the matter under investigation, and 
requiring them to provide statements in respect of such 
matter; 
(d) Examining and making copies of the property rights 
registrations and communication records and any other 
materials in connection with the subject matter under 
investigation; 
(e) Examining and making copies of the securities trading 
records, records of securities registrations and transfers, 
financial and accounting information and any other relevant 
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documents and materials of the parties concerned and any 
entity and individual involved in the subject matter under 
investigation, and sealing the documents and materials which 
are likely to be transferred, concealed or destroyed; 
(f) Examining the cash accounts, securities accounts and bank 
accounts of the parties concerned and any entity and 
individual involved in the subject matter under investigation; 
freezing or seizing such accounts upon due approval by a 
CSRC senior executive, where there is evidence to 
substantiate signs of transfer or concealment of illegal funds, 
securities or any other properties, or where key evidence has 
been or may be concealed, forged or destroyed; and 
(g) Restricting, upon due approval by a CSRC senior executive, 
securities trading of the parties concerned for the purpose of 
investigating major violations of securities-related laws or 
regulations, such as market manipulation and insider trading, 
for a period of up to 15 trading days, which may be extended 
for another 15 trading days as required in complex cases. 
 
In order to adapt to the changing market, the CSRC has continued since 
2000 to issue rules and regulatory documents, opinions and guidelines on 
specific issues. Some noteworthy regulatory activities are reviewed below. 
 
(1) Developing Awareness of Minority Protection 
With reference to the special concern of minority protection, the CSRC 
promulgated three new regulations in the early 2000s, 784 including the 
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (2002). 
These new rules have brought the following changes to benefit minority 
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shareholders: (a) The power of minority shareholders at the annual 
shareholders‟ meeting has been increased; (b) Shareholders involved in 
related-party trading are prohibited from voting on such issues at the 
shareholders‟ meeting; (c) Companies are no longer in principle permitted 
to guarantee loans of their controlling shareholders; (d) The institution of 
independent directors has been introduced into Chinese corporate 
governance; and (e) Corporate transparency has been increased, 
especially in terms of related-party trading. 
 
However, scholars have challenged the effectiveness of such regulatory 
reform. A study by Berkman et al. suggests that the new rules could be 
effective only if the companies did not have close ties to the 
government.785 Given that most of the listed companies in the Chinese 
market have been transformed from SOEs and are still controlled by the 
state, this could indicate the uselessness of the regulatory reforms initiated 
by the CSRC. 
 
(2) IPO Section 
To achieve better management of IPOs, in 2001 a merit-based review 
system was introduced for the issuing of securities, replacing the quota 
system. Under the quota system, local governments had the decisive say 
on who would get the quota; whereas according to the new system, the 
decision-making power over the qualification to issue shares publicly is 
granted to the CSRC.786 In the view of this thesis, this is good news for 
investors, the public minority shareholders in particular, because the 
CSRC cares much more about the quality of the listed companies than do 
local governments, which may have other concerns such as taxation 
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targets or political strategies. It is also possible for the local government to 
help companies become listed even where they are not qualified, for 
example, by using fraudulent listing documents. 
 
A good example to illustrate this is the case of Shengjing Shanhe.787 The 
Hunan based company was one of the „Key Reserve Enterprises‟ selected 
by the local government and enjoyed financial and political supports. The 
CSRC halted its IPO at the last minute due to fraudulent listing 
documents, which had been ignored by the local government and exposed 
by the financial media. As a result, fortunately, the interests of public 
investors were protected by the CSRC. 
 
(3) Insider Trading 
In the last decade, the CSRC has been deemed the main force of anti-
insider-trading. Based on years of experience, the CSRC has clarified the 
definition of insiders, and the category of „other insiders‟, according to 
relevant provisions. For example, in the case of Li Qihong,788 the CSRC 
explicitly pointed out that the government official could be accountable as 
„other insider‟, as long as he took advantage of his position and acquired 
material information that had not been disclosed to the public. 
 
Similarly, when defining the scope of inside information, the CSRC has 
fulfilled its statutory duty by using statutory interpretation techniques to 
resolve the uncertainties of the Securities Law. According to Article 75 of 
the Securities Law, the term „insider information‟ refers to information that 
concerns the business or finance of a company or may have a major effect 
on the market price of the securities thereof and that has not been 
                                                             
787 Junqiang Wu, 'Shengjing Shanhe Bei Fou: Ouran Dayu Biran [The Rejection of Shengjing Shanhe: 
Avoidable Rather Than Inevitable]' Huaxia Daily <http://stock.hexun.com/2011-04-08/128588021.html> 
accessed 09-11-2012. 
788 Bo Kong and Yizhu Mao, 'Li Qihong Neimu Jiaoyi Shenyuan [The Abyss of Li Qihong's Insider Trading 
Case]' Outlook Weekly <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-05-14/170822464899.shtml> accessed 09-11-2012. 
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publicised in securities trading.789 In order to provide a clearer definition to 
guide market practice, the CSRC states that insider information is „any 
material, non-public information, regardless of whether it is corporate 
information or market information; and whether it is related to securities 
specifically or generally‟. 790  Moreover, the CSRC, generalising from 
practice, clearly defines certain kinds of information that fall into the 
category of „other important information‟ under Article 75 of the Securities 
Law.791 
 
Moreover, in order to overcome the difficulty of evidence acquisition during 
the inspection of insider trading, the CSRC promotes an insider 
registration system792 whereby the details of persons who have knowledge 
of relevant inside information are recorded.793 
 
(4) Commercial Bribery 
Commercial bribery is not unique to China, but is an important obstacle to 
further development of the Chinese market. Theoretically, the CSRC is the 
statutory inspector charged with eradicating it. However, research for this 
thesis has found that the regulatory methods used by the CSRC are 
questionable. The CSRC requires listed companies and their subsidiaries 
to complete a self-evaluation form to report their self-examination and self-
correction of commercial bribery. Only if the score is below 60 points794 will 
the CSRC start an investigation of corporate operation. 
                                                             
789 Followed this general description, eight categories are listed, including „any other important information‟: 
see Securities Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 75. 
790 Hui Huang, 'Insider Trading and the Regulation on China's Securities Market: Where Are We Now and 
Where Do We Go From Here?' (2012) 5 Journal of Business Law 379, 386. 
791 For instance, in the Pan Haishen Case, the non-public earning forecast was identified as „other important 
information‟. CSRC, 'Administrative Penalty Decision by the CSRC (2008) No.12 [Zhongguo Zhengjianhui 
Xingzheng Chufa Shu (Pan Hai Sheng) (2008) No.12]' 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306212/200804/t20080430_23109.htm> accessed 09-11-2012. 
792 Huang (n 790) 388. 
793 It includes who these persons are, when and where they come to know the information, and what the 
information is about. 
794 The evaluation is scored out of 100. Scores of 80 points or above are excellent, those under 60 are failed 
and the rest are passed. 
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Zhang has noted that the scoring sections of the self-evaluation form 
cannot provide any evidence, and therefore the mechanism cannot work 
appropriately in terms of market inspection and investor protection. 795 
Therefore, suggested by this thesis, the CSRC should introduce more 
practicable and powerful methods to fight against commercial bribery in 
the further development.796 
 
(5) Split Share Structure Reform 
As noted in the Introductory chapter, in 2005 the CSRC promulgated a 
milestone reform, the so-called „split share structure reform‟ aimed at the 
further improvement of the Chinese securities market. The CSRC issued 
the Guiding Opinions on Split Share Structure Reform of Listed 
Companies and the Measures for Administration of Split Share Structure 
Reform of Listed Companies.797 Under the reform, non-tradable shares of 
the listed companies would be able to trade freely in the market, while 
shareholders who held tradable A shares would be compensated. The 
compensation could take various forms, subject to approval by 
shareholders‟ meeting. In 2008, the CSRC claimed that the reform had 
been implemented successfully in the Chinese market,798 albeit that this 
thesis has argued that the state, as the controlling shareholder, may enjoy 
more benefits from the liquidation than minority investors. 
 
                                                             
795 Zhang (n 786) 339. 
796 Owing to the length and key emphasis of this thesis, more effective method for the CSRC to control the 
commercial bribery could be found in other researches. See, Kenneth J DeWoskin and Ian J Stones, 'Facing 
the China Corruption Challenge' (2006) 169 Far Eastern Economic Review 37, 38; and Haiping Wang, 
Guodong Chen and Hua Chen, 'Jinrong Xiaofeizhe Quanyi Baohu: Shichang Shiling Yu Zhengfu Jieru [Legal 
Protection of Participants of Capital Market: Defects of the Market and Intervention of the Government]' 
(2013) 125 Journal of Shandong University of Finance 50, 53. 
797 The former was issued on August 23, 2005, jointly by the CSRC, State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, Ministry of Finance, People‟s Bank of China and the Ministry of Commerce. 
The latter was issued on September 4, 2005, by the CSRC. See, Wai Ho Yeung, 'Non-tradable Share Reform 
in China: A Review of Progress' (2009) 30 Company Lawyer 340, 340. 
798 Rong Wang, 'Chinese Capital Market on a New Historical Starting Point' China Securities Daily (13-11-
2008). 
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(6) Information Disclosure 
Having learnt from the experience of other jurisdictions in mature markets, 
the CSRC realised the importance of the disclosure of corporate 
information. Therefore, in 2007, the CSRC issued the Administrative 
Measures on Information Disclosure by Listed Companies, 799  to set a 
minimum standard of information disclosure. 
 
According to this regulatory document, corporate information should be 
disclosed truly, accurately, completely and in a timely manner. Falsehood, 
misleading statements and major omissions are forbidden.800 Corporate 
documents, including the prospectus, listing memorandum, listing 
announcement, periodic reports and interim reports, are required to be 
disclosed to the public accordingly. 801  Yet, such regulation has not 
significantly improved the defect of corporate transparency in practice in 
China.802 
 
6.2.3 The Problems of CSRC Operations 
 
Since 2008, the Chinese securities market has been regarded as a 
nightmare for individual Chinese investors. The Shanghai Composite 
Index reached a record high of 6,093 points in late 2007, but dropped 
dramatically to 1800 points one year later, and remains at approximately 
2000 points today. 803  No doubt, the depressed market has been 
influenced by the worldwide financial crisis, but the poor protection level of 
investors is undeniably another key factor. 
                                                             
799 Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure by Listed Companies, issued on 03-01-2007, < 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/y/20070201/22423304956.shtml> accessed 18-12-2013. 
800 Ibid, Article 2. 
801 Ibid, Article 5. 
802 Zongxin Zhang and Weiye Zhu, 'Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Xinxi Pilu Zhiliang de Shizheng Yanjiu 
[Empirical Research on the Quality of Corporate Information Disclosure of Chinese Listed Companies]' 
(2007) 12 Nankai Economic Studies 48,50. 
803 For the historical figures of the indexes, see, 'Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index' (n 1). 
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Evidence shows that the CSRC has made great efforts in regulating listed 
companies, especially in terms of disclosure of corporate information, 
including the prospectus, periodical reports and ad hoc reports. 
Meanwhile, certain institutions have been introduced into the Chinese 
corporate legal system, such as independent directors, internal control, 
equity incentive schemes, proxy voting and cumulative voting.804 To some 
extent, the CSRC has helped to improve the legal protection of minority 
shareholders in China. Yet, is that enough? 
 
Taking the issue of anti-insider-trading as an example, despite the 
empirical evidence that the number of disclosures of insider trading cases 
has increased recently, scholars still hold that those cases may be just „the 
tip of the iceberg‟. 805  With the development of the Chinese securities 
market, especially since the establishment of a Growth Enterprise Market 
and the blooming of index futures, short sale and margin lending, it is 
foreseeable that the difficulty of anti-insider-trading will be increased. The 
CSRC itself has affirmed this and stated in a joint circular that: 
 
At present, the situation we face in preventing and fighting 
insider trading in the capital markets is very dire. The 
identities of insiders are very complicated, the trading 
methods are very elusive, the operating forms are very 
secretive, and the detection works are very difficult. With the 
introduction of index futures, insider trading has become 
more complicated and more secretive.806 
 
                                                             
804 CSRC, 'China Securities Regulatory Commission Annual Report 2011' (n 780) 79. 
805 Huang (n 790) 382 and 388. 
806 CSRC, 'Opinion on Preventing and Combating Insider Trading' <http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-
11/18/content_1748349.htm> accessed 18-12-2013. 
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Moreover, it should be noted that, although the CSRC has disclosed and 
penalised certain illegal activities in the market, there have been few 
cases in which minority shareholders have been compensated for their 
financial loss.807 Therefore, it may be too early to conclude whether the 
CSRC has done enough in relation to anti-insider-trading so as to provide 
better protection of investors.  
 
According to the findings of this research, there are four main factors 
obstructing the CSRC in discharging its statutory duties: (1) shortage of 
professional staff; (2) immaturity of regulatory activities; (3) absence of 
powerful rights; and (4) its compromised position as a market regulator 
 
(1) Shortage of Professional Staff 
As a ministry-level unit, the staff of the CSRC totals only about 400 around 
the country.808 Apart from personnel in the headquarters in Beijing, each 
local branch has around 10 commission members. However, investigation 
by CSRC staff is one of the most important ways to detect wrongdoing in 
the market.809 Hence, it is not surprising that the CSRC would struggle to 
carry out its important mission. 
 
Moreover, among these committee staff, very few have a financial industry 
background, while most come from courts, prosecution or law firms and 
know little about securities. 810  Absence of professional knowledge and 
experience in practice has hampered commission members from detecting 
questionable behaviours. Consequently, it is doubtful whether the CSRC 
can be an appropriate safeguard of the market. 
                                                             
807 Guanghua Yu and Shao Li, 'Against Legal Origin: Of Ownership Concentration and Disclosure' (2007) 7 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 287, 304. 
808 CSRC, 'China Securities Regulatory Commission Annual Report 2011' (n 780) 7.  
809 Another two are complaints to the Civil Complaint Office of the State Council and complaints to the 
CSRC. 
810 CSRC, Internal Annual Report (Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, 2002). 
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(2) Immaturity of Regulatory Activities 
Although the CSRC has issued several administrative documents to 
achieve a better market environment and to improve the quality of 
corporate governance of Chinese listed companies, critics have noted that 
such regulations cannot be entirely implemented in practice, mainly 
because of poor legislative skills and lack of market regulatory 
experience.811 
 
First of all, the regulations promulgated by the CSRC are mainly on an 
issue-by-issue basis, which has led to the co-existence of more than 200 
laws, regulations and standards relating to securities activities. 812 
Redundant regulations make it more difficult for market participants, 
particularly individual minority investors, to understand the real situation. 
Furthermore, issuing regulations too frequently would negatively influence 
the stability of the securities market, which is crucial for its further 
development. 
 
Second, there remain many ambiguities and uncertainties in these 
regulatory documents. Taking as an example the 2006 CSRC Guidelines 
for Articles of Association of Listed Companies, which is a compulsory 
regulation for companies listed in the two stock exchanges in mainland 
China, Art.178 (5) provides that: 
 
[in the case that] the operation and management of the 
company experience a great difficulty, continuation will lead 
to significant losses suffered by the shareholders, and the 
                                                             
811 Xiang Ke, 'Zhongguo Zhengquan Jianguan Jigou Lifaquan Wenti Yanxi [Research on the Legislative 
Power of the CSRC]' (2011) 1 Caijing Lilun yu Shijian [Economics Theory and Practice] 123, 126. 
812 Yuwa Wei, 'Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance in China' (Corporate Accountability 
Conference, Melbourne, Australia, 08-02-2006), <http://hdl.handle.net/10072/13270> accessed 18-12-2013, 
69. 
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crisis cannot be solved by other means, shareholders with 
more than 10 per cent of the voting rights can request the 
People‟s Court to wind up the company.813 
 
In literal terms, the provision provides an option for shareholders who are 
not powerful enough to influence business decisions, to block risky 
corporate operations. However, here the question arises as to the 
situations in which such a provision might be applicable. What is a great 
difficulty and how big a loss would be deemed as significant loss under the 
Guidelines? Such uncertainties in the regulations issued by the CSRC 
obstruct their implementation in practice and prevent their wide use by 
minority participants.814  
 
(3) Absence of Powerful Rights 
As mentioned above, the CSRC has been granted several rights to help it 
to fulfil its mission, yet it continues to demand more powerful rights. It has 
been claimed that the statutory rights granted by the Securities Law are 
too general, while market practice is too complicated for the CSRC to 
regulate and supervise. Therefore, only if equipped with more powerful 
rights, for example the enforceable investigation right or the veto right 
against any intervention by other government organs, could the CSRC 
achieve its regulatory role. 
 
In research focusing on insider trading, Cheng found that many insider 
trading cases in China involve ranking government and party cadres. Yet, 
under the current legal system, the CSRC lacks the power to investigate 
or penalise such individuals. 815  Cheng reports an interview with the 
                                                             
813 CSRC Guidelines for Articles of Association of Chinese Listed Companies, Article 178(5). 
814 K L Alex Lau, 'The 2006 CSRC Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies: A Hong Kong 
Viewpoint' (2009) 30 Company Lawyer 92, 93. 
815 Hongming Cheng, 'Insider Trading in China: the Case for the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission' 
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director in the Shanghai branch of the CSRC, who complained: 
 
We don‟t have sufficient power and resources to investigate. 
For example, we cannot enter a company to search for 
evidence. We cannot obtain through subpoena any 
evidence relevant to determining whether a violation of the 
securities laws has occurred. When we apply for a search 
warrant courts are normally reluctant to issue the warrant for 
us. This has increased difficulties for investigators to obtain 
evidence for insider trading offences. During the 
investigation of Chinese Science Group‟s insider trading, for 
example, some major offenders had fled long before a 
search warrant was issued.816 
 
Another senior official explained that: 
 
Actually, we did discover a large number of cases through 
our detection efforts. But the Party Disciplinary Committees 
wanted to deal with them through the Party and 
governments‟ internal disciplinary measures, because they 
didn‟t want those cases to dilute the reputation of China, the 
stability of Chinese capital markets…817 
 
(4) Compromised Position As a Market Regulator 
In theory, the CSRC should stand in a neutral position as the regulator and 
supervisor of the securities market, so as to achieve fairness, order and 
effectiveness. However, the unique history of state-owned enterprises has 
resulted in close links between the CSRC, government organs, and many 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(2008) 15 Journal of Financial Crime 165, 165. 
816 Ibid 169. 
817 Ibid. 
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listed companies transferred from traditional SOEs. In such cases, the 
government, especially the central government, is both player and referee 
in the same match. Inevitably, this causes problems. 
 
In fact, there have been few cases in which the CSRC has punished listed 
companies on the ground of their irregular activities. Even where a penalty 
has been incurred, it has been insufficient to act as a deterrent. 818 
Therefore, the low cost of violation could easily bring about new corporate 
scandals at the expense of the interests of minority shareholders. More 
importantly, as long as the penalty has not been handed to the 
shareholders directly as compensation for their financial loss, it is 
eventually returned to the wrongdoer, the listed company with the state as 
its ultimate capital provider, via the financial allocation by the central 
government. As such, the function of discipline and caution of law cannot 
be realised in practice. 
 
6.2.4 What Lessons Can China Learn from the SEC? 
 
One of the most important purposes of comparative research is to find out 
what we can learn from the comparative object, in this case the SEC in the 
US. In fact, over the past two decades the CSRC has borrowed certain 
insights of market regulation from the US. A typical example is the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies, issued by the CSRC. This 
could be evidence of convergence of international corporate governance 
practice, since almost all the articles have parallel provisions in the 
regulations in Anglo-American countries.819 Guo Shuqing, the chairman of 
the CSRC, stated in 2011 that they were trying a set of reforms to 
                                                             
818 In most cases, the penalties imposed by the CSRC were much lower than the illegal gains acquired by the 
questionable companies. 
819 Zhao and Wen (n 335) 374. 
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transform the market into a genuine one rather than a casino.820 
 
However, before drawing conclusions, it is necessary to address the 
question of why a jurisdiction that has more in common with the German 
model should transplant institutions designed for a common law model.821 
This research highlights two points to support learning from the common 
law model. The first is the tremendous change that has taken place, 
whereby the planned economy has been abolished and a market-oriented 
economy has been adopted in its place. On the surface, China now has a 
modern system of corporate governance. The second point is that the 
American market developed rapidly and now leads the world. Therefore, it 
is reasonable for China to learn from the United States. 
 
Of course, what to learn is another question. Legal transplantation should 
be selective. The unique local situations, including traditions and culture, 
should also be taken into account. For instance, freedom of the market is 
highly praised by American scholars. From their viewpoint, when a 
securities market has reached a stage of development, the market should 
be run freely under the market rules, which would boost an efficient 
allocation of capital. In other words, intervention by the government should 
be reduced or prohibited. Similarly, Cai argues that to create a strong 
securities market in order to facilitate the development of listed companies 
as well as the national economy as a whole, the state should set the 
market free. 822  However, the situation in China tells a different story. 
                                                             
820 The respected Chinese economist, Jinglian Wu, defined the securities market in China as a casino. He 
claimed: „More hazardously, prevalent fraud and illegal trading have kept investors from harvesting returns. 
Today‟s stock market has turned into a paradise for profiteers. As announced by some foreigners, China‟s 
stock market exists as a casino that has yet to be regulated. Even a casino has its rules. For example, you are 
not allowed to steal a glimpse of another person‟s card. In our stock market, however, there are so many 
underhanded dealings, such as stealing a glimpse at others‟ cards, cheating and swindling.‟ David Li and Li 
Hong Xing, 'China Launches SMEs Private Placement Bond' (2012) 33 Company Lawyer 284, 286. 
821 Zhao and Wen (n 335) 377. 
822 Wei Cai, 'State Control and the Weak Stock Market in China' (2010) 17 Journal of Financial Crime 179, 
179. 
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Scholars have pointed out that the Chinese securities market is 
developing in a special pattern, in which government control has been 
maintained.823 This distinctive characteristic may push the CSRC to find a 
unique regulatory method to balance the interests involved. 
 
This research identifies three aspects where the CSRC could borrow 
experience from advanced jurisdictions, including the US, the UK and 
Hong Kong. 
 
(1) Improving Independence 
It is necessary to note the practice in the UK. Despite the accountability 
owed by the FSA to the Treasury Minister, and through the Minister to 
Parliament, the FSA was an independent non-governmental body, funded 
entirely by the firms it regulates.824 Financial independence could be an 
important basis of independent operation. Alternatively, the CSRC could 
emulate the operation of the SEC. As an agency of the federal 
government, the SEC keeps its role as a regulator and referee, 
promulgating rules and policies fairly and inspecting and punishing illegal 
market activities strictly. With special concern of Chinese commercial and 
political environment, this thesis would prefer the US model which the 
CSRC could learn from to improve its independence. It is because entirely 
self-founded by the CSRC would not be achieved so easily at this 
moment. Being the agency of the Chinese government, rather than one of 
the departments of the government, the CSRC would be able to act 
independently as the regulator and referee, minimizing the undue 
influence by other government departments. 
                                                             
823 Jingyun Ma, Fengming Song and Zhishu Yang, 'The Dual Role of the Government: Securities Market 
Regulation in China 1980-2007' (2010) 18 Journal of Financial Regualtion and Compliance 158, 167; also see 
Parry and Zhang (n 13) 115. 
824 FSA, 'Who Are We?' (The Financial Services Authority 2012) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who> 
accessed 09-19-2012. Currently, the FSA has now become two separate regulatory authorities, the Financial 
Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. More details, see <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/> 
accessed 23-04-2014. 
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(2) Increasing Corporate Transparency 
In 2007, the regulations on the disclosure of information by listed 
companies were implemented. This was the first time the CSRC had acted 
on its realisation of the importance of corporate transparency to achieve a 
fair capital market.825 For further development, this research suggests that 
the CSRC should re-evaluate the current institutions in the corporate 
governance regime, and amend the defects. For example, the influence of 
independent directors and supervisory board should be improved, a higher 
accounting standard should be adopted and the regulations relating to 
information disclosure should be more specific. 
 
(3) Developing Investor Education 
Investor education has been ignored by the CSRC in the past. However, 
the importance of such education is no longer in doubt. The SEC has set 
out several initiatives in its strategic plan, which should be introduced into 
Chinese corporate governance practice. From the point of view of this 
research, investor education in China should emphasise three issues: (a) 
investment decision making; (b) personal assets management; and (c) 
market participation. Equipped with such knowledge and skills, a minority 
shareholder‟s rights would not easily be infringed. In other words, his 
interest would be protected. 
 
In addition to the above three areas where it could learn from the 
experience of the SEC, the CSRC should pay more attention to the issue 
of dividend distribution. In practice, the controlling shareholder cares little 
about dividend distribution, due to the relatively concentrated shareholding 
structure. Controlling shareholders can acquire much more benefit from 
                                                             
825 Ma, Song and Yang (n 823) 166. 
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control than from dividends, for example, through related-party 
transactions or tunnelling. Undoubtedly, some of these benefits are 
acquired illegally. However, it is currently difficult to inhibit all illegal market 
activities, owing to deficient corporate regulations. As such, the controlling 
shareholder would prefer to enjoy the benefit of corporate control 
individually rather than to share the dividends with minority shareholders. 
Therefore, the capital returns of the minority shareholders are quite poor. 
By the middle of 2008, although the capitalisation of the two stock 
exchanges in mainland China had been reported as reaching RMB 
2,339.70 billion, the dividends in total were a mere 35 per cent or so of the 
total money raised, approximately RMB 826.60 billion since the market 
was established. 826  If dividend distribution could be improved by the 
CSRC, minority shareholders would receive more regular benefits. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, as a government organ, the CSRC has 
political limitations that will not be changed in the short term. It will 
continue to be difficult for the CSRC to stand up for individual minorities 
against the majority shareholder, which is usually the state. What this 
research would expect is that the CSRC attempt to promote a fair and 
effective market, to increase the quality of corporate governance in 
Chinese listed companies and to improve investor protection as a whole. 
 
This thesis maintains that, if the general level of investor protection could 
be increased, minority shareholders would receive more benefits. An 
empirical study focusing on the Chinese stock market concluded that, in a 
jurisdiction with a concentrated shareholding structure, the higher the 
protection level of investors, the more effectively the „hollowing out‟ 
                                                             
826 Yangtse News, 'Shangshi Gongsi Tie Gongji Chulu: Bai Yu Jia Gongsi Shinian Mei Fenhong [Hundreds of 
Listed Companies Have No Dividends For Ten Years]' Yangtse News (10-09-2008) 
<http://finance.ifeng.com/zq/zqyw/200809/0910_923_777017.shtml> accessed 15-11-2012. 
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behaviour of controlling shareholders could be limited.827 Based on this 
finding, if the CSRC could improve the legal protection of investors in 
general, the majority shareholder would have less opportunity to infringe 
the rights of the minority. 
 
Coincidently, some of the suggestions by this research are mentioned in 
the CSRC‟s Annual Report 2011, released in 2012. The CSRC are making 
efforts mainly in the following respects: (a) continuing the reform and 
development of the stock market; (b) promoting the interconnection of 
bond markets; (c) facilitating the reform and innovation of the futures 
market; (d) improving the quality of listed companies; (e) enhancing the 
compliance and development of intermediaries; (f) strengthening investor 
protection; (g) opening up the capital market to the outside world; and (h) 
engaging in international financial regulatory reform and cooperation.828 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
Sound corporate governance cannot rely solely on internal structures, but 
also requires the help of external institutions. In terms of minority 
protection in China, the CSRC, as the market administrator, should 
guarantee a healthy and fair market for minority investors, preventing the 
interests of minorities from being infringed by the controller, just as the 
SFC did in Hong Kong in the case of PCCW. 
 
As reviewed by this thesis, the CSRC has attempted to promote better 
corporate governance in Chinese listed companies, by issuing the 
corporate governance code, introducing independent directors and 
                                                             
827 Xiangyang Yang and Suning Huang, 'Study on the Relationship of the Protection for Investors, Related 
Transactions and Company Efficiency: Taking Pan-Yangtze River Delta as Example' (International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce; 8-10 Aug 2011). 
828 CSRC, 'China Securities Regulatory Commission Annual Report 2011' (n 780) 1-4. 
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reinforcing the information disclosure standard. However, its effectiveness 
in achieving its mission and improving minority protection is still under 
question. 
 
The main reasons for such doubts are that the CSRC suffers from a 
shortage of staff, and from a lack of capability, market regulatory 
experience, legislative skills and powerful rights to investigate and 
penalise the faults that undermine the fairness of the market and infringe 
the rights of minorities. 
 
Therefore, in the belief that the CSRC could become an important external 
helping hand for minority protection, this thesis suggests that, first of all, 
the independence of the CSRC should be improved. Otherwise a fair 
market with a higher level of investors‟ protection will never be achieved.  
 
Moreover, increasing corporate transparency is essential. As stated in an 
earlier chapter of this thesis, minority shareholders could make relatively 
better investment decisions based on accurate and timely corporate 
information. 
 
Finally, investor education is another important way for the CSRC to help 
in terms of minority protection. With the benefit of such education, 
minorities in the Chinese market would have a better understanding of 
their investments and, consequently, the ability to protect themselves 
when necessary. 
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Chapter Seven: Proposals for Reform 
 
Executive Summary 
 
To improve the legal protection of minority shareholders in Chinese listed 
companies, this thesis argues that it is not necessary to cut all connections 
between the government and the company. Indeed, this would be 
impossible and irrational. Rather, this thesis suggests a large-scale 
adjustment of ownership structure, in order to eliminate the conflict of 
interest between the majority shareholder, the state, and the minority 
investors. Accordingly, infringement of minority rights by the majority 
shareholder would be decreased.  
 
As argued by this thesis, listed companies should be strictly divided into 
two area categories: competitive and non-competitive. Companies in the 
competitive area should prioritise shareholders‟ interests, pursuing higher 
investment returns; while companies in the non-competitive area should 
achieve both commercial targets and public governance functions. 
Furthermore, this thesis emphasises that state-controlled listed companies 
in the former category should compete fairly with other business entities, 
and eventually quit the competitive area. 
 
In addition, this thesis establishes an ideal model to improve corporate 
governance quality and minority protection in China.  According to this 
„board-centralised model with a three-level structure‟, one or more state-
owned assets management companies would be established, as the 
insulation layer between government and the listed companies, in order to 
eliminate undue government intervention over the company operation.  
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To guarantee the independence of the board of directors, both in the state-
owned assets management companies and in the listed companies, this 
thesis suggests a new design of board composition. In the state-owned 
assets management companies, the board of directors should be 
composed of governmental directors, independent directors and executive 
directors. The difference between such companies in the competitive and 
non-competitive areas is merely the proportion of the three kinds of board 
members. However, the board composition of listed companies is more 
complicated. Listed companies in the competitive area should have a 
majority of independent directors, whereas listed companies in the non-
competitive area should have shareholder representatives, independent 
directors and executive directors on the board, so as to ensure that both 
the commercial target and the public governance functions are achieved. 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
In this thesis, legal protection of minority shareholders in China has been 
investigated in detail. It is undoubtedly true that Chinese policy makers 
have realised the importance of minority protection in the further 
development of corporate governance in China. Therefore, various 
institutions that may potentially increase the protection level have been 
introduced or reinforced by legislation in the gradual reform. 
 
However, the minority protection level overall in Chinese listed companies 
is still not sufficient to safeguard the interests of minority investors. As 
argued by this thesis, the key issue of corporate governance in China is 
state control. This reduces the independence of corporate operations and 
results in a complicated corporate structure, compared with Anglo-
American counterparts. Moreover, undue intervention by the state also 
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prevents the reforms introduced so far from being effective. 
 
The research for this thesis included comparative investigation of practical 
experience of minority protection in other advanced jurisdictions, such as 
the UK and the US. The findings lead to the conclusion that many 
institutions, such as shareholder activism, independent directors and an 
external market regulator, may be more effective in minority protection 
without control by the state. 
 
Therefore, this chapter re-thinks the issue of state control and puts forward 
an ideal model to improve the protection of minorities, taking into account 
the lessons learnt from other jurisdictions and the unique domestic 
environment. With regard to the minority protection mechanisms already 
incorporated in corporate law, suggestions will be given in the Concluding 
Chapter. 
 
7.1 Re-think of the Reform of Listed Companies Controlled by the 
State 
 
State-controlled companies comprise a brief name used by this thesis. The 
term refers to those listed companies controlled by the state. Such 
companies are an important component of the Chinese national economy.  
Under the Chinese Constitution, state assets belong to all citizens, who 
have no individual right to occupy, operate, acquire profits or dispose of 
the assets. The central government is the representative of assets owners 
and the State Assets Supervisory and Administration Committee (SASAC), 
a ministerial government department, acts as the authorised capital 
provider. Since the 1980s, the gradual reform of state-controlled 
companies has been an important concern of national economic 
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development. Improving the quality of corporate governance of state-
controlled companies is one of the key aims of the reform. 
 
7.1.1 Rejuvenation of State-controlled Companies 
 
The two-track economic system, with both state-owned and private 
sectors, results in unbalanced distribution of productive resources.829 The 
state sector, whose efficiency is obviously lower than its private 
counterpart, claims disproportionate social resources, owing to improper 
intervention by the government. In other words, the two-track economic 
system cannot satisfy the needs of the real market. Undue government 
involvement, corruption and rent-seeking prevail in the market, resulting in 
the infringement of shareholders rights in state-controlled companies, 
especially those of minority investors. Ultimately, this impedes the 
development of the Chinese economy.830 
 
When considering corporate reform, to improve the governance quality of 
state-controlled companies, the question is raised as to which operational 
target such companies ought to pursue: maximising shareholders‟ 
interests or some other goal? Alternatively, what role should the state-
controlled companies play in the market? 
 
From the political point of view, party documents clarify that the state 
sector should remain the dominant part of the national economy and 
should be developed together with the private sector.831 However, what is 
                                                             
829 The productive resources refer to materials, labor or money which is used to create goods or services. 
More specific researches on distribution of such resources could be found, see Benjamin Croft, 'The Contest 
for Community Paradigm: Wealth Maximisation or Resource Equalisation?' (1999) 6 UCL Jurisprudence 
Review 60-82; and Ravi Chauhan, 'Equality is not Equal. Dworkin's Equality of Resources' (1999) 6 UCL 
Jurisprudence Review 38-59. 
830 Wenkui Zhang, 'Weixian de Ziwo Taozui [Dangerous Narcissism]' Zhongguo Gaige [Chinese Reform] 
<http://magazine.caixin.com/2012-06-04/100397013.html> accessed 26-09-2013. 
831 Enterprise Institution of the Institution of Development of State Council, Zhongguo Qiye Fazhan Baogao 
2012 [China Enterprise Development Report 2012] (Zhongguo Fazhan Chubanshe [Development Press of 
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the exact meaning of „dominant part‟? And how can the two sectors 
develop together? 
 
According to a government announcement, the two sectors should be 
encouraged to develop in different areas. The state sector should 
dominate those areas essential for political governance, while it should 
compete fairly in other areas. Nonetheless, the distinction between 
different areas remains uncertain. Ramanadham agrees that in theory two 
kinds of powers could co-exist, one being non-economic, concerned 
specifically with politics and ideology, and the other economic, based on 
pragmatism. However, in the real world, the boundary between the two 
remains invisible.832 
 
Certainly, the state sector has already expanded outside the areas that 
should be controlled by the state. The operational targets of state-
controlled companies are multiple, driven by public concerns, economic 
needs and other interests. Even worse, in many competitive areas the 
state sector competes with its private counterpart unfairly, having 
advantages in resources, political support and information, among others. 
 
At the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in 1997, 
national economic adjustment was espoused.833 The Congress explicitly 
noted that the areas in which the state sector should get involved are 
those important industries and key fields rooted in the governing of the 
country by the CCP, specifically: national security, natural monopolies, 
public welfare, the pillar industries and industries of high and new 
                                                                                                                                                                       
China] 2012), 93. 
832 Venkata Vemuri Ramanadham, The Economics of Public Enterprtise (Routledge 1991), 35. 
833 Gu Yue, 'The 15th National Congress of Communist Party of 
China'(<http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_697173.htm> accessed 16-07-2013. 
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technology.834 
 
However, the reform plan was implemented only until 2004. In 2006, 
SASAC nominated seven industries that should be fully controlled by 
state-controlled companies, namely: the military, grid power, 
petrochemical, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation and shipping 
industries. Moreover, in some other important industries, state-controlled 
companies are required to achieve partial control. Hence, monopoly by 
state-controlled companies took shape. 
 
Facing the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese central government 
launched an anti-crisis investment scheme, involving 4 trillion RMB in total. 
With this massive investment, the government planned to stimulate 
domestic demand. Capital was poured into affordable housing projects, 
transportation infrastructure, rural infrastructure, financial credit support 
and industrial restructuring. 835  More specifically, power grid, 
telecommunications, transportation, equipment, construction, metallurgy, 
and construction materials were the key industries selected by the 
government.836 Referring to the above list of industries controlled by the 
state sector, it is clear that state-controlled companies were the main force 
in the 4-trillion RMB investment scheme, thus acquiring enormous financial 
support from the state. In the words of Zhao and Shi, the scheme resulted 
in a „re-boom of state-controlled companies‟.837 
 
Currently, Chinese state-controlled companies and their assets are mainly 
distributed in the manufacturing, non-financial services and financial 
                                                             
834 Ibid. 
835 Changyong Wang and Huanyu Zhang, '4 Wanyi, Da Zhengjiu [4 Trillion: Great Rescue]' (2008) 24 Caijing 
Zazhi [Caijing Magazine] 84, 85. 
836 Ibid. 
837 Xiao Zhao and Guicun Shi, 'Da Kuozhang Hou Guoqi Hechu Qu [Where is the Exit for State-owned 
Enterprises after Expansion]' (2012) 4 Zhongguo Gaige [Chinese Reform] 24, 26. 
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industries. The manufacturing industry alone includes 20,510 state-
controlled companies nationwide.838 In 2010, the total assets, net assets, 
and net profit of all state-controlled companies were 130 trillion RMB, 25 
trillion RMB and 2 trillion RMB, respectively.839 
 
Accordingly, it is clear that state-controlled companies in China operate 
mainly in competitive areas, contrary to the case in many western 
countries. In addition, some state-controlled companies in non-competitive 
areas also operate some competitive businesses, such as real estate 
construction. The state-controlled companies enjoy 80-90 per cent market 
shares in the telecommunications and civil aviation industries. In the 
financial services industry, most market participants are controlled by the 
state.840 
 
Although the weight of the state sector in the national economy has 
decreased since the 2000s, especially in the manufacturing industry,841 its 
influence in the industry chain is still significant. This is because the state 
sector dominates the energy resource, raw materials and equipment 
industries that decide the structure and price of lower industries in the 
chain.  
 
Furthermore, most state-controlled companies in China are large 
enterprises. Among those firms ranked in the top 500 in China in 2011, 
316 were state-controlled companies, equal to 63 per cent of the total. The 
income, profit and assets of state-controlled companies amounted to 
                                                             
838 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Year Book 2011 (China Statistics Press 2011), 
532. 
839 Ibid. 
840 Ibid. 
841 In the manufacturing industry, the business volume of state-controlled companies in 32 out of 34 sub-
categories has clearly decreased. See, Xiaohong Chen, 'Guoyou Jingji Buju: Bianhua, Yingxiang Yinsu he 
Zhanwang [Distribution of State-owned Economy: Changes, Effective Factors and Prospect]' (2009) 1 China 
Development Review (Chinese Version) 47, 48. 
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approximately 83%, 82% and 90% of the total, respectively.842 Therefore, 
even if some state-controlled companies do not occupy a large proportion 
of market share, they are still capable of affecting the industry due to their 
leading position. In some other industries, state-controlled companies 
dominate the market, for example PetroChina in the petrochemical 
industry, China Mobile Communication Corporation in telecommunications, 
and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in banking.  
 
Compared with other OECD countries, the impact of state-controlled 
companies on the Chinese national economy is much greater.843 Using the 
ratio of state assets to GDP to weight the state sector in the national 
economy, Chen finds that in China in 2007 the ratio was roughly 3:1, while 
the average ratio of the other 16 countries was only 0.25:1.844 The result 
indicates how greatly Chinese state-controlled companies can affect the 
national economy. 
 
This thesis does not claim that the Anglo-American governance model is 
perfect.  On the contrary, a series of corporate governance scandals have 
revealed defects of corporate governance in the US private sector. 
However, even though the Chinese national economy escaped severe 
disturbance during the global financial crisis due to the rejuvenation 
scheme for state-controlled companies, scholars have noted certain costs 
behind the scheme‟s success.  Specifically, (1) The Chinese economy has 
suffered high inflation. Not until the end of 2011 did the CPI index drop to 5 
per cent. High inflation results in serious shrinkage of private wealth, 
making it impossible to boost domestic consumption; (2) Because the 4-
trillion RMB scheme involved fixed investment plans, the state sector took 
                                                             
842 Angang Hu, 'Guoyou Qiye Shi Zhongguo Jueqi de Lingtouyang [State-owned Enterprise is the Leader of 
the Economic Rise of China]' <http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1271/n20515/n2697206/14877127.html> 
accessed 16-07-2013. 
843 Chen (n 841) 53. 
844 Ibid. 
Chapter Seven: Proposals for Reform 
Page 328 of 415 
 
up a huge amount of loans, although its efficiency is relatively lower than 
the private sector. As a result, the development of the private sector has 
been restrained; and (3) The multiplier effect of massive investment by 
central government led to a widespread investment wave by local 
governments, which in turn caused a local debt crisis two years later.845 
 
7.1.2 New Problems during the Reform of State-controlled 
Companies 
 
In order to achieve further development of the Chinese economy, a set of 
reforms has been introduced by the government, seeking better 
governance quality. However, Chinese economic reform is a huge and 
gradual project, hampered by poor foundations and insufficient experience 
of a market-oriented economy. Therefore, it is difficult to guarantee that all 
parts of the reform are being implemented in an absolutely correct way. 
 
This section highlights four issues that have arisen during the reform: (1) 
the gap between corporate profits of state-controlled companies and 
benefits to citizens; (2) the consistent deficiencies in state-controlled 
companies; (3) the demolition of the market environment by monopoly; 
and (4) the irrational requirement to increase the value of state assets. 
 
(1) The Gap between Corporate Profits of State-controlled Companies 
and Benefits to Citizens 
According to Chen, the lower the proportion of the state sector in the 
national economy, the higher the sensitivity of domestic consumption to 
GDP. 846  This means that citizens living in those countries with a low 
proportion of state-sector companies would be able to enjoy more benefits 
                                                             
845 Zhao and Shi (n 837) 28. 
846 Zhiwu Chen, 'Shouru Zengzhang yu Jingji Zengzhang Weihe Bu Tongbu [Why Did the Increase of Income 
Not Keep Pace with the Increase of Economy]' Jingji Guancha Bao [The Economic Observer] (13-12-2010). 
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when the GDP grows. Conversely, people would receive less benefit in 
those countries with a high proportion of state-sector companies, such as 
China. 
 
It seems ironic that, with the growth of GDP, people living in a communist 
country receive less benefit than people in a capitalist country. In theory, 
Chinese state assets belong to all citizens living in mainland China. Why 
then, can people not share the benefit of the growth of GDP? 
 
The paradox is caused by a systemic defect of state ownership. In theory, 
each citizen in the country should be one of the owners of state assets, 
having a fair share of property rights. However, in practice the property 
right of state assets should be enjoyed collectively, which means that no 
single citizen could occupy, use or dispose of the assets individually. 
Therefore, peoples‟ residual rights cannot actually be realised.  
 
A further reason to explain the paradox, as explained by Chen, is the 
existence of a huge agency cost in such an ownership system. 847 
Evidence for this hypothesis might be found in the low profit delivered to 
the government. In 2010, the total profits created by state-controlled 
companies amounted to approximately 2 trillion RMB, while the part 
delivered to the government was only 0.044 trillion RMB, equivalent to 2.2 
per cent of the total amount.848 
 
(2) The Consistent Deficiencies in State-controlled Companies 
In spite of the enormous amount of profit, it cannot be denied that the 
efficiency of state-controlled companies is still inadequate in general. This 
view is supported by Mengfu Huang, Chairman of the National Federation 
                                                             
847 Ibid. 
848 Zhao and Shi (n 837) 26. 
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of Industry and Commerce, who claims that the operation of such massive 
state assets is inefficient. Dozens of trillions RMB of state assets deliver 
only several billion profits.849 
 
As reviewed by this thesis, the low efficiency of state-controlled companies 
is by nature a structural problem. Corporate executives are quasi-civil 
servants, managing the company but being evaluated by a similar 
standard as for civil servants. The majority shareholder, the state, enjoys 
the benefits of corporate control, such as related-party transactions or 
even tunnelling. Hence business performance becomes less important. To 
deal with this problem, a thorough re-structure is necessary, linking the 
benefit of each interest group directly to corporate performance. 
 
The low efficiency of corporate operations leads to low dividends, which 
negatively affects the investment return of shareholders, especially those 
minorities who are not capable of enjoying any benefit of corporate control. 
Moreover, it is almost impossible for minorities to achieve better 
management through their own activities under the current corporate 
structure. Hence, most minority shareholders seek a better premium of 
share price on the stock market, rather than a reliable dividend stream(s). 
This is not the optimal choice either for minority shareholders or for the 
Chinese capital market. 
 
(3) Demolition of Market Environment by Monopoly 
In many industries in China, natural resources, raw materials, price-setting 
and key information are monopolised by state-controlled companies. The 
government or administrative departments abuse their powers to provide 
additional support biased toward state-controlled companies. Such 
                                                             
849 Ibid. 
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monopoly by the state sector cannot help to resolve corporate 
deficiencies, but will ultimately destroy the fairness of the market. 
 
(4) The Irrational Requirement to Increase the Value of State Assets 
To date, the key principle in the operation of state assets is to maintain or 
increase their value. This is rooted in the nature of state assets, which 
belong to the whole people within the country, according to the 
Constitution850 and the newly-promulgated Law of the People's Republic of 
China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises.851 Since they involve the 
interests of all citizens, such state assets ought to be managed cautiously, 
based on an understanding of their nature. 
 
However, here arises a legal question, namely: When state assets are 
invested in a company, who should enjoy property rights? In accordance 
with the Chinese Company Law, as well as commercial practice in other 
countries, the investment relationship is based on the legal fact that 
shareholders transfer the property right of the assets to the company in 
exchange for corporate shares. 852  Accordingly, with independent legal 
personality, the company shall acquire the entire property right of all the 
assets invested in it. In other words, when the government transfers state 
assets to a company, no matter how many corporate shares it holds, the 
state assets should belong to the company rather than the whole people. 
Yet this deduction is not reflected in the current laws. 
 
In addition, even if state assets held by the company have been explicitly 
defined as belonging to all citizens in China, the requirement to increase 
their value can still be challenged. Certainly, state assets should be 
operated with special caution, but pursuing an increase in value should 
                                                             
850 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Article 6. 
851 Law of the People's Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, Article 3. 
852 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 27 and 28. 
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come with the necessary precondition that this should not damage the 
interests of the private sector. 
 
By taking advantage of political support and lower costs of capital, state-
controlled companies gain considerable profit, increasing the value of 
state assets. However, this is at the expense of fairness in the market. As 
a result, the private sector has to overcome more difficulties in order to 
develop. In the macro aspect, the citizens‟ right to undifferentiated 
development is infringed. Since both state and private sectors involve 
people‟s interests, how can we tell which is more important? Moreover, if 
state assets are to be operated with the requirement to increase their 
value, how can the state sector eventually exit the competitive area? 
 
For state-controlled companies in the non-competitive area, which will be 
discussed later in more detail, it is impossible to increase the value of 
state assets. Such companies are established to meet the needs of some 
public governance functions. The products or services they provide, such 
as the national grid for electricity, or public transportation, are part of social 
welfare. Therefore, the target of corporate operation should be to 
maximize the public interest, rather than profit. 
 
This thesis agrees that the requirement to maintain the value of state 
assets is rational, so as to guarantee cautious management. However, the 
requirement to increase the value is irrational, in both the competitive and 
the non-competitive areas. In order to achieve better resource allocation 
and to improve corporate governance quality in China, state assets should 
flow toward the non-competitive area, to increase social welfare. 
 
7.1.3 Direction for Further Reform of State-controlled Companies 
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State-controlled companies exist under both planned and market-oriented 
economies. For example, in the western countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, state-controlled companies have an important position, helping 
the government to remedy market defects. In other words, the market 
does not repel state-controlled companies. 
 
On the other hand, a sound corporate governance arrangement would, in 
theory, be able to improve the efficiency of state-controlled companies. 
State control is not by nature an inefficient mechanism. In Singapore, 
state-controlled companies such as Temasek have even higher efficiency 
than their private counterparts. 853  Similar cases exist in France, for 
example, Renault.854 Accordingly, the conclusion can be drawn that good 
efficiency is derived from good governance. In corporate operations the 
government should act as a wise representative of assets owners, rather 
than take on the roles of both market participant and market regulator. 
Administrative intervention should be prohibited. 
 
Certainly, such a reform target cannot be achieved in the short time. The 
combination of governmental functions and enterprise management has a 
long history in China, so that it will be very difficult to change. As noted by 
scholars, the commercial sector in China has long been under the control 
of the state government.855 Even today, the political nature of the assets is 
the key consideration in company law.856 For example, if the assets belong 
to the state, transferring such assets would need special approval by the 
SASAC. 
                                                             
853 Gu (n 660) 130. 
854 Ibid. 
855 Yue Wu (ed), Gongsi Zhili: Guoqi Suoyouquan yu Zhili Mubiao [Corporate Governance: Property Right 
of State-owned Company and Governance Targets](Law Press China 2006), 33. 
856 Shengbei Zhang, Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Kongzhiquan Falv Wenti Yanjiu: Quexian yu Gailiang 
[Legal Research on the Right for Corporate Control of Chinese Listed Companies: Defects and Improvement]  
(Law Press China 2007), 16. 
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Of course, the existence of difficulties must not become an excuse to stop 
moving forward. As emphasised by Wu, one of China‟s 
preeminent economists, the difficulties China is facing now may be much 
more than the beginning of reform. Rather, they are due to the fact that the 
breaking down of the original system was accompanied by the emergence 
of new interest groups, which represent resistance to further reform.857 
Indeed, since the rejuvenation of the state sector, some licenses that used 
to be issued to private companies have become invalid. Meanwhile, many 
medium or small size private companies have been merged with state-
controlled companies to consolidate their monopoly position. However, Wu 
insists that only by moving on can China achieve sustainable economic 
growth.858 
 
As insisted upon throughout this thesis, in order to achieve further 
development, it is necessary to have a better corporate governance 
regime, especially in terms of minority protection. Giving more confidence 
to minority investors would attract diversified investments to support the 
Chinese national economy. For this purpose, structural reform on the 
macro level will be the precondition for the improvement of corporate 
governance on the micro level. Without clarification of rights, obligations 
and operation methods in relation to state assets, companies may 
continue to fail to maximise the interests of shareholders as a whole. 
 
Therefore, this thesis suggests that the state sector should launch 
structural reform by means of: (a) Explicitly distinguishing between 
competitive areas and non-competitive areas. Moreover, the competitive 
area could be further divided into two categories: industries with strong 
                                                             
857 Jinglian Wu, 'Guo Jin Min Tui: Zhongguo Gaige de Fengxian ["Guo Jin Min Tui": the Risk of Chinese 
Reform]' (2012) Z3 China Private Economy of Science & Technology 74, 75. 
858 Ibid. 
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foundations and industries with weak foundations; 859  (b) Setting up 
operational targets in accordance with the different classifications to which 
the state-controlled companies belong; and (c) Keeping the separation of 
governmental functions from enterprise management. 
 
Generally speaking, state-controlled companies in the non-competitive 
area should prioritise the public interest, helping the government to fulfil 
public governance functions. For example, such a company may be 
established to make up for gaps in the market. Conversely, the target for 
state-controlled companies in the competitive area should be the same as 
for normal private companies, pursuing better performance and 
maximising the interests of shareholders as a whole, while competing with 
their private counterparts in a fair market.  For the long term, this thesis 
insists that the state should exit the competitive area by selling its 
corporate shares.  
 
(1) Non-competitive Area 
According to western economic theory, state-controlled companies should 
be limited to some key areas where the private sector is either not able or 
not willing to invest.860 In modern societies, national economic governance 
cannot rely on policy making, but should be supported by state-controlled 
companies. 
 
State-controlled companies in non-competitive areas are normally 
established to remedy market defects and relieve the conflicts that arise 
during market development. They either supplement the private sector, 
creating a desirable environment for its development, or fulfil the public 
needs for infrastructure, by providing public products or services. In the 
                                                             
859 For more details about the classification, see Hu (n 656) 15. 
860 Gu (n 660) 135. 
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macro aspect, with the help of state-controlled companies the economic 
structure could be optimised, while national safety and social stability 
could be guaranteed. As Liu argues, state-controlled companies have 
three main functions: providing fundamental services, adjusting the 
economic structure to make it more efficient, and promoting political 
stability.861  
 
Considering the intention of establishing such companies, their operational 
targets are accordingly not profit-driven. Instead, satisfying the public 
interest should be the first priority of corporate management. Given this 
corporate target, in practice it is impossible to separate entirely 
governmental functions from corporate management. 
 
(2) Competitive Area 
As mentioned above, according to western theory, state-controlled 
companies do not usually participate in market competition. The situation 
in China is different, a result of the unique domestic environment.  
 
State-owned enterprises were initially formed at a time when social 
productivity was extremely poor. The state called for industrialisation and a 
modern economy. To achieve such improvement, developing the state 
sector was the best policy choice. Moreover, during the transformation 
from planned economy to market-oriented economy, macro-economic 
policies, such as fiscal, tax, and monetary policies, were not sufficient to 
meet the complicated situation. State control could act as the coordinator 
of interest conflicts during the gradual reform. 
 
As a consequence, to push state-controlled companies to quit the 
                                                             
861 Huaping Liu, Reset the Relationship between Chinese Government and State-owned Enterprises 
(Southwest University of Finance and Economics Publishing Houses 2005), 6. 
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competitive area entirely would be too extreme in the short term. On the 
one hand, those companies still dominate the market, in terms of capital, 
technology, human resource, equipment and products. On the other hand, 
the private sector is not sufficiently mature to fill the gap in the market left 
by the quitting of the state sector. Such a move may lead to uncontrollable 
economic turbulence. 
 
However, this thesis insists that, with the development of the Chinese 
market-oriented economy, state-controlled companies should eventually 
quit the competitive area. At present, the reform should be implemented 
step by step, as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The Operation Direction of State-controlled Listed Companies in 
the Competitive Area 
 
Liu suggests that state-controlled companies in the competitive area 
should adopt profit-driven strategies. That is to say, such companies 
should take advantage of their capital and information to invest in the most 
profitable business, regardless of geographical and industrial 
Competitive 
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Industries with Strong 
Foundation 
Industries with Poor 
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restrictions.862 
 
Indeed, in current practice, many state-controlled companies do operate in 
this way, increasing the value of state assets. However, this thesis holds a 
dissenting viewpoint. First, the rationale of increasing the value of state 
assets has already been questioned.863 Secondly, the pursuit of profit-
driven strategy by state-controlled companies has been regarded as a 
cancer on the Chinese national economy. Profit created by the state sector 
depends not on sound management and high efficiency, but on easy 
access to capital with the help of the government. This thesis argues that 
with better corporate governance practice, and a market that is open and 
fair, the private sector may produce more benefits.  
 
7.2 An Ideal Board-Centralised Model with Three-level Structure 
 
While this thesis is seeking changes to improve the legal protection of 
minority shareholders in Chinese listed companies, it argues that a 
substantial change in the macro economy is the necessary basis for such 
a proposal. This is because most listed companies in the Chinese capital 
market are at the lower level of a pyramid shareholding structure, and 
have an indivisible relationship to state assets and the government.  
 
Therefore, this thesis believes a better corporate governance structure of 
Chinese listed companies should be designed to balance fairly the various 
interests held by different groups, including but not limited to the state, the 
local governments, the Communist Party, minority investors and other 
stakeholders. This is also the fundamental way to minimise the conflict of 
interests between the controlling shareholder and minorities. 
                                                             
862 Ibid 254. 
863 For a detailed illustration, see 7.1.2(4) of this chapter, page 332. 
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Figure 2: Interests of Different Parties Involved in Chinese Listed 
Companies 
 
As demonstrated by Figure 2, listed companies in the Chinese market are 
affected by the demands of various interests. In most cases, the 
controlling shareholders are different levels of government; alternatively 
companies may be owned or controlled by government. Hence, among all 
the interest concerns, the willingness to maintain and increase the value of 
state assets, and certain public governance targets, become in practice 
the first two priorities in corporate operation. 
 
According to a survey by the Chinese Entrepreneurs Institution in 2007, 
focusing on top corporate executives, including the legal representative of 
the company, targets such as „Creating a sustainable and outstanding 
enterprise‟, „Paying more attention to employees‟ welfare‟ and „Achieving 
personal value‟ have been considered more important than „Increasing 
profit to realise the investment of shareholders‟.864 
                                                             
864 Lan Li, Zhongguo Qiyejia Chengzhang 15 Nian: 1993-2008, Zhongguo Qiyejia Chengzhang Yu Fazhan 
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Here a question arises as to how the interest of the controlling shareholder 
can be realised, if corporate executives give profitability low priority in day-
to-day management, even though it is commonly believed that the 
interests of the controlling shareholder would be guaranteed. To answer 
this question, this thesis argues that in most cases the controlling 
shareholder acquires investment return not through dividends, but from 
the benefits of corporate control. For example, the corporate controller 
could receive greater benefits by tunnelling or related-party transactions. 
Moreover, unlike dividends, the benefits of corporate control enjoyed by 
the majority shareholder are exclusive, which cannot be shared with 
minorities. Therefore, it can be concluded that the interests of minority 
shareholders do not carry enough weight in Chinese listed companies. 
This thesis believes that taking the interests of minority shareholders into 
account properly in corporate decision making, rather than sacrificing 
them, is already a step forward compared with the current situation of 
minority protection. 
 
In order to achieve such a balance of interests, this thesis suggests that a 
board-centralised corporate structure should be established,865 based on 
the practical experience in Anglo-American companies, to get rid of 
unnecessary political intervention. A professional and independent board 
of directors would balance the various interests of different groups 
according to the criterion of achieving the success of the company. In this 
way, the interests of minorities, an important concern in corporate 
governance, could be taken properly into consideration in the board room, 
and be better protected by the board of directors against the controlling 
shareholder. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Baogao [15 Years Growth of Chinese Entrepreneurs: 1993-2008, Reports on the Growth and Development of 
Chinese Entrepreneurs] (China Machine Press 2009), 14. 
865 In this thesis, „the board‟ in the board-centralised structure refers to the board of directors. 
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Accordingly, this thesis provides a new ideal model with different 
structures for different market participants.  The provisionally named 
„Three-level Structure Model‟ is based on the principle that the decision-
making power over corporate operations should be truly exercised by the 
board of directors. The rationales of such an arrangement are discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
7.2.1 Description of the Ideal Model 
 
As has been mentioned, the Chinese government plays a dual role in the 
capital market. It is both the administrator of the social economy, taking 
charge of public governance, and the representative investor of state 
assets, exercising the legal rights of a capital provider. Due to this complex 
characteristic, the government as controlling shareholder has a composite 
target to pursue, concerned with both social stability and corporate 
profitability. Accordingly, pursuit of this target impacts upon the company‟s 
operations, through administrative activities and controlling power over 
corporate affairs. The pursuit of financial returns and the achievement of 
public management have similar weight in corporate decision making, 
which inevitably results in low efficiency in those state-owned or state-
controlled listed companies. Therefore, separating government functions 
from corporate management is the vital guiding concept of the proposed 
new system. 
 
To date, most state-controlled listed companies operate in a two-level 
structure, in which the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), a ministerial-level department of central 
government, exercises the shareholder‟s right on behalf of the owners of 
Chapter Seven: Proposals for Reform 
Page 343 of 415 
 
state-owned assets, officially defined as all citizens in the China mainland. 
There is no intermediate institution between the government and the listed 
companies. Under this structure, the government can easily and directly 
intervene in the daily operation of listed companies controlled by the state, 
which may make it impossible to separate the governmental functions from 
corporate management. In order to overcome such systematic problems, 
this thesis proposes that a three-level structure, „Representative of 
Owners of State-owned Assets - State Assets Management Companies - 
Listed Companies‟, be introduced into Chinese corporate governance. 
 
 
Figure 3: Conversion Function of Three-level Structure 
        Political Entity: Governments at Different Levels 
        Hybrid Entity: State Assets Management Companies 
        Business Entity: Listed Companies in Different Industries 
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Figure 4: Hierarchical Arrangement of „Three-level Structure Model‟  
 
As shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, state assets management companies 
are intermediate institutions between the state and the market. Authorised 
by the government, state assets management companies acquire the 
rights of use and disposition over the state assets, and then invest this 
capital into listed companies on the market. In accordance with 
commercial regulations, state assets management companies exchange 
the property right of state assets of listed companies on the market for 
corporate shares. The relationship between the state and the state assets 
management company is one of administrative trust, while the relationship 
between the state assets management company and the listed company 
invested in is a typical commercial relation between shareholder and 
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management company is the most important factor for the success of the 
proposed new structure. 
 
The „Three-level Structure Model‟ is inspired by the example in practice of 
Temasek, an investment company based in Singapore. Temasek is a 
Singapore exempt private company incorporated on 25 June 1974 and 
wholly owned by the Ministry of Finance. It owns a portfolio worth $198 
billion as at 31 March 2012, mainly in Singapore, Asia and growth 
markets.866 However, under Singapore‟s Constitution and laws, neither the 
President of Singapore nor the government is involved in its investment, 
divestment or other business decisions, except in relation to the protection 
of Temasek‟s past reserves. It owns and manages its assets with full 
commercial discretion and flexibility under the guidance of its board of 
directors, including investment, divestment and business decisions. 867 
Controlling a tremendous amount of state assets while maintaining 
extremely high independence has been regarded as the key reason for 
Temasek‟s success. As a state-owned enterprise, Temasek has been 
assigned an overall corporate credit rating of „Aaa‟ by Moody‟s and „AAA‟ 
by Standard & Poor‟s, with a healthy 17% shareholder return annually, 
much higher than most private sectors.868  
 
The experience of Temasek is a perfect model for China. Luo holds a 
similar viewpoint, although given the huge amount of state assets in total 
in mainland China, China needs not one Temasek, but perhaps more than 
ten.869 Similar to the attitude outlined earlier, whereby state assets should 
take different functions in the competitive and non-competitive realms, this 
                                                             
866 Temasek, 'Corporate Profile' <http://www.temasek.com.sg/abouttemasek/corporateprofile> accessed 28-
05-2013. 
867 Temasek, 'Temasek Review 2012' 
<http://www.temasekreview.com.sg/governance/governance_framework.aspx> accessed 28-05-2013. 
868 Temasek, 'Corporate Profile' (n 866). 
869 Jiangang Luo, Weituo Daili: Guoyou Zichan Guanli Tizhi Chuangxin [Trust and Agent: Innovation of 
State-owned Assets Management System] (China Financial & Economic Publishing House 2004), 230. 
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thesis suggests the state assets management companies should be 
designed differently in accordance with the realm to which they belong, 
because the two kinds of company would have different corporate targets. 
The detailed structure will be introduced later in this thesis. 
 
7.2.2 The Rationales for this Design 
 
(1) The Importance of Board of Directors in Corporate Operations 
As mentioned above, if the minority shareholders are to fight for their 
interests against the controller of the company, they should be able to 
count on the help of a professional and independent board of directors. In 
the view of this thesis, in a mature legal environment, the board of 
directors would take minorities‟ interests fairly into account to achieve the 
long-term success of the company. In other words, the interests of minority 
shareholders would be reflected in the decisions made by the board.  
 
Of course, there is still a gap to be bridged between the ideal status and 
current practice. Boards of directors in Chinese listed companies remain 
incapable of protecting minorities, in terms both of legal rights and the 
independence of the boards. As a consequence, this thesis argues that 
companies in different levels of the „Three-level Structure Model‟ should 
adopt different corporate governance systems with special regard to 
composition and decision-making power.  
 
Before illustrating these systems in detail, two relevant issues should be 
reviewed in advance: the legal ground of board-centralisation and the 
relationship between the government and the board. 
 
(a) The Legal Ground of Board-centralisation 
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Since the commencement of the new Company Law in 2005, the powers 
granted to boards of directors over corporate affairs in the non-wholly-
state-owned listed companies, or alternatively the listed companies 
invested in by the state assets management company and various 
minority investors in the lowest level of the „Three-level Structure Model‟, 
have been clearly stated. Nevertheless, as noted earlier in this thesis, the 
powers held by boards of directors in Chinese listed companies are 
relatively weak. This situation is adverse to the aims of improving the 
independence of the corporate board and balancing the conflicting 
interests of different groups in order to increase minority protection. This 
thesis will explain later the extent to which the powers of the Chinese 
board should be reinforced. 
 
There is regulatory uncertainty about the grant of powers to the board of 
directors in a wholly state-owned company, which is the usual legal form of 
the state assets management company in the middle level of the „Three-
level Structure Model‟. Without clear legislation, it would be very difficult for 
the state assets management company to establish a board-centralised 
governance structure. As a result, it would be impossible to protect 
corporate operations from unnecessary administrative interventions.  
 
Article 67 of Chinese Company Law 2005 provides that: 
 
A solely state-owned company shall not set up the 
shareholders' meeting, and the functions of the shareholders' 
meeting shall be exercised by the state-owned assets 
supervision and administration institution. The state-owned 
assets supervision and administration institution may 
authorize the board of directors of the company to exercise 
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some of the functions of the shareholders' meeting and 
decide on important matters of the company, excluding those 
that must be decided by the state-owned assets supervision 
and administration such as merger, split-up, dissolution of the 
company, increase or decrease of registered capital as well 
as the issuance of corporate bonds. The merger, split-up, 
dissolution or application for bankruptcy of an important solely 
state-owned company shall be subject to the examination of 
the state-owned assets supervision and administration 
institution, and then be reported to the people's government 
at the same level for approval.870 
 
As shown, the policy makers used „may‟ when providing for the grant of 
some shareholder rights to corporate directors by the state-owned assets 
supervision and administration institution, rather than „shall‟, as in the 
former Company Law 1993. On the face of it, the provision expressed in 
the new law mirrors the original idea that, as the representative owner of 
state assets, the state-owned assets supervision and administration 
institution should, in general, exercise its right alone, cutting short the 
agency chain so as to decrease agency costs.871 However, in fact, the 
provision quoted above embodies created uncertainty as to the 
circumstances in which and as to the extent to which the corporate board 
would be authorized rights to make decisions on important corporate 
affairs. The state-owned assets supervision and administration institution 
has large discretion, which, in the view of this thesis, represents an 
obstacle to the separation of governmental functions from corporate 
management. 
 
                                                             
870 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 67. 
871 Haijun Liu, Xiandai Gongsi Fa [Modern Company Law] (Law Press China 2008), 722. 
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After 15 years‟ debate, the Law of the People‟s Republic of China on the 
State-Owned Assets of Enterprises was finally promulgated in 2008, and 
for the first time the decision power of boards of directors in wholly state-
owned companies was clarified. With the exception of merger, split, 
increase or reduction of registered capital, issuance of bonds, distribution 
of profits, dissolution and petition for bankruptcy of a wholly state-owned 
enterprise or a wholly state-owned company, which should be decided by 
a representative institution of the capital providers, other corporate 
decisions fall to the board of directors.872 
 
As understood by this thesis, the new regulation implies a legislative trend 
towards board-centralisation in Chinese corporate governance, which this 
thesis holds to be a positive development. In other words, except for those 
specific requirements in law, administrative regulations or company 
constitution, it is possible that the board of directors will be granted more 
powerful rights over corporate operations in the near future.  
 
Nevertheless, the problem of uncertainty regarding directors‟ power has 
not been resolved entirely. This is because, first of all, the Law of the 
People‟s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, and 
the Company Law 2005, are formally equal in status. Hence the 
enforcement of the former would not influence the validity of the latter. A 
new revision of the Company Law is needed to clarify the decision-making 
powers of the board in wholly state-owned companies. 
 
The second reason is that, to date, the articles of association of wholly 
state-owned companies and any amendments to them are formulated by 
the SASAC; or formulated by the board of directors and approved by the 
                                                             
872 Law of the People's Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, Article 31 and 32. 
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SASAC. Hence, the government still holds the final say on the substance 
of corporate constitutions. Such decisive power enables the government to 
retain corporate control over and above the board of directors by 
formulating or amending the company‟s constitution, explicitly declaring 
the limited scale of corporate affairs which may be decided in the 
boardroom. 
 
Yet, it seems irrational to deprive the autonomy of corporate owners on 
such issues by setting up or amending a company‟s constitution. If this 
were done, the legislation would be inflexible and would impede the 
maximisation of shareholders‟ interests. Consequently, this thesis 
suggests that the government launch some pilot schemes, as it has done 
with many other reforms in China,873 leaving a wider scale of corporate 
affairs for the board to decide. Such an approach would provide the 
opportunity for corporate boards to gain experience of balancing political 
concerns with business targets, and allow the government to test to what 
extent it could separate administrative functions from daily corporate 
management. 
 
(b)  Independence of the Board of Directors 
Lack of board independence is not unique to China, but is a tough issue of 
corporate governance around the world. However, it is undeniable that the 
problem is more troublesome where state-owned assets are involved. The 
effectiveness and the responsibility of the board of directors would be 
influenced frequently by both government and management. On the one 
side, the board of directors would be forced to take into account political 
issues as required by the government, for example, assisting the 
government to carry out certain tasks of public management. On the other 
                                                             
873 The experience of the successful split share structure reform can be learnt from here. 
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side, the board may face difficulty in controlling and monitoring executives. 
Having a close relationship with policy makers, the executives in state-
owned or state-controlled companies tend to report directly to the relevant 
administrator or to the government, rather than seek instruction by the 
board. 
 
Therefore, in order to guarantee the independence of the board, it is vitally 
important to reset properly the relationships between government and 
corporate boards in different levels of the new arrangement, the „Three-
level Structure Model‟. This thesis argues that owing to the direct link 
between the government and the state assets management company, the 
board in this kind of company should be relatively independent from the 
government, but at the same time, it should be supervised by the 
government. The involvement of government in this kind of company, as 
the representative of the owners of state assets, is inevitable and 
necessary.874  
 
However, the listed companies on the lowest level of the „Three-level 
Structure Model‟, those invested in by the state assets management 
company and by very many minority investors, present a different case. 
This thesis believes that the less the government intervenes in listed 
companies, the better the performance of those companies will be. 
Keeping this kind of company as an independent market participant would 
help to promote a healthy and fair market environment. Hence, 
government supervision of the board of directors should be limited to 
companies in the middle level of the new model, while the boards of listed 
companies on the lowest level should be monitored only by shareholders, 
even though the dominant part of corporate shares are finally held by the 
                                                             
874 The participation of the government is similar to the involvement of shareholders in corporate operations 
in normal business companies, monitoring the activities of the directors to reduce agency costs. 
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companies in the middle level, which partly represents the will of the 
government. 
 
With regard specifically to administrative interventions, currently most 
come from SASAC. Some are rooted in authorisation by law or 
administrative regulations, while others stem from self-authorisation by 
SASAC itself. Since the establishment of this ministerial-level department, 
SASAC has been required to act as the representative of owners of  state-
owned assets, as well as the administrator of companies with state-owned 
assets.875 This dual role has the potential to cause serious problems, and 
challenges the fairness of the market. Accordingly, this thesis urges the 
government to separate the two roles played by SASAC in the next 
reform. 
 
It has been argued that SASAC itself is an incompetent representative of 
such a tremendous amount of state-owned assets. As mentioned in a 
policy analysis report by the World Bank Group in 2002, SASAC staff 
should possess abundant business experience and have the ability to 
evaluate comprehensive corporate affairs, such as marketing, 
manufacture, corporate finance and other business strategies.876 However, 
under the current system of bureaucracy, most staffs in SASAC are the 
officials of administrative departments or Communist Party cadres, lacking 
the necessary capabilities to operate state-owned assets. As stated by a 
senior leader of SASAC, the personnel „are more likely to have no idea 
how to perform as a representative of the owners of state-owned 
assets‟.877 
                                                             
875 Shuguang Li, 'GuoZi Fa Dingwei Benzhi Shi Zhengfu Dingwei [Determination of the Nature of the Law 
of the People's Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises is to Determine the Function of 
Government]' 21st Century Business Herald (27-06-2008). 
876 The WBG, 'The Policy Analysis Report: International Experience for China's Reform of SOEs' 
<http://wenku.baidu.com/view/fa6fe690daef5ef7ba0d3c9a.html> accessed 23-12-2002. 
877 Shengke Wang, 'Guoziwei Zai Dingwei [Re-positioning of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Adiministration Committee]' 21st Century Business Herald (06-01-2005). 
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As a result, considering the complexity and difficulty of being a competent 
representative, an earlier chapter of this thesis has suggested that such 
responsibilities should be fulfilled by several governmental departments 
collectively. Any single entity, whether SASAC or the Ministry of Finance, 
would feel helpless when faced with the mission to govern the corporate 
operation and personnel of approximately 150 central government-
controlled enterprises with more than RMB 30 trillion gross assets. 
Therefore, it could be more rational for the central government, rather than 
any one department of it, to exercise the duties of a representative of 
owners of the state-owned assets. Under the direction of the central 
government as a whole, relevant departments could fulfil certain functions 
according to their administrative powers. For example, the budget could 
be decided by the National People‟s Congress; capital allocation could be 
left to the Ministry of Finance; and SASAC could act simply as a monitor of 
state-owned assets. In this way, checks and balance could be realised. 
 
It has been argued by Gu that the supervision of state-owned assets may 
be achieved better if SASAC could be defined solely as a monitor, rather 
than as both monitor and regulator. 878  The supervisory work should 
include but not be limited to: (i) Investigating and evaluating the 
implementation of relevant laws, administrative regulations and 
departmental rules relating to the board of directors of state assets 
management companies; (ii) Monitoring the operation of the board and 
establishing the assessment system to evaluate the board as a whole as 
well as the directors individually; (iii) Monitoring the investment plans or 
arrangements provided by the state assets management company. In the 
competitive area, SASAC should not involve itself in the decision making 
                                                             
878 Gongyun Gu, 'Guoyou Zichan Lifa Zongzhi Ji Jiben Zhidu Xuanze [The Principles and Basic System of 
Legislations in Relating to State-owned Assets]' (2008) 6 Legal Science Monthly 67, 72. 
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on investment plans. Rather, to realise the government‟s right to know, the 
state assets management company should send its annual investment 
plan to SASAC for record. However, in the non-competitive area, because 
the capital would usually have a fixed investment target, SASAC could 
reject the investment plan if that fixed investment target had been 
changed; and (iv) Investigating self-dealing by the state assets 
management company, so protecting the state assets from abuse or illegal 
manipulation. 
 
(2) The Importance of the Insulation Layer in the ‘Three-level 
Structure Model’ 
As has been noted, in addition to improving legislation, in order to achieve 
a better quality of corporate governance in China it is also necessary to 
reduce the control and intervention of the government. According to Li, 
emphasis should be placed not only on the shareholding structure, but 
also on the government‟s administrative management of listed companies, 
because this is too common in the Chinese market. 879  In China, 
administrative management refers to administrative involvement in the 
corporate business plan, appointment and dismissal of senior executives 
and resource allocation in corporate operations, 880  while economic 
management is defined as a profit-based governance model that removes 
other unnecessary public governance targets. 881  In accordance with 
economic management, personnel affairs should be removed from 
administrative management by adopting a competitive mechanism, and 
resource allocation should be subject to market discipline. 
                                                             
879 Wei-an Li and Guoping Zhang, 'Jingli Ceng Zhili Pingjia Zhishu Yu Xiangguan Jixiao de Shiji Yanjiu: Jiyu 
Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Pingjia de Yanjiu [Research on the Top Management Governance 
Evaluation Index and Empirical Study on Relationship between the Index and Governance Performance: 
Based on Corporate Governance Evaluation of Public Listed Companies in China]' (2005) 11 Economic 
Research Journal 87, 87. 
880 Wei-an Li, 'Yanjing Zhong de Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili: Cong Xingzheng Zhili Dao Jingji Zhili [Chinese 
Corporate Governance in Gradual Progress: from Administrative Management to Economic Management]' 
(2009) 12 Nankai Business Review 1, 1. 
881 Ibid. 
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Currently, government control over the listed companies in China is 
normally carried out through the following ways: (i) Soft budget 
constraint.882 An excess of government intervention is one of the most 
important reasons for soft budget constraints in corporate operations, 
which negatively affects the governance quality of Chinese listed 
companies; (ii) Personnel affairs. Exercising the decision-making power of 
appointment and dismissal of key personnel is one of the most common 
ways for the state to control listed companies, even though such control 
has been criticized as one of the main reasons for low efficiency in 
corporate operations. Sometimes, such influence could be indirect; (iii) 
Executive remuneration; and (iv) Support in capital raising, whereby the 
policy maker provides political arrangements and rules in favour of state-
owned or state-controlled companies with regard to raising capital in the 
market. In research focusing on the different decisions made by state-
owned banks in response to applications by different types of listed 
companies for long-term loans, Li and Jiang find that the state-owned and 
state-controlled listed companies could acquire long-term loans much 
more easily than could private firms.883 To overcome those disadvantages, 
more and more private listed companies are seeking political connections 
to the government. In the view of this thesis, such a trend would amplify 
the current defects, rather than achieve a fair and sustainable market. 
 
As mentioned, with the aim of separating government functions from 
corporate management, the state assets management company is the 
core of the ideal model presented here. Established by the government,884 
                                                             
882 The term „soft budget constraint‟, originally formulated by Kornai to illuminate economic behaviour in 
socialist economies marked by shortages, is now regularly invoked in the literature on economic transition 
from socialism to capitalism. For more detail, see, J Kornai, Economics of Shortage (North-Holland 1979). 
883 Bin Li and Wei Jiang, 'Zhidu Huanjing, Guoyou Chanquan Yu Yinhang Chabie Daikuan [Institutional 
Environment, State Ownership and Bank Lending Discrimination]' (2006) 12 Journal of Financial Research 
30, 30. 
884 Here „government‟ includes both central government and all provincial-level governments. 
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the state assets management company is a wholly state-owned legal 
entity, authorised with the right to operate state assets. The investment 
strategies it makes should aim to maintain the value of state assets. It acts 
as an insulation layer, cutting off direct connection between the policy 
sector and the business sector. Without significant administrative 
intervention, the listed company could concentrate entirely on capital 
management and thus operate the business more efficiently. In line with 
the suggestion by Cheng, such state assets management companies 
could still satisfy the unique ownership by all the people in this country.885 
In the matter of law, the government is the representative of the capital 
providers of the state assets management company, all the citizens in 
mainland China, exercising rights as a shareholder. Such rights mainly 
refer to the decision-making powers over the appointment and/or dismissal 
of directors, mergers and acquisitions, company dissolution and other 
important corporate affairs.886 
 
From the point of view of legal personality, the state assets management 
company should be a participant in a fair market in the same way as other 
ordinary companies, since its business activities are no different from the 
capital investment operated by other counterparts. As to the governance 
structure, it is suggested that the state assets management company 
should make reference to other ordinary market participants. Most 
mechanisms of modern corporate governance, for example, performance-
based remuneration packages and balanced internal monitoring systems, 
should be introduced into the new model, excepting only those relating to 
some specific issues on which the government should have a say, such as 
personnel affairs and decision-making powers regarding important events. 
                                                             
885 In Chen‟s research, she argued that, to resolve the problems of state-owned or state-controlled companies 
listed on the Chinese market, clear definition of ownership by the people as a whole is of great importance. 
See, Hehong Chen, Zhihui Liu and Hongliang Wang, Guoyou Guquan Yanjiu [Research on State-owned 
Shares] (China University of Political Science and Law Press 2000), 265. 
886 Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Revised in 2005), Article 38. 
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However, the number of representatives of the government in such a 
company should be strictly limited by law. In that way, the state assets 
management company in the new model would be able to avoid 
unnecessary administrative interventions.  
 
As an independent legal entity with a modern corporate governance 
structure, the state assets management company has to make its own 
decisions, assume sole responsibility for its profits or losses and take on 
relevant legal obligations. This thesis would like to highlight that business 
risks are inevitable for all companies in the market, including state assets 
management companies. Accordingly, the previous principle of managing 
state assets to maintain and increase the value of state-owned assets 
should be abandoned. In other words, to maintain or increase the value of 
state assets could become a corporate target, rather than a political 
instruction which leaves a door for the government to enter to intervene. 
Otherwise, the separation of governmental function from enterprise 
management will never be achieved.  
 
In short, the state assets management company in the ideal model 
possesses two main characteristics: (i) it inevitably has direct connection 
to the government; and (ii) it is independent from the government. In order 
to achieve successful economic reform, the government must relinquish 
undue control and assist the state assets management companies to 
achieve independence.  
 
Under the three-level structure, the listed companies in the various 
industries in the lowest level of the new model have functions different 
from those of the state assets management company, although they are 
all, to some extent, ultimately controlled by the state. The corporate 
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governance regime for those listed companies will be more similar to that 
of private sector companies. The relationship between the state assets 
management company and those listed companies is based on capital 
investment, rather than political instruction. In other words, it should be 
regulated not by political documents, but by the Company Law. The shares 
of listed companies, held by the state assets management company, 
should be managed under market rules. Administrative approval by the 
SASAC will not be necessary for such operations, except for some special 
companies.887 
 
To achieve the full separation of governmental function from enterprise 
management, this thesis suggests that the state assets management 
company should be encouraged to disperse its capital to various listed 
companies, as a majority shareholder, or even a minority one. The ability 
of the state assets management company to set up another wholly state-
owned company should be limited by law. This is because, as a 
shareholder, the state assets management company can only legally exert 
its influence over listed companies through the board of directors, which is 
normally nominated by the controlling shareholder, who also has the 
decisive vote. Consequently, direct interventions in corporate affairs may 
be avoided to the maximum extent. 
 
7.2.3 The Ideal Design of Board of Directors of State Assets 
Management Company 
 
As illustrated by this thesis, the board of directors will be the core 
institution of the ideal model to improve the quality of Chinese corporate 
governance, especially those listed companies owned or controlled by the 
                                                             
887 Xiangsong Ye, Property Rights and the Managerial Structure of State-owned Enterprises (Economy & 
Management Publishing House 2000), 139. 
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state. Therefore, this section focuses on the structure of the board of 
directors. The specific institutions designed for minority protection 
reviewed in the earlier chapters of this thesis should, undoubtedly, be 
incorporated into this ideal model. More detailed suggestions for those 
institutions will be put forward in the concluding chapter. In order to 
facilitate the better performance of the board, its structure should be 
reformed by law, moving from an administration-based structure to one 
that is market-oriented.  
 
With regard to the structural re-design, this thesis insists that companies in 
different levels and different areas of the ideal model should be considered 
differently. Generally speaking, companies in the competitive area should 
be encouraged to participate in market competition in the same way as 
normal private business sectors, so that the structural reform of the board 
of directors should focus on the de-politicisation; while state control and 
market-oriented operations should co-exist in the companies in the non-
competitive area. This is because public management functions make up 
the main performance targets in those companies in the non-competitive 
area. Therefore, the thorough separation of governmental function from 
enterprise management is unnecessary and irrational. 
 
The proposed governance mechanisms of state assets management 
companies, in both the competitive and non-competitive areas, as well as 
the listed companies in the lowest level of the three-level model, again in 
both the competitive and non-competitive areas, are now discussed detail. 
 
(1) Non-competitive Area 
 The Structure of Boards of Directors of State Assets Management 
Companies in the Non-competitive Area 
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Capital management in the non-competitive area has multiple goals, 
concerned both with maximising social benefit and with the maintenance 
or increase in the value of state assets. As a consequence, the design for 
boards of directors of such companies cannot be wholly according to the 
usual market-oriented practice. Moreover, relying merely on commercial 
laws, such as Company Law or Securities Law, is not sufficient to run such 
companies well, since the legislation focuses on the „microeconomic‟ field, 
regulating the individual rights and obligations. However, the state assets 
management companies in the non-competitive area could be regarded as 
instruments for the state to get involved in social economic activities. 
Authorisation to exercise some part of public governance makes it 
inevitable that administrative interests must be taken into account. Hence, 
the new board structure should be designed to balance public interests 
and commercial needs, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: The proposed new board structure in state assets management 
company in non-competitive area 
 
Due to the special legal personality of the state assets management 
The Board Structure of State Assets 
Management Company in Non-competitive 
Area 
Governmental Directors
Independent Directors
Executive Directors
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company as a wholly state-owned company, all the members of the board 
are selected by the government. However, this does not mean the 
government can wield absolute control over the board. Independence is 
still the first priority. Only an independent and professional board can 
improve the governance quality of Chinese listed companies.  
 
To illustrate, this thesis suggests the board of such companies in the 
middle level of the three-level model should be composed of the following 
three kinds of members. 
 
First, governmental directors are necessary, but should make up no more 
than one third of all members. The governmental directors are 
representatives of the capital provider, the government. Therefore, those 
directors are essentially civil servants, but are appointed to sit on the 
board of state assets management companies. In order to guarantee the 
independence of such directors from the executives, governmental 
directors will be paid not by the company, but directly by the government, 
as would any normal civil servant.  
 
The rationale to have such governmental representatives on the board is 
to ensure that the public interest is reflected in the board‟s decision 
making. It provides a proper method for the government to participate in 
corporate management. However, it should be kept in mind that 
appropriate participation is not equal to a mixture of governmental function 
and enterprise management. Governmental directors may expound the 
government‟s political concerns in the board room. However, in common 
with the other directors, they have only one vote per person in meetings. 
Therefore, since they account for no more than 1/3rd of the total board 
members, the governmental directors would not be able to control voting 
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outcomes. In other words, having these governmental representatives on 
the board is setting up a new path for the government to convey its 
political concerns to the board room, rather than direct administrative 
intervention. The limitation of no more than 1/3rd of all board members 
keeps the balance of the board and helps to achieve the board‟s 
independence from the government.  
 
Secondly, independent directors are the professional consultants on the 
board, and key monitors of corporate insiders. Similar to normal corporate 
practice, independent directors are those board members who have no 
direct or indirect connection with the company that would negatively affect 
their independent judgment on corporate affairs. More importantly, 
according to the All-right Model proposed by this thesis,888 independent 
directors are probably one of the best guarantees of minority protection. 
This is because only independent directors, selected from the market for 
professional managers on the basis of their former performance and 
business experience, could objectively balance all the relevant interests in 
decision making, including the interests of minority shareholders. 
However, given the problems such as lack of working time and insufficient 
access to company information, this thesis suggests that the number of 
independent directors should total not more than 1/3rd of the board. 
 
Thirdly, executive directors remain important in Chinese listed companies. 
As mentioned before, the key issue of corporate governance in China is 
different from that in the Anglo-American world, where the power of 
executives results in serious agency problems, infringing all shareholders‟ 
interests. Executives in Chinese listed companies are not that powerful in 
general. On the contrary, this thesis argues that executives, in most cases 
                                                             
888 For more detail, see Part 3.4.1 of this thesis, page 156. 
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the top-level managers of the company, can help the board to fulfil its 
functions much better. This is partly because, equipped with professional 
knowledge and skills, full-time working hours and explicit legal powers and 
duties, the executives have unrivalled detailed knowledge of the business, 
and possess more important corporate information than anyone else on 
the board. They can help the governmental directors and independent 
directors to make better decisions.889 Furthermore, including executives on 
the board could improve the quality of decision implementation. By 
participating in the decision-making process, executives could reach a 
better understanding of corporate strategies and, accordingly, exercise 
their functions in the most appropriate way, in line with decisions made in 
the boardroom. 
 
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that one of the functions of the 
board is to monitor and evaluate corporate management. In order to 
maintain the necessary independence from management, it is important to 
limit the number of executives on the board. Therefore, while strongly 
backing the rationale to include executives, this thesis suggests that the 
number of executive directors should be limited by law. No more than 
1/3rd may be a proper choice. 
 
As to the employee directors provided for in the current Company Law,890 
this thesis questions their necessity. The reasons for including employee 
directors on the board may be based on several concerns. First of all, the 
intention might be to reflect the Constitution of the PRC, which states: „The 
basis of the socialist economic system of the People‟s Republic of China is 
                                                             
889 As discussed in former chapters, corporate leaders in Chinese listed companies, especially the directors, 
are still far from being well experienced in general. Many are academics or governmental officials, and lack 
experience in corporate affairs. More details see Part 3.3.5 of this thesis, page 143. Cooperating with 
management is therefore a good way to fulfil their duties. Only when those governmental directors or 
independent directors were capable of making corporate decisions professionally and independently, would 
system permit a reduced number of executives on the board. 
890 The Companies Act 2006, Section 45. 
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socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership 
by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people.‟891 
Alternatively, the aim might be to achieve special protection of 
employees.892 
 
However, this thesis questions whether these employee directors, who 
normally come from the front line or junior management, could be fully 
qualified as directors to determine corporate strategies. Partially pursuing 
the interests of employees may impede the company‟s success in the long 
run. This thesis would further argue that a professional and independent 
board of directors would be able to take employees‟ interests fairly into 
account, because it is the board‟s responsibility to protect the interests of 
all stakeholders, including employees. 
 
In short, this thesis proposes a three-pronged structure for board reform in 
state assets management companies in the non-competitive area. The 
fundamental principle of such a system is to balance different interests in 
the boardroom. Governmental directors stand up for the purpose of public 
management, independent directors contribute their professional 
knowledge and experience to the board to reach more efficient decisions, 
while executive directors resolve the problem of information asymmetry. 
The interests of all groups could be bargained, and eventually balanced, at 
the board meetings. As such, corporate decisions could be made that 
ensured the success of the company. 
 
 The Powers of Boards of Directors in State Assets Management 
                                                             
891 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Article 6. 
892 More literatures relating to the employee director, see Jeremy Lewis and Andrew Edge, 'Fiduciary Duties 
of Employee Directors' (2004) 10 Tolley's Employment Law-Line 32; Martin Edwards, 'Company Directors 
as Employees' (1986) 7 Company Lawyer 204-206; Dirk Otto, 'German Co-determination Culture under 
Attack' (2005) 45 European Lawyer 15; and Christine Windbichler, 'Cheers and Boos for Employee 
Involvement: Co-determination as Corporate Governance Conundrum' (2005) 6 European Business 
Organization Law Review 507-537. 
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Companies in the Non-competitive Area 
Generally speaking, the powers authorised to the board in state assets 
management companies in the new model are almost the same in both 
the non-competitive and competitive areas. The starting point for such a 
design is to reinforce the independence of state assets management 
companies by constraining the decision powers held by government over 
corporate affairs. 
 
The only difference in the system is that the government would be granted 
certain controlling powers in relation to the operation of state assets 
management companies in the non-competitive area. As argued by Hu et 
al., the products provided by state-owned companies in the non-
competitive area could be distinguished from those provided by private 
counterparts by their public character. Sometimes the government defines 
the products or services offered by such state-owned companies as an 
extended part of public management. With the purposes of safeguarding 
the social interest and coordinating various resources, the government 
should be allowed more involvement in determining corporate structure 
and important personnel affairs in those companies, compared with other 
listed companies.893 
 
This thesis cannot agree with Hu et al.‟s suggestion that the government 
be allowed rights in personnel decisions. However, it does argue that, in 
addition to alterations to the corporate constitution, changes in registered 
capital, corporate separations, mergers and dissolutions, as well as 
liquidations, the government should be granted a final say on the following 
issues: (i) Alteration to the company‟s main business. Owing to the 
particular purpose of establishing such a company, to provide products 
                                                             
893 Haitao Hu, Guoyou Zichan Guanli Falv Shixian Jizhi Ruogan Lilun Wenti Yanjiu [Theoretical Research on 
Legal System of Management of State-owned Assets] (Zhongguo Jiancha Chubanshe [Chinese Procuratorate 
Press] 2006), 275. 
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and services in the best interests of social welfare, the main business of 
such a company should not be easily changed by the company itself; (ii) 
Limitation of investment strategies, plans and directions. As mentioned, 
such a company shares some public functions with the government. 
Therefore, the corporate strategies and business plans should keep pace 
with public policies. To ensure this, government should be granted certain 
power over corporate strategies and planning; (iii) Pricing and rate 
setting. 894  Products and services provided by companies in the non-
competitive area could be regarded as a part of social welfare, where the 
core target is the maximisation of the public interest. Hence, the 
government should have a decisive influence on price setting; and (iv) 
Issues of corporate transformation and assets transfer. 
 
Apart from the specific circumstances listed above, this thesis opposes 
any other intervention by the government over corporate affairs. All other 
decision-making powers should be granted to the board of directors so as 
to improve corporate independence and governance quality. Of course, 
the government could monitor and evaluate the performance of the board 
as a shareholder. 
 
(2) Competitive Area 
 The Structure of Boards of Directors of State Assets Management 
Companies in the Competitive Area 
As is the case with private sector companies, state-owned capital in the 
competitive area should be operated with the purpose of maximising 
returns. Accordingly, the board of directors in such companies ought to 
comprise more professional managers who have adequate knowledge, 
skills and experience. Only when operated by such a board could a state 
                                                             
894 Ibid 276. 
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assets management company in the competitive area achieve high 
efficiency and make timely and proper in a rapidly changing market.  
 
In the three-level model provided by this thesis, the structural design of the 
state assets management company is extremely important, since it directly 
connects to the government on the one hand, and should remain 
independent from the government on the other. When re-structuring the 
board in such a company in the competitive area, this thesis recommends 
that the rights held by the government as shareholder should be narrowed 
by law, in order to avoid excessive administrative involvement. Instead, 
more business affairs should be decided by the board of directors, 
according to their independent business judgments. 
 
As to the composition of the board, this thesis suggests a similar three-
pronged structure as that introduced above for the companies in the non-
competitive area, including governmental directors, independent directors 
and executive directors, but with different proportions of each, as shown in 
Figure 6. 
 
 
The Board Structure of State Assets 
Management Company in Competitive Area 
Only One Governmental
Director
Independent Directors
Executive Directors
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Figure 6: The new board structure in state assets management company 
in competitive area 
 
First, it is rational to have governmental directors sitting on the board in 
state assets management companies in the competitive area. 
Governmental directors, as the guarantors of state interests, could report 
information from the boardroom to the government. It is true that SASAC 
has already implemented an external supervisor mechanism to oversee 
the board performance, and the National Audit Office has made board 
efficiency of state-owned enterprises a concern of the national economic 
audit. However, those mechanisms can only provide ex post monitoring 
and external supervision. By contrast, having governmental directors on 
the board could help the government to discover wrongdoing in the 
decision-making process and to take action before damage occurs.  
 
Of course, corporate independence is the key principle of this re-
structuring. Therefore, the number of governmental directors should be 
strictly limited. This thesis suggests that one governmental director will be 
enough to keep the government updated with corporate information. In a 
„one head one vote‟ voting system, the existence of one governmental 
director could hardly have a substantial impact against the independent 
decisions of the board. 
 
Secondly, the board should include independent directors. As noted, it is 
extremely important for such companies in the competitive area to keep 
board independence and ensure the capabilities of board members. As a 
result, decisions made by the board will be professional, and guaranteed 
to be in the company‟s best interests. Furthermore, only without the control 
of government or the executives could the board fully achieve its role as 
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internal monitor over corporate management. Therefore, in accordance 
with the All-right Model suggested by this thesis, the independent directors 
should occupy the majority of seats in the boardroom. 
 
Thirdly, with a special concern about information asymmetry, it is still 
rational to have executive directors, to help a professional and 
independent board to make timely and proper decisions with the best 
current information. However, to avoid the interlocking of board members 
and executives, the number of executives on the board should be 
restricted by law. China can learn from the business practice of other 
countries, where the number of executive directors on the board is 
relatively few. In Temasek, only the CEO plays a dual role of board 
member and executive.895 Accordingly, this thesis suggests that only one 
or two executives sit on the board. 
 
In short, independent directors should dominate the board in state assets 
management companies in the competitive area. 
 
 The Powers of the Board in State Assets Management Companies in 
the Competitive Area 
To what extent the board should be granted power over corporate affairs is 
another key issue of board-centralisation. In theory, such decision power 
should not be improperly challenged by shareholders. In other words, 
despite the fact that it is prohibited by laws or corporate constitution from 
exercising certain rights, the board could freely decide operative activities 
in accordance with its independent judgment, in order to maximise 
corporate interests.  
 
                                                             
895 Temasek, 'Temasek Review 2007' <http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg> accessed 15-07-2013. 
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The restrictive separation of governmental functions from enterprise 
management is the basis of sound operation by state-owned companies in 
the competitive area. Temasek is a good example from which China could 
learn. Here this thesis wishes to highlight not the source of capital invested 
in the company, but the operation under a market-oriented rule which has 
led to the success of this wholly state-owned company in Singapore. More 
specifically, the board of directors has been granted a wide set of decision-
making powers over various corporate affairs to satisfy the needs of a 
rapidly changing market. 
 
Therefore, in the context of Chinese legislative reform, this thesis 
concludes that three aspects could be improved in order to reinforce board 
powers while also avoiding insider control. First, the rights of the 
representative of capital providers, exercised by the government, should 
be tightly limited by law. That is, new legislation should explicitly formulate 
the definition and range of important affairs in which the government 
should be involved. Such important affairs refer to certain fundamental 
issues, including but not limited to: (i) formulation and amendment of the 
articles of association of the company; (ii) increase or decrease of the 
registered capital; (iii) separation or merger of the company; and (iv) 
dissolution and insolvency. Other corporate affairs, including strategy 
making and business plans, should be discussed and decided in the 
boardroom, with decision powers explicitly authorized to the board of 
directors. Secondly, the new legislation should strictly prohibit any 
enlarging of government power over corporate operation by amending the 
corporate constitution. Otherwise, the board independence would still be 
threatened by the state. Thirdly, the government, as the market regulator, 
should be forbidden to intervene, veto or correct the decisions made by 
the board via legal procedure, unless such decisions violate the laws, 
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administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company. 
 
In order to monitor the board so as to prevent the agency cost problem, 
this thesis proposes action in the following three areas: (i) The evaluation 
method of board performance should be improved; (ii) Access to 
information should be guaranteed; and (iii) Statutory duties of directors 
and remedies should be well designed and strictly interpreted. 896 As a 
consequence, the government would be able to ensure that board 
members were performing at their best to operate the company; 
otherwise, it could simply dismiss the board member or search for legal 
remedies. 
 
7.2.4 The Ideal Design of Board of Directors of Listed Companies 
Invested in by the State Assets Management Company 
 
(1) Competitive Area 
First of all, it should be kept in mind that the existence of state-controlled 
or state-invested listed companies in the competitive area is a by-product 
of the gradual reform of the Chinese market. The final objective should be 
that the state quit the market in competitive areas. As such, listed 
companies invested in by state assets management companies should 
have no difference from other listed companies, being operated by a 
professional and independent board with a majority of independent 
directors. In accordance with the All-right Model, governmental directors 
should not sit on the boards of such companies, as shown in Figure 7. 
 
                                                             
896 This is the viewpoint concluded by this thesis in Chapter Three, page 184. 
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Figure 7: Board Structure of Listed Company Invested in by State Assets 
Management Company in the Competitive Area 
 
The goal of corporate operations is to achieve the success of the 
company, maximizing the interests of shareholders as a whole. In 
particular, independent directors should place special emphasis on the 
issue of minority protection. Only with a sound level of minority protection 
could the confidence of public investors be revived. If this were achieved, 
listed companies with state assets could attract more private capital, 
diluting the shareholding of the state and helping the state to achieve its 
ultimate aim. 
 
In common with other private listed companies, the board of a listed 
company invested in by a state assets management company is 
authorized under company law to exercise corporate operations. However, 
according to current company law, the board of directors have little 
substantial influence over corporate affairs other than in designing the 
internal management structure, appointing managers, determining 
remuneration of managers and implementing the decisions made by the 
shareholders‟ meeting. More fundamental decision powers remain with 
Board Structure of Listed Company in the 
Lowest Level of the Ideal Model in 
Competitive Area 
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shareholders; for example, in strategy making and disposal of corporate 
assets. Indeed, this situation did conform to the political need during the 
gradual reform of the Chinese market. Nevertheless, there remains a large 
gap compared to the legislative model under the board-centralisation 
concept that has been argued for above. 
 
According to Hamilton, to ensure the dominance of corporate affairs by the 
board of directors, powers exercised by shareholders should be narrowed 
to four aspects: 897  (1) appointing and dismissing board members; (2) 
ratifying corporate transactions when necessary; (3) formulating and 
amending the corporate constitution; and (4) determining important events 
which are outside the range of daily operations, such as corporate 
mergers, compulsory share exchanges or disposal of all corporate assets. 
In terms of how to balance the interests of all stakeholders, including the 
majority shareholder, minority shareholders, creditors and employees, this 
thesis believes it could be better to leave this issue to a professional and 
independent board. 
 
In accordance with the board-centralisation concept, Xu lists the following 
powers that should normally be granted to the board of directors in an 
ideal model: 898  (1) monitoring business operations and evaluating 
management performance; (2) investigating and approving when 
necessary financial goals, important business plans and activities; (3) 
investigating and approving when necessary important changes of audit or 
accounting methods in corporate financial reporting; (4) implementing 
other duties conferred by law or by the corporate constitution; (5) making 
corporate strategies; (6) providing consultation to top-level management; 
and (7) providing advice to shareholders. 
                                                             
897 Robert W Hamilton (ed), The Law of Corporations (West Publishing Company 1986), 155-161. 
898 Chuanxi Xu (ed), Gongsi Zhili Yuanze: Fenxi yu Jianyi [Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis 
and Recommendations](Restatements of the Law, Law Press China 2006), 101. 
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(2) Non-competitive Area 
Due to the special characteristics of listed companies in the non-
competitive area, the state assets management company, as the 
shareholder, would usually possess a dominant proportion of corporate 
shares to guarantee the political interests behind the business. Therefore, 
another three-pronged board structure would be introduced, this time with 
no governmental director.  
 
It should be reiterated that the listed company in the lowest level of the 
three-level model has no direct power relationship or investment 
relationship with the government. Instead, it is wholly or partly invested in 
by the state assets management company, which is in the middle level of 
this new model. Hence, the representatives of shareholders should 
replace governmental directors on the board. Such representatives could 
be elected by shareholders at the shareholders‟ meeting. Accordingly, this 
thesis suggests the introduction of a three-pronged board, with equal 
proportions of shareholder representatives, independent directors and 
executive directors, as shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Board Structure of Listed Company Invested in by State Assets 
Board Structure of Listed Company in the 
Lowest Level of the Ideal Model in Non-
competitive Area 
Representatives of
Shareholders
Independent Directors
Executive Directors
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Management Company in Non-competitive Area 
 
Although listed companies in the non-competitive area should also be 
encouraged to operate independently under market rules, they could not 
enjoy the same freedom as their counterparts in the competitive area, 
because the products or services they provide impact upon social welfare. 
Therefore, in order to prevent short-term actions by the board, some 
business decisions should be left to shareholders to consider, rather than 
be voted on in the boardroom. These should be explicitly listed by new 
legislation, but could include, for example: (1) changes of investment 
strategy or investment plans; and (2) changes of business operations, 
such as price setting, branch establishment, types of operation, and 
service hours. 
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Conclusions 
 
Over the past two decades, the Chinese national economy has developed 
dramatically. Due to globalisation, the business environment in China is 
becoming more and more like that in the western developed countries, for 
example, the UK and the US. However, based on different political 
concerns and cultural background, Chinese corporate governance has its 
own key issue, the fact that most of the listed companies in the Chinese 
market, with a relatively concentrated shareholding structure, are 
controlled by the state, directly or indirectly. This is the main obstacle to 
improving minority investor protection. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to uncover the deficiencies of current legislation 
and provide suggestions for further legal reform that would enhance 
minority investor protection.  To that end, using a comparative 
methodology, this thesis has investigated comprehensively the specific 
governance mechanisms that are or would be beneficial for minority 
protection. 
 
In addition to the ideal model illustrated in the previous chapter, what 
follows comprises a set of suggestions concluded from each chapter, to 
support that ideal model.  
 
(1) Invoke Institutional Shareholder Activism 
 
Corporate scandals in Anglo-American countries have driven a rise in 
shareholder activism, whereby shareholders seek to get more involved in 
corporate management, in order to safeguard their own interests. In terms 
of motivation and capability, this thesis has argued that institutional 
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investors would be the proper catalysts of such activism, rather than 
individual minority shareholders. 
 
Among all kinds of institutional shareholders, the thesis found that the 
mutual funds, which have little conflict of interest with the portfolio 
companies, are the most highly motivated to participate in corporate 
operations, in order to achieve the better performance of the company and 
a higher return on its investment. 
 
However, to date institutional investors in Chinese listed companies have 
contributed very little to minority shareholder protection. The main reasons 
for this are the concentrated shareholding structure, especially the control 
by the state, and the lack of helpful legal mechanisms, such as a more 
appropriate voting mechanism, to fight against the controller. 
 
In the view of this thesis, as long as the ideal model illustrated in Chapter 
Seven could be implemented, institutional shareholders in Chinese listed 
companies, with more motivation and professional knowledge and skills, 
would be able to increase the level of protection of minorities‟ interests. In 
addition, this thesis suggests that more practical mechanisms should be 
instituted by law to promote active participation by minority shareholders. 
For example, the law should formulate the content in a notice of 
shareholders‟ meeting to ensure that minority shareholders understand 
their rights relevant to the meeting. 
 
(2) Lower the Actionability Requirements of the Derivative Claim 
 
The derivative claim is a type of litigation initiated by shareholders in the 
name of the company, based on wrongs done to the company, against the 
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wrongdoers. The compensation from the lawsuit belongs to the company 
directly, rather than to the claimant shareholder. Such a litigation technique 
has been widely accepted throughout the world. Given a similar 
conservative attitude towards the derivative claim, this thesis made a 
comparative investigation of the technique as used in the UK and in China. 
Although there remain some uncertainties and areas to be clarified, the 
„two-stage‟ litigation proceeding in the UK provides a good example for 
China. 
 
The Chinese Company Law 2005 incorporates the derivative claim. 
However, to date there have been few successful cases. In fact, this thesis 
has noted, the requirements to initiate a derivative claim are so strict that it 
is extremely unlikely that minority shareholders could do so. 
 
In terms of the locus standi requirements to initiate a derivative claim, 
minority shareholders in Chinese listed companies should satisfy two 
conditions: a minimum shareholding percentage of no less than one per 
cent of the total shares, and a minimum shareholding period of at least 
180 days. As argued by this thesis, such locus standi requirements are too 
difficult for Chinese minorities to fulfil. As to the litigation procedure, unlike 
the „two-stage‟ proceeding in the UK, the Chinese Company Law 
implements a pre-procedure requirement, named the Demand Rule, 
whereby shareholders should exhaust the possibility of internal remedies 
before bringing the lawsuit.  
 
Indeed, the legal design of the derivative claim should achieve a good 
balance, to provide a remedy for shareholders to protect the company‟s 
interests on the one hand, and to protect the normal business 
management from unmeritorious or speculative claims on the other. 
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However, according to the argument in this thesis, the problem in China is 
not an excess of unmeritorious and speculative claims, but rather a lack of 
participation by minority shareholders in corporate operations. Therefore, 
lowering the locus standi requirement and abolishing the Demand Rule 
would result in the wide use of derivative claims in China, which would in 
turn be helpful to protect the interests of minorities. 
 
(3) Improve the Design of Cumulative Voting 
 
Unlike the traditional „One Share One Vote‟ voting system, cumulative 
voting provides shareholders with extra votes based on the number of 
nominees to the board. Shareholders can allocate all their votes to any of 
the candidates. Such a system increases the possibility for minority 
shareholders to elect directors who stand for their interests. 
 
Nevertheless, the cumulative voting system is not suitable for all 
situations. It will only help the minority shareholders to have a say in the 
election if collectively they hold a certain amount of corporate shares. This 
is not currently the case in Chinese listed companies. Because the 
controlling shareholder, the state, possesses a huge advantage in terms of 
shareholding, in practice cumulative voting results in no fundamental 
change. 
 
The ideal model suggested by this thesis could represent the solution to 
the problems created by the concentrated shareholding structure. In 
addition, the „Threshold Voting‟ system mentioned in Chapter Two is 
suggested as a better voting mechanism to improve the current cumulative 
voting system. According to this system, a „minimum supporting rate‟ 
would be required in the first round of voting, so that a candidate should 
obtain a certain number of votes before being elected as a board member. 
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Moreover, with the belief that cumulative voting would increase the 
bargaining position of minorities against the controller, this thesis proposes 
that such a voting system could be used more widely, and not just in the 
election of board members.  
 
(4) Perfect the Supervisory Board 
 
As explained in Chapter Four, the supervisory board was the first internal 
monitoring body in Chinese corporate governance, introduced by the 
Company Law 1993. The institutional design originated in Germany, where 
the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) is the link between shareholders and 
the management board (Vorstand). To fulfil its responsibility as the 
representative of the company, monitoring the management, the 
supervisory board has been granted the rights to appoint and dismiss 
members of the management board and to determine the remuneration of 
those directors. 
 
However, the legal design of the supervisory board In China is different 
from that in Germany. Instead of being a middle layer between the 
shareholders and the management board, the supervisory board in a 
Chinese listed company is merely an internal monitoring body reporting to 
shareholders, and has little practical power to keep the board of directors 
accountable. Given the lack of determination right on appointment and 
dismissal, the supervisory board does not pose a threat to directors, so 
that the effectiveness of its internal monitoring is open to question. 
Furthermore, inadequate independence, motivation and relevant 
knowledge also inhibit the effectiveness of the supervisory board. 
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The unsatisfactory position of the supervisory board was made worse 
when Chinese policy makers added the institution of independent directors 
into the existing corporate structure, but failed to specify a clear division of 
their responsibilities. Therefore, neither of the two internal monitoring 
bodies has performed as well as expected. 
 
As a solution, this thesis strongly suggests that legislators revise the 
Company Law to clarify the responsibilities of the supervisory board and 
the independent directors. Only with clear job division can the co-
existence of the two internal monitoring institutions safeguard the interests 
of shareholders, especially those minorities who have little participation in 
corporate affairs. In addition, it is necessary to reinforce the powers held 
by the supervisory board, to keep the executives accountable. As argued 
by this thesis, the right to dismiss board members without approval by 
shareholders, and the right to veto board decisions relating to important 
events, could be granted by law to the supervisory. 
 
(5) Limit the Influence by the Party Committee of the CCP 
 
As the special participant in Chinese corporate governance, the party 
committee of the CCP has an important influence on corporate 
management. As concluded through the research for this thesis, 
intervention from the party committee of the CCP does not provide any 
help to improve minority protection in practice; on the contrary, such 
intervention can infringe the rights of minorities. 
 
Currently, the party committee in a Chinese listed company has decisive 
impact on personnel issues and important decision making. Moreover, it is 
required by party documents to act as another internal supervisor of 
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corporate management. 
 
As reviewed by this thesis, such party committee intervention disrupts 
corporate management and ultimately infringes the interests of minorities 
who simply desire the company to perform well. First, the party 
committee‟s preference in personnel issues is not based mainly on a 
candidate‟s ability to manage the business, but takes more account of 
political concerns. Consequently, the corporate performance under the 
leadership of such an appointee would be open to question. Secondly, in 
decision making, the involvement of the party committee would integrate 
into corporate decisions many public management concerns, which ought 
to be fulfilled by the government rather than the listed company.  Hence, 
rather than being in the interests of all shareholders as a whole, the 
corporate decision may reflect only the will of the controlling shareholder, 
the state. As such, minority shareholders‟ interests would be sacrificed. 
Thirdly, if the party committee participates in decision making, how can it 
discharge the monitoring duty fairly? Last but most importantly, Chinese 
legislation only grants rights to the party committee in a listed company; 
there are no legally imposed responsibilities to keep this participant 
accountable. 
 
Although, in the view of this thesis, the best solution to overcome these 
problems would be to remove the party committee from the corporate 
structure, in practice this will not be possible in the short term. Therefore, 
this thesis suggests that the mismatch of rights and responsibilities should 
be corrected by revising the law, to keep the party committee accountable 
to the company and all shareholders, including the minority. Furthermore, 
the amendment should limit influence by the party committee to political 
affairs. All interventions in corporate personnel issues and business 
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decision making should be banned, to ensure the independence of 
corporate management and, accordingly, achieve a better performance to 
realise the investments of shareholders. 
 
(6) Reinforce the External Monitoring Institution 
 
A well-designed corporate governance system needs not only a sound 
internal monitoring institution, but also a powerful external monitoring 
institution. Through the case study and comparative research, this thesis 
found that a market regulator, such as the SFC in Hong Kong and the SEC 
in the US, can act as an effective external monitoring institution to 
safeguard the interests of minority shareholders. 
 
Established in 1992, the CSRC is the market regulator in China. With a 
requirement to put specific emphasis on minority protection, the CSRC has 
set forth certain regulations to improve such protection. It has put efforts 
into limiting insider trading, fighting against commercial bribery, increasing 
corporate transparency and providing more investor education. 
 
However, in spite of these positive activities, there remain significant 
shortcomings, which prevent the CSRC being as effective as expected in 
terms of minority protection. These include a professional staff that is too 
few in number and lacks necessary regulatory knowledge and skills; a lack 
of powerful rights, and doubts over independence, which should be 
guaranteed. In addition to addressing these shortcomings, as part ofits 
future development the CSRC should adopt two further targets: (1) 
increasing corporate transparency; and (2) developing the education of 
minority shareholders in particular. 
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If all these suggestions, along with the ideal model introduced in Chapter 
Seven, could be realised in practice in the further development of Chinese 
corporate governance, then the legal protection of minority shareholders 
could be improved significantly. 
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